


**The Tragedy  
of the  
Soviet  
Countryside**

# **The War Against the Peasantry 1927–1930**

Edited by  
**Lynne Viola, V. P. Danilov,  
N. A. Ivnitskii, and  
Denis Kozlov**



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Peasantry, 1927–1930

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*Translated by Steven Shabad*

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## Editor's Acknowledgments

This project (*The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside*) began in 1993 on a shoestring budget at a time when the Russian economy was collapsing. V. P. Danilov approached Roberta Manning and me, inviting us to participate in what at the time sounded like a far too grandiose research project that could very well outlive us all. Professor Danilov proposed the compilation of a five-volume documentary history of the Soviet countryside from 1927 to 1939. The documentary history would be based on research in the newly opening central archives of Moscow, research that would take years of scouring the archives and negotiating with complex bureaucracies. We were joined by a team of more than forty highly dedicated Russian historians and archivists who gave generously of their time and expertise. Over the next few years, several non-Russian historians joined the project: Kim Chang Jin, R. W. Davies, Michael Ellman, J. Arch Getty, H. Jeong-Sook, and Stephen Wheatcroft, contributing both expertise and funding. In 2001, Jonathan Brent of Yale University Press agreed to publish a condensed version of the Russian-language series in English in the *Annals of Communism* series, and Steven Shabad joined the project as our translator.

We have had many generous benefactors, and it is a pleasure to take this opportunity to thank them. The National Endowment for the Humanities has sponsored this project with a series of Collaborative Project Grants, providing roughly two-thirds of our funding. We are

pleased to thank our grant officer at the NEH, Elizabeth Arndt, for her dedication and endless patience. The Stalin-Era Research and Archive Project of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto came to our assistance at an early stage and remained a constant source of support over the years. This project was funded by an MCRI grant from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. Jana Oldfield, Janet Hyer, and Edith Klein provided constant assistance at the University of Toronto. Boston College has also been a steadfast source of support, both in terms of funding and in the administration of grants. Joanne Scibilia, the assistant director of the Boston College Office of Sponsored Programs, and her staff assisted us in the compilation of grants, sometimes difficult money transfers between countries, and the August 1998 collapse of the Russian banking system, which came perilously close to shipwrecking the project. The Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Melbourne, the University of Birmingham, Seoul National University, the South Korean Foreign Ministry, Amsterdam University, Praxis International, the International Research and Exchange Program, the Social Science Research Council, and the Australian Research Council have also contributed funds.

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Finally, we would like to thank Sergei Miakin'kov for his tireless patience, years of hard work, and unfailing collegiality in the administration of the Russian side of the project.

Viktor Petrovich Danilov did not live to see the completion of *The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside* in the Yale edition. He died at the age of 79 on 16 April 2004 in Moscow.

*Lynne Viola*  
*Toronto*

## Translator's Note

In order to make the locations of administrative entities as clear as possible in English, my practice in this volume has been to retain the Russian terms—*raion*, *gubernia*, *oblast*, *krai*—while using the noun form of the original place name rather than the Russian adjectival form. Thus *Saratovskaya Gubernia* becomes Saratov Gubernia, and *Belotserkovsky Raion* becomes Belotserkovka Raion.

I would like to thank Aleksandr Protsenko, Vladimir Solovyov, and Elena Klepikova for their invaluable assistance in clarifying the sometimes obscure terms and concepts in the documents translated here. I would like to extend my gratitude as well to Lynne Viola and Denis Kozlov for their historical expertise and help in finding the best English renderings. The solutions—especially with regard to Marxist jargon—tended to settle on the side of traditional English equivalents that hew close to the Russian. We sometimes disagreed, but the debate was always civilized and stimulating.

*Steven Shabad*

## Note on Transliteration

In transliterating from Russian to English we have used a modified version of the standard Library of Congress system in the text and documents. Soft and hard signs have been omitted, and the following changes have been imposed.

In final position:

ii in the LOC system becomes y (Tomsky, not Tomskii)  
iia = ia (Izvestia, not Izvestiia)  
nyi = ny (Nizhny, not Nizhnyi)

In initial position:

E = Ye (Yevdokimov, not Evdokimov)  
Ia = Ya (Yagoda, not Iagoda)  
Iu = Yu (Yurkin, not Iurkin)

In the notes, we have followed the Library of Congress system.

## A Note on the Documents

The documents reproduced in this book were initially published in the first two volumes of the original Russian series, *Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927–1939* (Moscow: Rosspen, 1999–2004) [*The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside: Collectivization and Dekulakization. Documents and Materials in 5 Volumes, 1927–1939*]. The following archives took part in this work: GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, or the State Archive of the Russian Federation), RGAE (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki, or the Russian State Archive of the Economy), RGASPI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii, or the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, the former archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), RGVA (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv, or the Russian State Military Archive), TsA FSB (Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti Rossii, or the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service, formerly the KGB), and, in a more limited and indirect way, APRF (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, or the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation). (APRF permitted V. P. Danilov to work with its archival materials, allowing him to make citations to these materials in his introduction to volume 1 of the Russian-language series.) GANO (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Novosibirskoi oblasti, or the State Archive of Novosibirsk Oblast) provided additional documents for our use.

Russian archival documents are cited and numbered by collection (fond or f.), inventory (opis' or op.), file (delo or d.), and page (list or l. or if plural ll.), thus, for example, RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 40, l. 41. The document numbers from the Russian edition appear in the index of documents for the convenience of specialists who may want to consult the original Russian documents.

In some cases, we chose to omit specialized materials in the documents, editing sections out in the interests of space and readability. These sections are marked by ellipses in brackets: [. . .]. Sections left out in the Russian edition are marked with an ellipsis, while ellipses in the original documents are noted. In addition, we have chosen to reproduce the original notes to the Russian-language volumes in a greatly reduced form, leaving out most of the specialized information. Many of these notes are useful only to specialists conversant in Russian; we refer them to the original Russian edition. We have added notes in this edition when it seemed likely that English-language readers and nonspecialists would require additional information, explanations, or definitions.

Documents with approximate dates (for example, "not later than . . .") have been dated according to the contents of the document or other documents contained in the file.

# Glossary of Russian Terms and Abbreviations

aktiv: activists; the most politically active segment of an organization or group

APRF (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii): Archive of the President of the Russian Federation

arshin: a Russian measure, equivalent to 28 inches

art.: article

artel: a form of collective farm featuring the socialization of most land, production, and the basic means of production

baba: a slightly derogatory term for peasant women

bab'i bunty: peasant women's riots

CC (Tsentral'nyi komitet): Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)

centner: a Russian measure, equivalent to 100 kilograms

Cheka (Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia komissiiia po bor'be s kontrrevoliutsiei, spekuliiatsiei i sabotazhem): All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (1918–22); predecessor to the OGPU and NKVD

Comintern: Communist International

desiatina: a Russian measure, equivalent to 1.09 hectare

dvor: peasant household

EKOSO (ekonomicheskie soveshchaniia): Economic Councils of the Sovnarkoms of the union republics

EKU (Ekonomicheskoe upravlenie): Economic Directorate of the OGPU

GANO (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Novosibirskoi oblasti): State Archive of Novosibirsk Oblast

GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii): State Archive of the Russian Federation

Glavlit (Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literatury i izdatel'stv narodnogo komissariata prosveshcheniia RSFSR): Main Administration for Literature and Publishing Houses of the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Education

GO OGPU (Gubernskii otdel OGPU): Provincial Department of the OGPU

Gosplan (Gosudarstvennaia planovaia komissii): State Planning Commission

Gossel'sklad (Upravlenie sel'skokhoziaistvennymi skladami narodnogo komissariata zemledeliia RSFSR): State Agricultural Warehouse

Gosstrakh (Glavnoe upravlenie gosudarstvennogo strakhovaniia): Main State Insurance Administration

GPU (Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie): State Political Administration; successor to the Cheka and predecessor of the OGPU and NKVD

guberniia: province

GUGB (Glavnoe upravlenie gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti): Main State Security Administration of the NKVD

HP: horse power

INFO (Informatsionnyi otdel): Information Department of the OGPU

izba: peasant house

Khleboprodukt (Aksionernoe obshchestvo po torgovle khlebnymi i drugimi sel'skokhoziaistvennymi produktami): Joint-Stock Company for Trade in Grain and Other Agricultural Goods

khutor: a form of peasant land tenure in which a peasant family lived in a consolidated farm separate from the village community

Khlebotsentr (Vsesoiuznyi soiuz sel'skokhoziaistvennoi kooperatsii po pererabotke, proizvodstvu i sbytu zernovykh i maslichnykh kul'tur): All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives for the Production, Manufacture, and Marketing of Grain and Oil Seeds

KKA (Kavkazskaia Krasnoznamennaia armiia): Caucasus Red Army

KKOV (Komitet krest'ianskoi obshchestvennoi vzaimopomoshchi): Committee for Peasants' Mutual Social Assistance

Kolkhoztsestr (Vsesoiuznyi soiuz sel'skokhoziaistvennykh kollektivov): All-Union Center of Agricultural Collectives; the primary agency in charge of the collective farm system

kombed(y): Committee(s) of the Village Poor

Komsomol: Communist Youth League

krai: territory or region

KSD (Kavkazskaia strelkovaia diviziia): Caucasus Infantry Division

MTS (mashinno-traktornaia stantsiia): machine and tractor station

muzhik: a slightly condescending term for a peasant except when used among peasants in which case it assumed a familiar and friendly connotation

NEP (novaia ekonomicheskaiia politika): New Economic Policy

NKVD (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del): People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, successor to OGPU

oblast: region or province

OGPU (Ob'edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie): Unified State Political Administration, successor to GPU and Cheka

okrug: county

peregiby: excesses

piatokratka (piatokratnoe oblozhenie): a fine of five times the value of grain owed, which was imposed on kulak households who failed to fulfill their grain delivery assignments

PO (potrebitel'skoe obshchestvo): consumers' cooperative

podkulachniki: kulak followers

pood: a Russian measure, equivalent to 16 kilograms, or .01638 tons

PP: either polnomochnyi predstavitel' (plenipotentiary representative) or polnomochnoe predstavitel'stvo (plenipotentiary representative office) of the OGPU; the OGPU's krai- and oblast-level representatives

Politburo: Political Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)

raion: district

raionirovanie: rezoning of administrative territorial units

rasputitsa: a time of the year (usually in the autumn and spring) when roads in the countryside are impassable

razbazarivanie: squandering of property and livestock through sale or destruction

RGAE (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki): Russian State Archive of the Economy

RGASPI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii): Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

RGVA (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv): Russian State Military Archive



- RKI (Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia): Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate
- RKKA (Raboche-krest'ianskaia Krasnaia Armiia): Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
- RSFSR (Rossiiskaia Sovetskaia Federativnaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika): Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
- RVSR (Revoliutsionnyi voennyi sovet Respubliki): Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic
- Sakharotrest (Ob'edinenie gosudarstvennoi sakharnoi promyshlennosti): All-Union Sugar Trust
- samosud: lynching, mob law
- Sel'skoiuz (Vserossiiskii soiuz sel'skokhoziaistvennoi kooperatsii): All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives
- sel'sovet: a village soviet or council
- skhod: peasant assembly
- smychka: union or alliance of workers and peasants
- Soiuzkhrab (Vserossiiskii soiuz sel'skokhoziaistvennoi kooperatsii po proizvodstvu, pererabotke i sbytu zernovykh i maslichnykh kul'tur): Union Grain, a joint-stock company under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Trade
- SO OGPU (Sekretnyi otdel OGPU): OGPU Secret Department
- SOU (Sekretno-operativnoe upravlenie): Secret Operations Administration of the OGPU
- Sovnarkom (Sovet narodnykh komissarov): Council of People's Commissars
- spetsposelki: special settlements or villages to which the kulaks were deported in the early 1930s
- SPO (Sekretno-politicheskii otdel) OGPU: Secret Political Department of the OGPU
- SR: Socialist Revolutionary
- stanitsa: a Cossack village
- SSR (Sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika): Soviet Socialist Republic
- STO (Sovet truda i oborony): Council of Labor and Defense
- Traktorotsentr (Vsesoiuznyi tsentr mashinno-traktornykh stantsii): All-Union Center of Machine-Tractor Stations
- troika: an extrajudicial tribunal consisting of three members
- TsA FSB RF (Tsentralnyi arkhiv Federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii): Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
- TSD (Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni): Russian edition of *The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside*
- Tsentrosoiuz (Tsentral'nyi soiuz potrebitel'skikh obshchestv SSSR): All-Union Central Union of Consumers' Societies

TsIK (Tsentral'nyi ispolnitel'nyi komitet): Central Executive Committee  
 TsRK (Tsentral'nyi rabochii kooperativ): Central Workers' Cooperative  
 TsSU (Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri SNK SSSR): Central Statistical Administration of the USSR Council of People's Commissars

uezd: county

USM: the Ural-Siberian method (of grain extraction from the countryside)

VChK: see Cheka

versta: a Russian measure, equivalent to 1.1 kilometers

VKP(b) (Vsesoiuznaia kommunisticheskaia partiia {bol'shevikov}): All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)

VLKSM (Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii kommunisticheskii soiuz molodezhi): All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League, or Komsomol

volost': district, a rural administrative unit below the uezd

VSNTKh (Vysshii soviet narodnogo khoziaistva): Supreme Council of the National Economy

VTsIK (Vserossiiskii tsentral'nyi ispolnitel'nyi komitet): All-Russian Central Executive Committee

VTsSPS (Vsesoiuznyi tsentral'nyi soviet professional'nykh soiuzov): All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions

zazhitochnye: economically strong or relatively well-off peasants

zemleustroistvo: land reorganization

Zernotrest (Gosudarstvennoe ob'edinenie zernovykh sovetskikh khoziaistv Narkomzema SSR): All-Union Trust of Grain-Producing State Farms

zolotnik: 4.25 grams

## The War Against the Peasantry, 1927–1930

I think that collectivization was an erroneous and unsuccessful measure and it was impossible to admit the error. To conceal the failure people had to be cured, by every means of terrorism, of the habit of thinking and judging for themselves, and forced to see what didn't exist, to assert the very opposite of what their eyes told them. This accounts for the unexampled cruelty of the Yezhov period, the promulgation of a constitution that was never meant to be applied, and the introduction of elections that violated the very principle of free choice.

—BORIS PASTERNAK, *Doctor Zhivago*

The War Against the Peasantry,  
1927-1930

## Introduction

The history of the collectivization of Soviet agriculture has long been obscured by official taboos, historical falsification, and restricted access to archival source material. Until 1991, most essential archival material on the subject was classified, closed even to Russian scholars. Since August 1991, state and Communist Party archives have opened their doors to Russian and Western scholars, declassifying and making available formerly inaccessible materials on collectivization.

In 1993, an international collaborative research team came together under the general editorial direction of V. P. Danilov, Roberta T. Manning, and Lynne Viola to begin a collective effort to work through newly available materials on the history of collectivization and the Soviet countryside and to secure further declassification of archival documents.<sup>1</sup> Working with a team of more than forty historians and archivists, the main editorial board directed the compilation of the five-volume Russian-language document series entitled *Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927–1939* [The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside: Collectivization and Dekulakization: Documents and Materials in 5 Volumes, 1927–1939] (Moscow: Rosspen, 1999–2003).

The goal of the Russian-language project was to fill in one of the many major blank spaces in the history of twentieth-century Russia through the excavation and publication of the most important pri-

mary documents on collectivization and the subsequent fate of the peasantry in the 1930s, as well as to place in the public domain some of the most significant documents on the early history of Stalin's Soviet Union. Included in the Russian-language series are documents from the Politburo, Secretariat, and Orgburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; the Central Executive Committees of the USSR and RSFSR; the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and RSFSR; the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR; the OGPU; and the commissariats of agriculture, justice, internal affairs, finance and Kolkhoztsentr, as well as a series of official reports from the political administration of the Red Army that survey rural opinion as expressed in the correspondence between peasant soldiers and their families in the villages. These documents represent a variety of official, institutional points of view, as well as the opinions of regime critics and peasants. Together, they have allowed us to compile, for the first time, a thorough documentary history of the experience of the peasantry in the years from 1927 to 1939, illuminating such pivotal moments in the fate of the countryside as the grain procurement crises of the late 1920s and the demise of NEP; the collectivization of Soviet agriculture and the liquidation of the kulak as a class; the famine of 1932–33; the evolution of the collective farm system and rural economy; and the impact of the Great Terror on the countryside. In the process, these documents also illustrate the relations between Moscow and the provinces, the workings of the secret police, and the central role of I. V. Stalin in the fateful decisions of the times.

The English-language edition of *The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside* presents a condensed version of the Russian-language series, offering readers, for the first time in English, access to the most vital archival documentation on the history of collectivization and the peasantry in the years from 1927 to 1939. Yale University Press plans to publish three volumes of documents from the original series, as well as a fourth, summary volume. Volume 1 focuses on the grain requisitioning crisis, collectivization, and dekulakization; volume 2 examines the famine and the rural economy; and volume 3 explores the workings of the police state in the Soviet countryside. The fourth volume will present a summary history of the entire period, combining text and documents in its presentation of materials.

This first volume, devoted to the history of collectivization, is derived from the first two volumes of the Russian-language series. The editors faced the huge and often daunting task of condensing more

than 1,800 pages of Russian text into a one-volume English edition. In this volume we have sought to provide background for this period as well as material that tells the story of the first stage of collectivization. Toward this end, we have selected from the original Russian edition the most important documents of the major institutions involved in decision making and policy implementation, as well as a sampling of sources illustrating popular reactions to policy.<sup>2</sup>

Communist Party documents make up a large part of the collection. These include directives and decrees from the Politburo, Central Committee, and Secretariat; protocols from Politburo meetings; and correspondence between Stalin and other officials. Among the most important of these documents are the Communist Party directives and instructions on collectivization and dekulakization, as well as documents and information from the important November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee (see documents 39–41), the December 1929 Politburo Commission on collectivization (see documents 42–52), and the January 1930 Politburo Commission on dekulakization (see documents 57–61). We have also included several illuminating reports from provincial Communist Party leaders (see documents 46 and 68) and a series of key communications between Stalin and Molotov (see documents 48–50). Revealing documents from regime critics, including M. I. Frumkin (see documents 14 and 18) and N. I. Bukharin (see documents 19 and 20) are also included. In the interests of documentary narrative, we have reprinted several published speeches of Stalin as well as previously published documents on his fateful trip to Siberia in 1928.

Materials from the secret police constitute one of the most valuable categories of documents in this collection. These materials include previously unpublished directives, statistics, and reports, as well as memoranda from G. G. Yagoda, the de facto head of the OGPU (*Ob"edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie*, or Unified State Political Administration—in short, the secret police).<sup>3</sup> Also included among these documents are the previously top secret OGPU order on dekulakization (see document 65) and an important OGPU report analyzing peasant protest in 1930 (see document 78). A series of OGPU reports offer firsthand accounts of policy implementation and an indirect glimpse of popular reactions to policy.

Additional materials from other government agencies and the main commissariats involved in rural policy provide information on the development of policy and its implementation as well as on the dynamics

of collectivization. Peasant reactions to grain requisitioning, collectivization, and dekulakization appear both directly and indirectly, in the form of letters (see documents 28 and 74) and military and police reports with excerpts from letters and firsthand descriptions (see documents 2, 6, 9, 16, 27, 35, 38, 53, 67, 73, and 78).

A word of caution is in order. The bureaucratic mentality behind documents of institutional provenance, the filter through which peasant voices reach us, and the language of presentation and description of the documents present a sometimes obscuring, distorting, and always politicized filter through which we may glimpse an often-fleeting reality. This is not without value in and of itself in that we gain access to the Stalinist mind-set through these distortions, obfuscations, and politicized formulations. The highly politicized and ideologically biased language of the documents reveal as much about their authors as they do about the topics they address.<sup>4</sup> In addition, much of the language of the documents is stiff, rather wooden Soviet bureaucratise. Our translator made every attempt to remain faithful to the original in an attempt to reproduce a language that very much reflects a bureaucratic, Stalinist mind-set and an abstract, and in many ways dehumanizing, approach to the peasant population.

It is important to maintain critical distance from these sources. Yet the documents of the Stalin era remain an invaluable repository of evidence—full of detail, description, and data. The materials published in this collection document the background of collectivization, exploring the grain procurement crisis, urban food shortages, and the development of the “extraordinary measures” in grain procurements (that is, the substitution of administrative and police pressure for market forces in the countryside). They shed new light on the all-important crisis of NEP, detailing the panicky response of the Communist Party leadership to the war scare of 1927 and to alarming OGPU reports of peasant disenchantment with the regime as well as providing new information on the variety of reactions, including quite critical ones, to regime policies from within the Soviet government and Communist Party. In the process, we begin to see a kind of OGPU “master narrative” evolving, one that would feed into Stalin’s fears and extremism by presenting the specter of war, domestic economic crisis, and peasant rebellion as imminent threats to the regime.

The documents in this collection offer important insights into Stalin’s dictatorship. His elevation to the status of uncontested dictator developed in tandem with the growing use of repression in the regime’s



relations with the peasantry. The last significant opposition to his policies came in the midst of the grain procurements crisis in 1927–28. By the time of the November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Stalin's rule was largely uncontested. An extremely interesting and revealing demonstration of his powers is evident in the role he plays in the December 1929 Politburo Commission (see chapter 4). In these documents we begin to see his central role in decision making as well as his close working relation with and dependence upon Yagoda and the OGPU.

The role of the OGPU in decision making and policy implementation is apparent in many of the documents in this collection. Beginning with the grain procurement crisis in 1927, we can see the increasing role of the secret police in the rural economy, its key role in dekulakization, and the central influence of Yagoda in policy formation. A regime of secrecy pervades the documentation from 1927 as the OGPU demanded classification and top secret status for increasing amounts of information on the countryside. The documents trace the growing power of the OGPU and its emergence as an economic empire by way of dekulakization and the deportation of the kulaks.

The evolution of rural policy also demonstrates that it was not without its critics. Frumkin and Bukharin both offered powerful arguments against Stalin's extraordinary measures. The workings of the December Politburo Commission reveal muted institutional conflict as well as the existence of advocates of slower and faster paces of collectivization (the latter championed by Molotov and Stalin). And the peasant rebellion of 1930 provides the most significant and dramatic indicator of protest, illustrating in the process the deadly dynamic between regime and peasant violence in the shaping of ever more radical policies.

In the course of the grain procurements crisis and collectivization, we see the development of a kind of siege-state socialism, in which war fears and crisis form the context for the evolution of Stalin's dictatorship. The close connection between supposed external enemies and internal enemies, "capitalist encirclement," and civil war nightmares shaped the collectivization campaign and the atmosphere of the 1930s. The archival materials in this first volume of *The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside* document the birth of Stalinism in the countryside as well as the economic and cultural subjugation of the peasantry through collectivization and dekulakization.

PART I

# The Grain Procurement Crisis

## CHAPTER 1

### The Crisis of NEP

7 May 1927–14 January 1928

Nineteen-twenty-seven was a transitional year in the Soviet regime's relations with the peasantry. It marked the beginning of the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the reemergence of repression as the basic *modus operandi* for Soviet rule in the countryside. A crisis in state grain procurements evolved in the course of this year, putting at risk not only internal supplies but the regime's grain export plans and, in consequence, capital funding for industrialization. In the context of the war scare of 1927 and ongoing political battles in the Politburo, the problem of state grain procurement ceased to be merely an economic issue. Stalin and his allies in the Politburo manipulated the war scare and the threat to industrialization to rationalize the use of violence to procure grain. Stalin's actions resulted in a social and political crisis that led to the entrenchment of violence in the state administrative system and the first steps in the emergence of the Stalinist police state and command economy.

#### War Communism and the Introduction of the New Economic Policy

Grain was one of the Soviet Union's most vital economic resources and a major source of export revenue. To a great extent, grain shaped the historical destiny of the Soviet Union in the decade and a half that followed the Russian Revolution of 1917. Grain served as a nexus be-

tween town and countryside, regime and populace, in what remained an agrarian nation with more than 80 percent of the population residing in the countryside.

The country experienced a breakdown in the grain trade during World War I as inflation skyrocketed, making money exchanges for grain meaningless and undermining networks of food supply and distribution. The response of the tsarist government was to impose, first, fixed prices for grain and then, on the eve of the February Revolution, a system of fixed quotas for grain delivery. The Provisional Government, which claimed power in February 1917, attempted to remedy the crisis by introducing a state grain monopoly. Neither of these approaches was in effect long enough to achieve any measure of success; more fundamentally, neither government was able or willing to apply the force it would require to extract sufficient quantities of grain from a depleted agricultural economy and war-weary peasantry.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet regime inherited both the food supply crisis and the statist approaches of the earlier administrations. As the revolution deepened and civil war broke out in 1918, the crisis in food supply, distribution, and transport worsened, threatening the towns and army with starvation. The Soviet regime implemented a policy of forced grain requisitions to deal with the crisis.

War communism, as it came to be known, described the set of policies that the Soviet regime employed during the Russian Civil War. The policy included the nationalization of industry, a ban on private trade, the partial substitution of barter for a money economy, and the forcible requisitioning of the peasantry's grain in addition to an ethos of class war that included Red Terror and revolutionary retribution.<sup>2</sup>

Initially, the regime attempted to requisition grain through the institution of the Committees of the Village Poor (*kombedy*). In theory, these committees were supposed to unite the poor against the rich, stirring up class war in the village. In return for their assistance in identifying kulaks and their hidden grain reserves, the poor were to receive a portion of the requisitioned grain. In practice, these committees floundered on baseless Marxist visions of rural class stratification and the actions of poorly informed urban requisitioning detachments, unfamiliar with village society and inclined to use force without discretion.

Marxist-Leninist ideology posited that the countryside, like the city, was made up of antagonistic social classes. Arguing that capitalist relations had come to the countryside, V. I. Lenin divided the peasantry

into poor peasants, middle peasants, and kulaks. Poor peasants, who made up the majority of the peasant population before the revolution (roughly 65 percent), declined in numbers after the civil war to some 25 percent of the peasant population, while the proportion of wealthy peasants declined from roughly 15 percent (depending upon calculation) to about 3 percent in the same time span. The middle peasant became the dominant figure in Soviet agriculture as a result of wartime losses, social revolution and redistribution of wealth, and the return, often forced, of large numbers of peasants who had quit the commune to establish individual farmsteads in the prewar Stolypin agrarian reforms. The result of the agrarian revolution was, paradoxically, a strengthening of village cohesion and a socioeconomic leveling that increased the role of the middle peasant in the life of the countryside.

Nonetheless, Lenin and the Communist Party insisted that class struggle was a reality in the countryside and regarded kulaks as a rural bourgeoisie. According to Lenin, the poor peasantry was an ally of the urban proletariat; the middle peasant “wavered” in class (and by implication, political) loyalties between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (or kulak); and the kulak remained, inherently according to socioeconomic definition, the enemy of Soviet power. Yet the actual definition of the kulak remained amorphous and slippery, given to politicization if not demonization, in Marxist-Leninist thinking throughout the postrevolutionary years. Starting with the policy of the Committee of the Village Poor, the kulak became a figure of opprobrium in the Marxist-Leninist pantheon of enemies and, more often than not, a category defined by politics rather than by actual socioeconomic standing.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout the countryside, peasants of all economic strata rose as one against the unpopular Committees of the Village Poor. In response, the regime abolished the committees in November 1918 in most parts of the country. Although the policy of forced grain requisitioning continued with little or no diminution in violence, the regime now turned its attention away from an exclusive focus on the poor peasantry toward an at least theoretical alliance with the middle peasantry, the majority of the rural population by this time. It was the kulak who remained “our implacable enemy” according to Lenin.<sup>4</sup> Henceforth, peasant resistance to grain requisitioning was declared “kulak” resistance. That is not to say that the kulaks were the only peasants to resist or from whom grain was taken. Rather, to paraphrase E. H. Carr’s famous dictum, politics had already begun to

shape class definitions, resulting in the “kulakization” of the peasantry when and if it opposed Soviet policies, thus making the peasantry as a whole vulnerable to generalized repression.<sup>5</sup>

By late 1920 and early 1921, the peasantry rose up in revolt against grain requisitioning. Once the civil war ended, there was no longer any justification for the continuation of this detested policy. Large-scale peasant revolts broke out in central Russia, Ukraine, and Siberia. Combined with growing urban unrest and the sailors’ mutiny on the Kronstadt naval base, the peasant revolt pushed the regime into a retreat from war communism. It had become abundantly clear to Lenin by this time that the Communist Party had lost its social moorings, becoming a “dictatorship of the party” rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

In 1921, at the tenth congress of the Communist Party, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy. This policy was, above all, a concession to the peasantry, abolishing grain requisitions and replacing them first with a tax in kind and later a money tax. It also legalized private trade as well as denationalized all but the “commanding heights” of industry. The NEP introduced a mixed economy, a kind of market socialism, in an attempt to stabilize the social base of the revolution and restore the war-shattered economy.

To the end of his life, Lenin insisted on gradualism in the regime’s approach to the peasantry, arguing that “it will take generations to remold the small farmer and recast his mentality and habits”<sup>6</sup> and placing his hope on the expansion of voluntary trade, consumer, and production cooperatives to persuade the peasantry of the advantages of socialism. In his last articles, Lenin attempted to come to terms with the dilemmas of a “proletarian revolution” in a peasant country. He warned the party to learn from the experience of the civil war. He argued that the Soviet regime could hold out until the coming of international revolution provided that the alliance with the peasantry held. The idea of the alliance—the *smychka*—became the basic Marxist-Leninist theoretical justification for peasant Russia’s working-class revolution.<sup>7</sup>

Lenin wrote in 1923 that NEP was intended to last for an entire historical epoch—one to two decades at best.<sup>8</sup> Yet he wrote this when NEP was just beginning, during a year when the country was more stable than it had been in almost a decade and when grain exports had started up again. He did not live to see the further development of NEP, its structural flaws and contradictions that evolved in tandem

with the power struggle in the Communist Party following Lenin's death in January 1924.

## The New Economic Policy

The Soviet regime's chief economic priority during NEP was the industrialization of the country, something that to many communists was tantamount to the construction of socialism in "backward" peasant Russia. The expansion of the grain trade was intended to provide the necessary revenues, from grain exports, to finance the regime's industrial development while at the same time creating the level of peasant prosperity needed to maintain an internal market for manufactured goods from the industrial sector. By turning the terms of trade against the peasantry—by charging higher prices for industrial goods than for grain—the regime hoped to ensure a net profit for industry and further industrial expansion.

The New Economic Policy was an awkward policy for a revolutionary party, or at least for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which saw its base of support in the working class. It was, in fact, a compromise, political and theoretical, to paper over the profound contradictions of the October Revolution, a revolution created in the name of a class that constituted little more than 5 percent of the population and in the relatively backward conditions of a largely agrarian economy. Had the regime been willing to wager on the peasantry and bide its time during a lengthy period of economic development, NEP might have proven a far-sighted policy for the industrial development of a peasant country. But then the communists would not have been the communists; nor would they have faced the threat of capitalist encirclement.

The dilemma confronting the Soviet regime was not new to Russian economic development. The alternatives appeared completely dichotomous: either the regime could allow the peasantry to prosper, and through balanced growth and social stability the needed revenues for industrialization would gradually accrue, or, risking social discontent, it could "squeeze" the peasantry through heavy taxation, maintain low agricultural prices, expand grain exports, and with the rapid accumulation of capital thus obtained push forward with a forced program of industrialization. In either case, the peasantry was perceived mainly as an economic resource, in effect little more than an internal colony. And the factors that determined the approach were more often political than economic.

The first option was less attractive to a regime with revolutionary designs for restructuring Russian society. The issue of the pace or tempo of industrialization became a major and contentious problem for the regime. During the first years of NEP, L. D. Trotsky and the Left Opposition pushed aggressively for higher industrial growth rates. In the mid-1920s, E. A. Preobrazhensky, a theoretician for the Left Opposition, urged that the terms of trade be turned more steeply against the peasantry, that a “tribute” be exacted in order to speed up capital accumulation and industrialization. With neither irony nor shame, he dubbed this process “primitive socialist accumulation,” echoing and subverting Marx’s detested “primitive capitalist accumulation” in the interests of Soviet power. Trotsky and the Left Opposition were labeled “super-industrializers,” bent on destroying the *smychka*. N. I. Bukharin, the regime’s leading proponent of NEP, argued that primitive socialist accumulation would threaten the *smychka*, leading to massive peasant discontent and withdrawal from the market, as had occurred during the Russian Civil War. Bukharin warned that the very stability of the state would be at risk if the interests of the peasantry were so abused.<sup>9</sup>

In 1925, Bukharin encouraged the peasantry “to enrich itself” in order to further the development of the agricultural economy and hence industrialization. Bukharin’s proposal was, perhaps, sensible from an economic point of view, but it provoked a strong political reaction that sheds a great deal of light on the theoretical contradictions of NEP. In addition to the acerbic response of the Left, even Bukharin’s erstwhile ally Stalin distanced himself from the pronouncement, writing, in unison with V. M. Molotov and A. A. Andreev, that the slogan of “enrich yourselves” is “not ours” (*ne nash*).<sup>10</sup>

At a time when the question of whether rural social stratification was expanding as a result of NEP was a deadly serious political issue, Bukharin’s slogan threw oil on the fire. Rural economic prosperity—the very success of NEP—could not but lead, at least theoretically, to social developments unacceptable to the regime, that is, to the growth of a prosperous stratum of peasants associated in the communist mind with the kulak. And although the actual growth of the kulak stratum in the countryside would be minuscule, the economic and social dimensions of NEP stood in clear contradiction. Furthermore, most communists were utterly opposed to the market, viewing it as antithetical to socialism, to a planned economy, and to the “conscious” direction of historical development. Given that political context, the regime had



minimal toleration for the private traders so necessary for NEP economics. In the Soviet mentality, trade easily slid into what the communists called “speculation,” in reality little more than profit through resale but in the Soviet context a crime of considerable gravity. In the end, the very idea of a *developed* peasant economy was oxymoronic to the Soviet regime, which saw the peasantry as doomed to disappear with the advance of a modern industrial society. To make matters worse, most communists viewed the peasantry with a profound cultural disdain, casting the peasants as a whole into an inferior class status that generally precluded any type of political consciousness except that of kulak or counterrevolutionary. None of these preconceptions and prejudices boded well for NEP.

### The War Scare

In 1923–24, NEP entered into its first crisis. The “scissors,” as Trotsky labeled it, in pricing between industrial and agricultural goods had opened too far. This imbalance in pricing, along with heavy state subsidies to industry, led to the overproduction of manufactured goods and, perhaps for the last time in Soviet history, a glut on the market. Peasants were not buying and, of consequence, had little incentive to sell their own produce. The regime responded by temporarily lowering industrial prices and inaugurating a series of cost-cutting reforms in industry. The consequent closing of the scissors, however, was thought to hinder industrial growth, and in fact, by 1927 the country entered into a goods shortage that would increasingly impede trade between town and countryside even as the scissors reopened.<sup>11</sup>

Harvest yields continued to increase in the next few years, reaching prewar levels by 1926. Yet as a result of government intervention in regulating prices, lower state taxation, peasant inclination to retain more of their grain for themselves and for the more lucratively priced livestock and dairy sectors, and a growing shortage of manufactured goods due to sluggish industrial growth, the amount of grain marketed by the peasantry did not return to prewar levels. The economic year 1926–27 was NEP’s one consistently good year. According to R. W. Davies, “demand and supply were in equilibrium, and industrial goods were readily available,” so that the state succeeded in purchasing grain at relatively low prices. The year 1926, however, would prove to be NEP’s last good year and would, of consequence, set the bar disproportionately high for the next economic year.<sup>12</sup>

The year 1926 also saw industrial production return, for the most part, to prewar levels. Increasingly, key Soviet leaders as well as the economic planning agencies began to push for more state intervention in the economy and higher industrial growth rates. Under the slogan “socialism in one country,” Stalin soon emerged as the regime’s chief proponent of more rapid industrial tempos, taking over much of the Left’s program once it went down to defeat and tying the Soviet Union’s industrial development to its defense and therefore survival amidst “capitalist encirclement.” The popularity and appeal of socialism in one country would be greatly magnified in 1927 as the Soviet Union appeared to be on the verge of war.

The war scare of 1927 pushed the nation’s politics further to the left, radicalizing ongoing discussions of economic development and the issue of political dissent within the Communist Party. In May 1927, the newly installed British Conservative government staged a police raid on the Anglo-Soviet trade mission in London, violating the mission’s claims to extraterritoriality and accusing the Soviet regime of using the mission for espionage, subversion, and a part in the recent general strike. The British government broke off all ties with the Soviet Union. The crisis in diplomatic relations with Britain followed on the heels of a major debacle in the Comintern’s United Front policy<sup>13</sup> in Poland in 1926, when General Pilsudsky, whom the communists had supported earlier, established a military dictatorship on the Soviet Union’s western border. In 1927, the United Front policy suffered another setback when the nationalist Kuomintang in China broke violently with its communist allies. In June, P. L. Voikov, the Soviet diplomatic representative to Poland, was assassinated in Warsaw by what were labeled “monarchist forces.” This combination of foreign policy disasters created a tense situation in the country, rekindling ever-present communist fears of capitalist intervention.

Although it is clear that Stalin and the top Soviet leadership knew that war was in fact not imminent,<sup>14</sup> the war scare aroused considerable anxiety among the general population, whose memories of war were still quite vivid. Rumors of war circulated widely in the countryside and the cities. The OGPU reported that war rumors had sparked livestock sales and hoarding as well as “defeatist agitation” among peasants who claimed that they would not fight for a regime that discriminated against them in favor of the working class (document 2). In the cities, town dwellers emptied the shops of their goods as people

prepared for war, waiting in increasingly longer queues as food and goods became scarce.

The newly formed United Opposition, in which Trotsky joined forces with G. E. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev, was quick to capitalize on the war scare, blaming Bukharin and Stalin for their shortsighted United Front Comintern policy. Citing Clemenceau's continuing opposition in wartime France, Trotsky refused to stand down in the face of calls for party unity. In consequence, Stalin turned the tables on Trotsky, claiming that the Soviet Union was threatened "by a united front from Chamberlain to Trotsky." In his attempts "to strengthen the rear," Stalin used the war scare as a rationalization for the expulsions of the United Opposition from the Communist Party in late 1927.<sup>15</sup> Henceforth, Stalin would link manifestations of domestic dissent, real or perceived, to the foreign foe, equating opposition with treason. The OGPU's role in policing dissent increased accordingly.

### The Grain Procurement Crisis

It was in this context that the regime confronted a crisis in grain procurements in 1927, the first of a series of such crises that would continue up to the forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture. State grain procurements first faltered in the spring, reviving in the summer months, and then declining again in the fall. By December, according to R. T. Manning, "only one-third of annual domestic food requirements (220.2 million poods<sup>16</sup> of grain) had been secured from the 1927 harvest, compared to 340.1 million poods the previous year." Crop failures in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus, which produced two-thirds of the nation's grain, were responsible for the shortfall.<sup>17</sup> The export plan and the internal supply of grain appeared to be in jeopardy. In the face of the war scare, the grain procurement crisis was viewed as a threat to national security, posing risks to industrialization and defense capacity as well as to internal social stability (see document 3).

The 1927 harvest was several million tons lower than the good harvest of 1926. In 1927, poor weather conditions and a series of crop failures in the south resulted in lower harvest yields. Moreover, peasant grain sales to state procurement agents in the fall of 1927 were only half that of the previous fall. Hoarding induced by the war scare and low state grain prices hindered sales. Many peasants diverted their

grain to fodder for livestock and dairy farming, both of which yielded higher prices. A “famine” in the availability of manufactured goods meant that there was little incentive for peasants to sell their grain for purchases. Finally, by this time, peasants had accumulated sufficient cash reserves to allow them to wait for prices to rise in the spring.<sup>18</sup>

To make matters worse as we now know, the regime vastly overestimated the available grain reserves in the country. Officials at the Central Statistical Administration estimated the grain reserve at 900 million poods, a figure Bukharin was to label “mythological.” The former head of the Central Statistical Administration, P. I. Popov, calculated that these statistics were exaggerated by 350–367 million poods, making 529 million poods a more likely estimate for reserves.<sup>19</sup>

On 3 October 1927, in a speech to his commissariat’s collegium, Commissar of Trade A. I. Mikoian argued for setting grain collections at 700 million poods, adding that he did not “rule out the possibility that we may not be able to collect 700 million, but we must not set a goal of less than 660–670” as opposed to lower estimates proposed by I. Ya. Veitser and others in the commissariat. Mikoian did, however, call for lowering the export plan from 195 to 90 million poods in order to insure enough grain for the domestic market (see document 3). On 24 October, the regime set the grain collection target for the 1927–28 economic year at 780 million poods, an impossible figure to meet.<sup>20</sup>

In a 24 December speech to the economic council of the Russian Republic, G. V. Chukhrita of the Commissariat of Trade presented a frank assessment of the reasons for the problems in grain procurements, citing the factors that we have discussed above.<sup>21</sup> The OGPU also was aware of the “objective” reasons for the crisis, as is evident from its reports on the rural economy, although it spoke a more politicized language, insisting on kulak agitation for a “grain strike” and for “squeezing the city” until prices rose (see documents 6 and 9).

Stalin’s assessment of the crisis, however, was almost entirely political. He placed the blame for the grain procurement crisis on the kulak, the private trader, and inert local officials (see documents 8 and 10). Although at the fifteenth congress of the Communist Party in December 1927, Stalin was still only advocating “economic measures” to limit “the known growth of the kulak,”<sup>22</sup> he would call for the arrest of all those involved in “speculation” less than a month later (see documents 8 and 10). A repressive campaign against private traders had been underway since September, with the regime and the OGPU charging them with “speculation,” “disorganizing the market,” and unfair competi-

tion with state procurement agencies (see documents 4 and 9).<sup>23</sup> In the meantime, Stalin expressed scorn for local officials, accusing them of “complacency and sluggishness” and all manner of “rotten ideas” (see document 10). At the fifteenth congress, Stalin said that there was “no other way out” of the crisis and its accompanying impact on industrialization but through a transition to collectivized agriculture, thus putting collectivization on the agenda for dealing with the peasantry.<sup>24</sup>

Stalin and his allies continually warned not only of the dangers of war, but of the threat of hunger and urban instability if the grain procurement crisis was not forcefully addressed. The towns and parts of the countryside, especially in grain-consuming districts, had experienced interruptions in food supply since the summer of 1927.<sup>25</sup> On 24 December 1927, in a directive to local party organizations, the Politburo warned of the threat of a food supply crisis in the major industrial centers and the prospect of hunger in Moscow and Leningrad, arguing that such possibilities threatened export and industrial plans.<sup>26</sup> In its reports, the OGPU regularly featured news of interruptions in food supply in industrial areas, as well as queues and working-class grumbling over bread (see document 6). It is difficult to say how real the threat to subsistence was. It is likely that the amount of grain harvested per capita in 1927–28 was not significantly lower than harvests in the prewar years. What had changed was state pricing policies, peasant marketing dynamics, export plans, and the regime’s stubborn industrialization desiderata, making for a supply and distribution crisis.<sup>27</sup> What is amply clear is that the regime capitalized on the crisis to push for a final solution to the problems of grain procurement.

At the same time, the OGPU regularly reported news of peasant discontent over grain prices, high taxes, the goods famine, inadequate food resources, and the injustice of the regime favoring the working class over the peasantry. The OGPU increasingly reported on the manifestation of various types of “antisoviet” activities in the countryside, ranging from agitation for peasant unions and the distribution of political proclamations to mass disturbances and terror. Although the omnipresent kulak featured prominently in the OGPU’s reports, the reports clearly indicate the extent to which other strata of the peasantry, including both middle peasantry and poor peasantry, were also deeply affected by the regime’s hard line in grain procurements. The picture that the OGPU painted for Stalin and the Politburo was of an extremely tense political atmosphere in the countryside (see document 6).

The regime increasingly resorted to administrative measures to deal

with the grain crisis and what it saw as a politically recalcitrant peasantry. The OGPU began to play an increasing role in the economy. As early as 1926, the OGPU involved itself in the state grain trade as the regime reclassified a series of economic crimes, moving them from the jurisdiction of the regular police to the OGPU.<sup>28</sup> In June and July 1927, the OGPU conducted a mass operation (i.e., a campaign of mass arrests) against “antisoviet elements” in the village, meaning in this case former tsarist landlords and priests, leading kulaks and others to fear for their safety, according to the OGPU.<sup>29</sup> In September, the OGPU conducted a further mass operation in the countryside, this time against private traders and owners in the leather and hides business.<sup>30</sup> In October, claiming to be following the proposals of the trade commissariats, VSNKh (*Vysshii sovet narodnogo khoziaistva*, or Supreme Council of the National Economy), and a series of local organizations, the OGPU issued a report to Sovnarkom (*Sovet narodnykh komissarov*, or Council of People’s Commissars) calling for “swift” repressive measures against private grain traders (see document 4), an action that resulted in a 4 January 1928 OGPU directive to initiate a mass operation of arrests against private grain procurement agents and merchants (see document 7), which would result in the arrest of more than 6,000 individuals by early April 1928.<sup>31</sup>

At the same time that the OGPU’s role in the economy was increasing, so too was what V. P. Danilov calls the “regime of secrecy.” In May 1927, the OGPU circulated an order forbidding the publication of any news of grain difficulties in the press (see document 1). Within months, similar orders were issued forbidding the publication of news about grain exports and bread prices (see document 5). According to Danilov, from this time forward, any discussion of grain procurement problems in government or Communist Party documents was subject to classification as *sovershenno sekretno* (top secret).<sup>32</sup>

The regime took a series of other measures to deal with the grain procurement crisis. A Politburo directive of 24 December ordered that 70 to 80 percent of manufactured goods be sent directly to the major grain producing districts in order to raise procurements. This decree also called on the Commissariat of Finance and local party organizations to collect all peasant tax arrears by 1 March 1928, in the first step of what would amount to a major cash mopping up exercise in the countryside in the years leading up to and including wholesale collectivization. At the same time, the Politburo ordered the STO (*Sovet*

*truda i oborony*, or Council of Labor and Defense) to decrease the money supply in circulation as a way to force grain into circulation. The Politburo forbid further discussion of the possibility of price increases for grain. It also ordered local party organizations to fulfill grain requisition assignments in a timely fashion and forbid them from restricting grain shipments out of their regions (see document 5). Finally, the Politburo mobilized a series of top Communist Party leaders to tour the major grain producing regions, assigning them plenipotentiary powers from the Central Committee and the STO.<sup>33</sup>

In January 1928, the Central Committee issued two additional directives to local party organizations, each bearing the signature and political imprimatur of Stalin (see documents 8 and 10). In the first (5 January), Stalin complained that despite a series of earlier directives to increase grain procurements,<sup>34</sup> there had been no turnaround. He blamed the lower level government and party apparatus for this state of affairs, calling for the collection not only of grain but of money reserves in the countryside and for the imposition of harsh penalties on kulaks in arrears. Stalin called for special repressive measures in regard to kulaks and speculators who disrupted agricultural pricing policy (i.e., paid higher prices than the state). In the second directive (14 January), Stalin wrote that two-thirds of the mistakes in grain procurements were due to poor leadership. He argued that kulaks and private traders were exploiting the “complacency” of local organizations. He called for the arrest of grain dealers and kulaks and noted that by arresting them the middle peasant would cease to hold out the hope of an increase in grain prices. He noted that there were two and one-half to three months to collect grain in the Urals and Siberia before the bad road season set in.<sup>35</sup> “We have to exert desperate pressure there, since this is the last resource.” Further and perhaps even more ominously, Stalin wrote that “only under such a policy will the middle peasant realize that the prospect of raising grain prices is an invention by speculators, that the speculator and the kulak are enemies of Soviet power, that it is dangerous to tie one’s fate to the fate of the speculators and kulaks, and that he, the middle peasant, must fulfill his duty as an ally to the working class.” This was, indeed, a dire warning to the whole peasantry, not just the ephemeral kulak, that repression lay in store for all those who resisted the new grain procurement policies. In order to apply pressure in the provinces, Stalin dispatched Molotov to the Urals (directly after his return from Ukraine), and he himself went to Siberia

in January 1928 to “exert desperate pressure” on the kulaks and local party organizations (see document 10).

This series of decrees marked the beginning of the end of NEP and the birth of the *chrezvychaishchina*, or extraordinary measures, in state grain procurements. Administrative measures and force would eclipse the market from this time onward. Many of the repressive measures generally associated in the literature with Stalin’s trip to Siberia (see chapter 2) were already in place before he left (see documents 5, 8, 10). Molotov, a key player in Stalinist politics, later explained the transition in this way: “To survive, the state needed the grain. Otherwise it would crack up—it would be unable to maintain the army, the schools, construction, the elements most vital to the state. So we pumped away.” And when his interviewer, Felix Chuev, asked, “From the kulaks?,” Molotov responded, “From everyone who had grain.”<sup>36</sup> As Stalin wrote in the 14 January Central Committee decree (see document 10), “The situation hinges, as you see, on grain procurements. Grain procurements, therefore, represent the fortress that we must capture at any cost. And we will certainly capture it if we do the job in a bolshevik style, with bolshevik pressure.”

## Documents

### • DOCUMENT 1 •

Mailgram from the Information and Political Control Department of the OGPU<sup>37</sup> regarding a ban on publication of material with information about difficulties with grain supplies, 7 May 1927. TsA FSB RF, f. 66, op. 1, d. 174, l. 162. Certified copy.

7 May 1927

No. 89

To the GPUs of autonomous republics  
and the Special Department of the Volga Region Military District

For purposes of elaborating and supplementing the Glavlit<sup>38</sup> circular no. 649/s of 11 March of this year, enclosed with mailgram no. 47/info of March 21 of this year, Glavlit circular no. 941/s of 16 April of this year is enclosed herewith for information and strict guidance—barring material from publication in the press that reports any difficulties in the matter of supplying grain for the country.



Enclosure to OGPU Mailgram No. 89/info

16 April 1927

Top secret

No. 941/s

To all gubernia, oblast, krai, and raion administrations for literature and publishing, autonomous-republic main administrations for literature and publishing, and special representatives at publishing houses (to Union-republic main administrations for literature and publishing for their information)

Glavlit instructs you to take all measures to completely bar the appearance in the press of any dispatches (articles, items, etc.) that refer to difficulties or interruptions in the supply of grain for the country as they could, without sufficient grounds, cause panic and derail measures being taken by the government to overcome temporary difficulties in the matter of grain procurements and supplies for the country.

Glavlit Director Lebedev-Poliansky  
Chief of the military-economic department Langovoy  
Secretary of the administration Ushakova

• DOCUMENT 2 •

From informational summary report [svodka] no. 22 of the OGPU Information and Political Control Department for 20 July through 3 August 1927, 4 August 1927. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 5, d. 394, ll. 88–89ob. Copy.

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4 August 1927

. . . Peasantry

*The Sell-Off of Livestock Resulting from Rumors of War*

*Riazan Gubernia.* 27 July. A rumor that spread in the village of Arkhangelsky, Miloslavskoe Volost, Skopin Uezd, to the effect that horses and cattle would be mobilized caused panic among the peasants, and over several days two horses, twenty head of cattle, and several sheep were sold in the village.

*Kursk Gubernia.* 18 July. In the village of Aleksandrovsky, Prokhorovka Volost, Belgorod Uezd, peasants at the bazaar are paying no more than 120 rubles for good horses that previously cost 150–200 rubles,

while they are offering 125–160 rubles for old horses and horses unfit for military uses. At the same time peasants are trying to sell good carts, out of fear that they may be confiscated in the event of a mobilization; carts that previously cost 130–150 rubles are being sold for 100–110 rubles.

*Black Sea Okrug.* 18 July. Panic can be seen among Cossacks in the village of Pavlovskoe, Krymsk Raion, in connection with the rumors of war. Instances in which horses and cattle are sold off have been noted, and silver money is being hidden.

#### *Defeatist Agitation*

*Kursk Gubernia.* 27 July. In the village of Ivanino, Glushkovo Volost, Rylsk Uezd, following a meeting at which a report was delivered on the danger of war, a middle peasant in a group of fellow villagers said: “What are we going to go fight for, we don’t have enough land, and our land was taken away by the state farm, which is leasing it back to us. For 16 hours of work a day we’re paid only 80 kopeks, can anybody live this way. We’re not going to go fight, they can shoot us.”

*Voronezh Gubernia.* 28 July. In Bobrov Uezd, at a meeting in the town of Buturlinovka, Berezovka Raion, a kulak who spoke in response to the report on the international situation said: “The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] turns to us only in a difficult moment for it, but when everything is fine it forgets about us, so let the party go and defend itself on its own. We are all against war and we’re not going to go kill workers and peasants from other countries. We don’t want to build airplanes so that these same airplanes are used to kill us [ . . . ]. We don’t need war, we don’t want it, and we won’t go to fight. All the artillery pieces, machine guns, and airplanes must be turned into plows and harrows.” This statement was endorsed by some of those present, and during the reading of a decree that called for coming to the defense of Soviet power, shouts rang out: “Down with this decree, we don’t want to stand on guard, and if we don’t go to war, they won’t kill people who don’t fight.” Only 15 out of the 250 people who attended the meeting voted for the proposed decree.

*Moscow Gubernia.* 25 July. At a shareholders’ meeting of the Rozhdestveno Cooperative in Mamoshino Volost, Voskresensk Uezd, a well-to-do peasant (a member of the church council and a member of the volost executive committee) commented on the report on the danger of war and said: “We’re not going to fight. The people who’ve gotten an improvement out of Soviet power should fight, not us peasants.”

*Kaluga Gubernia.* 25 July. In the village of Olikovo, Uteshevo Volost,

Meshchovsk Uezd, at a meeting of KKOv members,<sup>39</sup> a middle peasant commented on the report on the international situation by saying: “We have no reason to shout, ‘Lead us against the bourgeoisie, all of us peasants will lay down our lives to defend Soviet power!’ You communists will never see that happen, since peasants have no reason to defend the government. It hasn’t given us anything, and has given all the rights and privileges to you communists, so go and defend yourselves on your own.”

*Salsk Okrug.* 18 July. In the village [*khutor*]<sup>40</sup> of Grazhdansky, Zavetnoe Raion, a well-to-do peasant—a former bandit who served with the Whites<sup>41</sup>—spoke at a general meeting on the question of the international situation and made the following statement: “Down with war, we won’t go to fight, since we don’t have equipment like England has, and there’s no reason to fight her, she will choke us with gases. They can kill us at home, but since we won’t take up arms, they won’t touch us civilians.” He was endorsed by another well-to-do peasant who had connections with the band: “Let other great powers come, it won’t be any worse anyway.” These statements did not get sympathy from the assembled group.

*Achinsk Okrug.* 25 July. Berezovka Raion. In a conversation about the coming war, a middle peasant in the village of Borovaia said: “There must be a war without fail. First we should kill our own rats who are on our backs and each make 130 rubles [a month] and take our last piglet as tax.”

#### *Agitation for the Establishment of “Peasant Unions”*

Between 20 July and 3 August, 10 instances of agitation for the establishment of “peasant unions” were reported. Six of them were in the Central Region (one each in Moscow and Kursk gubernias, two each in Kaluga and Tver gubernias); one in the Western Region (Briansk Gubernia); and three in Siberia (one in Biisk Okrug, two in Rubtsovsk Okrug). Four of the ten statements occurred at meetings. With regard to the demands, two were political, four were based on the model of workers’ trade unions and four were of other kinds.

*Kaluga Gubernia.* 25 July. In the village of Kiselyovo, Balobanovo Volost, Maloyaroslavets Raion, a former merchant and four kulaks are agitating among peasants to establish a “peasant union,” to call a “Constituent Assembly”<sup>42</sup> and to refuse to pay insurance payments and the agricultural tax.

*Biisk Okrug.* 23 July. Novikovo Raion. On the basis of discontent with the tax, peasants in the village of Viatki are speaking out for the creation of a “peasant organization,” declaring: “Our brother peasants are being

squeezed everywhere. Now, for example, peasants are being squeezed dry with taxes more than anyone. Even though we're told that this is mostly being used to support our own government, white-collar workers, and our own needs, it seems to me that peasants did not decide this and did not resolve to do this, and everything is being imposed on them from above. If peasants were allowed to set themselves up, without stratification and dictatorship, then agriculture would grow and develop better. Factory workers have their own unions, they use them to defend their interests, yet peasants are just given orders. If we are told that the peasant organization is the cooperative, peasants' committee and so forth, that is not yet what peasants need. Peasants need something bigger than all these organizations."

*Kulak and Antisoviet Groups*

*Kursk Gubernia.* 18 July. In the *khutor* of Zviagintsevo, Medvenka Volost, Kursk Uezd, a kulak group headed by a teacher is openly opposing local government bodies, discrediting the latter and calling on the public to defy decrees of the local government. The group holds its own meetings and exerts influence on the peasants in nearby villages.

*Leningrad Gubernia.* 15 July. In the village of Bolshoe Verevo, Troitsk Volost and Uezd, kulaks from surrounding villages often assemble and discuss methods of combating Soviet power. A group of kulaks is setting the objective of overthrowing Soviet power; conducting terror against communists, responsible officials, and members of the government; organizing pogroms; and vandalizing state structures and property.

*Shakhty-Donets Okrug.* 15 July. A teacher in Tishchenka Raion has attracted a group of young Cossacks to him, is agitating among them for Cossack autonomy and is doing all he can to compromise Soviet power.

*Proclamations and Appeals*

*Voronezh Gubernia.* 17 July. Valuiki Uezd. In the village of Zalomnoe, a proclamation was hung in a prominent place where general peasants' meetings are convened. It read as follows: "Comrades, you will soon have a St. Bartholomew's Day massacre.<sup>43</sup> Comrades, agriculture cannot develop under Soviet power. Comrades, citizens and citizenesses, absolutely everybody must struggle against Soviet power."

Assistant director of OGPU Information Department Butsevich  
Assistant director of Second Section Gerasimova

## · DOCUMENT 3 ·

From a speech by USSR People's Commissar of Trade A. I. Mikoian at a meeting of the collegium of the Commissariat on the progress of grain procurements, 3 October 1927. RGAE, f. 5240, op. 9, d. 102, ll. 45-49. Copy.

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3 October 1927

...<sup>44</sup> With regard to grain we are having difficulties that came to light in the spring. Three months later they disappeared, but then, in October, they have reappeared. What factors affect grain? I'm not speaking for the moment about [grain] collections and the specific circumstances of this year's harvest. First, the bad road season applies to October, although Al'sky denies this. I propose that he travel to the Kuban and take a look at how one can cross from one side of the street to the other without riding horseback. The bad road conditions are a major factor. The same thing happened in 1925. We had a lot of grain lying at grain-collecting centers, yet we couldn't transport it out of them. But this, of course, isn't the only thing. If the weather improves, things will get better. But it isn't out of the question that the bad road season will last a long time. It may be short, or it may be long. But these are not economic reasons. There are reasons that affect Ukraine. In Ukraine, especially, the outline of the coming crop failure affects current grain procurements. We don't always grasp the importance of our own words. When we talk about the country's defense, everybody thinks we need to defend ourselves against military difficulties. We wrote a letter about these difficulties to the CC [Central Committee] plenum. If the muzhiks<sup>45</sup> obey, they must also prepare to defend themselves. The muzhiks are no fools, especially if they have confirmation that the crop will be poor. We waited until October for it to improve, but it never did. The rains didn't come. This had a great impact in Ukraine. If the crops are poor, spring procurements may be ruined; if everything goes well, the procurements may improve. But if a drought occurs in June and May, the muzhiks will be more cautious.

Of course, the delivery of industrial goods is also important. But I think we have a more favorable situation with industrial goods in Ukraine this year than last year. Last year the Ukrainians complained more about a lack of industrial goods than this year. In any case, industrial goods are not the main factor. I believe the notion of a crop failure is of greater significance than industrial goods.

Now to peasants' reserves. It is true that they are increasing. First, they

are increasing in other areas than before [*sic*]. The harvest is falling in the areas where we never focused to such an extent on procurements. This is where the muzhiks will set up reserves. For example, the Northern Caucasus is not of great importance with regard to the grain balance sheet, but it is of great importance in the commodity balance sheet. All this creates difficulties. I believe that in view of the war danger, in view of the simultaneous need to prepare for the crop failure—reserves may increase. The peasants are scared by the memory of 1921, when they ate even their own daughters, so they are creating reserves. The kulaks prefer not to focus on grain right now. They are shrewder and focus not only on grain but also on machinery and so forth. We must take account of the fact that the muzhiks are not fools, that they aren't stupid.

What will have to be changed in the control figures? I believe that with regard to grain we can't agree with Comrade Veitser concerning the 610 million [poods] and we can't agree to the figure that was adopted at yesterday's session—650 million. I think both of these figures are wrong. We must leave the procurement plan at 700 million [poods]. We can't give in too much. I believe that February and January will yield a larger amount of procurements. The quantity of goods will be greater. If you can't refute the TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] figures, you have no grounds to cut the grain plan. There are bad road conditions in Ukraine today, but tomorrow they may not be bad. The peasants are doing the right thing—sunflowers should be the first thing they sell. When they don't have enough money, they'll sell groats, and then they'll start selling rye as well. I believe that cuts here must not be excessive, even though the control figures require 740 [million poods]. But this is unrealistic, this is unfulfillable. I don't rule out the possibility that we may not be able to collect 700 million, but we must not set a goal of less than 660–670. We may even get 700. Veitser is proposing a figure below last year. This is wrong.

Do you remember the case with the Crimea? The Crimean comrades wrote that the Crimea would starve, there were telegrams to this effect both in June and July, yet the grain procurements in the Crimea were better than last year. They will have to be prosecuted for this. How can we trust such officials? This is a crime, because we can't distrust officials in the provinces, yet we can't trust them. People who say such things should be flogged and put in prison, so that they think about what they need to say before they talk. We must definitely get those telegrams, and if it was done by high-ranking party comrades, the matter should be turned over to the Central Control Commission.<sup>46</sup> We must not give in to the provinces,

we must criticize them. They want to insure themselves, they come up with minimum plans, yet their actual capabilities are greater.

Still, I favor a cut in the grain-export plan. I am for the previous grain procurement plan and for a cut in the grain export plan. We will have to give more grain to the areas with poor crops by cutting exports. We will have to give Central Asia 10 million and the Northern Caucasus 8 million.

I'm afraid we're going to lose a lot of grain from the reserve. . . . We will have to cut grain exports and set a plan of about 90 million [poods] instead of 195 [million poods]. Last year we had a different situation; this year, since we have to form a grain reserve,<sup>47</sup> exports will be stronger in the second half of the year. So in the area of grain exports, I think, we should cut it to 90 million. We can talk about this amount. I am doing this because we must not fail to satisfy the domestic market with grain. We can't do anything else about this commodity, whereas we will do something about other commodities. . . .

• DOCUMENT 4 •

Report from the OGPU to the USSR Sovnarkom on the need to take repressive measures against private traders, 29 October 1927. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 6, d. 567, ll. 1–5. Copy.

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29 October 1927

Secret

To the Chairman of Sovnarkom A. I. Rykov<sup>48</sup>

The acute shortages at the markets, especially in industrial areas, of the most popular food items and consumer goods are attributable, aside from a number of other factors, in large measure to the speculation [*spekuliat-sia*] that has overtaken the most widespread procurement markets (flour, vegetable oil, raw leather and semifinished leather products, wool, yarn, etc.). Speculators extract large profits from the sale of goods in short supply at inflated prices at markets with abnormally high demand, allocate the funds received in this manner to procurements and disorganize the procurement markets through excessive increases in set prices, which in a number of cases brings about a sharp drop in state and cooperative procurements.

For example, in the grain procurement market of Samara Gubernia, private traders have raised set prices to 70 kopeks for a pood of wheat. As a

result, during August they dispatched more than 50 rail cars of wheat out of the gubernia just from the small station of Bezenchuk, while state and cooperative procurement agents did not dispatch a single rail car during the same period. In the leather market, when private traders are buying they are exceeding syndicate prices by 50 to 100 percent, posing a very real threat to fulfillment of the procurement program by the All-Union Leather Syndicate. In Crimea's wool market, private traders are exceeding procurement prices by as much as 200 percent.

In the grain-consuming markets the private traders' selling prices leave far behind them the maximum selling prices of state and cooperative organizations, which, given the shortages of goods in those organizations, interferes with measures to lower prices. In this case the private traders widely practice criminal methods of obtaining goods in short supply from state and cooperative organizations. This is adequately borne out by the cases recently completed by the OGPU in holding accountable employees of the Moscow shops of *Khleboprodukt* [Joint-Stock Company for Trade in Grain and Other Agricultural Goods] and the lower-level network of consumer cooperatives who released a large quantity of flour to private traders for bribes. As a result of the situation that has taken shape at procurement and consumer markets, the OGPU has received proposals from the USSR and RSFSR commissariats of trade, from the USSR and RSFSR VSNKhs, the All-Union Leather Syndicate, and the Moscow Gubernia Department [of the OGPU], as well as from local economic, party, and soviet organizations to take repressive measures against private traders who are derailing the procurement of agricultural products and supplies to the public at normal prices.

Below we quote excerpts from letters from the USSR VSNKh, signed by Comrade Rukhimovich, and from the Union Commissariat of Trade, signed by Comrade Kulikov, that point out the private traders' disruptive role and request that the OGPU take administrative measures, without which the market cannot be brought into the necessary equilibrium. The USSR VSNKh writes: "To supplement the letter from the presidium of the RSFSR VSNKh, the presidium of the USSR VSNKh deems it necessary, in order to create the necessary normal conditions for the development of raw-material procurements, to urgently carry out measures through the OGPU aimed at choking off and eliminating the activities of private traders in the raw-material procurement market." The Commissariat of Trade writes: "Considering the existence of speculation in raw leather in the market, the USSR Commissariat of Trade deems it necessary to take special measures through the OGPU aimed at combating speculation in leather goods."



Combating the above-mentioned criminal phenomena in the markets on the basis of normal court proceedings is yielding absolutely no results. This is attributable to the fact that the courts practically do not combat speculation, and the small number of cases that the OGPU turns over to the courts for their examination or that come to the courts from procurators' offices and regulatory agencies are not taken up by the courts until at least two or three months after they are received. Yet market conditions change sharply in a shorter time, and the procurement seasons come to an end as well, i.e., the cases are only heard when the acute need for repressive measures is over and the political purpose of a trial is lost.

What is needed here is the use of swift repressive measures that produce an immediate normalizing influence on the market. Therefore, while also taking into account the existing condition of the market and the appeals quoted above from regulatory and economic institutions, the OGPU, deeming it necessary to take action at the present time against speculating and criminal elements, submits for your approval the enclosed draft of a special decree.

At the same time the OGPU informs you that administrative measures are already being carried out in the textile market because of the exceptional gravity of market conditions there.

In addition to the measures proposed in the draft, the OGPU deems it expedient:

1. To prohibit the conveyance out of Moscow and the gubernia of food items and industrial goods in short supply by all types of transport and shipment, including the mail.

2. To strengthen the inspection and purging of the lower-level procurement and trade network.

3. To take action through the trade unions against trade union members who transmit cooperative or other documents to third parties enabling the latter to obtain goods in short supply for the purpose of resale.

Enclosure: draft decree.

OGPU Deputy Chairman Yagoda  
Director of OGPU Economic Directorate Prokofiev

Draft decree of the USSR Sovnarkom on intensifying the struggle against speculation and artificial price inflation in the area of procurements and the supply of the country with industrial and agricultural products

Top secret

In order to intensify the struggle against speculators and other criminal

elements in the area of procurements and the supply of the country with industrial and agricultural products and in order to normalize the procurement markets themselves, the USSR Council of People's Commissars resolves:

A. Instruct the OGPU to hold accountable on an administrative basis private procurement agents and merchants proven guilty of:

1. inflating procurement prices for food products and industrial raw materials;
2. speculating in consumer goods that are in severely short supply in the market;

Note: a commodity shall be classified as being in short supply by the USSR Commissariat of Trade in coordination with the OGPU.

3. violating current rules on trade and regulatory measures;
4. and [to hold accountable] officials who aid and abet them in committing the criminal acts enumerated in clauses 1–3.

B. Direct the procurator of the USSR Supreme Court to ensure the swiftest possible processing in the courts of cases involving:

1. officials guilty of failing to fulfill or violating plans for procurements and deliveries;
2. the inaction of officials of the relevant agencies in settling questions and fulfilling decrees in the area of the regulation of procurement and commercial markets.

Chairman of the USSR Sovnarkom A. I. Rykov

• DOCUMENT 5 •

Politburo directive "On Grain Procurements," 24 December 1927. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 666, ll. 10–12. Certified copy. Appendix to protocol no. 3 of the Politburo meeting on 29 December 1927.

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24 December 1927

Because of the drop in grain procurements in recent months, which is extremely dangerous for the state of the entire economy, [and] in order to fundamentally rectify the grains procurement situation as quickly as possible, the Politburo deems it necessary:

1. To urgently dispatch the maximum quantity of industrial goods to grain-growing areas throughout the coming period until spring by stripping cities and non-grain-growing areas (the task to be set should be to

dispatch 70 to 80 percent of industrial goods to grain-growing areas). To issue a completely rigorous and firm directive to central and local soviet bodies and local party organizations. Organizational measures must be carried out so that the transfer of industrial goods to the countryside brings about an increase specifically in grain procurements. The release of industrial goods by cooperatives to raions must be made contingent on the delivery of grain in each raion.

2. To instruct the Commissariat of Finance and party organizations to take all necessary measures to collect arrears from the peasantry on agricultural taxes, agricultural credit, insurance premiums, and other fees. To direct the Commissariat of Finance and local party organizations to complete the campaign for agricultural taxes by 1 March and, if possible, to complete the collection of insurance premiums by the same date.

3. To grant the people's commissar of foreign and internal trade, pending a special decree, the right to issue direct orders to local oblast and gubernia bodies with regard to the distribution of industrial goods, as well as the right of direct relations with the aforesaid bodies. At the same time the Commissariat of Trade shall be required to recruit the central bodies of cooperatives for preliminary review of its planned measures. All directives by the USSR Commissariat of Trade and its local bodies with regard to the distribution of industrial goods, both between trading organizations and among raions, shall be absolutely mandatory for all trading organizations, state and cooperative organizations, and for local soviet organizations as well.

4. To instruct the STO to ascertain the reasons for the decline in the output of light industry, particularly the textile industry, and to take the most decisive measures to increase the production of mass-market goods as much as possible in the immediate future.

5. [To instruct] local party organizations to take the necessary measures to expand the assortment of industrial goods being transferred to grain-growing areas by also increasing the delivery of goods from local and cottage industries.

6. To accelerate the issuance of a law increasing the size of shares in cooperatives in accordance with the Politburo decision of 30 November based on the results of market conditions.<sup>49</sup>

7. To instruct the STO, when approving the credit plan for the second quarter, to provide for a decrease in the money supply in circulation in the national economy.

8. To require local party bodies to oversee accurate and timely fulfillment of assignments that are issued for the shipment of grain and to forbid local bodies to impose bans or restrictions on the shipment of grain.

9. In view of the appearance of a number of articles in the press that are disrupting the market, to instruct Comrade Molotov together with Comrade Mikoian to implement measures to ensure the publication of information on the market in the press that would assist the implementation of measures to organize the market and help eliminate current difficulties.

10. To consider an increase in grain prices impermissible and to prohibit raising this question in the press or in soviet or party bodies.

11. For purposes of overseeing implementation of the aforementioned measures, to deem necessary the dispatch of responsible representatives (including CC members), supplied with mandates from the CC and STO, to the most important grain procurement areas. The representatives shall be granted the right to revoke decisions by local bodies that contradict the directives specified in this decree and to issue appropriate orders that are mandatory for local party and soviet bodies. To instruct the Secretariat of the CC, in coordination with Comrade Mikoian, to approve the composition of the aforesaid representatives, to ensure their departure no later than 30 December, and to instruct the Secretariat of the CC, together with Comrade Mikoian, to draw up directives within three days for increasing the involvement of soviets and cooperatives in the countryside in the entire campaign of grain procurements.

12. [To instruct] the Commissariat of Trade to report to the Politburo on 25 January on the progress of grain procurements and on the results of implementation of all measures.

• DOCUMENT 6 •

From a survey by the OGPU Information Department on the political situation in the USSR in December 1927, January 1928. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 5, d. 386, ll. 1-3, 15-45. Copy.

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January 1928

. . . Peasantry

A sharp drop in grain procurements was noted in December, caused mainly by a shortage of goods in the provinces at a time when substantial cash reserves are accumulating in the countryside from the sale of industrial crops. The measures by local [government] organs to increase grain procurements in some places have created the impression among broad

segments of the countryside that this is caused by famine, the threat of war, and so forth, and have increased discontent over the “scissors” effect.<sup>50</sup> The modest increase in procurement prices and the release of goods to people now delivering grain are creating grounds for an increase in discontent among the less prosperous groups in the countryside that have already sold their grain surpluses. Kulak and antisoviet elements are agitating for a “grain strike” and for “squeezing the city” until grain prices are raised.

The re-election campaign of KKOVs [Committees for Peasants Mutual Social Assistance] took place in most areas with little activity on the part of the poor and middle peasants, due to inaction by the KKOVs, little assistance from the poor in a number of cases, and poor preparation for the elections. In some places the poor were passive and did not oppose the agitation by kulaks for the abolition, and against the establishment, of KKOVs—agitation that in some places was successful among middle peasants (a number of decrees on the abolition of KKOVs). A high level of activity by the poor was noted in the elections of the Committees of Poor Peasants in Ukraine.<sup>51</sup>

In December some decline was noted in the countryside’s interest in questions of the party’s struggle against the opposition: statements by the antisoviet element defending opposition views (particularly on the basis of the goods famine and the “scissors” effect) are not widespread and do not exert significant influence.

The re-election campaign for the KKOVs during the reporting period, as well as the beginning of elections in cooperatives and the preparation for elections of soviets, have contributed to a revival of kulaks and antisoviet elements. This has been evident from the increase in the number of kulak groups (55 in December, as opposed to 24 in November) and the agitation for “peasant unions” (204 in December, as opposed to 170 in November). . . .

#### *Discontent over Interruptions in Supply*

In December the supply of food products deteriorated in a number of workers’ districts (Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Belorussia, the Urals), and a severe shortage of food is being felt in some places (Vladimir and Tver gubernias). There has also been a noticeable deterioration in the supply of basic necessities—textile goods, shoes, etc.

Lines for produce and textile goods have become a routine occurrence (the Central Region, Belorussia, Volga region, Transcaucasia), and crushing mobs and shouting matches have also become common. A number of cases have been reported in which women standing in line have fainted

(Saratov, Northern Caucasus Krai). In this connection conversations among women workers and workers' wives have been observed: "As soon as you think of going to the TsRK [Central Workers' Cooperative store], your heart skips a beat, because you never know when you're going to get crushed to a pulp" (Stalingrad); "The whole day is killed just for 10 pounds of flour, your husband comes home from work, and dinner isn't ready" (the settlement by the Red October plant). . . .

Antisoviet elements are actively trying to exacerbate the workers' discontent. For example, at the Red Branch [Krasnaia Vetka] factory in Ivanovo-Voznesensk this conversation was reported among a group of workers: "Now they've put us on rations, we need to get control of the government, soon we're going to toss out proclamations and call on the public to fight against the communists." A proclamation was found in Tver that said: "There's no butter, flour became available only recently, there's no kerosene, the people have been duped." The proclamation threatens a strike unless supplies are rectified.

### Central Region

#### *The Mood with Regard to Prices and the Goods Famine*

The question of the scissors effect continues to come up, mostly in grain-producing gubernias. Statements by representatives of prosperous groups and middle peasants maintain that the reduction that has occurred [in industrial prices] is inadequate. "Another reduction is necessary" (Tambov Gubernia). "For the price of a pood of grain you can still buy half a shirt" (Voronezh Gubernia). Discontent over the scissors effect is especially exacerbated by the lack of a sufficient quantity of goods, which have not yet gotten to the country markets: "In the summer, when the muzhiks had no money, all the shops had goods, but when fall came, people got money and the goods disappeared. At the consumers' cooperative [PO] they only sell members' coupon books at 10 rubles apiece, but you can buy goods only for 40 kopeks" (Voronezh Gubernia). In Kursk Gubernia, lower-level cooperatives in Graivoron Volost categorically refused to take advance payments for grain procurements, explaining that peasants don't want to deliver grain for money when they have earnings in hand from seasonal jobs. Because of the pressure by local organizations to increase grain procurements, the purchase of grain by the public is being observed in a number of raions of Kursk and Tula gubernias. In Tula Gubernia, the peasants' mood has become such that procurement agents come to the countryside for grain, and in some cases carts loaded with

grain that had been dispatched to the city came back from 100 versts away [107 km]. As a result of the measures to restrict private traders, kulaks, and antisoviet elements are agitating to the effect that “private grain delivery agents helped to strengthen the peasant economy, and now Soviet power is doing the opposite” (Tula Gubernia).

*Antisoviet Manifestations in the Countryside*

a. Agitation for “Peasant Unions.” Agitation for “peasant unions” continued to grow in December (91 instances, as opposed to 72 in November). More than 60 percent of all the statements in favor of a “peasant union” took place at various kinds of meetings. The largest number of instances of agitation for a “peasant union” continues to occur in Moscow Gubernia (38, as opposed to 32 in November). The statements primarily lay out demands for a “Red Trade Union” (23), price regulation (18), [are] of a political nature (15), and [demand] the replacement of the KKOv organization with a “peasant union,” 11.

b. Kulak groups. The establishment of ten kulak groups has been recorded (Tambov Gubernia, five; Voronezh Gubernia, five; Vladimir and Kaluga gubernias, one each), and eight of them were set up in connection with the elections of KKOvs and cooperatives.

Two opposition groups made up of former members of the VKP(b) and former members of the VLKSM [Young Communist League] have appeared in Voronezh Gubernia. Group members regularly conduct antisoviet agitation at the club and at the bazaar, advancing opposition slogans.

c. Mass disturbances. A mass disturbance in the village of Peski, Tambov Gubernia, deserves attention. A crowd of 400 peasants tried to impose mob law [*samosud*] on a thief who had been caught at the bazaar. During the crowd action antisoviet elements conducted agitation: “We must smash the government, it breeds thieves, it just defends the interests of workers. Long live the Union of Working Peasantry! Long live the party of peasants! Smash all the Yids who are against the peasantry!” (see appendix).<sup>52</sup>

d. Proclamations. In Voronezh Gubernia, three proclamations opposing the expulsion of Zinoviev and Trotsky from the party were discovered in the village soviet of Kon-Kolodez and Khlebnoe. [. . .]<sup>53</sup>

Ukraine

[. . .] *Grain Procurements and Goods Famine*

After some increase in grain shipments in previous months, a significant drop in grain shipments to the market was noted in December. Based on

the shortage of essential goods during the period of maximum accumulation of money and grain and raw-material reserves, provocative rumors circulated in the countryside to the effect that “the Yids and the government have deliberately hidden the goods in order to cheat the peasants later” and so forth. Kulaks and well-to-do peasants are making use of instances of discontent over the goods famine to intensify agitation for the abolition of cooperatives, for refusal to ship grain, and for an expansion of private commerce. The meager grain shipments were also attributable to the weak pressure in the collection of arrears on various payments from the well-to-do groups in the countryside. In the village of Yurievka, Lugansk Okrug, kulaks who each have 1,000–2,000 and more poods of grain are saying: “We’re going to wait for a year when grain prices go up to three rubles a pood.” Speculation by kulaks and well-to-do peasants on the grain-price gap between grain-producing and -consuming areas has been noted. With the establishment of a sleigh trail, kulaks are milling grain into flour and dispatching bread by cart to the northern okrugs of Ukraine, to Briansk Gubernia, and to other industrial centers. Since restrictions were imposed on the milling of peasants’ grain at state mills, speculation has declined significantly. The ban on milling grain into top grades of flour has caused harsh antisoviet agitation by kulaks trying to turn the entire peasantry against this measure and to organize pressure on the highest [government] organs to revoke the restriction on milling.

The latest measures to increase grain procurements (pressure on delinquent payers of levies that are mandatory for the peasantry and so forth) have caused various provocative rumors spread by the kulaks about war, about famine in the north, about a return to war communism, and so forth. The modest increase in procurement prices for grain has caused discontent among the poor who have already sold their surpluses. At a peasants’ meeting in Turov Raion, Kiev Okrug, a poor peasant, to universal approval, said that “Soviet power, by raising the price of grain from 80 kopeks to 1 ruble a pood after the poor already sold their grain, has cheated peasants, so Soviet power should not be given a single pound of grain.”

#### *Antisoviet Manifestations: Peasant Unions*

In the first three weeks of December, 28 statements in favor of a “peasant union” have been reported in 13 districts in Ukraine: there were 13 statements at meetings and conferences, including 7 in connection with a discussion of the manifesto.<sup>54</sup> An antisoviet group that agitated for a “peasant union” in one unit of the First Cavalry Corps (Proskurov) de-



serves attention. Members of the group have repeatedly demanded during political discussions that “a ‘peasant union’ be established”; the head of the group—a well-to-do peasant—said during one discussion: “We will never arrive at socialism, we need to make a second revolution.” Members of this group have now been discharged. In the village of Preobrazhenskoe, Zaporozhie Okrug, a kulak is agitating among peasants to the effect that “the opposition offers peasants the freedom to establish peasant unions and the freedom to set up groups.”

### *Kulak Groups*

Four groups were re-established in December, including two on the basis of the preparation for the elections of village soviets (Berdichev and Korosten okrugs) and two agitating for a “peasant union” (Dnepropetrovsk and Lugansk okrugs).

### *Antisoviet Proclamations*

Three instances were reported in December in which religious and monarchic proclamations of local origin appeared (Krivoy Rog, Shepetovka, and Poltava okrugs).

### *Terror*

Thirteen terrorist incidents were reported, including five murders. In six cases the terror was directed against officials in the lower-level soviet apparatus. In one case the premises of a Komsomol cell were smashed up. In Shepetovka Okrug, members tried to beat up a Komsomol activist whom they suspected of having ties with the OGPU.

## Northern Caucasus

### *Progress of the Tax Campaign*

The inflow of agricultural taxes in December was poor. In Armavir Okrug, only 81.2 percent of the assignment had been fulfilled by the second payment deadline; in Kuban Okrug, there are a significant number of class 1 delinquents in a series of raions: Korenevo Raion has over 3,700, Pavlovsk Raion has more than 5,000, and up to 40 percent of farms have been distrained for nonpayment. Most of the delinquents remain absolutely unpunished. A sharp dip in the rate of inflow of taxes occurred after the TsIK [USSR Central Executive Committee] manifesto was published, which can be attributed to the expectation of tax reductions not only for low-income groups but also for well-to-do groups. A typical

statement is: "Declare who owes what under the manifesto, then you can collect."

An equally substantial reason for the poor inflow of the YeSKhN [Unified Agricultural Tax]<sup>55</sup> has been the inadequate pressure on payers, especially well-to-do peasants and kulaks, by village soviets. A fair number of village soviets have refused to exert pressure on nonpayers. Frequently village soviet members themselves do not pay [the tax] on time, and in these cases as well no pressure is exerted on the nonpayers. The situation regarding the inflow of premiums to Gosstrakh [Main State Insurance Administration] is even worse.

*Improper Distribution of Reductions under the Manifesto*

A number of shortcomings have been reported in connection with the distribution of reductions under the [USSR Central Executive Committee] manifesto. In the village of Vostochnaia, Kuban Okrug, strong, middle peasants were exempted from taxes while poor peasants were not exempted and were taxed at 1–2 rubles each. In a number of instances employees of raion executive committees and village soviets with strong farms have been exempted from taxes at the expense of the poor.

*Antisoviet Manifestations in the Countryside: Agitation for "Peasant Unions"*

According to incomplete information, 16 cases (as opposed to 19 in November) [of agitation] for a "peasant union" were reported in 7 okrugs in December. Eight cases [of agitation] for a "peasant union" took place at meetings and conferences. Among the demands for establishment of a "peasant union," demands for the "peasant union" to regulate prices are predominant (7 out of the 16). There were reports of two calls for a "peasant union" on the basis of discontent over the large benefits under the USSR Central Executive Committee manifesto for workers (Salsk and Don okrugs) and one case [of agitation] for a "peasant union" in connection with opposition activity (Maikop Okrug). In the village [stanitsa]<sup>56</sup> of Prochnookopskaia, Armavir Okrug, the agitation for a "peasant union" was repeatedly discussed at meetings of the Hunters union, which is comprised of 130 well-to-do peasants; one member of this union told a group of fellow villagers: "If we organize a grain growers' union, it will be such a force that in no time at all it will take control of the country and will trade with every country, then things won't be like they are now, when there aren't even any textile goods."

*Kulak Groups*

Seven kulak and antisoviet groups have manifested themselves in Armavir, Donets, and Stavropol okrugs, and five of them ran in the elections for the boards of cooperatives (four in Donets, one in Stavropol). The four groups that ran in the cooperative elections in Donets Okrug suffered defeats, except for one in the village of Verkhne-Talovskaia, where the group succeeded in keeping the old chairman of the board in place—a protégé of the kulaks.

*Counterrevolutionary Proclamations*

In the village of Novo-Kubanskoe, Armavir Okrug, a proclamation with counterrevolutionary content, entitled “Notice from the Revolutionary Center,” was discovered on a telegraph pole near the home of a village activist.

## Volga Region

*Progress of Grain Procurements and Discontent over Low Grain Prices*

Despite grain surpluses that are concentrated primarily among the well-to-do and strong middle peasants, grain deliveries have been poor. In cases of extreme need, peasants sell livestock while holding on to their grain (Samara and Penza gubernias). There has been a tendency by kulak and well-to-do segments of the countryside (Samara Gubernia) to “squeeze the city,” a desire to make use of the difficulties with grain procurements in order to raise grain prices: “Peasants expected the price of grain to be three rubles [per] pood—then peasants, once they sold their grain, could buy the necessary goods. But now peasants won’t sell grain—eventually Soviet power will have second thoughts and will meet the peasants halfway by setting higher prices for grain.”

Similar attitudes can be seen among a segment of the middle peasants (Melekes and Buguruslan uezds, Samara Gubernia). In anticipation of grain price increases by spring, they are not selling grain, while accusing the government of “depreciating peasant labor.”

*Goods Famine*

The severe shortage of industrial goods, especially textile goods, that is evident in every gubernia of the Volga region continues to generate severe discontent and criticism of cooperatives and Soviet power by broad strata of the countryside. “At every meeting we hear that there are a lot of goods and the factories and plants have exceeded the prewar level, but in reality

there are no goods—now we can't trust these fairy tales anymore" (Astrakhan Gubernia). The release of textile goods only to cooperative members who have contributed a full share (Penza Gubernia) and its distribution above all among office employees of the cooperatives are also causing severe discontent among the peasantry, primarily the poor, who in most cases have not contributed a full share and therefore remain unsatisfied with regard to their need for textile goods and other products: "Goods are not released to us poor peasants because we aren't shareholders, but since we are poor we can't contribute a full share."

*Antitax Agitation by Kulaks and Well-to-Do Peasants*

The use of coercive measures against persistent nonpayers (distrainment or seizure of property) has intensified agitation among kulaks and well-to-do peasants to refuse to pay agricultural taxes. Several attempts by kulaks to create mass disturbances while property seizures were carried out have been reported (Samara and Astrakhan gubernias). At a general meeting in the village of Chulpan, Astrakhan Gubernia, peasant fishermen, incited by well-to-do peasants ("Soviet power is squeezing us dry") refused to pay taxes.

*Antisoviet Manifestations*

a. Groups. Thirteen kulak groups appeared during the reporting period (as opposed to seven in November). Nine of them were set up in connection with the re-election of cooperatives, three to oppose taxes, and one to oppose land reorganization [*zemleustroistvo*].

In the village of Verkhny Baskunchak, Astrakhan Gubernia, a group of kulaks (comprising a former secretary of the village soviet, the board chairman of a consumers' cooperative, and 13 kulaks) at a general meeting rejected the candidacies of the poor peasants and pushed through its own protégés onto the board and chairmanship of the consumers' cooperative. In the village of Grachi in the same gubernia, a kulak triumvirate, with the support of kulaks, voted down the poor peasants' slate of candidates and pushed through its own candidates. In the village of Voskresenka (Samara Gubernia), a kulak group pushed through its own representatives in an agricultural credit association.

b. "Peasant Unions." Twelve cases [of agitation] for "peasant unions" were recorded during the reporting period (as opposed to six in November). In two instances a "peasant union" was promoted as a substitute for the KKOv. "The current peasants' committees are dead organizations. Peasants, like workers, should have their own organization—peasant committees on a nationwide scale" (Saratov Gubernia).

## Siberia

*Attitudes toward Grain Procurements*

Grain deliveries continue to be poor in most okrugs. The main reasons that well-to-do and, in part, middle-level segments of the countryside are holding on to grain, apart from a number of objective reasons (a worse harvest than last year, a bad road season that in most okrugs lasts more than a month and impedes grain deliveries, etc.), are still the shortage of industrial goods and the waiting for grain prices to rise. The introduction by the Siberian Krai Trade Administration of a new classification of grains that provides for a small decrease in prices for high-grade wheat and the violation by some procurement agents of syndicate prices have especially strengthened wait-and-see attitudes: "Maybe the price will go up, since the procurement agents' prices are unstable" (Barnaul Okrug); "I'm sure the state will raise the price of grain anyway" (a kulak, also in Barnaul Okrug). In addition to this, secondary agricultural products (meat, skins, firewood, and others) are being shipped to the market to meet pressing needs and for purposes of payments (taxes, insurance, etc.).

*Discontent over the Goods Famine*

The acute shortages in lower-level cooperatives of industrial goods, above all textiles, as well as soap, salt, tea, window glass, and other items, continues to cause severe discontent among broad strata of the countryside. Goods that village cooperatives receive in small quantities are quickly snatched up by the public; in certain instances the militia has to be summoned to keep order when the goods are released (Barnaul Okrug). In a number of raions peasants come to cooperatives every day to find out whether good [*sic*] have come in (Tomsk Okrug and others). The release of textile goods only to members of cooperatives is causing severe discontent among the rest of the public who do not belong to cooperatives: "The state is releasing goods because it wants to get 100 percent of the population into cooperatives" (Tomsk Okrug). In Bolotnoe Raion, Tomsk Okrug, the lack of goods at cooperatives has produced a sense among the public that money is unstable. When peasant shareholders deliver grain to the credit association, they immediately buy agricultural machinery, even if it is out of season, declaring: "What's this money good for, it's unreliable."

Because of the goods famine, discontent has intensified over the changeover to a seven-hour workday: "There are no goods in the shops as it is, and with a seven-hour workday there won't be any goods at all" (Minusinsk Okrug). "The muzhik's neck will carry the weight. With a seven-

hour workday there will be empty shops right away, and then what will happen” (Barabinsk Okrug). Agitation by kulaks is intensifying: “If peasants were organized into some organization and said with one voice that we will not deliver grain to you for this price, workers would sit with their goods and croak from starvation, and then they’d forget about a seven-hour workday” (Barnaul Okrug). In Irkutsk Okrug there were reports of three statements by well-to-do peasants agitating for the establishment of “peasant unions” and “associations” to sell peasants’ products. A number of similar statements by middle peasants were also reported. . . .

#### *Antisoviet Manifestations: Terror*

A substantial decrease in the number of terrorist incidents occurred in December (16, down from 35, including 1 murder). In 5 instances the terror was directed against tax officials. The largest number of terrorist incidents occurred in Minusinsk and Tomsk okrugs.

#### *Peasant Unions*

Fifteen instances of agitation for the establishment of a peasant union were reported, including four statements at meetings (for the re-election of KKOv and others). What is of interest are the statements for “peasant unions” that refer to the fact that this is being proposed by the opposition (Tulun [typo in original; should be Tulunsky—translator], Minusinsk, Barabinsk okrugs).

#### *Antisoviet Groups*

Six kulak groups manifested themselves in December; four of them spoke out during the elections of KKOv and cooperatives. A group of kulaks in the village of Orskaia, Novosibirsk Okrug, made use of shortcomings in the work of the local consumers’ cooperative to conduct broad agitation among shareholders for them to quit the cooperative, as a result of which 30 shareholders, along with the aforementioned group, gave notice of their resignation; thanks of [*sic*] measures taken by the party cell, the notices were withdrawn. The group is preparing for the new re-election of the council. In Omsk and Barnaul okrugs, there are reports of two opposition groups comprised of former members of the VKP(b) that are circulating opposition proclamations (Omsk) and conducting opposition work among the public and individual village communists. [ . . . ]

OGPU Deputy Chairman Yagoda

For the SOU director: director of INFO of the OGPU Alekseyev

• DOCUMENT 7 •

OGPU directive to arrest private grain procurement agents and merchants,  
4 January 1928. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 6, d. 982, l. 99. Telegram.

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4 January 1928

No. 6715

To the Siberian PP [plenipotentiary representative office] of the OGPU, the Urals PP of the OGPU, the Northern Caucasus Krai PP of the OGPU, Ukrainian SSR GPU, GPU of the Volga Germans, the Tatar Dept. of the OGPU, Voronezh GO [Gubernia Department], Tambov GO, Saratov GO, Samara GO, Ulianovsk GO, Orenburg GO, Penza GO, Stalingrad GO, Oryol GO, Kursk GO, Tula GO, Vladimir GO, Kostroma GO, Yaroslavl GO, Tver GO, Ivanovo-Voznesensk GO, Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic GPU, Belorussian SSR GPU, Leningrad Military District PP of the OGPU, Central Asian PP of the OGPU, Kazakhstan PP of the OGPU

Instructions are hereby issued to immediately arrest, with assent of gubernia committees, the most prominent private grain procurement agents and most inveterate grain merchants (the latter are few in number) who are disrupting set procurement and market prices, as well as those who are violating the rules of economic regulation on transport [and] other rules of commerce. The investigation is to be conducted swiftly and conclusively. Send cases [to] the Special Conference.<sup>57</sup> Report immediately the results of the influence [of the arrests] on the market.

OGPU Deputy Chairman Yagoda

• DOCUMENT 8 •

CC directive to party organizations on grain procurements, 5 January 1928.  
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 667, ll. 10–12. Certified copy. Appendix to  
protocol no. 4 of the meeting of the Politburo. (The directive was  
sent out to the provinces on 6 January 1928.)

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5 January 1928

Secret

Despite firm CC directives issued twice to increase grain procurements,<sup>58</sup> there has still been no turnaround at all in the progress of grain procurements. The pace of work by local organizations is intolerably

slow, lethargy is still continuing, the lower-level apparatus has not yet buckled down, the cooperatives are not performing their elementary duties, the levers of the government and the party have not been set in motion, and the supply of industrial goods has not been placed in the service of grain procurements. Peasant communists and soviet and cooperative activists have not sold all of their surpluses, and state and collective farms have not shipped out all of their marketable grain, either—in fact there have been instances when they have sold grain to private traders. Despite [the passing of] deadlines for payments by peasants to the state, agricultural taxes, insurance premiums, seed loans, and scheduled payments on agricultural credit have not yet been collected, which attests to a lax approach by party, soviet, and cooperative bodies and to the weakness of their influence in the countryside.

The CC proceeded on the basis of these glaring omissions when it required you, in its directives dated 14 December and 24 December, to organize a decisive turnaround in grain procurements. More than three weeks have passed since then, and there has been no turnaround whatsoever.

All this indicates that you have, completely impermissibly, forgotten your basic revolutionary obligations to the party and the proletariat in this matter.

Having pointed out these facts, the CC requires you to achieve a decisive turnaround in grain procurements within a week from the time this directive is received. The CC will regard any excuses or references to holidays or the like as a gross violation of party discipline.

The CC directs that:

1. The yearly and monthly assignments of the Commissariat of Trade for grain procurements in your gubernia (or okrug) be accepted for firm fulfillment. All current directives by the Commissariat of Trade are to be carried out without delay.

2. All orders by the USSR Commissariat of Trade on grain shipments be fulfilled with the strictest precision and on schedule.

3. All previous CC instructions regarding the removal of monetary reserves from the countryside be accepted for implementation; deadlines be shortened as much as possible for all payments by the peasantry to the treasury on taxes, insurance, and seed loans; deferrals on loan obligations to the credit system not be allowed and the collection of advance payments for industrial goods and agricultural machinery that are coming in be organized; early remittances of all payments be obtained while simultaneously launching a campaign to popularize peasant loans and [the pur-



chase of] cooperative shares; additional local levies be established immediately on the basis of laws on self-taxation.<sup>59</sup>

4. When arrears are collected on any kind of payments, harsh penalties be imposed immediately, above all against the kulaks. Special repressive measures are imperative in regard to kulaks and speculators who disrupt agricultural prices.

5. All of the party's best forces be mobilized without delay, including members of the bureaus of gubernia, okrug, and raion committees, as well as the presidiums of executive committees, for the purpose of comprehensively strengthening grain procurements and keeping them at the procurement site until a decisive turnaround occurs.

6. Personal accountability be established on the part of the leaders of party, soviet, and cooperative organizations for fulfillment of assignments on procurements that have been issued to them, immediately removing those of them who do not display the capacity and ability to achieve success in grain procurements.

7. A prolonged campaign on grain procurements be organized in the press, concentrating on resolute and systematic criticism of deficiencies in the grain procurement campaign, especially specific instances of shortcomings in the work of institutions and persons who are guilty of negligence, of impeding and derailing grain procurements, without, however, allowing panic to occur among the peasant masses or in the cities.

The CC warns you that any delay in carrying out this directive or failure to achieve real successes regarding a decisive turnaround in grain procurements within a week may confront the CC with the necessity of replacing the current leaders of party organizations.

The CC is to be notified forthwith that this directive has been received and on measures that have been taken.

CC Secretary I. Stalin

• DOCUMENT 9 •

Summary report no. 5 by the EKV<sup>60</sup> of the OGPU on the grain procurement campaign of 1927–28 and the mood of the peasantry, 11 January 1928.

TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 6, d. 53, ll. 76–86. Original.

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11 January 1928

1. *Samara Gubernia*. Based on a report dated 6 January. Samara Gubernia is located in a ring of [grain-] consuming gubernias (Ulianovsk,

Ufa, Saratov, Urals, and the Tatar Republic), as a result of which grain has been and is being sent to these gubernias in large shipments from the border raions of Samara Gubernia. The enormous price difference (up to 5–6 rubles per pood of flour) has created an incentive not only for private capitalists but also for the peasants themselves to cart flour hundreds of versts to sell it in those gubernias. Such an enormous movement of grain has disrupted the grain procurements of state procurement agents, to whom no one wanted to deliver grain at set prices.

In the internal market private capitalists, in exactly the same manner, have removed large consignments, paying up to two rubles a pood and forwarding the grain by rail to various locations. Numerous instances have been reported in which grain is bought up and milled into flour by peasants, mostly kulaks and the well-to-do (called “maklaki” [middlemen]), who travel around the villages, buy up small quantities of grain, grind 100–200 poods each at mills, and carry them out to city markets. According to rough estimates, in recent months private traders have removed 480,000 poods of grain from the market, primarily wheat.

Railroad food supply agents buy a pood or two of flour apiece and thereby cause a great disruption in the market.

At the same time the activities of private meat merchants are worth noting. During the procurement period they collected 330,000 poods of meat (private traders collected 5,400 tons, as against 14,000 tons in total procurements by state procurement agents under the 1927–28 [economic year] plan). At various locations there are large groups of private traders who have a far-flung network of agents (up to 70 people), and they ship meat off by the dozens of railroad cars. Their sales reach into the hundreds of thousands of rubles. The advantageous ratio between grain and meat prices creates an incentive for peasants to pour meat into the market instead of grain.

### The Mood of the Peasantry

The situation regarding grain procurements and the goods market has created an atmosphere in the countryside in which the question of grain and goods is central. The most common opinion among the peasants is that they should hold on to grain until spring, when prices for it should rise. Given these wait-and-see attitudes, the lack of goods and the fact that peasants have money are resulting in an extremely poor flow of grain procurements.

The fact that peasants have grain is indisputable, despite the poor har-

vest that occurred in a number of raions of gubernias. For example, in Yekaterinovka Raion there is a grain surplus of up to 100,000 poods, which is concentrated among the stronger segments of the peasantry and middle peasants. Certain peasants have grain reserves of as much as 2,000–3,200 poods. The kulak and well-to-do segments of the countryside are beginning to take on the mood of “squeezing the city,” which also manifests itself in the fact that these strata want to make use of our difficulties for the purposes of their own well-being. Typical talk by a well-to-do peasant in Voskresenskoe, Samara Uezd, with factory workers at a bazaar: “At the present time you workers aren’t giving us peasants the necessary industrial goods and the basic necessities, and what is available you’re not selling at prewar prices, so right now you won’t get anything from us. We well know that you’ll need grain in the spring anyway and then you will give us the price we ask.”

Besides these attitudes, there have been reports of increased discontent with the cities, mainly on the part of middle peasants, and charges that the government “depreciates peasants’ labor.”

“Peasant grain is extremely cheap, and the workers’ industrial goods are very expensive, and the government buys up all the grain on the cheap and sends it abroad, but doesn’t give the peasants anything for this. If war comes, the other peasants and I will definitely fight, but then we’re going to restore rule by peasants alone, so that peasants don’t live this way, under the workers’ oppression” (middle peasant Osmankin, Buguruslan Uezd).

“Peasants aren’t taking their grain to the market, because they’ve been taught by last year’s bitter experience, when all their grain was bought from them dirt cheap. Just like then, the state is not giving peasants any goods now, so the peasants will do all they can to delay the delivery of grain.”

Discontent with the situation has also been noted among certain poor peasants and individual handicraftsmen. Typical in this respect is the talk of a number of poor peasants in Buguruslan Uezd, the point of which boils down to the fact that: “Peasants are doing the right thing in not taking grain to the market. Soviet power is to blame for this, because in its ten-year existence it hasn’t been able to put industry on a firm track.”

2. *Kursk Gubernia*. Based on a report dated 3 January. Through 20 December 1927 (the end of the second ten-day period of the month), 11,393,000 poods of grain products had been procured in Kursk Gubernia, which is 51.8 percent of the annual plan. This December, just as last month, the inflow of grain products to the market has been poor, mostly

rye and oats, and this is attributable to a number of factors: on the one hand, the inadequate supply of the markets with industrial goods, and on the other, the peasantry is meeting its material needs with funds received from the sale of other agricultural products and with earnings received [from work] at the sugar mills. It should be noted, however, that an increase in grain procurements over the first ten-day period of December has been noted. For example, 336,000 poods of various grain products were procured in the third ten-day period of November, 417,000 poods in the first ten-day period of December, and 504,000 poods in the second ten-day period. To increase the pace of grain procurements, local organizations are taking all the necessary measures, in particular, industrial goods, mostly textile goods, are being sent to the grain-growing raions of the gubernia. The results of these measures should have an effect in the immediate future.

Because of the inadequate delivery of grain products to the market, private grain procurement agents have intensified their activities and are carrying out procurements at increased prices, thereby disrupting the market and complicating the work of plan-oriented state and cooperative procurement agents.

The following has been noted in the work of grain procurement organizations this December: (a) The Gostorg [State Trade Agency] procurement center in Rylsk is conducting procurements of vetch at a price of 86 kopeks per pood, whereas the established price of it is 80 kopeks per pood. This is being done in order to capture the greatest quantity of vetch and to prevent its shipment to the Khleboprodukt centers that operate there. (b) The Nizhnee Smorodino Agricultural Credit Association in Ponyri Volost, Kursk Uezd, for an undetermined reason, is procuring grain products at reduced prices—for example, rye at a price of 75 kopeks a pood, oats 66 kopeks a pood, millet 64 kopeks a pood, buckwheat 34 kopeks a pood, and hemp 1 ruble 15 kopeks a pood.

3. *Tula Gubernia*. Based on a report dated 4 January. Grain procurements around the gubernia are poor. The main reasons for the peasantry's meager delivery of grain to the market is the peasantry's relatively plentiful supply of money and the lack of industrial goods in the countryside. In this situation the pace of grain procurements in December continues to be very slow.

4. *Ulianovsk Gubernia*. Based on a report dated 2 January. Procurements around the gubernia are poor. For example, in November the procurement plan was fulfilled by 7.2 percent, and from 1 December through

21 December it was 4 percent fulfilled. We should list the following reasons for the poor supply of grain by the peasantry: (1) The dry weather that prevailed during the winter-crop planting season created a wait-and-see attitude among peasants. (2) The price reductions mandated by the Commissariat of Trade last September have had the most negative effect on the supply of grain. (3) The reduction of state obligations, the deferment of tax-payment deadlines, and so forth have made things substantially easier for producers and, to a considerable extent, have deprived them of an incentive to deliver grain to the market. (4) Economic factors that have caused a decrease in grain deliveries basically boil down to the following: in the months since the grain harvest there have been increased sales of secondary agricultural products and livestock products, which are the most profitable for peasants than [*sic*] the sale of their grain surpluses. The price of livestock, which has nearly doubled (in November 1926 a cow cost an average of 77 rubles, while this November it cost 120 rubles), the sturdier condition of the peasant economy, outside earnings, and higher prices for workers and cart deliveries naturally have not provided an incentive to increase grain deliveries.

Market prices for rye, which were stable last July and August and dropped by 6 kopeks a pood in September, already rose significantly in October. Rye prices at some markets reached 1 ruble 30 kopeks a pood (an increase of up to 60 kopeks over the July-August prices). Wheat prices, because of increased demand and a poor harvest, have also been rising steadily. At some markets wheat prices are as much as 1 ruble 38 kopeks higher than during the summer months.

There is an even wider gap between the prices for grain and for processed products. At present the average price for rye is 76 kopeks, whereas rye flour and sifted flour go as high as 1 ruble 80 kopeks a pood. This factor has also affected the delivery of grain by the peasantry. The peasantry, taking account of the profitability of selling its surpluses in processed form, is reducing the supply of rye and wheat to almost zero.

The lack of a grain reserve with room to maneuver, the poor implementation by the Commissariat of Trade and local procurement agents of the plan for internal gubernia supplies, and the fact that the gubernia has raions with poor harvests and grain-consuming raions and is adjacent to the Chuv[ash] Republic and Nizhny Novgorod Gubernia allow no opportunity to eliminate the existing price gap. The supply of cities and of workers' and grain-consuming raions with grain has been poor, and speculation

in processed products by private traders and, in part, by lower-level cooperatives has been observed. The gubernia's distilling industry, which is inadequately supplied with raw material (grain), has systematically violated procurement prices. An enormous gap has opened up between procurement and set prices. There has been a tense international situation in recent months and the danger of war. All of the above-mentioned factors have resulted in a decline in supply by the peasantry.

The private merchant's role in the 1927 grain procurement campaign (in recent months) has been mainly to process grain, particularly common and hulled millet, where the private merchant, taking advantage of the enormous price gap between grain and processed products, has successfully and intensively developed his procurement operations.

The standard set by the Commissariat of Trade for commercial expenditures, overhead, and other outlays for 1927-28 [economic year] must not exceed 48 kopeks per centner. *Khleboprodukt* alone exceeded this maximum by 7 rubles 36 kopeks per centner.

5. *Penza Gubernia*. Based on a report dated 31 December 1927. The increased delivery of grain that was noted in August and September has dropped sharply since October. For example, in November the plan was fulfilled to a level of only 10.8 percent. And since the beginning of the campaign all procurement agents have procured 3,012,000 poods, or 17.7 percent of the yearly plan.

The main reasons that have affected the negative aspect of grain procurements are: (1) An acute shortage of industrial goods, particularly textile goods. (2) Low prices for grain compared with prices for industrial goods. (3) The unrestricted participation of private traders in grain procurements. (4) Increased talk among the peasantry about war, and in this connection the peasantry's tendency to hold on to grain surpluses. (5) Inadequate pressure exerted by tax and other [government] organizations. (6) Bad road conditions during October and November.

6. *Stalingrad Gubernia*. Based on a report dated 5 January. Despite favorable aspects regarding grain procurements and the good roads that have been established, the progress of the procurement campaign is still far from satisfactory. The total of all crops procured from the beginning of the campaign through 1 December 1927 was 42,537 tons, which is 39 percent of the overall plan.

The pace of procurements has especially slowed in recent [months]—November and December. A total of 11,460 tons of all crops were procured in September, 1,694 tons in October, and 3,235 tons in November.

Numerical data for December are not yet complete, but it will yield a drop to 70 percent as compared with November.

The main reason for the poor delivery of grain products of late, as is noted throughout the gubernia, is the wide difference between prices for grain products and prices for secondary agricultural products, such as meat, pork, poultry, hay, and others. Intensive purchases of pork and cattle are under way in Ust-Medveditskaia Okrug. In Khoper Okrug, due to the operation of a cannery that consumes 50,000 poods of meat, plus the procurement of livestock for the external market, which increases the sale of livestock by the public and reduces the shipment of grain out of the gubernia [*sic*].

The second reason is the limited delivery to this point of industrial goods to grain procurement raions, particularly textile goods, as a result of which the public has been heard to utter such remarks as: "We aren't being given a chance to buy necessities, so we're going to sow less grain" (Ust-Medveditskaia and Khoper okrugs).

In late December Stalingrad Gubernia received three railroad cars loaded with textile goods that were specifically intended to stimulate grain procurements and were distributed by the gubernia internal trade administration among the cooperative organizations of grain procurement raions, with a warning that the goods be sold to peasants who have delivered grain to state and cooperative organizations. From the very outset this measure yielded a number of negative incidents. In the village [*stanitsa*] of Archadinskaia, Ust-Medveditskaia Okrug, after the above-mentioned measures were announced a crowd of peasants assembled in front of the consumers' cooperative and screamed abuse at the government: "The government doesn't know how to harass the people, so what it's thought of is not to give any goods at all for money. We've won the best result—there's nothing to buy with our money, and everybody says that Soviet money is reliable." As a result of discontent, textile goods have been lying at the consumers' cooperative since 23 December without movement, since nobody is bringing in grain to exchange for them. In Khoper Okrug, this measure caused the following incident. On 31 December 1927, while a large crowd filled the store of the Smychka consumers' cooperative, cries rang out: "Get the sales clerks out from behind the counter and take the goods. All of this was bought with our money." The poor are also discontented. They say: "With each passing day life gets worse. Soviet power changes its practices toward peasants with each passing day. First they said sign up with the cooperatives, they'll give out goods to members, and now they're giving out goods only for grain, but we delivered all of

our grain back in the fall, when there were no textile goods, and now they're not giving any out." Similar incidents can be observed in other raions of the gubernia as well.

On 27 December 1927, two proclamations with the slogan "Famine threatens the village!" were discovered in Nikolaevsk Uezd. The two proclamations are of a similar nature, they are handwritten and say that the public is forbidden to ship goods out of the village, people carrying any bundle are detained, but the mill dispatches grain in all directions. It's a trust, the proclamation says, it's allowed, yet people are starving. Cooperatives are being organized, private traders aren't wanted, but private traders are the ones who kept your village going, and so forth.

7. *Siberian Krai*. Based on a report dated 3 January. Total procurements of grain products in Siberia from the beginning of the campaign through 10 December 1927 amounted to 336,660 tons of various crops, which is 25.5 percent of the yearly plan and 39 percent of the calendar plan. Fulfillment of the calendar plan for procurements by individual procurement agents was as follows: Khleboprodukt, 41 percent; Sibkraisoiuz,<sup>61</sup> 63 percent; Selskосоiuz [All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives],<sup>62</sup> 76 percent; Sibtorg [Siberian Trade Administration], 50 percent; Maslozhirsindikát [Oil and Fat Syndicate], 74 percent; Meltrest [Mill Trust], 74 percent.

The chief reason for underfulfillment of the procurement plan is the inadequate supply of industrial goods. As a result of the overall growth of the economy, the purchasing power of the countryside is growing: from 168 million in 1925–26 [economic year] to 235 million rubles in 1927–28 [economic year] (according to control figures of the Siberian Planning Committee for 1927–28 [economic year]).

Whereas the procurement plan for 1927–28 [economic year] increased over 1926–27 [economic year], the delivery of goods declined significantly.

From the start of the campaign throughout the first quarter, there were increased sales by peasants of flax, skins, meat, and other agricultural products, which substantially exceeded 1926–27 [economic year]. As a result of the latter factor, as well as the lack of pressure to collect overdue loans that the public has in the form of money and in kind from Selkredit [Agricultural Credit Association], Gosselsklad [State Agricultural Warehouse], and Selskосоiuz, a certain cash glut has formed among the public that has a negative effect on procurements.

Assistant director of [4th] section of EKV of the OGPU Ivanov  
Plenipotentiary Tizenberg



• DOCUMENT 10 •

CC directive to local organizations on intensification of measures with regard to grain procurements, 14 January 1928. *Izvestia TsK KPSS*, 1991, no. 5,

pp. 195–96. Adopted by the Politburo on 14 January 1928.

Draft of the telegram prepared by I. V. Stalin and S. V. Kosior.

(Footnote from the editors of *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*).

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14 January 1928

Top secret

No. 68ss

To Kaganovich, Medvedev, CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Kharkov

cc: Molotov, Shvernik in Sverdlovsk; Dogadov, Syrtsov in Novosibirsk; Mikoian, Andreev in Rostov-on-Don; Goloshchekin, Kubiak in Kzyl-Orda [capital of the Kazakh SSR, 1925–29]

First. We believe that we have only a month and a half to two months left for grain procurements in the southern<sup>63</sup> areas of the USSR, after which the bad road season will set in. Since the southern regions will in large part decide the grain question this year, this short stretch of time must be put to the fullest use. It has been proven that two-thirds of our mistakes regarding grain procurements can be attributed to shortcomings of leadership. It is precisely for this reason that we have decided to put brutal pressure on our party organizations and send them tough directives<sup>64</sup> on measures to increase grain procurements.

Second. A significant factor is that private traders and kulaks have made use of the complacency and sluggishness of our organizations, have broken through the front in the grain market, raised prices, and created a wait-and-see attitude among peasants, which has paralyzed grain procurements even more. Many communists think they can't touch the reseller or kulak, since this could scare the middle peasants away from us. This is the most rotten idea of all the rotten ideas that exist in the minds of some communists. The situation is just the opposite. In order to restore our price policy and achieve a serious turnaround, we must strike at resellers and kulaks right now, we must arrest speculators, kulaks, and other disrupters of the market and price policy. Only under such a policy will the middle peasant realize that the prospect of raising grain prices is an invention by speculators, that the speculator and the kulak are enemies of Soviet power, that it is dangerous to tie one's fate to the fate of the specula-

tors and kulaks, and that he, the middle peasant, must fulfill his duty as an ally to the working class. Without such a policy we will not succeed in isolating the speculators and the kulaks in the market and will not achieve a decisive turnaround on the grain procurement front.

It has been proven that in this area the work of our party officials suffers from serious shortcomings, not to mention the judicial bodies and the lower-level soviet and cooperative apparatuses, which frequently go easy on the speculator and kulak.

Third. The next most important areas are the Urals and Siberia. There we have two and a half to three months before the bad road season. We have to exert desperate pressure there, since this is the last resource. Molotov has already left for the Urals. Stalin is leaving today for Siberia. Unless we exert all-out pressure on every level of government and the party, the situation regarding our economy as a whole could slow to a crawl for the entire year. Or even for the entire short term.

The situation hinges, as you see, on grain procurements. Grain procurements, therefore, represent the fortress that we must capture at any cost. And we will certainly capture it if we do the job in a bolshevik style, with bolshevik pressure.

Secretary of the CC of the VKP(b) Stalin

## CHAPTER 2

# Extraordinary Measures and the Right Opposition

18 January 1928–23 April 1929

Nineteen-twenty-eight witnessed the birth of the *chrezvychnaya shchina*—the rule of extraordinary measures in grain procurements—and the emergence of a repressive relationship between regime and peasantry that would constitute the essence of the Soviet order in the countryside under Stalin. As plans for industrialization and, of necessity, increased grain exports became ever more pressing and as state distribution and supply networks faltered, raising the specter of hunger with all its attendant social dangers, Stalin demanded a tribute (*dan'*) from the peasantry in the shape of forced extractions of grain and “surplus” money resources. The countryside became, to paraphrase Stalin, “the new front,” grain procurements represented a “fortress to be captured at any cost” (see document 10), and the regime mobilized for a new type of war, one with domestic objectives and domestic enemies.

The enactment of extraordinary measures in grain procurements led to the final rupture in the Communist Party as the Right Opposition, led by Bukharin and A. I. Rykov, coalesced in protest over the Politburo's new line.<sup>1</sup> Along with the crisis at the top, the regime faced an increasingly disturbing wave of popular discontent in the villages and, to a lesser extent, in the towns over shortages of goods and interruptions in food supply. Such opposition, however, served only to feed into the mechanism of repression, enabling Stalin to advance the argument that the country was threatened from within as well as from

without. Stalin argued at the July 1928 Central Committee plenum that class struggle would increase as the country progressed toward socialism, thereby justifying the use of repression in a process he viewed as the inevitable dialectic of class struggle and historical progress.<sup>2</sup>

### Stalin's Trip to Siberia

In response to falling grain procurements, on 12 January 1928 the Politburo mobilized a series of important Central Committee members to go to the provinces and intervene directly in local grain requisitioning campaigns.<sup>3</sup> Because of the poor harvest in the south (in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus), Siberia and the Urals were under pressure to make up for the shortfall in grain procurements.<sup>4</sup> Stalin interceded personally in Siberia,<sup>5</sup> spending more than two weeks there, cajoling and threatening the Siberian party organization over its slow progress in grain procurements. In a 19 January letter written from Novosibirsk to Molotov and Central Committee secretary (later first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party) S. V. Kosior, Stalin complained, "Nowhere have we fallen as far behind in procurements as [in] Siberia," where, he noted, grain procurements between July and December 1928 had amounted to only one-third of the annual plan. That meant, according to Stalin, that the pace of procurements would have to be increased "at least twofold" in the next month instead of reducing the plan as the majority of Siberian officials had initially intended. Stalin argued that the Siberian organization put far too much faith in the barter of manufactured goods to bring in grain, writing that that would not solve the problem. The solution, according to Stalin, was "to strike at speculators and kulak resellers" as well as at all those in the lower-level apparatus "who connive at, or abet, speculation" (see document 13).

In this way, extraordinary measures in grain procurements were born. More specifically, what Stalin proposed was the extensive use of repression—articles 105<sup>6</sup> and 107<sup>7</sup> of the criminal code—to force the lower-level apparatus and the peasantry into submission. Article 105 was applied for violations of rules regulating trade and could entail punishments of up to one year of forced labor or a monetary fine. Far more severe was article 107, which was used against traders and kulaks for the purchase and/or (re)sale of goods for gain, or speculation as it was dubbed in the Soviet criminal code, and, more ominously, for *withholding* goods from the market.<sup>8</sup> Article 107 authorized the dep-

rivation of liberty for up to one year as well as partial or wholesale property confiscation, thus prefiguring the subsequent practices of dekulakization. The application of these measures would be publicized widely in the press as an intended prophylactic for the rest of the countryside (see document 11). With these practices, repression—or in official parlance, administrative measures—replaced the market in the economic relations of town and countryside.

On 19 January, the day after Stalin's meeting with the Siberian Krai party committee (see document 11), S. I. Zagumenny, chairman of the Siberian regional agricultural bank, wrote a letter of protest to Stalin and S. I. Syrtsov, then the first secretary of the Siberian Krai party committee. Zagumenny objected in particular to Stalin's recommendation that "attention be focused on the specific section of article 107 that sets forth the punishment specifically for 'failing to put them (the goods—S.Z.) on the market'" as a way to pressure the rest of the peasantry into compliance. Zagumenny argued that this law was "not in keeping with the spirit of the new economic policy" and concluded that the peasantry would view the arrests of kulaks for failing to sell grain "as nothing other than a return . . . to the times of war communism." Rather, he continued, the middle peasant would fear that his turn was next. He concluded by urging that only actual speculators, kulaks or not, be subject to article 107 (see document 12).

Zagumenny was not alone in objecting to the new political line in the countryside. Along with protest from within the Siberian party organization, a series of other officials, provincial and central, offered significantly differing prognoses of the crisis in grain procurements.<sup>9</sup> The deputy commissar of finance, M. I. Frumkin, who was to become one of the regime's most determined critics of the extraordinary measures, wrote a detailed report of his work in the Urals, where he was dispatched by order of the Politburo in early January to serve as a plenipotentiary in grain requisitioning.<sup>10</sup> Frumkin provided a critical, mainly economic analysis of some of the underlying causes for the poor progress of grain procurements in the Urals. He devoted a good deal of attention to the problem of artificially low grain prices. According to Frumkin, peasants saw these low prices as "outright robbery," especially in view of the fact that the previous year's grain prices were higher for a lower quality of grain. Peasants chose instead to divert their grain to fodder for dairy and livestock production or to home brew, products that were priced significantly higher than grain. Their resultant cash reserves allowed peasants to withhold grain deliv-

eries even while paying taxes and other money obligations to the state. Although peasants feared inflation and were anxious to exchange their rubles for manufactured goods, the supply of such goods was only some 60 percent of that of the previous year (with a large proportion of that going to the towns). To make matters worse, only members of consumer cooperatives (some 43 percent of the population) were entitled to purchases, while the rest, including kulaks disenfranchised from the cooperatives—that is, precisely those supposedly with surplus grain—were forbidden to make purchases at the cooperatives, therefore having to rely on the now mostly criminalized private trade network. There was no doubt, according to Frumkin, that the extraordinary measures were affecting far more than the kulak. In the end, Frumkin recommended some unspecified combination of “administrative measures” and barter (assuming a reform of the cooperative rules) to increase grain requisitions, while arguing strongly for a reduction in the Urals’ grain procurement plan.<sup>11</sup> Unlike Stalin’s largely political and ideological diagnosis of the grain procurement crisis, Frumkin’s was based mainly on economic factors and clearly was written in the spirit of the New Economic Policy (see document 14).<sup>12</sup>

It was Stalin’s voice that prevailed, however, as the extraordinary measures became the order of the day in the countryside. Repressive operations against private traders had been underway from the fall of 1927 (see document 4),<sup>13</sup> accelerating sharply with the OGPU directive of 4 January 1928 (see document 7) to arrest “the most prominent private grain procurement agents and most inveterate grain merchants” and to send the cases directly to the OGPU’s extrajudicial tribunals. By early April, the OGPU reported that it had arrested 6,542 private traders and 252 soviet and cooperative officials (see document 17). According to the Commissariat of Justice, a total of 5,597 people were charged with article 107 from January through April; among these, 66 percent were said to be traders or kulaks, 10 percent well-off peasants (*zazhitochnyye*), and 18.5 percent middle peasants, thereby giving some sense of the extent to which the campaign was affecting peasants other than kulaks.<sup>14</sup> Document 15 provides an indication of how the OGPU viewed the campaign. The OGPU wrote that the majority of arrests occurred in the main grain-producing regions and that as a consequence of the arrests the activities of private grain traders had sharply declined. According to Roberta Manning, by mid-April close to 16,000 people had been arrested in all, including 1,864 individuals charged with article 58 for counterrevolutionary crimes.<sup>15</sup>

## The Emergency Order and Its Critics

The emergency order in grain procurements resulted in a temporary upsurge in grain procurements in many parts of the countryside, but by mid-March the OGPU reported once again a slowdown in the pace of procurements, complicated by difficulties in the transport, storage, and guarding of grain reserves.<sup>16</sup> The slowdown continued into April. By this time, there had been numerous reports of widespread violations in the application of the extraordinary measures, violations that included illegal house searches, arrests, and closures of markets, as well as the extension of article 107 to the middle peasantry.<sup>17</sup>

At the joint Central Committee–Central Control Commission plenum of 6–11 April 1928, extensive discussion was devoted to the problem of grain procurements. According to V. P. Danilov, the plenum endorsed the extraordinary measures but condemned the widespread violence as “excesses” (*peregiby*).<sup>18</sup> Although this plenum witnessed the first clash of opinions between Stalin and the emerging Right Opposition (particularly regarding industrialization), it ended formally in compromise.<sup>19</sup> Within days—on 19 April—the Politburo would issue a new decree on grain requisitioning, noting declining figures through the first half of April and calling for an increase in tempos.<sup>20</sup> Less than a week later, the Politburo convened a conference on grain procurement issues with representatives from the provinces. Molotov set the tone for the conference, blaming local leaders for the shortfalls in grain, while Mikoian raised the specter of hunger in the grain-consuming regions and towns.<sup>21</sup> The result of the conference was a new Politburo decree of 25 April reiterating Molotov’s criticism of local leaders and calling for a renewed campaign against kulaks and private traders on the basis of article 107.<sup>22</sup>

Popular responses to the grain procurement crisis continued to trouble party leaders, feeding into the Right Opposition’s concerns about maintaining the *smychka* as well as Stalin’s ideological rationalization for the expansive use of repression. Mikoian had spoken of the possibility of widespread hunger in the central industrial regions at the April conference on grain procurement issues.<sup>23</sup> A Politburo protocol of 26 May made reference to a threat to the provisioning of a series of large industrial centers (Moscow, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, and Ivanovo-Voznesensk).<sup>24</sup> Distribution and supply problems were leading to long queues at bread stores and piecemeal regional legislation introducing rationing. To make matters worse, there was a series of in-

dustrial strikes: in the first nine months of 1928, the OGPU reported 96 strikes among some 17,000 textile workers and 10,000 metal workers and miners.<sup>25</sup>

In the countryside, the OGPU reported a wave of bread riots in the spring of 1928. The illegal closures of markets and the interdictions on intraregional grain sales hurt poor peasants in particular as they were more dependent on local grain markets to tide them over until the next harvest.<sup>26</sup> Discontent over bread shortages was combined with widespread unrest over the extraordinary measures.<sup>27</sup> Peasants complained that state procurement agents took even the household's subsistence grain. Others considered the forced grain requisitions to be a "crime" tantamount to dekulakization.<sup>28</sup> In 1928, the OGPU reported 1,027 incidents of terror and 709 mass disturbances.<sup>29</sup> Peasants wrote to their sons in the Red Army complaining about the regime's policies, goods shortages, and continued fears of war, thereby circulating the mood of unrest from the village to the barracks and raising another worry for the regime (see document 16). At the end of May, the Soviet courts issued a decree expanding the categories of individuals against whom a crime could be considered a counterrevolutionary act, meriting the imposition of article 58. The decree noted that although terrorist acts were committed mainly by kulaks, there were significant numbers of middle and poor peasants involved as well. The courts called for a "brutal line" in processing new cases.<sup>30</sup>

In mid-June, Frumkin again wrote to Stalin and the Politburo. This time he struck a far more critical note. Reacting to six months of repression in the countryside, he wrote, "We must not close our eyes to the fact that the countryside, with the exception of a small segment of the poor peasants, is against us, that these attitudes are already starting to spill over [into the towns and army]." Frumkin claimed that the socioeconomic situation had deteriorated since the fifteenth party congress as a result of the new political line, a line that contradicted the congress's call for the continuation of the *smychka* and the preservation of the NEP. He wrote that the April plenum's condemnation of the "excesses" committed in the imposition of extraordinary measures were mere words—"the line, the ideology, have continued." Frumkin singled out Molotov for attack, arguing that Molotov favored forced grain requisitions from the middle peasantry and accused anyone who disagreed with him of "pandering to the kulak." According to Frumkin, Molotov had said, "We must strike at the kulak in such a way that the middle peasant stands at attention before us." As a result, Frumkin



continued, “despondency reigns in the countryside” and “the outlawing of the kulaks has led to lawless actions against the whole peasantry” (see document 18).

On 20 June, Stalin penned a letter addressed to the Politburo but entitled, “An Answer to Frumkin.” Stalin charged Frumkin with exaggerating the threat to social stability posed by the extraordinary measures, arguing that the threat would have been all the greater had the regime *not* imposed extraordinary measures. He claimed that Frumkin was “knocking on an open door” in his condemnation of the excesses and violations committed in the implementation of extraordinary measures and denied Frumkin’s claim that the kulak had been “outlawed.” He concluded by accusing Frumkin of “petitioning” on behalf of the kulak.<sup>31</sup>

Molotov also wrote to the Politburo in response to Frumkin’s letter. He argued that the countryside had not turned against the regime, that the *smychka* still held. Frumkin, according to Molotov, had clearly come out against the party line. Furthermore, Molotov accused Frumkin of misquoting him, denying that he had said “We must strike at the kulak in such a way that the middle peasant stands at attention before us.” The defensive tone of Molotov’s reply was in no way apologetic, but it did offer some indication that the new line was far from assured.<sup>32</sup>

Further evidence of the uncertainty of the new line would be apparent at the July Central Committee plenum (4–12 July). In the aftermath of the April plenum, the disagreements between Stalin and the Right increased over a series of key issues relating to the pace of industrialization, exports, and the extraordinary measures. The 25 April Politburo decree had led to a new wave of violence in the countryside with the widespread use of article 107. In the towns, there were several attacks on labor exchanges as well as strikes, bread queues, and local experiments in rationing. Although the struggle between Stalin and the Right remained behind closed party doors, both sides mobilized their supporters for the July plenum. The Frumkin letter (see document 18) set the stage for debate.

It was at the July plenum that Stalin made his fateful speech on the relation between industrialization and the peasantry. He argued that unlike England with its colonies, Germany with its indemnity from the Franco-Prussian War, or the United States of America with its reliance on loans, the Soviet Union had only its own internal resources with which to develop the country’s industrial economy. He argued that it

was therefore necessary to take a “tribute” from the peasantry in order to finance industrialization. Although he admitted that “this situation, needless to say, is unpleasant,” Stalin had in effect reduced the Soviet peasantry to an internal colony from which the state would extract the necessary capital for economic development.

Stalin went on to justify the use of extraordinary measures, arguing that they had “saved the country from a general economic crisis.” While calling on those who worked to turn the extraordinary measures into a permanent policy “dangerous people,” he at the same time refused to renounce the extraordinary measures: “We have no basis for asserting that the emergency conditions that required the use of extraordinary measures can never recur.” Furthermore, Stalin insisted on the necessity of establishing an emergency grain reserve as a defensive measure in the event of war, as insurance against crop failure, and as a fund for exports (see document 19).<sup>33</sup>

In order to overcome the perennial grain procurement crisis, Stalin called for raising the productivity of small-scale peasant agriculture as well as gradually moving toward collective forms of agriculture. He also warned his comrades that the class struggle would continue even under NEP, growing more fierce in direct correlation to the country’s progress toward socialism.<sup>34</sup> This “theory” would serve as Stalin’s basic “ideological” rationalization for the expansion of repression through the rest of his regime and also remind the party that the revolution was not over, that violence was a necessary part of socialist construction.

Bukharin responded to Stalin with what on the face of it appears to be a ponderous, rather academic speech—surely enough to incite many of Stalin’s less intellectual followers—but what was in fact an impassioned defense of NEP and the *smychka*. Whereas Stalin maintained that the leading role of the working class was paramount in the *smychka*, Bukharin inveighed against the possibility of the loss of peasant support.<sup>35</sup> Quoting Lenin on the danger of a split between the working class and the peasantry, Bukharin argued that the threat of such a split, or *razsmychka*, was entirely realistic and based in general on the leadership’s mistaken economic calculations, the imbalanced growth of the economy, and the push for rapid industrialization. More specifically, he blamed the artificially low pricing policy for grain for the disruption in grain procurements and exports. Because of these miscalculations, there was little choice but to turn to extraordinary measures. But now the task, according to Bukharin, was to lift the extraordinary measures because they had ceased to be useful and were

simply making existing economic imbalances worse, while leading the country back to war communism with all its attendant social ramifications. Bukharin ended his speech with a plea that the party “remove the threat facing us of losing the connection with the middle peasant,” which meant ending the extraordinary measures (see document 19).

The July plenum did in fact result in the temporary lifting of the extraordinary measures. The Commissariat of Justice took a series of measures against officials who committed “excesses.” The latter were already labeled *peregibshchiki* (those who commit “excesses”), a category that would appear repeatedly during collectivization as scapegoats for regime policy. The justice commissariat also ordered a review of all cases in which poor and middle peasants were charged with article 107 as well as calling for an end to closures of peasant markets and illegal house searches and arrests. That these measures were less than successful in ending the violence in the countryside is apparent from a justice commissariat circular of 15 September 1928 urging a continuation of the “struggle with recidivism in the application of extraordinary measures.”<sup>36</sup>

The seeming victory of the Right over extraordinary measures at the July plenum was a Pyrrhic victory. Although Stalin formally compromised on this issue, the Right ended the plenum in what was clearly a minority position within the leadership.<sup>37</sup> Toward the end of the plenum, Bukharin in fact took a step that would seal the fate of the Right Opposition. On 11 July, he met clandestinely with L. B. Kamenev, one of the leaders of the Left and United Oppositions. At the meeting, Bukharin reportedly referred to Stalin as a “Genghis Khan” whose “line is ruinous for the whole revolution” and attempted to convince Kamenev that the former Left Opposition had more in common with the Right than with Stalin and the new Politburo majority. The meeting soon became known to Stalin, providing him with an additional reason to move against the Right.<sup>38</sup>

At the end of September, Bukharin published “Notes of an Economist” in *Pravda*. Bukharin criticized the obsession with rapid industrialization and the resulting imbalance in the economy. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin’s biographer, described this article as “a transparent assault on Stalin’s group and as close as Bukharin had come to making public the struggle.” Stalin responded by engineering, on 8 October, a Politburo reprimand for the “unauthorized publication” of the article. Within days, Stalin moved against a key organizational base of the Right Opposition. The Politburo publicly accused the Moscow party leadership and its first secretary, N. A. Uglanov, of “right deviation-

ism,” leading to its rout by the end of November when Molotov replaced Uglanov as Moscow party chief.<sup>39</sup>

In the meantime, the economic situation showed few signs of improvement. The 1928 harvest proved to be poor and the grain requisitioning plan for the 1927–28 economic year was noticeably underfulfilled (698,800,000 of the planned 725,000,000 poods were collected while only 34.3 percent of the grain export plan and about one-half of the grain reserve were fulfilled).<sup>40</sup> At the same time, the scope of OGPU activities widened in the countryside, as its role in the inspection and oversight of grain collections increased and it assumed responsibility for a series of crimes normally reserved for the regular police (e.g., grain theft, embezzlement, negligence, and so on).<sup>41</sup>

On 5 November 1928, Frumkin again wrote to the Central Committee, this time denying that his earlier letter (see document 18) was a “factional” letter and insisting that it was meant to be “comradely.” He wrote that he considered then and still considered that “the anti-middle peasant ideology [in the party] was more dangerous than the extraordinary measures.” He insisted on the necessity of “ten-twenty years of good relations with the peasantry,” during which time socialized forms of agriculture could gradually develop while the regime pursued policies conducive to the improvement of small-scale peasant farming. Frumkin’s letter appeared on the eve of the November plenum (16–24 November), once again setting the tone for discussion and this time earning him the label of “rightist.”<sup>42</sup>

The November 1928 plenum took place amidst continuing problems of supply and distribution of food and manufactured goods in town and countryside alike.<sup>43</sup> Bukharin again pointed to the uneven development of the economy and the incorrect pricing of grain as well as objecting to “voluntaristic” planning and the obsession with heavy industry. Both he and Rykov stressed the importance of the market, while issuing warnings about the fate of NEP and strongly contesting the control figures for the 1928–29 economic year.<sup>44</sup>

Stalin continued to justify the tempos of industrialization with reference to the dangers of the external and internal situation, paying particular attention to the economic “backwardness” of the Soviet Union within the context of “capitalist encirclement.” Furthermore, he argued that large-scale collective agriculture and the defeat of capitalism in the countryside depended on the success of industrialization. Collectivization, he proposed, was also an essential answer to the grain problem. Stalin, however, reserved most of his fire for the Right Oppo-

sition, taking aim once again at Frumkin and telling the plenum that it wanted to know what the right deviation was they should read Frumkin's letter. Stalin declared "a full-scale ideological struggle" with the Right, stressing that "at this moment the Right danger is the chief danger in our party" while still denying there was a right deviation within the Politburo itself.<sup>45</sup>

## The Entrenchment of Extraordinary Measures

By the time of the November plenum, the Right was already in a weakened position with few supporters from among the party's leadership.<sup>46</sup> In less than a week after the plenum's conclusion, extraordinary measures returned to the countryside. On 29 November, a joint Central Committee–Sovnarkom directive ordered that the tempos of grain procurement be increased, blaming local officials for tardiness and noting a sharp shortfall in grain procurements in November.<sup>47</sup> In late December, the Commissariat of Trade reported that the regime had succeeded in collecting 296.5 million poods of grain in the months between July and November 1928, fulfilling the yearly plan by 49.4 percent. This amount was greater than in the previous year but still less than in 1926. A poor harvest and slow grain collections continued to plague the southern parts of the country.<sup>48</sup> In Siberia, there had been some improvement in collections in the first half of December, but this was followed by a decline. The OGPU blamed the decline on the goods famine, poor leadership, kulak recalcitrance, and speculation.<sup>49</sup> In spite of these problems, a Politburo–Sovnarkom decree of 11 January 1929 ordered the increase of procurement assignments in the Volga regions, Bashkiria, the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. The decree exhorted the provinces to "mobilize" the money reserves of the rural population through the collection of insurance payments, credit payments, taxes, and arrears. The decree also called for a reduction in the plan for provisioning bread in all parts of the country and the creation of a reserve for provisioning the grain-consuming regions.<sup>50</sup>

The regime was determined to establish a grain reserve, planning to create a secret emergency fund of 25 million poods between January and April.<sup>51</sup> Bread shortages continued to be felt in the towns and among the rural poor, especially in the grain-consuming regions. Increasingly, though, even peasants in grain-producing regions were complaining that they were not left with even minimal reserves of grain after requisitions.<sup>52</sup> Whatever may have existed as the "mythical

grain surplus” was gone by the 1928–29 economic year, the second year of extraordinary measures in grain procurements.

The regime did not let up but on the contrary increased repressive measures, in particular antikulak measures. On 3 January 1929, the Politburo resolved that the Commissariat of Justice must “guarantee maximum haste in the repression of kulak terrorists” and also recommended wide press coverage of such cases. At the end of January, the military procurator of the Soviet Supreme Court reiterated an earlier decision (from June) calling for the removal of “socially dangerous” and “class-alien elements” from the army, most notably, of course, the sons of kulaks. By mid-January 1929, 4,029 soldiers had been purged from the army on the basis of this order.<sup>53</sup> A report by the deputy Sovnarkom RSFSR chairman T. R. Ryskulov, then a radical Stalin supporter, concluded that the class struggle in the countryside was worsening, a conclusion in keeping with Stalin’s general diagnosis of Soviet historical development.<sup>54</sup> And in point of fact, peasant unrest was on the upswing, although such unrest constituted less class war than the opposition of what had become as a result of extraordinary measures a peasantry united against the regime’s grain procurement policies. The OGPU reported more and more cases of mass demonstrations, noting the central role of women in such outbursts, as well as noting the continued violations of policy committed by so-called *peregibshchiki*. The OGPU also reported the increasing tendency of middle peasants to ally themselves with the kulaks.

At the end of January, Bukharin issued a declaration to the Politburo on the internal strife within the party. He explicitly challenged Stalin on the use of the word “tribute,” claiming that that word “had nothing in common with socialist construction.” Most of all, Bukharin warned of the threatening internal economic situation as a result of the continuation of extraordinary measures and radically unbalanced economic growth. He wrote that he considered “peace with the middle peasant” to be the “central task” of the party (see document 20). A week later, Bukharin, Rykov, and trade union leader M. P. Tomsky (1880–1936) presented a declaration to a joint Politburo–Central Control Commission meeting in which they reiterated the main points of their criticism, again challenging Stalin on his demand for a peasant “tribute” and warning of the threat to the *smychka*. They also talked about the destruction of collective leadership in the party and the “bureaucratization” of inner party life, thus repeating the earlier criticism of each of the successive Left oppositions.<sup>55</sup>

The conflict between Stalin and the Right reached its apogee at this time. As Stalin undermined the institutional positions of the leaders of the Right Opposition, the news on the economy continued to be bad—the harvest in the south was poor, the goods famine persisted, and workers were grumbling about food shortages. In mid-February 1929, the Politburo introduced rationing. According to Alec Nove, this was likely “the first and only recorded instance of the *introduction* of rationing in time of peace.”<sup>56</sup> This was the backdrop for the April (16–23) joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Here Bukharin was asked to choose between “war and peace.” When he refused to stand down, Stalin argued that the Right had answered a plea for “compromise” with a declaration of war. This was the beginning of the end of the Right Opposition, the final organized political opposition to Stalin’s power. Following the plenum, Stalin moved quickly to purge the party of rightists and to assure his ascendancy.<sup>57</sup>

## Documents

### Documents 11, 12, 13. I. V. Stalin’s Trip to Siberia

#### • DOCUMENT 11 •

Protocol no. 53/b of joint meeting of the bureau of the Siberian Krai party committee with Comrade Stalin and representatives of procurement and other organizations, January 1928. GANO, f. 2, op. 4, d. 24, ll. 26–28ob. Original; *Izvestiia TsK KPSS* 5 (1991): 196–99.

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18 January 1928

Strictly secret

[Novosibirsk]

[. . .]

Heard: 1. Report by Comrade Stalin and certain questions regarding grain procurements.

[. . .]

Resolved: 1) To deem absolutely mandatory the fulfillment of the procurement plan for the center of 60 million poods.<sup>58</sup>

2) To break down the plan by okrug, raion, and grain procurement organization, giving assignments for each five-day period. To assign implementation of it to the Siberian Krai Trade Administration (Comrade Zlobin). To begin it on 25 January.

3) a) to ensure uninterrupted shipments of grain, assigning personal responsibility for the adoption of the relevant measures to Comrades Podshivalin, Beliaev, and Tauklis;

b) to enlist the Kraisovprof [Krai Council of Trade Unions] and other trade union bodies to concentrate for the immediate future on raising labor discipline among railroad clerks and workers, as well as soviet employees by dispatching krai trade union officials to the most important raions and issuing instructions to lower-level bodies, including local committees and raion control commissions;

c) to instruct the okrug committees and [party] fractions of All-Union bodies and the boards of the Omsk and Tomsk railroads to steadfastly carry out the circular of the krai committee of 4 January 1928 [ . . . ] on the struggle against negligence and carelessness in transport.

4) To instruct okrug and raion committees to ensure the vigorous collection of arrears on agricultural taxes so that repressive measures (arrest, trials, and so forth) are imposed without fail on a number of kulaks for the tardy remittance of agricultural taxes.

5) As an addendum to the decision of the krai committee bureau of 17 [January] (holding accountable in each of the principal grain procurement raions several kulaks [4–10] who possess large grain reserves and utilize grain difficulties for speculating, price-inflating, and delaying and failing to put grain on the market, as inveterate speculators, with confiscation of their grain), to deem it imperative that this measure (on the basis of article 107 of the Criminal Code) be implemented on behalf of the procurator's office. To instruct Comrades Eikhe, Kozhevnikov, and Zakovsky to ascertain, on 19 January, the possibility of pushing a portion of these cases through people's courts on an especially urgent basis, without formalities, choosing the most inveterate kulak-speculators, with broad publication of the sentences and decisions in the press, through village soviets and elsewhere.<sup>59</sup>

6) To instruct the krai procurator's office to publish on its own behalf in newspapers and special proclamations a notice on articles 107 and 105<sup>60</sup> and on the procedure and conditions for their enforcement.

7) To arrange wider coverage in krai and local newspapers of questions related to grain procurements and the exposure of shortcomings and outrageous practices in the work of various institutions and organizations.

8) To deem it imperative to dispatch, in addition to officials previously sent to local areas, a number of krai officials (from the krai committee and



the krai executive committee), assigning them to okrugs, raions, and individual institutions.<sup>61</sup> A list is to be drawn up by Comrades Kisis and Eikhe.

9) To take into consideration the communications from Sibrabkrin [Siberian Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate] and the grain procurement organizations that the lower-level bodies of the latter have been issued orders to prevent any evasions whatsoever of current work instructions (the prevention of price gouging, of scheming against one another, and so forth). To instruct the troika,<sup>62</sup> if necessary, to put addenda in these orders that ensure coordinated work and unity among all procurement organizations.

10) To forbid procurement and local organizations throughout the second quarter to raise the question of reducing the network of procurement agents.

11) To request that Comrade Stalin assist the Siberian organizations in settling the question of the price gap in the border areas of Siberia and Kazakhstan.<sup>63</sup>

12) To communicate with the Urals about the possibility of obtaining some additional quantity of iron products. To instruct Comrades Kornev, Strikovskiy, and Podshivalin to draw up the relevant requisition order.

13) To instruct local soviet [bodies] and party organizations to intensify as much as possible the struggle against home brew and the collection of fines, to grant plenipotentiaries of okrug executive committees in the raions the right to approve fines on behalf of the okrug. The krai executive committee is to draw up the relevant instructions. [. . .]

Secretary Syrtsov

• DOCUMENT 12 •

Letter from S. I. Zagumenny to I. V. Stalin and S. I. Syrtsov on the application of article 107 of the Criminal Code, 19 January 1928.

*Izvestiia TsK KPSS* 5 (1991): 199–201.

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19 January 1928

To be delivered personally to secretary of the CC of the VKP(b) Comrade I. V. Stalin and secretary of the Siberian Krai committee Comrade S. I. Syrtsov

Considering the decision adopted yesterday,<sup>64</sup> 18 January, by the conference of krai leading officials on the question of grain procurements to be exceptionally important and crucial, whose political consequences could be of great importance in the working class's relations with the peasantry, I decided to offer you, comrades, a more detailed explanation for

my objections to the use of art. 107 of the Criminal Code *to its full extent* against the kulak elements of the countryside who are major holders of grain surpluses.

This article provides for “confinement for a term of up to one year with or without confiscation of property” for “deliberately raising prices of goods by buying them up, concealing them, or failing to put them on the market.”

The main purpose of the proposals by Comrade Stalin, who laid out the necessity of using this article, boils down to striking at the kulaks, striking hard, but striking at the same time in such a way that the legitimate reason for the arrest, confiscation of property, and other measures we impose against the kulaks is clear to the bulk of the peasantry. In developing this idea further, Comrade Stalin recommended that attention be focused on the specific section of article 107 that sets forth the punishment specifically for “failing to put them (the goods—S.Z.) on the market.”

What will this pressure on the exploiting elite of the countryside give us? What are our calculations aimed at accomplishing?

According to the notions expressed at yesterday’s session, this pressure on the kulaks will make the middle peasants take their grain to the market. The middle peasant will say: “Now that is a government. You can’t fool around with it. It demands compliance with its laws” and so forth. These measures, therefore, are calculated to have a psychological effect among the masses of middle peasants.

I think this calculation is mistaken. I am most deeply convinced that we will get an effect from these measures that is absolutely opposite to the one we expect. And here is why.

As I said yesterday at the session, not once during the entire period of NEP—as far as I can judge—have we imposed measures against the village kulak so as to try him just for failing to put grain on the market. If we have exiled anybody to Narym, it has evidently been only urban grain speculators,<sup>65</sup> who are not directly backed up by millions of middle peasants. We have not only not taken the measures we are now planning against kulaks, whose exploitative essence is rooted not in trade but in the production of agricultural products, but we have primarily propagandized the need to exert economic influence so as to limit their growth. Therefore, even though we have a law, it will still be unclear to the bulk of the peasantry as a law that is not in keeping with the spirit of the new economic policy. I may be mistaken, but I am firmly convinced that the bulk of middle and poor peasants will view putting the kulaks on trial just for failing to sell grain as nothing other than a return, in one form or another, to the times of war communism and the period of forcible grain requis-

tioning [*prodravyorstka*]. Citing the law, no matter what kind of agitation is conducted, will not change the muzhiks' minds. I am not even mentioning that the kulaks, based on these actions, will develop increased agitation against us; that is a relatively secondary matter. The main thing is that convicting kulaks just for "failing to put grain on the market" will persuade the middle peasants that sooner or later they, too, as holders of a certain portion of grain surpluses, will have their turn as well. The first thing we will encounter as a result of carrying out the planned measures will be an increase in the value of grain in the eyes of the countryside itself, and hence a subsequent decline in its supply in the market.

[. . .] Based on the aforementioned considerations, I have felt and do feel that the kulaks must be smashed only as resellers of grain. Under the current market conditions, one or two out of every ten kulak farms are doing this for sure. I know from Slavgorod Okrug, where I, unfortunately, visited for a very short time, that this speculating by the kulak farms, as a result of the crop failure in the southern areas and in neighboring Barabinsk Okrug, has been developed on a rather wide scale. It isn't so hard to find such kulaks in every large village. The middle peasant, of course, will feel sorry for them, Comrade Stalin is right. Let him feel sorry, that is beside the point. What is important is that he will have no grounds in this instance to expect his turn to come, in the sense of being put on trial just for failing to sell grain surpluses. After all, he doesn't buy up grain to resell it.

And I would suggest that this measure—putting grain-speculating kulaks on trial—be carried out with particular caution, making it a mandatory condition for every okrug committee that each trial be personally guided by an authoritative member of the bureau. The impression made by a judicial decision on the broad strata of the peasantry must be carefully taken into consideration and reported to the krai centers.

On a parallel basis, and with no less attention and energy, we must pressure the countryside through more effective levers (this is being done, but not precisely enough): (a) the collection of any debts from the countryside. In particular, a directive must be issued to the localities that they immediately revise the decisions by credit associations to grant the public deferments on special-purpose loans of agricultural credit, beginning in August. The work should be completed under the leadership of the plenipotentiary of the okrug executive committee within 10–15 days; (b) a total cessation of credits granted to the countryside on all special-purpose loans, except for loans to collective farms and the poor out of a special fund, and then only for seasonal needs; (c) further revision of the credit scale for machinery supply toward increasing advance payments and expanding the assortment of machinery and implements that are to be sold

for cash (while retaining the current restrictions for kulaks); (d) firm and swift implementation of other measures drawn up by the CC and the krai committee, with the dispatch of leading officials to the localities.

I would not like to be a prophet, but I know the countryside well, both because I grew up there and based on the letters that I have received lately from my father, who is a peasant (a poor one) living in Saratov Gubernia.

It seems to me that we are making too drastic a change.<sup>66</sup>

With communist regards,  
 member of the VKP(b) [Chairman of the board of the Siberian Krai  
 Agricultural Bank]  
 S. Zagumenny

• DOCUMENT 13 •

Telegram from I. V. Stalin in Novosibirsk to V. M. Molotov, S. V. Kosior,  
 and the CC, 19 January 1928. *Izvestiia TsK KPSS* 5 (1991): 201-2.

19 January 1928

To Molotov, Kosior, the CC of the VKP(b), Moscow. 5:35 p.m. [Novosibirsk time]

1. Nowhere have we fallen as far behind in procurements as [in] Siberia. In the first six months, that is from July through December, less than one-third of the yearly plan has been procured; in the second six months, that is from January through June, more than two-thirds of the plan needs to be procured, which requires speeding up the pace of procurements at least twofold, whereas procurements in January increased by only 10-15 percent. In view of this, the consensus was to reduce the plan because it is unfulfillable. However, in view of the influence that was exerted, the conference of [provincial] officials unanimously resolved yesterday that the entire plan of 60 million poods for the center must be fulfilled at any cost.

2. There is a widespread faith here in the unlimited power of industrial goods to increase grain procurements. Without denying the great importance of industrial goods, we must, however, recognize that industrial goods by themselves do not decide the question of grain prices, which is the most important concern for the peasantry. Industrial goods can play a decisive role only when there is a firm policy on grain prices, when there is a common front among all of our procurement agents on the basis of a firm price policy, when speculation is decisively curbed, when there is active leadership of the procurement effort by the party organizations. Yet the unbridled competition among our procurement agents, the free activi-

ties by speculators and kulaks, the connivance of the lower-level apparatus, and the inertia of the party organizations have created an environment for price gouging, have corrupted the market, and have undermined procurements, despite the availability of industrial goods.

In view of this the conference resolved: first, to strike at speculators and kulak resellers, on the basis of article 107 of the Criminal Code, as violators of revolutionary legality; second, to strike at those in the lower-level apparatus who connive at, or abet, speculation, on the basis of article 105, as violators of Soviet laws; third, to punish those who destroy the common front of the procurement agencies; fourth, to mobilize without delay for a prolonged period the entire soviet and party leadership to work in the province and to make the fullest use of the press.

3. With regard to the confiscation of money it was decided to schedule the collection of the tax for 15 February. We are tardy with self-taxation. The USSR Central Executive Committee law does not conform to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee law. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee amendment has been published, but the sword of Damocles of the USSR Central Executive Committee law is hanging over it.<sup>67</sup> This discrepancy must be eliminated, too. It has been decided to initiate, unconditionally, criminal proceedings against kulaks, as tax delinquents and lawbreakers, under article 60.<sup>68</sup>

4. I consider it my duty to note that the local party officials have gotten down to business with great zeal and conscientiously, as true bolsheviks, which is reason to count on success.

5. On the evening of the 21st I am leaving for the Altai, and will let you know my address from there.

Stalin

• DOCUMENT 14 •

From a report by M. I. Frumkin, USSR deputy people's commissar of finance, to the CC and the STO on a trip to the Urals and the issue of grain procurements, 19 January 1928. GARE, f. 5446, op. 19, d. 318, ll. 2-17. Original.

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19 January 1928

Secret

1. At the time of my arrival in Sverdlovsk (1 January) the following quantity of grain had been procured in the Urals since the beginning of the campaign by all procurement agents covered by the Urals plan (in thousands of poods):

	1927-28	1926-27	1927-28 + -
Wheat	9,422.4	8,719	+ 703.4
Rye	2,188.6	3,319	- 1,130.4
Oats	2,772.4	7,795	- 5,022.6
Other grains	1,558.8	1,133	+ 425.8
Total	15,942.2	20,966	- 5,023.8

As this little table shows, grain procurements this year have declined substantially—by 5,024,000 poods. But with respect to individual crops we see an increase in procurements of wheat and sharp decreases in the amounts of oats and rye coming in.

2. With regard to the agricultural tax, as of 1 January, 11,778,000 rubles had been received out of an annual assignment of 19,244,700 rubles adopted by the Urals Oblast executive committee, which is 61.3 percent of the annual assignment. The control figure issued by the RSFSR Finance Commissariat is lower than the figure adopted by the Urals Oblast executive committee, specifically 17,900,000 rubles. The above-mentioned revenue on the agricultural tax as of 1 January is 65.8 percent of the figure issued by the RSFSR Finance Commissariat. The control figure of the RSFSR Finance Commissariat is closer to reality because the Urals Oblast executive committee fails to take account of the decrease in the control figure on the agricultural tax resulting from the privileges granted under the manifesto.<sup>69</sup> Now that I have familiarized myself with this question in the provinces, we can establish that no more than 18 million rubles will come in from the agricultural tax in the Urals as a whole. Fulfillment of the agricultural tax is uneven. It is higher in the grain-growing raions than in the mountainous raions and the Cis-Urals Region [the area just west of the Urals]; as of 1 January, 68.7 percent of the RSFSR Finance Commissariat's control figure had been fulfilled in the grain-growing area [*sic*].

3. Insurance premiums. The yearly assignment for the Urals is 7,610,000 rubles. As of 1 January, 2,047,000 rubles had come in, or 27 percent of the yearly assignment. In this case, too, we see the same phenomenon: the fulfillment percentage is greater in the grain-growing raions than in the non-grain-growing raions. The fulfillment percentage for the grain-growing raions is 31.6.

4. The VKP oblast committee and the Urals Oblast executive committee have adopted the following measures to increase grain procurements:

a. With regard to the agricultural tax: the final deadline for payment of

the agricultural tax in the grain-growing raions has been pushed forward and set for 1 February, with instructions that repressive steps be taken against payers who missed their payments for the second deadline (1 January). An order has been issued that the payment for the final deadline be collected ahead of schedule.

b. Specific calendar deadlines have been set for insurance premiums to be received so as to ensure that 60 percent of the yearly assignment is received by 15 January and all premiums are received by 1 February.

c. Work on attracting purchases of shares in consumer and agricultural cooperatives has been intensified.

d. The second-quarter plan for providing credit to agriculture has been revised and tightened up, so that loans will be issued only in kind in January and February and in minimal amounts of cash credit in March.

e. Advance payments to the countryside for raw-material and food procurements have been terminated, but in some cases [only] reduced.

f. Grain supplies within the oblast have been tightened up by eliminating, or in some cases reducing, provisions for grain-producing raions in the Urals.

g. The fight against bag-trading [*meshochnichestvo*] has been intensified by prohibiting peasants from carrying high-quality ground grain out of the region by rail and prohibiting them from grinding it at all mills, in order to counteract the sale with flour [*sic*] that is most profitable to the peasantry.

h. An order has been given to bring in all grain that is being kept at remote cooperative centers to railroad stations.

i. The second-quarter plan for supplying the oblast with industrial goods has been revised with a view to providing as much as possible to grain-procurement raions by reducing deliveries to other raions. The supply of grain-growing raions has been set at 76 percent of the overall Urals plan for scarce goods, and at 63.6 percent when combined with goods that are available in ample quantities. An order has been issued to lower meat prices first by 10 percent, and later by another 8 percent.

j. A levy in kind for ground grain has been imposed at the mills of raion executive committees and Meltrest [Mill Trust].

k. An order has been issued to cooperatives that they release industrial goods not only to shareholders but to nonshareholders as well.

l. A directive has been issued to enlist all the party and soviet apparatuses of the okrugs in the work to increase grain procurements.

m. Responsible officials (though not from the leadership itself) have been dispatched to all of the grain-producing raions.

Together with the oblast party committee, we adopted a decision to prohibit the barter of goods for grain. I issued an order to delay fulfillment of Comrade Mikoian's directive to exchange goods for grain on an equal footing.

On the night of 2–3 January I left for the area together with the second secretary of the oblast party committee, Comrade Ryndin, and the head of the Urals Oblast Trade Administration, Comrade Markov. We stopped at the following okrug towns and locations: Cheliabinsk, Chumlak station, the village of Shumikha, Kurgan, Makushino station, Petukhovo station, Ishim, Obutinskaia station, Tiumen, and Shadrinsk. In addition, I stopped in Petropavlovsk and Omsk for a few hours.

This tour revealed the following:

1. The oblast executive committee's data on the agricultural tax lagged far behind the data of the okrugs, and the okrugs' data lagged behind the data of the raion executive committees. The latter data are also incomplete because village soviets keep undelivered sums of money for a few days (seven at a time). The average fulfillment of the agricultural tax for all of these raions in the early days of January was about 80 percent. The same was true of insurance premiums. It was determined that an average of more than 50 percent of insurance premiums had been received. The okrug and raion executive committees have taken measures to obtain the agricultural tax and insurance premiums. We can affirm that revenues from the agricultural tax and insurance premiums by 1 February will amount to roughly 95–98 percent. It should be noted that in certain okrugs that have both grain-growing and non-grain-growing raions, revenues from the agricultural tax and insurance premiums are higher in the grain-growing raions (with the exception of Tiumen Okrug).

2. Steps have been taken to increase the collection of arrears on land reorganization work [*zemleustroistvo*] and on seed loans and to attract shareholder capital to cooperatives.

3. Village soviets in all localities displayed a somewhat restrained attitude toward collecting the above-mentioned premiums and payments because the chairmen of the village soviets were avoiding a deterioration of their relations with the public before the elections—some out of fear of not being re-elected, others out of a reluctance to do work for those who will be elected in their stead.

4. On the basis of discussions both in the okrugs and in the raions, we can definitely establish that there is a great deal of unsold surplus grain throughout the Trans-Urals Region, but it should be noted that the bulk of the surplus is wheat. Both on the basis of the progress of procurements



(see above) and on the basis of discussions, we can establish that the oat harvest is significantly lower than the data from the grain-and-forage balance sheet of the TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] and the Urals Planning Committee. According to the data of those two organizations, the oat yield per *desyatina* [1.09 hectare] was 52 poods. Local residents assert that the oat yield is no more than 40 poods. The quality of the grain is exceptional. The average moisture content is 15.5–16 (2–3 percent below last year). The average weight of a liter of wheat is 128 *zlotniks* [545 grams], or 6–7 *zlotniks* [26–30 grams] more than last year. The average weight of a liter of oats is 75–80 *zlotniks* [320–40 grams].

5. Prices. [. . .] According to the Oblast Internal Trade Administration, wheat prices are 3 kopeks lower than the mandated prices of the Trade Commissariat, and oat prices are 2 kopeks lower. Grain prices are 2 kopeks lower than last year, but without adjusting for the difference in grain quality. After adjusting for this difference, we will get a price decrease of 8–10 kopeks. In addition, we established the following in the raions: a refaction (price reduction) of 8 kopeks per pood was applied in October and November for excess moisture content of *half a percent*, at a high weight level per liter, and the moisture content was determined by a highly primitive method. We established in Ishim that instead of an additional payment for delivery to the mill, a price decrease was set just before our arrival: consequently, instead of the base price of 95 kopeks the following prices were used: at the station, 95 kopeks; at the bazaar, 92 kopeks; at the mill, 93 kopeks. Peasants harshly protested the above-mentioned refaction, regarding it as outright robbery. The peasants repeatedly pointed out that last year, when the grain quality was poor, they received a higher price than this year, when the grain qualities are excellent. The peasantry is unhappy with the price, its complaints amount to roughly 10 kopeks a pood. There have been a number of incidents at grain-collecting centers when the grain or a portion of the delivered grain has been taken back because of a few kopeks, or peasants have asked about the prices and have declared that for now they will not bring in any grain at these prices. The peasantry has also expressed displeasure over the fact that first the good wheat, last year's, was being sold at 1 ruble 10 kopeks [a pood], then it was reduced to 1 ruble, and later to 95 kopeks, and combined with the above-mentioned refaction it reached 87 kopeks (especially in November; in late October the oblast trade administration ordered the refaction rescinded, and the Commission set moisture content at 15.5 to 17).

6. Near the large consumer centers, the peasantry has tried to turn grain into flour and sell it at the bazaar, often transporting it over distances of

150–200 versts [160–213 kilometers], thus gaining 30–40 kopeks in price. Bag-trading was not widely developed in the Trans-Urals Region. There were only short-distance runs of a local nature from Tobolsk to the area of Ishim and Tiumen, which (runs) disrupted the price somewhat.

7. Procurements of other agricultural (nongrain) products have increased considerably. The yearly plan for meat procurements has been overfulfilled everywhere by 30–40 percent. In addition, private traders and representatives of the Leningrad and Moscow Meat Society were operating widely. The plan for procurements of furs is also being surpassed. People in every raion talked about water rats, which yield significant revenues. Catching these rats is reported to have earned peasants up to almost 40 rubles a day, and certain farms up to 400 rubles, for the campaign. Increased deliveries of pork and dressed poultry are reported at all bazaars. Flax and tow deliveries are also proceeding well. The plan for procurement of hides has been overfulfilled for small hides, but is being underfulfilled for large ones. The latter is attributable to the strong development of tubbing [*kadushnichestvo*] (production at home) and increased operations by private, cottage factories.

In December the vast majority of private factories were shut down by order of the okrug executive committees.

8. The prices for nongrain agricultural products are high. Meat prices throughout the campaign held at a level of 5 rubles to 5 rubles 25 kopeks, as opposed to a prewar price of 2 rubles 80 kopeks to 2 rubles 90 kopeks. Pork prices are 7 rubles, as opposed to the prewar price of 3 rubles 75 kopeks to 4 rubles; fur prices have been increased by 20–30 percent over last year, and for certain types of furs, such as fox and wolf skins, the increase has been 50 percent. All the okrugs considered the prices for nongrain agricultural products to be too high, unjustified by the general state of the market and as far back as last fall they protested these high prices. [. . .]

9. In every raion the disparity between prices for grain and for other agricultural products is such that peasants have the least to gain from selling their grain and in any case they have more to gain by selling other products, because, for example, a 10-pood pig carcass yields a revenue of 70 rubles, which is equal to three cartloads of winter wheat.

10. The supply of scarce goods to the grain-producing raions was significantly lower than last year. Supplies throughout the area have been 60 percent of last year. But a large portion of this 60 percent was left for urban and workers' supplies. Few goods reached the countryside. In certain areas, for example in Shumikha, the amount of textile goods that came in during the first quarter was 25 percent of last year's figure, but of this 25

percent, grain holders received very little. On the basis of a circular by the Commissariat of Trade, scarce goods, including textiles, were issued only to members of consumer cooperatives, at a time when 43 percent of the total population belong to cooperatives and disfranchised kulaks have been expelled from them. The kulaks could meet their needs by buying only from private traders. This order was being rescinded<sup>70</sup> in many places as we passed through, and in others the circular ceased to be in force in the provinces a day or two before we arrived, or at best as of 1 January. The well-to-do elements of the countryside sought ways to exchange grain on a private basis for goods that they could not obtain at state and cooperative organizations. The scarcest goods are, in order: tea, iron, textile goods, metal products, especially nails, timber, and soft hides. During the fall, glass was also in short supply. The supply of goods that are available in ample quantities is proceeding more or less normally. In October and November there were interruptions in the supply of sugar.

11. The increased pressure to pay taxes during the second half of December did not affect grain deliveries. For example, between 15 December and 8 January in Ishim Raion, 1 million rubles in agricultural taxes and insurance premiums came in, while grain procurements declined. The appearance of goods did not increase grain deliveries. The goods were quickly bought up with the peasantry's cash.

12. The campaign to float the loan<sup>71</sup> had not yet been launched when we toured. We had to give instructions on this question to the Cheliabinsk and Kurgan okrug executive committees, as well as the local raion executive committees. By the time we arrived in Ishim the law had already been broadcast on the radio and they had already received an order to organize a Commission to Float the Loan. The same thing happened in Tiumen. All the local authorities are taking active steps to float the loan, although they believe that the figure given by Moscow, after a 50-percent increase, is exaggerated. The law on self-taxation was received after we returned to Sverdlovsk. The campaign for self-taxation had been set already upon Comrade Molotov's arrival.<sup>72</sup>

13. The fight against home brew, which is widely made throughout this area, has begun. At the same time it is noted that the state-manufactured grain wine that is brought in is quickly bought up by the peasantry and in some raions is also a scarce commodity. Local residents say that, with the pressure against home brew, the consumption of grain wine will increase significantly.

14. The local cooperatives are generally reluctant about carrying out grain procurements, preferring to conduct trade in other agricultural

products that are more advantageous to them, especially in out-of-the-way locations. The local cooperative bodies are in no rush to deliver grain, as they attempt to use a portion of it for the internal sale of grain and flour. In Shadrinsk Raion we confirmed an incident in which a cooperative organization held up 7,000 poods of grain in anticipation of a price increase (an order has been issued to remove the chairman of the board and to put him on trial). We were also told about another such incident in which 30,000 poods of grain was not delivered, but we didn't have time to verify it.

15. The lower-level apparatus of Khleboprodukt is to be considered satisfactory, but it has been organized into a purely bureaucratic framework. It must wait for the grain to be delivered without displaying its own initiative with regard to communication with the peasantry, negotiations about grain deliveries, etc. At one branch we received a complaint that Khleboprodukt had committed a crime by issuing sacks to peasants for them to deliver grain in; Khleboprodukt was fined for this, even though the branch had an ample supply of sacks.

16. There was no mention in any of the raions of possible military complications. But it was strongly emphasized that the peasantry expects a poor harvest; in this regard the peasantry specifically cites the speech by Comrade Rykov. There is a widespread expectation among the peasantry of a major crop failure in 1930-31 [economic year].

17. The collection of a milling tax<sup>73</sup> (payment in kind for ground grain) had just gotten under way when we arrived. Executive committees everywhere regarded the order ending high-quality milling for the peasantry as unacceptable.

On the basis of the tour, we have been able to conclude that the oblast executive committee and the oblast party committee were not familiar enough with the situation in the okrugs, sketching an overly rosy picture for themselves. The okrugs were in the same position with regard to the raions. The representatives of okrug executive committees and okrug party committees who traveled with us to grain-collecting centers saw for themselves that the situation they had sketched at our joint meetings does not correspond to reality. It proved to be much worse everywhere. All of the okrug and raion officials took measures to increase the collection of payments, but they did not link this matter adequately with grain procurements and have not yet realized that grain procurements must be the core of their work. In some places we still encountered the attitude that grain procurements are merely one of the campaigns along with campaigns, no less important to them, for elections and reports to the voters, as well as for studying the decisions of the congress.<sup>74</sup>

On the basis of a tour of the region and an acquaintance with the situation in Sverdlovsk, one could not help but conclude that the chief reasons for the unsatisfactory progress of grain procurements are prices and industrial goods.

1. The disparity between prices for grain and nongrain products has prodded the peasantry into selling all other products but grain. The excellent quality of this year's grain is providing a particular incentive for the accumulation of peasant reserves. We noted above that wheat procurements are running no lower than last year, but oat and rye procurements have dropped sharply. With the unquestionably small oat harvest, the oat price of 53–56 kopeks is unacceptable to the peasantry, and it is trying everything to feed the possible oat surplus to the cattle and secure more profitable forms of using oats [for feeding the horses involved] in carting and carrying. The scarcity of oats, which is derailing timber procurements in the Urals, has caused price increases at the bazaars: up to 80 kopeks in Cheliabinsk and Shadrinsk, up to 1 ruble 50 kopeks in Sverdlovsk. The main problem of the price question is the imbalance between the prices for grain and nongrain products.

2. With the significant surplus cash that the peasantry has accumulated from selling nongrain agricultural products at elevated prices and with the poor [collection of] taxes, the peasantry has become fully capable not only of covering all of its payments but also of buying industrial goods available in greatly diminished quantities, *without resorting to selling grain*. The more well-to-do elements of the countryside and grain holders were, in effect, deprived of the opportunity to buy scarce goods because of an order from the Trade Commissariat.

3. The peasants' accumulation of cash enables them, even with the planned increase in the delivery of goods for the second quarter, to buy up, to a significant degree, an increased quantity of industrial goods without resorting to taking more grain out of the region. A number of local officials warned us of this possibility.

Having ascertained the above situation, we had to conclude that deliveries of scarce industrial goods that are not directly related to the delivery of grain will not yield desirable results, that an increase in grain procurements is possible only if two factors work together: administrative pressure and rewarding grain deliverers with industrial goods. In this regard it has been clear to me that the latter, i.e., rewards, will be of preponderant importance for the following reasons:

By 15 January the well-to-do elements of the countryside will cover almost the full amount of agricultural taxes and the vast majority of insur-

ance premiums. The remaining payments (on seed loans, land reorganization, etc.) are minor and, to a significant extent, disputed. Consequently, before the campaign for floating the loan and for self-taxation, the main grain holders, at any rate, will easily make their payments without making grain deliveries. I proceeded on the assumption that the campaign for self-taxation and for the loans would not be launched more or less widely until 15 February. It is in our interests to make maximum use of one of the best months for procurements: 15 January to 15 February. I also felt that increased pressure for self-taxation and the loan could fall flat. With these two campaigns we are affecting not only kulaks but also the entire mass of middle peasants. In the Urals as a whole, 12 million rubles has been paid on the loan and 7.5 million on self-taxation, for a total of 19.5 million rubles, i.e., a larger sum than the annual agricultural tax assessment. By conducting these two campaigns, we may run into a common front of kulaks and middle peasants and increased influence from the former.

In dwelling on the idea that a reward of industrial goods for deliverers must be introduced, we had to consider the impact of this measure, of course, on the status of cash. But during our tour we ascertained that the peasants are doing everything they can not to hold on to money, converting it to objects that are even superfluous in the peasant economy. For example, peasants have widely purchased iron beds, old cabinets, all kinds of furniture, gramophones, galoshes without regard for sizes, etc. Given this attitude by the peasantry toward accumulation in nonmonetary form, I felt that issuing rewards of industrial goods could not substantially worsen the situation of the chervonets [unit of currency] in the countryside, I felt that issuing rewards of industrial goods as a temporary measure for roughly the next two months is inevitable and necessary. The oblast party committee agreed with this view when we returned.

We recommended that the rewarding of grain deliverers with scarce industrial goods be introduced in the form of granting grain deliverers the right to make purchases on a priority or preferential basis in the amount of 50 percent of the value of the grain delivered, of which 30–35 percent is to go for textile goods, and the entire transaction must, without fail, be in cash rather than in-kind. Cooperatives are required to issue industrial goods to grain deliverers in the above-mentioned quantities, regardless of whom the grain was delivered to: a state organization, an agricultural cooperative, or a consumer cooperative. Our proposal fully coincides with the latest CC directive.<sup>75</sup>

A total count of commodity resources has shown that this measure is feasible. According to the plan for supplying goods to the Urals, 12.5 mil-

lion rubles' worth of scarce goods (textiles, tea, leather, metal) will be sent to the grain-producing raions. In addition, we established during our tour that the principal grain-procurement raions in the steppe have an enormous need for lumber, which can be provided by the Urals region itself, in the amount of 1 million rubles, so that the entire stock of scarce goods should be reckoned at 13.5 million rubles. We determined together with the oblast party committee that a stock of 20 percent of all scarce goods should be allocated for general sale primarily to poor peasants who have previously delivered grain. After deducting this 20 percent, we get a stock worth 10.8 million rubles with which to issue rewards for grain procurements. Yet the rewards stock, based on 50 percent, needs to be in the following amounts: we set the procurement plan for January to March for the Urals at 18 million poods, worth 16 million rubles rounded off, in other words, the rewards require 8 million rubles' worth of goods. As a result, the oblast trade administration retains a reserve of goods worth 2.8 million rubles, which insures against possible interruptions in the arrival of goods and makes it possible to form a certain reserve of goods in Sverdlovsk to maneuver with, to send to raions that for various reasons will not receive goods on schedule.

I mentioned in my telegrams that the Urals can procure 39 million poods and from the very outset tried to reach agreement on this with the Urals organizations. I proceeded from the following premises: this year's harvest is no higher than last year's. We let procurements slip in the first quarter and, second, which is no less important, last year about 19 million poods of oats were procured, while this year at best 5–6 million poods will be procured, or 12–13 million poods less than last year. In 1926–27 [economic year] procurements by all Urals organizations totaled 44.5 million poods, so by subtracting these 12 million poods we get 32 million poods. The shortfall of 7 million poods can be covered by increasing wheat deliveries. I settled on this figure for tactical reasons as well. The whole plan for supplying the Urals, as coordinated [with] the Trade Commissariat, totals 34.6 million poods. This plan must now be reduced by the following amounts: (a) a change to 80 percent milled grain yields a savings of 1 million poods; (b) elimination of the vast majority of grain-producing raions from the supply plan, 1.5 million poods; and (c) under-fulfillment of the supply plan in the first quarter, 1.2 million poods, for a total of 3.7 million rubles. As a result, we will get a supply plan for the Urals in round numbers of 35 million poods (34.6–34.7). I considered it correct to set this figure and to firmly establish that the Urals must provide 8 million poods to be shipped out of the oblast, while granting it the right

to increase its reserves as it increases procurements. Comrade Molotov disagreed with me and insisted on a procurement figure of 44 million poods, which even the Commissariat of Trade regarded as tentative, whereas the plan drawn up by officials in the Urals has been for 41 million poods from the very beginning. I consider the possibility of fulfilling a procurement plan of 44 million poods to be unrealistic because in the first six months 16 million poods, rounded off, were procured, which leaves 28 million poods, or 64 percent of the yearly plan, for the second half of the year. The unfeasibility of this plan gives the Urals organizations an opportunity, by citing it, not to carry out orders to dispatch shipments out of the region. It also seemed more beneficial to me from the standpoint of pressure to use my proposal—to guarantee the shipment of 8 million poods out of the region with a minimum procurement plan of 39 million poods.

M. Frumkin

• DOCUMENT 15 •

Report from the OGPU EKU on mass repression carried out against speculators in the USSR grain market, 8 February 1928. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 6, d. 567, ll. 278–81. Copy.

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8 February 1928

On 4 January of this year the OGPU instructed its organs in the provinces to immediately carry out, in coordination with local party and soviet authorities, mass repression against the most inveterate private grain procurement agents and grain traders, who by their activities were exerting a particularly disruptive influence on the condition of local grain markets, with the cases to be turned over afterward for consideration by the Special Conference of the OGPU Collegium.<sup>76</sup>

Final summary reports on this operation have not yet been received from the provinces, but the communications already in hand sketch a fairly clear picture both of the nature of the repression itself and its results.

Number of Persons Arrested

Measures of repression were carried out mainly against the speculators among private traders who procured grain in procurement raions at prices



that exceeded set prices and sold grain in grain-consuming raions at prices that exceeded market prices established for state and cooperative trading organizations. In this regard it should be kept in mind that the private procurement agents and grain traders conducted all their activities while violating the rules for economic regulation of shipments, persistently agitating against the delivery of grain by peasants to plan-oriented procurement agents, violating in massive numbers various resolutions by local executive committees on the procedure for conducting grain procurements and grain trade, arranging for the milling of grain by peasants used as stand-ins, and committing a multitude of other offenses.

The largest number of arrested private traders was in the major grain procurement areas, especially those that gravitate geographically toward the grain-consuming areas. Information on the number of arrested persons by area is contained in the following list: Ukrainian SSR, 704; Siberia, 234; Tatar Republic, 150; Bashkir [Republic], 110; Urals Oblast, 85; Tambov Gubernia, 100; Saratov Gubernia, 104; Voronezh Gubernia, 71; Orenburg Gubernia, 35; Ulianovsk Gubernia, 84; Tula Gubernia, 63; Penza Gubernia, 50, Kursk Gubernia, 48; Samara Gubernia, 44. All told, according to estimates, about 3,000 private grain traders were arrested in the USSR as a whole. In addition, beginning in the final days of January, arrests were carried out in Siberia and Ukraine against kulak elements who, because of the repression against private grain traders, started to buy up grain themselves for speculating purposes while conducting persistent agitation against party and government measures to increase grain procurements.

Initial information on the progress of the antikulak operation has been received only from Siberia and from Urals Oblast, and the numbers arrested were: Siberia, 136; Urals Oblast, 80.

### Quantity of Confiscated Grain

At the time the private traders were arrested, they were found everywhere to have stocks of grain that had been hidden for speculating purposes, in hopes of an increase in prices.

The largest stocks of hidden grain were discovered in Ukraine. For example, in Cherkassy a secret stock of 20,050 poods of barley was discovered; in Mariupol, 10,000 poods of sunflower seeds; in Pervomaisk, 7,000 poods of wheat; in Odessa, 4,000 poods of wheat flour, etc.

In the Urals, some arrested individuals had grain stocks containing up

to 5,000 poods of wheat and rye. Grain stocks, though in somewhat smaller quantities, were also discovered in other areas, for example in Penza, Samara, and other gubernias (from 500 to 1,500 poods of grain). As soon as it was discovered, the grain was turned over to cooperatives at set prices. In view of the continuing transfer, we have not yet received precise information about the amount of grain confiscated.

The arrests of private traders have directly resulted in the immediate cessation of all grain procurements by them almost everywhere, and the private trader, consequently, has been removed from the grain procurement market. The absence of the private trader as a rival to plan-oriented procurement agents has increased procurements by the latter and has had a calming effect on market prices for grain. In fact, these prices have not only come close to set prices but have coincided with them in a whole host of areas.

To describe the situation following the operations in the grain procurement markets, here are excerpts from reports by local OGPU organs.

Ukraine: "Private traders in okrugs where operations were conducted are passive and most of them have quit the market."

Siberia (Barnaul Okrug): "The arrest of the most inveterate private traders has increased the pace of procurements, and in the very first two days after the operation Sibtorq [Siberian Trade Administration] procured up to 800 poods, while Khleboprodukt procured up to 500 poods of grain. The arrest of private traders has also contributed to a drop in grain prices in the market, which previously were 50 to 100 percent higher than the set prices. Private traders have hastened to enter into an agreement with the local internal trade administration on prices for grain and forage."

The Urals: "As a result of the operation and the removal of private grain traders from the market, an increase in grain purchases by state organizations has been noted in large grain procurement okrugs: 23,000 poods was procured in Kurgan Okrug in a single day, i.e., more than in the entire previous five-day period."

The shift in grain prices during the period following the measures of repression is also evident from the information received from Samara Gubernia. For example, before the arrest of private traders, the market price for wheat in the city of Samara was 2 rubles 10 kopeks per pood, whereas after the arrest of 44 private traders the price fell to 1 ruble 50 kopeks.

Chief of OGPU Economic Directorate Prokofiev

## · DOCUMENT 16 ·

From a political report by the Political Administration of the Caucasus Red Banner Army on the attitudes of Red Army soldiers toward the grain procurement campaign, 28 February 1928. RGVA, f. 9, op. 28, d. 55, ll. 50–50ob. Certified copy.

28 February 1928

Excerpts from letters that arrived from the countryside at KKA [Caucasus Red Army] units in January and February 1928:

“Forced grain requisitioning [*prodrazvyorstka*] is being imposed here now. Life used to be good somehow, but now it’s bad; people have become kind of gloomy” (1st KSD [Caucasus Infantry Division]).

“If you deliver less than 17 poods of grain, you won’t get any textile goods” (Kuban Oblast).

“The grain procurements surprise us. We deliver grain, and we are given a receipt; war is probably being prepared. One village [*stanitsa*] was saddled with a mandatory assignment of 100,000 poods of grain. Why is that? Is war coming? They inventoried all of our grain, and we can’t sell the surplus without permission from the village soviet” (1st KSD).

“I can’t buy grain without the village soviet, and I myself don’t sow it. The cooperative issues all its goods for grain, it doesn’t sell them for money. Why is that? Find out in your regiment and write us” (1st KSD).

“There has been ferment among peasants in the countryside lately; a lecturer came out from the city and said that peasants should turn in their grain for textile goods, if you don’t turn it in, we’ll take it anyway; we don’t suffer, he says, if middle peasants become poor or become farm hands [*batraks*]. For money they don’t even give you half a meter of textiles. In short, the peasants are being squeezed; the grain is being pumped out by using textiles. Besides that the lecturer suggested that we do self-taxation. There’s unhappiness among the peasants. Then they suggest that we be sure to take the loan bonds” (Kherson Okrug).

“I don’t understand what’s going on in the countryside. The peasants say that in the event of war we’ll attack our own government. If a peasant slaughters an animal, he doesn’t have the right to sell it without turning in the hide to the Kozhtrest [Hides Trust]” (11th Convoy Battalion).

“Maybe where you are everything is quiet and peaceful and nothing is going on, but we’ve had a big change happen. In the village and at the shop they’re not giving out goods for money, they’re only giving them out for wheat. Vania, and at the mill they’re just letting us grind the norm—2

poods a person—and whatever’s left over they take for the state at a ruble [a pood]” (2nd Caucasus Regiment).

“Vasia, I’m letting you know that the grain troika is going around here. They’re taking grain from whoever has too much, and they’re only leaving some freshly reaped grain for each person” (2nd Caucasus Regiment).

“You write that service has become easy for you and life is good, but for us, our dear son-in-law, life has gotten very bad. They’ve started taking away grain from the rich for the treasury, and they’re forcing them to sell it at fixed prices. They don’t let them sell it at the bazaar and they aren’t giving out goods for money, but only for grain. Flour now costs 3 rubles, so that they’re pushing every citizen into taking grain out of the area” (2nd Caucasus Regiment).

“Don’t send any money, we don’t need it, it’s better if you buy textile goods and send them to us, because we don’t have any” (letter to a serviceman who volunteered for an extended term—2nd KSD).

“The cooperative isn’t giving out goods for money, they’re demanding grain. The peasants are saying, since they’re not taking cash, soon it won’t be worth anything, you won’t be able to buy anything with it. Take care of your grain” (2nd KSD).

“For a pood of grain they’re giving out a meter of textile goods” (2nd KSD).

“The elevator is paying less for grain than a private [trader]. They’re not letting peasants sell grain at the bazaar, they’re delivering it to the elevator, and the prices there are cheaper” (letter to a well-to-do peasant—2nd KSD).

“We have some news. All the mills have taken out sieves, they’re grinding meal into ordinary whole grain, but there won’t be any white flour. The Soviet government will eat white bread while the peasants will eat bran, so that they learn how to dredge up [more] bread. Freedom has finally come, but not for the peasants. Find out if things are the same way where you are. It seems that the peasants will have to die like flies” (5th Caucasus Regiment).

“The procurement agent will buy grain in the village at the cooperative’s prices, then he resells it to the private trader at higher prices” (2nd KSD).

“We have a big revolt here in the village because the government has stuck a food tax of 30 kopeks on every ruble . . . [sic] and won’t take it in cash but only in grain and they want to take away all the grain. They leave 1 pood a month per person to eat, but nobody agrees and [people are] saying we’ll fight to the death than [sic] starve to death. And they’re confiscating from the rich and fifteen people have been taken in and stuck in a workhouse because they didn’t agree to turn in the self-taxation, their situation is bad” (5th Caucasus Regiment).

“The payments, Seryozha, are impossible. They’ve added further voluntary insurance for 500 rubles. Nobody gets insurance voluntarily, they divvied it up by force and collected it. Now they’ve sent in a lottery bond for 1,100 rubles, also voluntarily, but they’re making people take it by force. So, Seryozha, it’s payment after payment. Nobody is happy with Soviet power, not one citizen, and how can you be happy, Seryozha? The bolsheviks turn out not to be rulers but robbers, not a proletarian government but an SR [Socialist Revolutionary] one. So why are peasants grinding away—they sell their livestock and all they have left are their own two legs and one horse, and some people don’t have any grain at all. At the elevator grain is worth nothing against printed cotton fabric or satin, and rye is 70–75 kopeks, wheat 1 ruble 25 kopeks or 1 ruble 30 kopeks, while printed cotton fabric is 70 kopeks a meter and satin is 1 ruble. So the way we’re living, things couldn’t be worse” (5th Caucasus Regiment).

“Now we’re not going to vote for the poor, we voted for them for two years, and they’re failing in everything. Consequently, we need to vote for the well-off peasant and his property, so that he has something to answer with” (2nd KSD).

Commander of 1st Unit of 1st Department Mei

• DOCUMENT 17 •

Report from the OGPU EKU on the number of speculators arrested during mass operations, 2 April 1928. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 6, d. 567, l. 409. Copy.

2 April 1928

Top secret

<i>Name of Markets</i>	<i>Private Traders</i>	<i>Officials</i>
Grain	3,971	147
Raw hide	1,780	53
Meat	29	—
Textile goods	631	36
Chicory	24	—
Veg[etable] oil	13	—
Wool	16	—
Fur	33	16
Footwear	30	—
Potatoes	15	—
Total	6,542	252

Assistant chief of section 4 of OGPU EKU Ivanov  
Senior plenipotentiary Ponomarev

· DOCUMENT 18 ·

Letter from M. I. Frumkin to the Politburo, 15 June 1928. RGASPI,  
f. 17, op. 163, d. 736, ll. 43–50. Certified copy. Typewritten text.

15 June 1928

Top secret

To all Politburo members and candidate members and Comrade Bauman  
To Comrade I. V. Stalin

The critical difficulties we are experiencing have already had a harsh impact and are mounting, both in our domestic and our foreign situation. There is no question that the sharp deterioration in our foreign situation stems least of all from the activities of the Comintern. The intensified charges of purveying “propaganda” are merely welcome material for the Western European bourgeoisie. The principal and decisive factor in the offensive by the capitalist world against the USSR is the political and economic weakening of our forces.

The deterioration in our domestic situation is attributable above all to the countryside, to the agricultural situation. We must not close our eyes to the fact that the countryside, with the exception of a small segment of poor peasants, is against us, that these attitudes are already starting to spill over into workers’ and urban centers. Those who speak at workers’ and Red Army meetings know well how the discontent of the countryside is strongly reflected in the attitudes and statements of workers and Red Army men. A further increase in discontent in the countryside threatens, through the unemployed, through workers associated with the countryside, and through Red Army men, to cause us difficulties in the cities as well. In attaching exceptional importance to the countryside’s role in the critical processes that we are experiencing, I consider it my duty to call the Politburo’s attention to the factors that are the focus of hundreds and thousands of party members, (the factors) that people talk about at every encounter.

There is hardly any need to prove that the difficulties we are experiencing stem not only and not so much from our mistakes in planning the economy. It is also true that these difficulties in large measure derive from the postrevolutionary structure of agriculture, but it is beyond question

that the deterioration in our economic situation intensified thanks to the new political line toward the countryside since the fifteenth congress, a line that has little to do with the decisions of the congress

The fifteenth congress issued a directive to put the collectivization of agriculture in the center of attention and to conduct “a further offensive against the kulak.” The whole spirit of Comrade Molotov’s report and the resolution of the congress are a long way from dekulakization, from getting rid of well-to-do farms as production units. The main idea of the congress’s resolution was that “the offensive must, in the future, be conducted on the basis of the new economic policy, by increasing the taxation of kulaks, limiting their exploitative ambitions, by forming cooperatives, and collectivizing the poor and middle-peasant farms” (*Pravda*, no. 89, from the resolution of the Leningrad party *aktiv* on Comrade Bukharin’s report).<sup>77</sup>

At any rate there is no doubt that an alliance with the middle peasantry forms the basis of Leninist policy in general and in the countryside in particular. Rejecting this policy, as Comrades Stalin and Molotov correctly pointed out, brought the opposition to its doom.

The line taken toward the countryside after the congress is at odds with the above understanding of the congress’s decrees. Comrade Molotov said at the congress: “The ideology of the opposition, which is hostile to the middle peasant and hostile to an alliance with the middle peasantry, precisely this ideology leads it to propose a forcible peasant loan.

“Yet this proposal for a ‘loan’ is a direct breach of the party’s entire policy, the entire policy of NEP. So whoever now proposes to us this policy of a forcible loan, the forcible confiscation of 150–200 million poods of grain from at least 10 percent of peasant farms, i.e., not only from the kulak segment but also from a portion of the middle-peasant segment of the countryside, no matter how well intentioned this proposal is—he is an enemy of workers and peasants, an enemy of the alliance between workers and peasants (*Stalin: Right!*), he is pushing a line toward the destruction of the Soviet state. [. . .]”<sup>78</sup>

Ten days after the congress the author of these energetic words displayed the utmost initiative in a direction other than the line he developed. A forced loan was imposed, and forced confiscation of grain was applied to middle peasants as well. One can debate how to assess the campaign that was conducted in the countryside from January to March, but if the assessment is positive<sup>79</sup> it should be established that a new ideology took shape during the campaign that is at odds with our entire policy in the countryside.

At a session of the Urals Oblast party committee, in the presence of 30–

40 comrades, Comrade Molotov formulated the attitude toward the countryside this way: “We must strike at the kulak in such a way that the middle peasant stands at attention before us.” This phrase was not incidental. In his report on his trips to survey grain procurements, he accuses everybody who disagrees with this line of pandering to the kulak.

We learn from a speech by Comrade Kuchmin at a plenum of the Siberian Krai party committee about a typical directive that the latter issued in a circular: “We linked our plan with article 107 much less than was instructed in the directive of the krai party committee, which says, ‘article 107 is intended for kulaks only. This is wrong, and this blurs the main purpose of article 107—to make an object lesson out of the kulak’s hide for the middle peasant.’ I ask, does this formulation link article 107 with the procurement plan for Siberia or not? (*Comrade Syrtsov*: ‘It does in part.’) Maybe, even somewhat more than other organizations linked their plan with article 107. Besides everything, this formulation is slippery. Unless it is developed further, it blurs our explanatory work, where we say, ‘We are putting emphasis on the fact that article 107 will not apply to you, the middle peasant.’ (*Comrade Syrtsov*: ‘That emphasis? That’s wrong.’)”

The “object lesson” produced a definite result: our “ally,” the middle peasant, has turned his back on us.

At the plenum of the Siberian Krai party committee, Comrade Nusinov lays a “theoretical foundation” under this ideology: “Comrade Kuchmin proceeds from the premise that the middle-peasant farm is not exploitative. This is absolutely correct, in the process of production the middle peasant is indeed not an exploiter. In a certain market situation, however, some middle peasants may display ‘exploiter characteristics’ in the area of circulation, by holding back large amounts of marketable grain and attempting to speculate from a price rise.

“This is in theory. But in practice? Doesn’t such a middle peasant, who wants to disrupt the market and raise prices, cause harm to us? Of course he causes harm, since he is derailing the grain procurement campaign. And the purpose of applying article 107 is precisely to strike at the kulak and, by making an example of the kulak, show the chief grain holder, the middle peasant, that the proletarian state and the party cannot permit their economic plans to be derailed and their economic regulation to be resisted.”

According to Nusinov, it seems that the middle peasant is obligated to sacrifice his interests in the name of recognition and approval of all of the regulatory measures by the Trade Commissariat and to accept the established grain prices with enthusiasm.

At a session of the commission for the funding of agriculture (in early



March) Comrade Molotov said the following: “Feeding credits to the middle peasant could cause him to develop into a kulak.”

At a session of the Central Executive Committee Comrade Kubiak proposed the following program:<sup>80</sup>

“We now face a serious problem that we must solve—it is to organize our own, large state grain factories, and we and the Commissariat of Agriculture, with the help of the government, are getting started on this and we think that we will, without question, accomplish this task with general support. Without a solution to this problem of building large new Soviet commodity grain farms, of course, we will often find ourselves in the kind of grave situation when grain lies in the granaries, it will be eaten by mice (as I saw in Kazakhstan—stacks eaten up by mice), and we will face the prospect of importing grain from abroad.”

The program of building state farms in Comrade Kubiak’s interpretation has only one meaning. It is futile to think that we will succeed in establishing a relationship with the peasants such that we could count on getting grain from them.<sup>81</sup> This viewpoint most definitely smells of Trotskyism.

A new line has been adopted throughout the party toward the middle peasant. There continues to be talk, through inertia, of an alliance with the middle peasant, but in practice we are pushing the middle peasant away from us. Trouble has turned into a virtue, a new assessment of our relations with the peasantry has taken shape.

The April plenum of the Central Committee warns against measures that “threaten to weaken the alliance of the working class with the majority of middle peasants.”<sup>82</sup> The words are definite and binding, but because of the halfway quality and duality of the plenum’s whole resolution on grain procurements, there has been no turnaround in the attitude of local party authorities. Along with the diminished amount of grain, the distortions that were condemned by the plenum as antiparty phenomena have also diminished (only diminished), but the line, the ideology, has continued. The local party authorities are devoting their attention and concerns only to the poor, who were issued promissory notes during the grain procurements; the necessity of a “lasting alliance with the peasant” has receded to the background. We don’t see any measures in the countryside that would help to overcome the attitudes of the middle peasants, which, if not hostile, are in any case unfavorable toward the party and government.

The line taken lately has driven the majority of middle peasants to hopelessness and despair. Any incentive to improve a farm, to increase the inventory of working animals or equipment, or commercial livestock, is par-

alyzed by the fear of being listed as a kulak. Despondency reigns in the countryside, and this cannot help but affect the development of the economy. It is not without reason that we are seeing unprecedented stagnation in the sale of agricultural machinery. The prevailing attitudes in the countryside, apart from their immediate political importance, are leading to a deterioration of the peasant economy and to systematic shortages of bread outside the countryside. We must say this.

To solve this critical situation, a drastic turnaround is necessary not only in the attitudes of the peasantry, it is imperative to give a new orientation above all to our own party ranks. The key: we must return to the fourteenth and fifteenth congresses; the latter clarifies the resolutions of the fourteenth congress only by increasing attention to collectivization. We were in too much of a hurry to pull away from the position of the fourteenth congress. These positions still needed reinforcement.

What is to be done in the short term:

1. Establish revolutionary legality. The outlawing of kulaks has led to lawless actions against the whole peasantry. It is inadmissible that in the eleventh year of Soviet power a citizen in the countryside does not know the boundary between what is lawful and lawless, that the authorities issue decrees that are nominally laws but in essence are a mockery of legality. (For example, fines of 100–200 rubles for weevils or for not keeping dogs on a leash.)

2. The role of marketability and the growth of agricultural production must retain all of the importance that we attached to them during the fourteenth congress and the fourteenth conference. All local party bodies must clearly understand that every million poods of grain, no matter what group it comes from, strengthens the dictatorship of the proletariat and industrialization, while every lost million poods of grain weakens us.

3. Hence. We must fight the kulak by reducing his savings, by increasing taxes, by freeing middle and poor peasants from his economic (and hence political) influence, we must not support him with our meager credits, but we must not “dekulakize” and completely smash his farm and his production, which we still need for a number of years.

4. Hence. Devote attention and assistance above all (and not third of all) to the individual farms of middle peasants who can give us grain not in five or ten years but this year and next.

5. Allocate as much assistance as possible to poor peasants who are moving into collectives and, through the strengthening of these collectives, draw middle peasants as well into a genuinely (rather than pseudo-) socialized economy.

6. Do not expand state farms on an intensive [*udarny*] and superinten-

sive [*sverkhudarny*] basis. This intensive way of operating will be costly. Our meager funds will yield better results if they are spent, for now, on primary forms of collectives and on strengthening poor and middle peasants' farms.

7. Restore, or rather open up, the grain market, which entails a change in the entire practice of the Commissariat of Trade.

8. Raise grain prices by 15–20 kopeks while simultaneously lowering prices for other agricultural products by such amounts as to keep the overall agricultural index at the current level. Pursue a line of lowering rates for timber procurements, haulage and so forth.

9. Intensify the struggle against manufacture of home brew, on which a large quantity of grain is expended.

10. Have the agriculture commissariats focus on the development of field-crop cultivation, especially grain cultivation, which has received little attention until now.

11. Give individual farms, and not only collectives, an opportunity to purchase machinery (this is done in some okrugs of the Northern Caucasus).

I am well aware that implementation of these measures will require that we ease our pressure on the private trader and on small-scale industry in the countryside. I am not talking about this because I only wanted to discuss the central issue.

I would ask you to take into consideration that I am not the only one who favors the main ideas that have been set forth very schematically in this letter. They are expressed by hundreds and thousands of comrades who have not been in the opposition and who until now did not belong to the rightist camp, who completely agree with the party line but regard the pace that has been set for carrying out the line as ruinous.

M. Frumkin

• DOCUMENT 19 •

From speeches by I. V. Stalin and N. I. Bukharin at the July plenum of the CC, 9–10 July 1928. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 375 (part 2), ll. 500b–660b. Transcript. Printed text.

9–10 July 1928

9 July, evening.

*Chairman.* Comrade Stalin has the floor.<sup>83</sup>

*Stalin.* Comrades, before moving on to the specific question of our difficulties on the grain front, allow me to address several general questions

that are of theoretical interest and that have surfaced here during the discussions at the plenum.

First of all, the general question of the main sources of the development of our industry and the paths of sustaining the current pace of development of industry. Comrade Osinsky, and right after him Comrade Sokolnikov, brushed right up against this question, perhaps without realizing it. This question is a question of paramount importance. I think we have two main sources that are fueling our industry: first, the working class and, second, the peasantry. In capitalist countries industrialization was usually based not only on internal accumulation but also on the plundering of other countries, the plundering of colonies or vanquished countries, or on substantial loans from abroad. You know that for hundreds of years England used to drain all its colonies, from every continent, and in this way injected additional investments into its industry. This, by the way, also explains how England at one time turned into “the world’s factory.” You also know that Germany developed its industry, among other things, on the basis of an indemnity of 5 billion [francs] taken from France after the Franco-Prussian War. It is also well known that America developed its industry on the basis of loans from Europe. Germany is now rebuilding its industry in precisely the same way, on the basis of loans, mostly from America. Our country differs from the capitalist countries, by the way, in that it cannot and must not engage in the plundering of colonies or in the plundering of other countries in general. Therefore this path is closed to us. But our country doesn’t have loans from abroad either. Consequently, this path is closed to us as well. In that case what is left for us? One choice is left: to develop industry, to industrialize the country on the basis of internal accumulation. Under bourgeois practices, industry, transport, and so forth usually developed in our country on the basis of loans. Whether you take the construction of new plants or the re-equipping of old ones, whether you take the laying of new railroads or the construction of big power plants—not one of these enterprises could manage without foreign loans. The situation is completely different in our country under Soviet practices. We are laying the 1,400-verst [1,500-kilometer] Turkestan Railroad, which requires more than a hundred million. We are building the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, which also requires more than a hundred million. Do we have any loan here? No, we don’t. All of this is being done in our country on the basis of internal accumulation. But where are the main sources of this accumulation? As I said, there are two such sources: first, the working class, which creates valuable output and moves industry forward; and second, the peasantry.

The situation in our country with regard to the peasantry in this case is the following: it pays the state not only ordinary taxes, direct and indirect, but it also pays relatively high prices for goods from industry—that is first of all—and it doesn't receive the full value of the prices of agricultural products—that is second of all. This is an additional tax on the peasantry in the interests of developing industry, which serves the whole country, including the peasantry. This is something like a "tribute," something like a surtax, which we are forced to take temporarily in order to sustain and further develop the current rate of industrial growth, to support industry for the whole country, to further improve the well-being of the countryside, and then to completely destroy this additional tax, these "scissors" between the city and the countryside. This situation, needless to say, is unpleasant. But we would not be bolsheviks if we papered over this fact and closed our eyes to the fact that, unfortunately, our industry and our country cannot manage without this additional tax on the peasantry for the moment. [ . . . ]

Was it a mistake to impose extraordinary measures during the grain procurement crisis? Everybody now acknowledges that it wasn't a mistake, that, on the contrary, the extraordinary measures saved the country from a general economic crisis. What made us impose these measures? A shortage of 128 million poods of grain by January of this year, which we had to make up before the bad road season and at the same time set a normal pace for grain procurements. Could we have refrained from taking extraordinary measures when we didn't have the roughly 100-million-pood grain reserves we needed to bide our time and intervene in the market, or when we lacked enough foreign currency reserves to import large grain shipments from abroad? It's clear that we couldn't have. And what would have happened if we had not made up that shortage? We would have now had an extremely serious crisis throughout the national economy, hunger in the cities, hunger in the army. If we had had a grain reserve of about 100 million poods, we could wait awhile and then starve out the kulaks by intervening in the market. . . .<sup>84</sup> [ . . . ]

. . .<sup>85</sup> we, of course, would not have resorted to extraordinary measures. But you are well aware that we didn't have such a reserve. If we had had a foreign currency reserve at the time of about 100–150 million in order to import grain, we probably would not have resorted to extraordinary measures. But you are well aware that we didn't have this reserve. I must state that I don't consider importing grain to be shameful, given the well-known circumstances of our foreign trade. I can easily imagine a situation in which we import one kind of grain, one crop, while we export

another and end up with a net gain. (*Voice: Right!*) But we didn't have these reserves. And it was because we didn't have these reserves that we found ourselves forced to resort to extraordinary measures. One can hardly deny that without these measures we would now have an extremely serious crisis throughout the national economy. (*Voices: Right.*) Does this mean that we must remain without a reserve in the future and resort again to help from extraordinary measures? No, it doesn't. On the contrary, we must take all the measures in our power in order to accumulate reserves and preclude the necessity of imposing any extraordinary measures whatsoever. The people who are thinking of turning the extraordinary measures into a permanent or long-term policy of our party are dangerous people because they are playing with fire and are creating a threat to the union [between the city and countryside].

Does it follow from this that we must renounce the use of extraordinary measures once and for all? No, it doesn't. We have no basis for asserting that the extraordinary conditions that require the use of extraordinary measures can never recur. Such an assertion would be idle quackery. Lenin, who founded the new economic policy, did not consider it possible, however, to disavow even *Kombed* [Committee of Poor Peasants]<sup>86</sup> methods during NEP under certain conditions and in a certain situation. We, all the more, cannot disavow once and for all the use of extraordinary measures, which cannot be compared with such a harsh measure for fighting the kulaks as *Kombed* methods. It may be pertinent to recall an episode involving Preobrazhensky at the eleventh congress of our party that has a direct bearing on this matter. It is well known that, in his theses on work in the countryside, Preobrazhensky attempted at the eleventh congress to reject "once and for all" the policy of *Kombed* methods of fighting the kulaks during NEP. Preobrazhensky wrote in his theses: "The policy of nonacceptance of this segment (the kulaks and well-to-do peasantry) and crude, extra-economic suppression of it with the *Kombed* methods of 1918 would be a highly damaging mistake" (section 2). It is well known that Lenin responded to this as follows: "The second phrase of section 2 (against 'Kombed methods') is harmful and wrong because a war, for example, *can compel the use of Kombed methods*. This must be said completely differently, for example, this way: in view of the preponderant importance of developing agriculture and increasing its products, *at this moment* [emphasis mine.—*I.St.*] the proletariat's policy toward the kulaks and the well-to-do peasantry must be aimed mostly at limiting its exploitative ambitions and so forth. How our state must and can limit these ambitions and protect poor peasants, that is the whole crux. This must be

studied and people must be forced to study this in practice, but general phrases are hollow” (cf. *Leninskii sbornik*, 4, p. 391).

It is clear that the extraordinary measures must be viewed dialectically, because everything depends on the conditions of time and place. . . .

What is the basic meaning and basic significance of our difficulties on the grain front? That they confront us with the full extent of the problem of grain, of grain production, the problem of agriculture in general, the problem of grain production in particular.

Do we have a grain problem in general, as a pressing issue? We certainly do. Only the blind can question whether the grain problem now affects all of Soviet society. We can't live like Gypsies, without grain reserves, without certain reserves in case a crop failure occurs, without reserves for maneuvering in the market, without reserves in case war breaks out, and, finally, without some reserves for export. Even a small-scale peasant, as meager as his farm is, doesn't do without reserves, without some back-up stocks. Isn't it clear that a great state that occupies one-sixth of the world's land area cannot manage without grain reserves, for internal and foreign maneuvering?

Suppose that we did not have the winter crop failure in Ukraine and we ended the grain procurement year “no better, no worse”—can we feel that this would have been enough for us? No, we can't. We can't continue to live “no better, no worse.” We must have a certain minimum of reserves at our disposal if we want to defend the positions of Soviet power both domestically and abroad.

First, we have no guarantee against military attack. Do you think we can defend the country without any grain reserves for the army? Comrade Rykov was absolutely right when he said that today's peasant is no longer the same as he was, say, six years ago, when he was afraid of losing land to a landowner. The peasant is already forgetting the landowner. Now he is demanding new, better living standards. In the event of an enemy attack, can we wage war both against the Poles at the front and against the muzhiks at home in order to get emergency grain for the army? No, we can't and we shouldn't. In order to defend the country, we must have certain back-up stocks to supply the army, at least for the first six months. What is this six-month breathing spell needed for? To allow the peasant to show some life, adjust to the dangers of war, grasp what is happening, and knuckle down for the common cause of defending the country. . . .<sup>87</sup>

Second, we have no guarantee against complications in the grain market. We definitely need a grain reserve to intervene in the affairs of the grain market, to pursue our price policy. Because we cannot and must not

resort to extraordinary measures every time. But we will never have such reserves if we are going to walk along the edge of the gorge every time, contenting ourselves with being able to finish the procurement year “no better, no worse.”

Third, we have no guarantee against a crop failure. We absolutely must have a certain grain reserve in order to supply the hungry areas in the event of a crop failure, at least to a certain extent, at least for a certain amount of time. But we will not have such a reserve unless we increase the production of marketable grain and drastically and decisively give up the old habit of living without reserves.

Finally, we absolutely must have a reserve for exporting grain, we need to import equipment for industry. We need to import agricultural machinery, tractors, and spare parts for them. But it is impossible to do this without exporting grain, without building up certain foreign currency reserves by exporting grain. In the prewar period we used to export from 500 to 600 million poods of grain a year. We were able to export so much because we were underconsuming it ourselves. That is absolutely correct. But it must be understood that, even so, during the prewar period we had twice as much marketable grain as now. And it is precisely because we now have half as much marketable grain—it is precisely for this reason that grain is excluded from exports. And what does the exclusion of grain from exports mean? It means the loss of the source with whose aid we imported and must import equipment for industry, tractors, and machinery for agriculture. Can we continue to live without building up grain reserves for export? No, we can't. [ . . . ]

10 July. Morning.

*Chairman* (Rykov). Comrade Bukharin has the floor. [ . . . ]

*Bukharin*. Comrades, I would like to address in my speech not only questions directly related to grain procurements but also some general questions of our economic policy. It seems to me that, in discussing questions related to grain procurements, we are essentially, perhaps without fully realizing it, toting up a certain balance sheet for our work over a certain, qualitatively new period of time. We are living, as everybody has known for a long time, in a period of reconstruction, and the question of grain procurements is essentially turning into a question of how well we have adjusted to fulfilling the tasks of the period of reconstruction. So it is from this perspective that I would like, first of all, to say a few words. In summing up our work since the end of the recovery period, consequently, for the first steps of the period of reconstruction (I will note parenthetically that I understand perfectly well how arbitrary these boundaries are)



we can point, first of all, to the tremendous achievements of the Soviet state. These enormous achievements run in a whole host of the most diverse directions. There can be no doubt whatsoever that in the area of technological reorganization, despite all the flaws and mistakes, we have made great headway. There can be no doubt whatsoever that, from the standpoint of the growth of productive forces and the development of the socialist sector of the economy, we can cite the most indisputable and very significant successes. There can be no doubt whatsoever, furthermore, from the standpoint of erecting a socialist framework for agriculture, that we have entered a period (which cannot possibly be underestimated!) of much more rapid development of social, collective forms in our agriculture; finally, there can be no doubt whatsoever that with regard to training personnel for our human apparatus we also have something to say “in our defense” before world history. But, comrades, along with this (and, it seems to me, this is the specific characteristic of the moment), along with the indisputable headway and the enormous positive balance sheet for which we can take historical credit, the experience of the period of reconstruction, or rather, the segment of the period of reconstruction that we already have behind us, has revealed enormous, gaping holes, failures that confront us with a whole host of serious problems in general economic policy. When we began the period of reconstruction, the party wrote in its decisions, on its banner, the party emphasized this, the password: An economy with reserves! If you look at the decisions of our congresses and CC plenums—both in connection with the domestic situation and in connection with the foreign situation, which is inevitably deteriorating—you will see that we always set the task of managing with reserves: in foreign currency, goods, grain, gold. We have failed to fulfill this basic directive, and in this respect we are in an extremely grave position. (*Voices: Right!*) We cannot possibly underestimate this, especially if we face a high probability of big foreign complications. This is a topic, it seems to me, comrades, that we need not dwell on in order to popularize it. It is so glaring that a couple of figures showing our indebtedness on short-term obligations alone and our decrease in gold reserves, plus a comparison with the tremendously rapid build-up of gold reserves in the Western European countries, above all Germany, are quite enough to make a general assessment of the situation on this front. It, this situation, is such that, of course, it cannot help but cause us a certain amount of alarm, it cannot help but confront us in a very pointed way with fundamental tasks in our economic policy. The difficulties stemming from the failure to fulfill the directives regarding reserves, the elimination of grain exports, the major failures in

our capital construction, of which we are all well aware and for which, of course, we all bear responsibility, the uniting of counterrevolutionary forces against us on this basis, and the major failures in the area of grain procurements, which is the subject, the political nucleus of the discussion of economic questions at this plenum—all sends us a signal about some general tasks regarding our economic policy.

First of all, comrades, I would like to raise before the Central Committee plenum a general question, a question that may seem too academic or almost superfluous to comrades at first, specifically I would like, in all candor and honesty, to raise this kind of problem: don't the enormous fluctuations and difficulties of the scale that we have now in regard to grain procurements, and the big sociopolitical fluctuation that accompanies this—doesn't all this stem from the very essence, the very nature of the period of reconstruction? Doesn't the enormous range of sociopolitical fluctuations in the country stem from the general difficulties of the period of reconstruction? Aren't these difficulties a general law of our development in the period of reconstruction? Isn't this something imposed on us by the very course of events, which we cannot possibly escape under any circumstances? I must say that I personally answer this in the negative. Difficulties of the scale that we have by no means stem directly from the general difficulties of the period of reconstruction. It seems to me that with regard to this question we must strictly distinguish between two things that do not coincide. A certain increase in objective difficulties in general is a real fact. If we want to catch up to Western Europe (and we do want this); if we want to increase the rate of accumulation in socialist industry (and we do want to do this); if we take into account our general economic setting, our backwardness, our poverty—it is completely clear that enormous difficulties flow from all this for our construction. We want to accomplish a whole host of important tasks overnight: to maximize the accumulation in socialist industry; to maximize the growth in agriculture; to maximize the consumption of the working class and the laboring masses in general, to maximize their growth and so forth—we want to achieve the maximum everywhere. It is not hard to understand that, first, in this formulation these tasks cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. We are partially fulfilling them, leaning either in one direction or another, then correcting ourselves. We have inevitable tilts too far in one direction that cause a reaction from the opposite side, and we are always proceeding in conflict. It goes without saying that such difficulties do indeed lie in the nature of our period of reconstruction. I call your attention, for example, to the curious fact that we complain about an economic imbalance either

toward one end or the other. (*Voroshilov*: Give us your panacea.) I don't want to give a panacea, and don't taunt me, please.

I want to say that the period of reconstruction, absolutely naturally, produces a number of complications and difficulties. But at the same time I have no doubt that there are different kinds of difficulties, that the kind of difficulties that would definitely entail, to use Comrade Stalin's formulation in yesterday's speech, a threat to the union with the peasantry, that difficulties of this kind do not necessarily flow from the character of the period of reconstruction. And it seems to me that when Lenin left us his political bequest (in leaving it, he, of course, understood perfectly well that we would begin a period of reconstruction at some point), he formulated with absolute precision the boundary of the difficulties that are admissible for us and that can take place during our historical development. It seems to me that he gave a precise quantitative formulation for these economic difficulties. Vladimir Ilyich wrote: "If serious class-based disagreements arise between these classes" (i.e., between the proletariat and the peasantry), "then a split is inevitable, but the grounds for such a split are not inevitable in our social system, and the main task of our CC, as well as our party as a whole, is to keep track of the circumstances" (keep track of the circumstances!—NB) "from which a split can result, and prevent them."<sup>88</sup>

When we now say, to use Comrade Stalin's formulation, "we have a threat to the union [between the proletariat and peasantry]," does this come under the category of "circumstances from which a split can result"? Of course it does. The threat to the union is a "circumstance" "from which a split can result." Lenin understood perfectly well that the proletariat and the peasantry are two different classes, that there are, of course, class-based disagreements between them because there cannot be two classes between which no class-based disagreements exist. But Lenin wrote that the main task of our CC and Central Control Commission, as well as our party as a whole, was to prevent these disagreements from growing to the degree of "serious class-based disagreements," i.e., such disagreements that could cause a threat to the union. And if we now say that there is a serious threat to the union, then it is absolutely natural that the class-based disagreements here are beginning to develop quantitatively into class-based disagreements such that "a split can occur" from them, and our party's task, according to Lenin's political bequest, is to keep track of this and prevent it.

. . . One of the main conclusions we must draw is that we have not yet learned to manage economically and have not achieved the degree of

management skills that we need from the standpoint of the objective needs of the period of reconstruction.

. . . If we approach the final balance sheet of our economic policy from this standpoint, then it is hardly correct now, either tactically or politically, to develop an entire campaign against the so-called “theory of miscalculations.” When we discussed the causes of our procurement crisis at the last plenum and when we looked for these causes in our past, you probably all remember the arguments we used at the time. Here, for example, is the speech by Comrade Mikoian at the last plenum of the CC and Central Control Commission in April. Comrade Mikoian bluntly advanced the following proposition in his report, he said: “I believe, in any case one can straightforwardly affirm that *two-thirds of the causes of these difficulties could have been eliminated by us if we had promptly taken all of the necessary measures with regard to economic leadership and organization.*” (Comrade Mikoian’s emphasis.) (*Mikoian*: With reference to the specific causes of the difficulties this year, that’s right. . . .) The April plenum’s decisions, which you probably all remember and which nobody has revoked yet, contain two points: one says that the causes of these difficulties are not random, that they stem from the difficulties of the rapid preparation for the country’s industrialization, mistakes in economic planning leadership, etc. That is absolutely correct. . . .

But if we take specific causes, then we also have in the resolution of that same April plenum an answer to the question of the specific causes of the difficulties. Page 12 of the edition of the April plenum’s resolutions that I have refers to the difficulties with grain procurements, difficulties “that would not have taken place if the basic elements of the economy had been properly balanced in a timely manner and mistakes by the economic and party apparatuses had been eliminated.”<sup>89</sup> This is written in the April plenum’s resolution, and this point, just like Comrade Mikoian’s words, is an absolutely correct interpretation of our difficulties with regard to specific causes.

The Politburo offers a certain resolution of grain procurements for the plenum’s consideration. This resolution sketches two sets of causes in great detail and absolutely correctly. The big set of causes or, if you like, conditions for the appearance of difficulties: our economic backwardness, the fragmented state of agriculture, its small-peasant character, our poverty, etc. On the other hand, it points out absolutely correctly that these general causes realize the possibilities of the difficulties, they transform the difficulties from possible into actual ones on the basis of a number of separate, specific causes. The resolution cites these specific causes as well:

a. The breach in market equilibrium and the exacerbation of this breach as a result of the more rapid growth in solvent demand by the peasantry compared with the supply of industrial goods, caused by the rise in the income of the countryside, especially its well-to-do and kulak strata.

b. The unfavorable relation between grain prices and prices for other agricultural products, which weakened the incentive to sell surplus grain and which, however, the party could not change in the second half of the procurement year without coming into conflict with the low-income strata of the countryside.

c. Mistakes in planning leadership, mostly with regard to the timely delivery of goods and taxation (a low tax for the well-off strata of the countryside).

d. Shortcomings of the procurement, party, and soviet organizations (the lack of a common front, a lack of active work, a willingness to let events take their own course).

e. Utilization of all these minuses by the capitalist elements of the city and countryside (kulaks, speculators) to undermine grain procurements.

In summing up, the resolution also views this process from the social-class side when it refers to the “utilization” of all these minuses by the capitalist elements of the city and countryside. This is an absolutely correct formulation. But if we ask ourselves concerning each of these factors whether it is an objective one (in the sense of being independent of our policy), we must answer in the negative. Let’s take these factors in order. “The breach in market equilibrium as a result of the inadequate supply of industrial goods” stems from our mistakes, in the sense of insufficient taxation of the rural elite, i.e., it stems from our policy. “The unfavorable relationship between prices in the grain market” is not a god-given quantity, it also depends on our policy. Next come the references “mistakes in planning leadership” and “shortcomings of procurement, party, and soviet organizations”—all of this, in precisely the same way, are quantities that do not come from god but depend entirely on us. Consequently, our resolution, which I hope the plenum will adopt with full unanimity, says: here are a number of specific factors, and all of them, as you see, have the closest connection with our economic policy. Hence, with more skillful economic leadership, since the specific causes of the difficulties depend on these factors, we will clearly obtain a different specific result and will not allow the insolent and growing kulaks, who are the organizing source of the forces that oppose us, to maneuver the way they have maneuvered during the period of time we are going through.

I completely agree with the way the issue has been framed, namely, that

the grain procurement difficulties have exposed difficulties of a twofold nature to us in all their severity and have put before us problems of a twofold nature: (1) general difficulties, which embody broad tasks that demand a firm general line from us for a number of years (this applies to difficulties stemming from our backwardness, from the small scale of our agricultural production, and to our directive issued at the fifteenth party congress, a line toward intensified work in collectivizing agriculture); (2) difficulties of a specific, and extremely acute at that, character, which form the essence of the so-called current moment in the narrow sense of the word and which demand specific responses from us (the cancellation of extraordinary measures, etc.). It goes without saying that these problems are directly linked to issues of the class struggle. No economic problem at all is a “pure” economic problem; there is no such thing as a pure economic problem, i.e., a problem of the economy that is unrelated to problems of the class struggle or does not express another aspect of this class struggle. (I addressed this in detail in my report on the April plenum.)<sup>90</sup>

We are naturally talking about a class-based society, a classless society doesn't have classes. It is absolutely clear that issues of the class struggle may not be detached from our economic issues under any circumstances; that would be a fundamental methodological inaccuracy, a mistake that would have to be combated with all our might and in the most decisive manner. (*Mikoian*: Right!) But when we analyze the specific causes of our crisis, when we move from a discussion of our general tasks, from issues of the general line toward collective and state farms, from issues of the offensive against kulaks and so forth to specific causes, to “small-scale” causes, then it becomes clear that we cannot explain from the general causes the sharp and convulsive upheaval that our economic system experienced this year. Indeed, last year we exported 277 million rubles' worth of grain and fed everybody; this year we not only did not export anything, but in addition we are experiencing the most brutal signs of underconsumption in a whole host of areas. Clearly, in one year the kulak could not have grown into such a force, in one year there could not have been such a process of fragmentation as to cause such a rapid and crisis-ridden upheaval of our whole economy. This is precisely why the resolution raises the question of the specific causes that transformed possible difficulties, based on our general shortcomings, on our general backwardness and fragmentation, into reality; these causes have made the possibility of a kulak offensive a reality. And the kulak has been able to take other strata of the peasantry with him precisely on the basis of these separate, additional,

specific causes. Last year, on the average, if one includes private grain procurements when the private trader paid higher prices than ours, the grain price on the whole for the muzhik was somewhat higher than this year. Last year the tax could not be paid in industrial crops, whereas this year it was paid in industrial crops; last year there was not such a large amount of additional money from construction as this year. Now grain has been placed in a completely exceptional, extremely unfavorable position in the grain market. This is precisely why the incentive to sell grain was greatly reduced. This is precisely why the kulak this year has been able to take certain strata in the countryside with him on the issue of prices (not on just any issue, but on the issue of grain prices). This is precisely why we experienced an upheaval of our economic system this year in grain as well.

Consequently, the most important issue that plays a role here is the issue of prices. It is wrong to minimize the importance specifically of this factor and it is not quite correct precisely in this case to argue that prices in general play a limited role in our country, that we don't have a capitalist economy, that in our country under a proletarian dictatorship prices in general don't play a significant role as a regulator of production and are not of decisive importance. This is true and not true. Of course, within our state sector, price or the form of value is a kind of fiction, if you like; it is our accounting method, not an expression of an anarchic economy. This is all true, but in the connection between us and the small-scale peasant sector, where market relations are decisive (all of us here fought in a common front against Comrade Osinsky and in part against Comrade Varga and others), the price category there is decisive. It cannot happen there that price would not be a regulator of production. It is also wrong to think that in a completely planned economy, where there is no price form at all, it would be possible to "designate" just any proportions among various production sectors. This is also wrong. If some production sector, whether it is agriculture, industry, or an individual branch of these major sectors, systematically gave up much more labor than it received, if it did not cover its labor costs, then that production sector would have to shrink. In a communist society there will be no market, there will be no price. But it does not follow from this at all that the planning authorities of a communist society can treat a certain production sector any way they please. If you "insult" it, it will stop developing. The law of prices is dying, but the law of proportional labor inputs remains, and if any production sector fails to get adequate nourishment from the aggregate economic system, it falls into decay. There is no way to escape this law, and therefore, while setting aside the very academic question of the relation between price and value,

of how price develops into something else, etc., we must say that if any production sector has been “insulted” with regard to the distribution of resources, it inevitably moves in reverse, and the distribution of our aggregate forces and resources in our country runs mostly along two channels: through price policy and through tax policy, as we all know very well. [. . .]

. . . Naturally, given this grain situation (with respect both to taxes and to prices), given the absence of grain reserves, given a situation when, almost from the outset, we took on too much for the state apparatus to supply—naturally we were compelled to resort to extraordinary measures. I must state quite resolutely that there should be no question of any repentant tone whatsoever now with regard to the extraordinary measures. Nor can there be any notion of tearing them down in hindsight or of saying in hindsight that they should not have been imposed. It is absolutely clear that, once we miscalculated in the past and were caught by surprise, we had to resort to extraordinary measures. There can be no doubt that we faced a problem: either to shut down factories or to take grain (to a substantial degree, specifically take rather than buy). (*Voices: Wrong.*) Well, that is not wrong at all, but, in my view, quite correct. I believe, however, that even under the formulation that I am giving, this measure was the correct one. We had no other way out. And to back down now after the fact and say, “Oh, look what we did, oh, what a mess we made,” will not lead to anything, because nobody pointed to another prescription for getting out of this situation. It seems to me that we could have resorted to other prescriptions if we had thought about it much earlier, a few months earlier. But after the fifteenth congress, when the time for any other maneuver had been missed, when we were caught almost by surprise by events, we had no chance for any other maneuver. And to raise doubts about this maneuver, to stick spokes in the wheels of these extraordinary measures, to gripe that they will entail major consequences, means harming the only measure that flowed out of the situation at the time. (*Voices: Right.*) This must be said openly. No revision in this regard can be allowed. But it seems to me that it is pointless in general to shift the center of our debate, the center of our discussion, into this area. The center of the issue is not here now. Not in our past, but in our present. And here we must ask ourselves: now our party’s CC has gathered, it has gathered at some difficult turning point in our economic and political life; what is the key political element that the plenum should seize now? What is the task that the plenum must accomplish above all, from the standpoint of the current political situation? The answer to this question is provided by our resolution, which the Politburo



is proposing to the plenum. Its political purpose? The political purpose is to lift the extraordinary measures. So it is absolutely clear that when people come out and propose such a resolution, it is the lifting of the extraordinary measures that they must justify above all. Because the party must know why the plenum, having gathered in a difficult situation and recognizing that the extraordinary measures were absolutely correct and there was no other way out, why this plenum set the lifting of the extraordinary measures as its most important task, as the response of current policy to today's situation.

The whole party should be completely clear about this question, and we must say this: we must now lift the extraordinary measures, which were historically justified and which we resorted to absolutely correctly. We must lift these extraordinary measures because they have outgrown themselves, they have outlived their historical usefulness, they are giving almost nothing economically anymore, if they have any result economically, this result is to intensify trends, not yet very big, but growing, that lead in the direction of war communism (a changeover to rationing coupons, the disappearance of food products from the market, and a whole host of other automatically developing phenomena). [ . . . ]

We must proceed from the premise that, when we imposed the extraordinary measures recently, we indeed had a process in which the extraordinary measures were developing to a certain extent into what may be called "a trend in the direction of war communism." This cannot be denied. During the program debate we just defined war communism as a system that sets the goal of rational consumption with a curtailment of individualistic incentive for the small-scale producer, with requisitions, confiscations, and so forth. It goes without saying that such elements exist in our system and that they could develop if the system of extraordinary measures continues.

Comrades, I would just call your attention to three points, two of which have been mentioned here. If we did not lift the extraordinary measures, we would intensify this trend, which would develop automatically while bouncing from one sector to another. This would be a system of war communism, but (1) without war, (2) when the "land" argument, as a whole host of comrades have remarked, has disappeared for the muzhik. I would also like to make another point that is extremely important to keep in mind for all future situations. It is the following: when we resorted to war communism measures in previous years, we had, to a certain degree, "equality in poverty," i.e., our officials were likewise on rations, but now that a ration-coupon system is being introduced, the living conditions,

consumption, and other conditions vary, since those who are introducing the coupon system are not on rations themselves. . . . [ . . . ]

Should we now rectify the situation that has resulted from the grain procurements by making some concessions to the kulaks and dropping the slogan of an intensified offensive against the kulaks? Absolutely not, that is not the problem now. The central problem at present is for us to remove the threat facing us of losing the connection with the middle peasant. We are lifting the extraordinary measures and by no means do we equate the extraordinary measures with the decisions of the fifteenth congress. This, it seems to me, needs to be hammered into the head of every member of our party with iron nails. The decisions of our party's fifteenth congress provide a general line of an unconditional nature: consolidation of our agriculture, intensified economic encirclement of the kulak, without dekulakizing him, on the track of the new economic policy, with increasing influence from the factors of regulation and state intervention. But the extraordinary measures, they stand apart. This is a reaction to market conditions [*konyunktura*] in the narrow sense of this word, a reaction to specific difficulties, as the lifting of the extraordinary measures now is. The reaction to long-term causes is to develop our agriculture, to develop individual farming, to pursue an intensified course toward collectivization, state farms and industrialization of agriculture, and a further offensive against the kulak. [ . . . ]

• DOCUMENT 20 •

From N. I. Bukharin's declaration to the Politburo, 30 January 1929.  
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 726, ll. 77–82. Copy.

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30 January 1929  
Dear Comrades!

Today's meeting has on its agenda "Comrade Ordzhonikidze's report on intraparty affairs." In essence, here it is for the *third* time that the issue is raised of the so-called "Kamenev diary," the "Trotskyist proclamation"<sup>91</sup> or, yet more concretely, [the issue of] Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov—Bukharin first of all. This base and provocative proclamation (which, fortunately, has not or almost has not circulated in the provinces) is being made a weapon for undermining my good name in the party and for preparing the appropriate practical conclusions "from below," by means of spreading "information" to that effect. With regard to this, I

must offer my explanation, which I am putting on paper in the present declaration.

A few words about the “document.” It suffers, in certain parts and in general, from strangely careless fabrication: (1) it speaks of the three-some’s resignation in *July*, while the idea of it appeared in *November*;<sup>92</sup> (2) allegedly, the Trotskyists issued the proclamation *a few days ago*, but there is not a word about the arrests of the Trotskyists and Trotsky’s banishment; (3) the proclamation cites Comrade Stalin’s *October* speech<sup>93</sup> as the latest event but does not say a word about his *November* speech;<sup>94</sup> (4) it is next to impossible to obtain the document itself, while other proclamations have been spread in large numbers, etc.

Naturally, I cannot be responsible for the content of this document, for whomever, for whatever purpose, fabricated, printed, and circulated it. It is written, mildly speaking, one-sidedly, tendentiously, with omissions and distortions of a number of the most important points. . . .

I must, however, discuss more significant and substantial issues that arise in connection to this episode. It would be ridiculous and senseless to tear this episode out of the general context of important party problems and to reduce it to the “intraparty situation.”

### On the Party’s Political Line

What has been and still is the foundation of internal conflicts within the Politburo? It would be very strange to explain these [internal conflicts—trans.] only by reference to the personal characteristics of Politburo members, etc. Clearly, certain political shades are present here beneath the surface.

This issue should by no means be confused with the issue of a *political line*. I participated most actively in drafting the resolutions of the fourteenth and fifteenth congresses and all the subsequent plenums. For the most part, it was I who wrote the drafts of these resolutions. I *am in agreement* with the resolutions of these official organs of the party. But I assert that the actual policy line is frequently carried out *against* these resolutions, according to the instructions or speeches of comrades who understand the situation *in their own way*.

Before the *July* plenum, I was extremely alarmed about the issue of extraordinary measures and some other very important economic issues (reserves, gold, crops, etc.). Remembering Lenin’s last testament,<sup>95</sup> it was with great anxiety that I observed the processes of unrest among the peasants, etc. Lenin had directly warned about this. It was this that he saw as

the *main task*. In a backstage way, I was proclaimed a panic-monger, and the rumor of that was circulated all over the country. However, after intense struggle we worked out a *common resolution*. The extraordinary measures were repealed.

But what was it that defined the *subsequent policy*? It was what the “document” also mentions, namely, Comrade Stalin’s speech about tribute. At the fourteenth party congress, Comrade Stalin gave Preobrazhensky a dressing down for [what he said about] colonies and the exploitation of the peasantry.<sup>96</sup> Yet at the July plenum, he proclaimed the slogan of tribute, that is, of the military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.

Tribute is a category that has nothing in common with socialist construction. But unfortunately, the pithy catchword of “tribute” proved to be not merely “literary.” Connected with it is the subsequent change in the taxation of the peasantry, the growing difficulties with the supply of bread, the reduction in the sown area, and the dissatisfaction of the peasantry (now we will have to reduce taxes). *Nobody* has discussed the question of “tribute.” *Nobody* has the right to demand that a member of the party makes common cause with this “tribute.” Meanwhile, the situation has become *such* that no one can say a word against the “tribute” because Comrade Stalin has pronounced this word. The fiery Comrade *Petrovsky* (*Leningradskaia Pravda*) has written against the “tribute” but quickly found himself in the position of deputy editor of the Saratov Krai planning committee press organ (a journal with a circulation of one thousand). Meanwhile, this formula overturned all the previous party decisions, and this is why it produced such an immense impression. Naturally, I could not agree with this formula and viewed it as an omen of further “extraordinary” policies. At the July plenum, Comrade Kaganovich was aiming for the repetition of extraordinary measures, “just in case.” Although it was necessary to emphasize *peace with the middle peasant*, people laughed at this.

In the fall it became clear to me that alarming tendencies in the economy were growing. I analyzed, in a very cautious form, these tendencies in “Notes of an Economist.” Then everyone literally jumped on me. I was away from Moscow (consequently, there was no way for me to convey the Politburo decision on the article to anyone). A *wave* of criticism began everywhere. I warned that the situation with gold was alarming, and raised the issue of reserves—but this was mocked. I said that our grain business was stalled or even going backward. This was declared panic and cowardice. I foretold that it was ridiculous to make appropriations if there were no building materials (and they could not be *produced in a year*).

This was interpreted as “planning on bottlenecks” [*ravnenie po uzkim mestam*], and so on, and I was [described as] an opponent of industrialization, state farms, collective farms, and as a right deviationist. Throughout the press, they badgered me anonymously in dozens of articles, moreover it was the Trotskyists, and also the editors of “Pravda,” who tried especially hard.

Before the November plenum, I spoke repeatedly, for a third time, for a tenth time, of the highly alarming situation regarding the prospects for grain procurements, for [widening] the crop area; and I predicted that difficulties would reproduce themselves and even grow if the emphasis was not placed on economic and political peace with the middle peasant. What I got in response was that in Ukraine, for example, peasants equipped with lanterns plowed the fields at night with great enthusiasm, and that only skeptics and panic-mongers could think otherwise. *Still, after intense struggle, here as well it was possible to adopt a common resolution*, its major point being that it was a central task to stimulate *the individual poor-middle peasant farm*. However, after the resolution had been adopted (unanimously adopted—I participated most actively in drafting this one as well, and it was Rykov and I who wrote the draft), the “practice” and the entire campaign took a different path: the above-mentioned passage “went out” and was “forgotten.” There were hundreds of resolutions—and almost none of them with an appropriate interpretation. There were hundreds of articles, to the same effect. As a result, despite brave proclamations by very brave comrades, what we have now is a substantial reduction of the *winter crop area* (according to the TsSU data, the reduction has been 5 percent all over the USSR, and 12 percent in Ukraine) and a major grain crisis, plus a difficult situation with foreign payments. We now have to introduce rationing, curtail imports, and almost certainly we will have to cut back on earlier production programs. Reality proved to be even worse than what I had predicted. I was cursed and badgered for *correctly evaluating the situation*, which is the main prerequisite for correct policies. Two “lines” were created: one, the verbal resolutions; the other, what was put into practice. I myself checked dozens and hundreds of times, tried to study the issue, raised arguments against my own opinion. But in our highest echelons, such a situation has been created that you cannot speak, otherwise you will inevitably find yourself either a “panic-monger” or “anti-Leninist”—and you receive those nicknames from comrades whose competence in these issues is questionable, to say the least.

It is evident from the document that I considered it *a principal point to make peace with the middle peasant*, to strengthen the union with him.

This remains the central task now as well. Only now it becomes strikingly clear how right Lenin was when he painstakingly insisted on the greatest caution in this issue . . .

The serious and painful questions are not being discussed. The entire country suffers over the questions of grain and supply, while the conferences of the proletariat's ruling party remain silent. The entire country feels that something has gone awry with the peasantry. And the conferences of the proletarian party, of *our* party, are silent. The entire country sees and feels changes in the international situation. But the conferences of the proletarian party are silent. Instead, there is a flood of resolutions on deviations (in one and the same wording). Instead, millions of rumors and petty rumors are spreading about the rightists Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin, etc. This is petty policy, this is not a policy that, in a time of hardships, tells the working class *the truth about the situation*, places a wager on the masses, hears and feels *the needs of the masses*, pursues its cause *as one with the masses*.

#### On the Party's Organizational Line

In this area, we also have two lines. One is the party line of "the appeal for self-criticism."<sup>97</sup> Here [we have] everything: self-criticism itself, party democracy, elections, etc. But where in real life have we seen an elected guberniia secretary? In actuality, the elements of bureaucratization have grown larger in our party.

Indeed, what for example does it mean to *dismiss* (!!) someone simply for voting against a Central Committee proposal at the [party] fraction of a trade union congress—an act that the regulations directly allow? In this light, what does *self-criticism* turn into? How is it possible to discuss economic issues if caring about grain is declared (by well-fed people) to be philistinism? If caring about a stable union with the peasantry figures, not infrequently, as a peasant deviation? If a suggestion to make or cut additional appropriations for something is interpreted as anti-Leninism? Et cetera, et cetera. Who dares open his mouth about these issues? That is why these issues are never raised but rather kept back. That is why the entire party has been discussing them, but does so "to itself," in groups of two or three.

That is why members of the party have also created a double "line": one "for their own conscience," the other for "public consumption" [*odin schet*—"dliia dushi," *drugoi*—"dliia sebia"].<sup>98</sup> Attendance at meetings, unanimous voting, and rubber-stamped official formula are becoming a

ritual, a necessary party ceremony. It is *here* that the struggle against bureaucratism has to begin—but instead, we plant bureaucratism ever more deeply.

Officially, I and a series of other comrades are not the object of attack, criticism, etc. In reality, we are the favorite objects of such attacks. Divided policies lead to divided *organizational* policies. At times the unofficial line suddenly breaks through: such was, for example, Comrade Kalinin's speech at the Bauman district conference<sup>99</sup> (against the "rightist" Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. A "leftist" Kalinin against a "rightist" Bukharin—this is food for the gods!). This "line" finds support in a number of official gestures—such as changes in the editorial board of *Pravda*, which breaks all the party traditions (the political commissars Krumin and Savel'ev were placed above the Politburo member Bukharin); such as dispatching certain comrades to the provinces; such as the work of trade unions (the so-called introduction of Comrade Kaganovich, a purely administrative type of official and a model of administration by force, who is supposed to struggle for "trade union democracy"); depriving party members of their most elementary rights provided in the regulations; with all of this comes the decline of the Politburo's importance.

On the basis of everything mentioned above, and taking into account all the need for peace and work without any tensions at the top, I consider it essential that I be relieved from work in the KI [Communist International] and in *Pravda*; in order to avoid doing any harm to the party, I suggest any outwardly appropriate form of resignation.

The attempt to bring work to order after November was undermined by the attack on the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] leadership. The "document" or, more properly, its distribution, etc., eliminates all possible doubts and hesitation. At the same time, the problems that the country is facing are so great that it is outright criminal to waste time and energy on infighting at the top. Nobody will push me onto the path of factional struggle. There is only one way out of this situation, and this is the way that I suggest and will insist on before the CC plenum.

Bukharin

## CHAPTER 3

### The Great Turn

4 May 1929–15 November 1929

Stalin dubbed 1929 “the year of the great turn” (*perelom*). In an article written on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin outlined the party’s “successes” in the sphere of labor productivity, industrialization, and agriculture in a year that had featured what he called “a determined offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements in town and countryside.” He wrote that “thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we are definitely emerging, or have emerged, from the grain crisis.” The peasantry, he claimed, was flocking to the collective farms “by whole villages, volosts, districts.” The entry of the middle peasant into the collective farms, Stalin asserted, was “the basis of the radical change in the development of agriculture that constitutes the most important achievement of the Soviet government during the past year” (see document 36).

Nineteen-twenty-nine was indeed a breakthrough year, but in ways that Stalin did not describe in his anniversary article. It was the year in which grain requisitioning “slid” (to use Moshe Lewin’s apt description) into collectivization.<sup>1</sup> It slid by way of the “Ural-Siberian method,” a new technique for pumping grain out of the countryside based on attempts to kindle class war in the village. It slid by way of a de facto dekulakization that took off in 1929 on the basis of an array of legislative and administrative measures engineered by the center against its most “implacable foe.” And as state repression escalated, so



too did peasant violence in a defensive reaction that only served to bring more repression down upon the village. By the end of the year, the party would place the *wholesale* collectivization of agriculture on the immediate agenda.<sup>2</sup> Collectivization would be presented as the solution to an entire series of issues, ranging from the grain procurement crisis and kulak resistance to industrialization and Russian backwardness. The great turn would be complete.

### The Ural-Siberian Method and the Intensification of Repression

The Ural-Siberian method (USM) in grain collection was first introduced in March 1929 in Siberia and shortly thereafter in the Urals.<sup>3</sup> Following acrimonious debate at the April joint Central Committee–Central Control Commission plenum where the USM was criticized by the Right Opposition as a continuation of extraordinary measures, the policy was endorsed for general use in other grain-producing areas in early May (see document 22) and received legislative sanction at the end of June (see document 26).<sup>4</sup>

The USM was an attempt to garner support for the regime's grain procurement policies among poor and middle peasants while isolating the kulak. To a large extent, it was reminiscent (minus the addition of the middle peasant) of the civil-war-era Committees of Poor Peasants (see chapter 1) that had also attempted to exploit class divisions in the village in order to take grain. In theory, general assemblies of villagers endorsed the grain requisition plan that was imposed upon their village. Special commissions composed of poor and middle peasants then assigned grain requisition quotas to the village's households according to a "class approach." What this meant, at least in theory, was that the village would force the kulak to turn over his "surplus" grain, thereby satisfying the lion's share of the village's assignment and perhaps even leaving some portion of grain over the plan to be shared by the village poor (see document 21).

Kulak households that failed to fulfill their assignments could be assessed a fine of five times the value of grain owed—the infamous *pi-atikratka*—and failing to deliver this assessment, they could face up to one year of forced labor under the provisions of article 61 of the penal code.<sup>5</sup> In cases when groups of households resisted their assignments, the penalty was "confinement for up to two years, accompanied by confiscation of property and their exile from the locality" (see document 26).

The precise nature of these punishments had not gone uncontested. Both Commissar of Justice N. V. Krylenko<sup>6</sup> and Mikoian argued for the imposition of milder penalties (see documents 23 and 25) in the face of opposition from provincial party leaders who claimed that these relatively mild sanctions “deprive us of the opportunity to fulfill the assigned plan for grain procurement” and who petitioned the center for endorsement of the *piatokratka* (see document 24). The center sided with the provinces, sanctioning the *piatokratka*, property expropriations, and exile, practices that directly anticipated dekulakization (see document 26).

The Ural-Siberian method was supplemented by an intensification of repressive measures in grain procurements. On 15 August 1929, the Politburo issued a resolution on grain procurements calling on the OGPU to increase its campaign against urban speculators and grain traders with ties to the towns. The resolution also called for the removal of collective farm leaders guilty of retaining grain surpluses or of selling them on the side (see documents 29 and 30).<sup>7</sup> On 20 September, the Central Committee issued a new directive “on measures to increase grain procurements,” in which it sent down a series of reprimands to the provincial party committees of Siberia, Northern Caucasus, Middle Volga, Kazakhstan, the Urals, Bashkiria, and the Crimea for the slow pace of procurements. The Central Committee criticized the provinces for “endless debates . . . on the size of the grain and forage stocks and of the grain procurement plan” and again ordered the OGPU to intensify repression in all grain-producing areas (see document 31).<sup>8</sup> Within days, the OGPU issued a circular letter pointing to the increase in peasant unrest from March and pressing its local agencies to step up its activities, particularly in the realm of prevention (see document 32). In early October, the Central Committee was still complaining of insufficient pressure in some regions on the kulak (see document 33), as a consequence of which the Politburo issued a directive on 3 October to the Commissariat of Justice and OGPU to take swift measures against kulaks who organized terrorist acts, up to and including execution (see document 34).

The Ural-Siberian method, in combination with the intensification of repression in the countryside, enabled Stalin to write in his October Revolution anniversary speech, “we are definitely emerging, or have emerged, from the grain crisis” (see document 36). For the first time in three years, the regime could speak of a “satisfactory” fulfillment of grain procurements.<sup>9</sup> It was finally able to secure an emergency grain

reserve to allow it room to maneuver in the event of foreign—or domestic—war. It was also better able to fulfill its export plans, the perceived *sine qua non* of industrialization. Although these “successes” on the grain front had less of a positive impact on the domestic food supply and distribution crisis, they were enough to convince Stalin and his supporters of the efficacy of an “administrative” approach to the peasantry.<sup>10</sup>

The regime’s success in taking grain, however, was not without cost. Peasant unrest increased throughout the country, especially in grain-producing areas. In 1929 as a whole, the OGPU recorded 1,307 incidents of “mass disturbances” (as opposed to 709 in 1928), with the largest numbers occurring between April and June and October and December. Incidents of “terror” also increased, from 1,027 in 1928 to close to 10,000 cases in 1929 (see document 38 for partial data).<sup>11</sup> According to the OGPU, peasant violence was on the upsurge from March and April and most often occurred as a reaction against grain requisitioning and the “socialist reorganization” of agriculture. Although the OGPU did not deny that middle and even poor peasants participated in these protests, it most often blamed peasant protest on “kulak agitation” and/or “*peregiby*” (excesses) by local officials who violated central policies.<sup>12</sup> The fact of the matter, however, was that the regime’s brutal policies were increasingly serving to override social divisions in the villages as peasants came together to protest policies that did not stop with the kulak but affected all of them (see documents 27, 28, 35).

As a result of repressive operations against speculators and kulaks, the OGPU could report, by early November, the arrest of 28,344 individuals in the countryside, of whom 15,536 were arrested for “economic” crimes and 12,808 for “counterrevolutionary” crimes. The largest numbers of arrests occurred in Siberia, Northern Caucasus, Ukraine, Central Black Earth Region, and the Urals (in that order), precisely those regions where grain procurement activity was central to the regime’s efforts (see document 37). The increasing numbers of arrests, combined with an increase in property seizures as a result of the *piatokratka* and the expanding application of the use of internal exile, made dekulakization a *de facto* reality in the countryside. These repressive practices, along with a series of economic self-defense measures taken by kulaks themselves (so-called self-dekulakization taking the form of property sales, family divisions, flight, and so on) resulted in the decline of the officially determined number of kulak households

in the country between 1927 and 1929, that is, *before* the official onset of the dekulakization campaign of 1930.<sup>13</sup>

By the fall of 1929, NEP no longer existed. Administrative practices had supplanted the market in the economic relations between town and countryside, with the OGPU now playing a, if not *the*, main role in the rural economy. Stalin's purported great turn had indeed taken place, but it was less a "victory of socialism" than an administrative coup against the market, the peasantry, and the New Economic Policy.<sup>14</sup>

### The Onset of Collectivization

When Stalin wrote "The Year of the Great Turn," the collectivization of Soviet agriculture was indeed on the upsurge, surpassing the relatively moderate rates projected for the socialized sector of agriculture at the fifteenth party congress in December 1927. At the sixteenth party conference in April 1929, in its five-year plan on agriculture, the Central Committee had projected the collectivization of 9.6 percent of the peasant population by the 1932–33 economic year and 13.6 percent by 1933–34. In June 1929, the USSR Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom instructed Gosplan (the state planning agency) to prepare new plans by early October that would set a target of 85 percent of peasant households to be collectivized by the end of the First Five-Year Plan.<sup>15</sup>

In actuality, by 1 June 1928, 1.7 percent of peasant households were in collective farms; and between 1 June and 1 October 1929 percentages rose from 3.9 to 7.5. The increase was especially pronounced in the major grain-producing regions. The Lower Volga and Northern Caucasus surpassed all other regions, with percentages of collectivized peasant households reaching 18.1 and 19.1, respectively, by October 1929.<sup>16</sup> The high rates achieved in the regional collectivization campaigns lay behind Stalin's statement that the middle peasant was entering the collective farms. By arguing that the middle peasant was turning voluntarily to socialized agriculture, Stalin was claiming that the *majority* of the peasantry was *ready* for collectivization. Yet in reality it was mainly poor peasants who were joining collectives. And, although there may have been some genuine enthusiasm "from below," the regional campaigns had already begun to resort to the use of force to achieve their high percentages.

In his October Revolution anniversary speech, Stalin attributed the supposed resolution of the grain crisis to the growth of socialized agri-

culture (see document 36). In fact, the overall contribution of the socialized sector of agriculture to the grain procurement plan was a mere 12.7 percent. Furthermore, the socialized sector had failed to fulfill its own plan, delivering only 1.51 million tons of the 1.64 million tons assigned to it.<sup>17</sup> Stalin was well aware of these facts. His optimism was as much a projection into the future as it was a reflection of the current state of socialized agriculture.

From late 1927, Stalin had consistently argued that collectivization was the ultimate solution to the grain procurement crisis.<sup>18</sup> Yet from late 1927, when the fifteenth party congress had signaled the importance of carrying out collectivization, to the spring of 1929, the socialized sector of agriculture figured more importantly in the rhetoric of the Communist Party than in actuality. A September 1928 Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate study on the perspectives of collectivized agriculture reported that there was a complete absence of planning in collective farm construction. As a consequence, the collective farms were growing "spontaneously" through the use of campaign methods in certain regions where local party organizations had assumed the reins. Their leaders were poorly informed and unqualified; they received almost no assistance from local land and cooperative agencies; and (despite "big promises") they received little economic aid from the center. The collective farms remained small in size and were primarily based on the membership of poor peasants, with middle peasants joining only when it served their economic interests.<sup>19</sup> Although the Politburo created a commission on collective farming in mid-February 1928 and even established a special fund for socialized agriculture, within a month it reduced the budget for these purposes.<sup>20</sup> The subsequent fate of the collective farm movement for the next year would be largely one of neglect.

The regime in fact did not trust the socialized sector any more than it trusted the private sector in agriculture. In June 1928, the Central Committee directed its local party organs to carry out a mass inspection of collective farms and cooperatives, ridding them of all "class-alien elements."<sup>21</sup> Reports on the collective farm movement in 1929 consistently pointed to problems in the social composition of the farms, especially their leadership, as well as a host of management problems.<sup>22</sup> The regime also bemoaned the fact that communists were hesitating to join the collectives. Collective farms that did not measure up to regime expectations were declared "false collective farms" and were subject to liquidation.<sup>23</sup>

In spite of these problems, it had become increasingly clear to Stalin that collectivization represented the solution to the accursed problem of grain and the peasantry. Collectivization was not only a continuation of the October Revolution in the countryside, as it was frequently described, but also a control mechanism for taking grain. It was far easier to administer several hundred thousand collective farms than to attempt each year to procure grain from some 25 million individual peasant households. Moreover, collectivization was increasingly advertised as the solution to rural economic and cultural backwardness, promising technological advances and untold opportunities for the supposedly benighted rural masses. Collectivization was also thought to be the key to industrialization and therefore the nation's defense. It would allow for the expansion of grain exports and capital funding for industrialization. And although, in fact, collectivization would not contribute to capital accumulation for industrialization in quite the way the regime expected, it was the perception that made all the difference, adding to the imperative of collectivization.<sup>24</sup>

The November Central Committee plenum (10–17 November 1929) was a major turning point in the evolution of Soviet history. It was at this plenum that the Right Opposition went down to its final defeat, capitulating ignominiously before a chorus of Stalin supporters. Rykov would retain his position as Sovnarkom chairman until the end of 1930, but Bukharin lost his seat on the Politburo, and the three leaders of the Right Opposition (Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy) submitted a formal recantation to the party soon after the close of the plenum. Although the Right had suffered its greatest defeat already at the April 1929 plenum, their formal rout and recantation in November signaled quite clearly Stalin's uncontested power at the summit of the Communist Party.<sup>25</sup>

The November plenum also placed *wholesale* collectivization on the immediate agenda. Based on the quite inaccurate assertions of Stalin that the middle peasant was moving into the collective farms and that there was a radical socialist upsurge in the countryside, the party exhibited a supreme confidence in its ability to transform the countryside onto socialist tracks in a dizzyingly short period of time. In his report to the plenum, G. N. Kaminsky, the chairman of Kolkhozsentr,<sup>26</sup> provided examples of the accelerated pace of collectivization, especially in the major grain-producing regions like Northern Caucasus and Lower Volga. Interrupted by Molotov, who shouted, "This information is out of date," Kaminsky agreed that the "movement" had already gone be-

yond such data. He denied the accusation of “some,” though, that the high rates of collectivization were based on the use of force. He argued that it would have been impossible to achieve such successes on the basis of coercion. And, although he did admit that there were problems in the collective farm movement (e.g., an inadequate level of socialization and a shortage of advanced technology), he suggested that they could complete the wholesale collectivization of the major grain regions in one and one-half to two years. He also firmly stated that the kulak must be barred from the collective farms, noting examples from the provinces where kulaks had been moved to the outskirts of the villages. To this, someone in the hall interrupted, calling out, “They [the kulaks] form an encirclement, that’s also dangerous.” Kaminsky’s report provides a good indication of how far the regime was committed to radical collectivization, but it also shows that the question of the exact fate of the kulak was still not decided (see document 39).

Molotov’s speech to the plenum was even more extreme than Kaminsky’s. Arguing that “our plans are lagging behind the pace” of collectivization, Molotov said that they needed not five-year, but one-year plans of collectivization and maintained that the Northern Caucasus would be collectivized within one year. Asserting that the spring planting season would be decisive to the next year’s grain procurements, he argued further that they had only four and one-half months (!), yet, he said, “we’re engaging in blather about a five-year plan.” Molotov also spoke about the kulak, foreshadowing rather ominously the momentous decisions on the kulak’s fate that would be made in December and January. He said, “Any wavering—to admit the kulak or not to admit to the collective farm—is extremely pernicious wavering. The kulak cannot have a place on the collective farm under any circumstances, because he will not only corrupt it but will disrupt the whole undertaking . . . the kulak is the worst enemy, but one who has not yet been finished off, and everything . . . follows from this, from the fact that the kulak must be viewed as the worst enemy, as an enemy who has not been finished off, as an enemy who at any moment is ready to deal the most serious blow to us” (see document 40).

In spite of the martial tone and brash confidence of speakers like Molotov and Kaminsky, it was clear that the campaign to collectivize the peasantry would be anything but simple. The countryside would not, as Stalin repeatedly said, enter into socialism “spontaneously” on its own. Outside forces, in the form of massive mobilizations of urban communists and industrial workers, would be required to “bring” the

peasantry to socialism. And those forces would encounter resistance—officially not the resistance of the middle and poor peasantry, but the resistance of the kulak. Moreover, it was clearly apparent that there were major organizational, technological, and personnel problems to be faced in reorganizing the agricultural system, that “it would be an illusion,” to quote Syrtsov, “to think that the most important part has [already] been accomplished in the collective farm movement.” A few, a very few, at the plenum,<sup>27</sup> like Syrtsov, expressed concerns about the widespread reports of force used to attain the summer’s high percentages in collectivization and admitted that, again to quote Syrtsov, there was still “a great deal of economic distrust toward socialized forms of enterprise” among middle and poor peasants.

Yet the overarching sentiment of the plenum was to forge ahead into the breach, confronting the collectivization of agriculture as a new “front” and approaching it very much like a military campaign. Stalin reflected this mentality when he interrupted Syrtsov’s speech to interject, “Do you think that everything can be ‘organized in advance’?” (see document 41). With this, wholesale collectivization became the order of the day, inaugurating a revolution in social and economic relations in the countryside that would profoundly impact upon the fate of the nation.

## Documents

### • DOCUMENT 21 •

USSR Commissariat of Trade directive (by direct wire) on forcing grain procurements, 4 May 1929. RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 159–60.  
Certified copy.

4 May 1929

To the Commissariats of Trade of Ukraine, Bashkiria, and Tataria; to the krai trade administrations of the Lower Volga and Northern Caucasus; to the oblast trade administrations of the Central Black Earth and the Middle Volga.

The course of grain procurements and the demands of supplying the domestic market dictate the maximum forcing of grain procurements during May-June-July. Immediately after the completion of sowing, begin imple-



menting the methods of procurement by informing the countryside about the plan targets and drawing the village poor and middle peasant public into the task of fulfilling the grain procurement plan. While doing that, follow the directions below:

1. On May 7 we will communicate to you the grain procurement assignment for three months (May, June, July), which is set as a minimum for compulsory fulfillment in your region. That will include specific targets for the procurement of food crops (rye, wheat), which must be fulfilled regardless of the general fulfillment of procurements of all crops.<sup>28</sup>

2. Inform the countryside about the assignment that will be communicated on the seventh, setting precise targets for each village.

3. Upon the adoption of a village grain procurement plan by a meeting of village citizens, the first priority is to single out the kulak top stratum from the general mass of the peasantry and to lay specific obligations upon these kulaks to sell grain [that will count] toward the fulfillment of the village plan. The amount of grain in excess of the obligations laid upon the kulaks is to be divided among the rest of the peasantry.

4. In order to fulfill the village grain procurement plan adopted by a general meeting of citizens and to allocate targets for specific farms, the general meeting of citizens will elect a special committee. It is necessary to ensure the appropriate composition of this committee, to be drawn from the poor and middle peasant *aktiv*. While determining the targets for specific peasant farms, the committee should be guided by a class approach.

5. Announce to the population that the fulfillment of the village grain procurement plan will exhaust the grain procurement campaign for the current year. The same is to be announced to the deliverer.

6. Citizens who do not fulfill the resolution of the general meeting or the special committee elected by the general meeting should be taken to court or subjected to other kinds of penalties (money fines, etc.).

7. When allocating plan targets, it is necessary to stipulate the exact amount of food crops (rye, wheat) or their percentage in the overall amount of grain to be delivered.

8. It is necessary to publicize the work of committees selected by village meetings (through publication, announcement of resolutions, information on penalties, posting information reports in wall newspapers, etc.).

9. The campaign's success depends upon: (1) thorough advance preparation of the village poor and middle peasant public; (2) realistic targets assigned to villages; (3) singling out kulaks and barring any wholesale leveling approach to allocating the targets.

10. Bearing in mind the need for a maximum enhancement of grain pro-

curements during May-July, raise the question, with the appropriate organs, of re-elections in cooperatives (agricultural and consumer), in order to coordinate the timing [of the elections] with the interests of grain procurements. Immediately take preparatory measures for carrying out the above upon the completion of sowing; make sure that a proper number of workers are mobilized for that purpose; ensure that the general meetings of citizens adopt appropriate resolutions; make sure that the party apparatus is deployed accordingly.

Inform [us] about the course of your preparatory measures, as well as the fulfillment of instructions given in the present telegram. Transmit a copy of the present [directive] to the unions of agricultural cooperation, unions of consumer cooperation, cooperative grain unions, and to Soiuzkhlleb.<sup>29</sup> Also immediately transmit a copy of the present [directive] to the krai party committee and the krai executive committee.

Mikoian

• DOCUMENT 22 •

Decree of the Council of Labor and Defense "On Grain Procurements and Grain Supplies," 7 May 1929. GARE, f. 5446, op. 10a, d. 96, ll. 1-10b. Certified copy.

7 May 1929

Top secret

The Council of Labor and Defense resolves:

1. Upon the completion of sowing, to extend the grain procurement methods employed in the Urals, rallying public support for measures to promote fulfillment of the grain procurement plan by the masses of poor and middle peasants, to all of the grain-producing areas, excluding the okrugs of Ukraine and Northern Caucasus with poor crops, and to instruct the USSR Commissariat of Trade, Tsentrosoiuz,<sup>30</sup> and Khlebotsentr<sup>31</sup> to prepare immediately for implementation of these measures.

2. To set as a mandatory minimum assignment the procurement of 55 million poods of food crops (rye and wheat) throughout the USSR for the period of May, June, and July. To direct the USSR Commissariat of Trade, along with Tsentrosoiuz and Khlebotsentr, to draw up a plan for distributing this assignment by area and to submit it to STO for approval.

3. To designate as the most important task of the USSR Commissariat of Trade, the Union-republic commissariats of agriculture, Khlebotsentr,

Kolkhozsentr, Zernotrest,<sup>32</sup> and local authorities, the organizing in July and August of the speediest possible gathering, threshing, and mobilization of grain from the new harvests by state and collective farms and those under contract in the southern and Volga regions in order to provide supplies for the domestic market. To direct the USSR Commissariat of Trade, together with Tsentrosouiz and Khlebotsentr, to submit a draft of the necessary measures to the STO.

4. To require Zernotrest, and to direct the Union-republic EKOSOs [Economic Councils]<sup>33</sup> to require Sakharotrest,<sup>34</sup> Gosselsindikat,<sup>35</sup> the Ukrainian State Farm Association, and the Ukrseltsuker<sup>36</sup> to immediately prepare and implement all the necessary measures so that the entire harvest of food grains is delivered during July and August in areas with early-ripening grain, leaving only the grain necessary for sowing.

5. To instruct the Union-republic EKOSOs to require agricultural cooperatives and state farms that have tractor fleets and machine-tractor stations to deliver grain received as payment for machine cultivation by such deadlines and to such organizations as instructed by the USSR Commissariat of Trade.

6. To direct the Union-republic EKOSOs to require local executive committees to ensure in full, under their most rigorous accountability, the allocation of 90 percent of grain dues for ground grain, as directed by the USSR Commissariat of Trade while establishing special supervision of the collection and use of milling taxes.

7. To confirm for mandatory implementation the order of the USSR Commissariat of Trade to transfer from local (decentralized) to centralized procurements the surpluses that result in the event that the ratio of decentralized to centralized procurements in a given month exceeds the ratio indicated by current yearly plans for both types of procurements.

8. To utilize for food purposes the quantity of high-quality grain that will not be exchanged for ordinary grain by the end of the term of contracts.

9. To utilize for fulfillment of the supply plan until the new harvest, according to approved standard, the savings in the use of grain that are derived from the introduction of ration books in the cities and the reduction of carry-over reserves.

Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense A. I. Rykov  
Deputy manager of the Chancellery of the USSR Council of People's  
Commissars and of the Council of Labor and Defense Art. Kaktyn  
Secretary of the Council of Labor and Defense

## • DOCUMENT 23 •

Telegram from the RSFSR Commissariat of Justice on administrative penalties for violating grain delivery deadlines, 23 May 1929. RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 10, l. 159. Certified copy.

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23 May 1929

No. 17133

To republic procurators in Ufa and Kazan, krai procurators in Saratov and Rostov-on-Don, and oblast procurators in Samara and Voronezh

On 9 May the Commissariat of Trade sent out by direct cable a telegram with a directive on the procedure for conducting the grain procurement campaign for the remaining period. According to this telegram, general village assemblies shall distribute the amount of grain [to be collected] among individual, large-scale (kulak) farms at a general meeting, and the assemblies shall set up special commissions to carry out the grain collection.

Clause six of the same telegram gives these commissions powers to impose administrative penalties in the event grain is not delivered on schedule and to bring those who do not yield to trial.

In this connection it is directed that:

1. persons be brought to trial under art. 61 of the Criminal Code;
2. the commission's powers be confined to imposing an administrative fine of up to 10 rubles, with an expansion of the rights of village soviets in imposing administrative penalties to be approved first by krai [soviet] executive committees. [. . .]
3. in the event of nondelivery of grain, administrative penalties shall be imposed on the same day, after which the deliverer shall be instructed to deliver it, and in the event that he refuses, the cases shall be sent to court under art. 62, section 2, of the Criminal Code.<sup>37</sup> In the event delivery is not made, the repressive measure to be imposed is a levy equivalent to double the amount of grain [owed], with the subsequent sale of the individual's property.

The commission's powers are to be confined to this. No other repressive measures may be applied. A measure of social pressure—a boycott—must be used only in those forms and with regard to those individuals that are specified in the telegram. In any case, measures of physical pressure—arrest, expulsion of children from school, any measures that bring shame upon someone and are carried out through violence or abuse of individual dignity, etc., may not be applied.

Procurators shall be duty-bound to strictly oversee implementation of the aforementioned standards.

Republic Procurator Krylenko

• DOCUMENT 24 •

Telegram from A. A. Andreev, secretary of the Northern Caucasus Krai party committee, to I. V. Stalin on the Justice Commissariat directive, 29 May 1929. RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 10, l. 157. Certified copy.

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29 May 1929

Secret

The krai party committee has received Krylenko's directive to the krai procurator of 22 May<sup>38</sup> [ . . . ] holding liable individuals who fail to deliver grain on schedule under art. 61 of the Criminal Code to a fine of up to 10 rubles. If grain is not delivered, individuals are to be held liable in court under art. 62, section 2, of the Criminal Code, to the sum of double the value of the grain due for delivery. The krai party committee has already set, for nondelivery of grain, a fine to be imposed by the commissions, based on a resolution of citizens' meetings, at five times the value [of the amount owed]. Krylenko's directive deprives us of the opportunity to successfully fulfill the assigned plan for grain procurements. We resolutely object to Krylenko's directive and insist on carrying out the krai party committee's decree ordering a fivefold fine against kulak farms for nondelivery of grain. We have suspended implementation of Krylenko's directive until we receive your reply.

Secretary of the Northern Caucasus Krai party committee Andreev

• DOCUMENT 25 •

Memorandum from A. I. Mikoian to V. M. Molotov on the inquiry from A. A. Andreev, 3 June 1929. RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 10, l. 157. Certified copy.

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3 June 1929

Regarding Comrade Krylenko's letter addressed to Comrade Stalin<sup>39</sup> on judicial penalties against kulaks over grain procurements, let me state that there is no conflict between my directive<sup>40</sup> and the instructions for the

procurators' offices agreed upon between the Trade Commissariat and Comrade Krylenko.

Comrade Krylenko discusses a number of local orders that do not flow from my directive or from Krylenko's instructions. Specifically, instructions have been issued in a number of places and in the Northern Caucasus to impose a fivefold fine against kulaks who refuse to carry out assignments, and this is to be implemented on an extrajudicial basis by means of decisions by village commissions.

I believe that Comrade Krylenko is right, and it is inadvisable to carry out such a measure on an extrajudicial basis. We should carry out such harsh measures of pressure, but the most desirable form for this is the courts. We just need the courts to act swiftly in examining these cases and without dragging things out.

I believe that this is the reply that must be given to Comrade Andreev's inquiry regarding Comrade Krylenko's order.

With communist regards, A. Mikoian

· DOCUMENT 26 ·

Decree of the RSFSR Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom  
 "On the Expansion of the Rights of Local Soviets in Assisting the  
 Fulfillment of State Assignments and Plans," 27 June 1929.  
 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 746, l. 10. Certified copy.

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27 June 1929

Responding to the numerous petitions by masses of poor and middle peasants in grain-producing areas and with a view to curbing kulak and speculator elements, the RSFSR Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom resolve:

1. In instances when, by decision of a citizens' general meeting (village assembly), resolutions on the fulfillment of a grain procurement plan by an entire village are adopted as pledges and in connection with this plan the distribution of the assignment among individual farms is adopted as well, to allow local soviets to take the following measures under art. 61 of the Criminal Code against individual farmers who obstruct the fulfillment of decisions by village assemblies and fail to deliver grain:

a. To impose a fine on an administrative basis in the amount of up to five times the obligations set by the resolution of a general assembly or commission of a village soviet, and in the event of refusal, to auction off property.

b. In the event individual groups of farms refuse and directly resist the delivery of grain products, to turn over cases on such citizens for criminal prosecution for resisting the government under art. 61, section 3, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

2. Of the fines and sales receipts collected under the above procedure from inveterate kulaks, to allocate 25 percent to funds for assistance to poor peasants in the specific village or raion.

3. In accordance with item 1 of this decree, to amend art. 61 of the RSFSR Criminal Code as follows: "Refusal to perform an obligation, state assignments, or work of state significance shall be punishable: in the first instance, by an administrative penalty in the form of a fine imposed by the appropriate authorities, in the amount of up to five times the designated obligation or assignment. In the second instance, by confinement or forced labor for up to one year.

"Such actions perpetrated by a group of persons by previous agreement who render active resistance shall be punishable by confinement for up to two years, accompanied by the confiscation of property and their exile from the locality."<sup>41</sup>

• DOCUMENT 27 •

OGPU Information Department report about a mass disturbance in the village of Konokovo, Armavir Okrug, 1 July 1929. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 7, d. 523, ll. 167–69. Copy.

1 July 1929

Top secret

The mass disturbance in the village of Konokovo, Armavir Okrug, on June 2 of this year, took place as a result of the expropriation of property from the kulaks Rezinka F. E. and Fomushkin P. F. The expropriation was carried out as a result of these individuals' refusal to sell 650 poods of grain surplus. When on June 2 of this year a cow was being taken from Rezinka, the members of his family resisted, attempting to draw their neighbors' attention with weeping and noise. The village executors [*sel'ispolniteli*, a kind of bailiff] were taking the cow across the market square where, because of a holiday, there was a large number of people. Weeping members of Rezinka's family were following the village executors. Rezinka was in the market square at the time, talking with the peasants and complaining that the authorities were robbing him of his property.

Ten minutes after the cow had been taken across the market, people

started coming up to the village soviet in groups. Women went from house to house calling upon people to go to the village soviet to defend Rezinka. By 8 a.m. up to 300 people, mostly women, had gathered before the village soviet. A few people from the crowd began searching the courtyard for the village soviet chairman Eshchenko who, in fear, locked himself up in his office. The crowd broke the door open and took Eshchenko to the square, demanding that he hand over the keys to the premises where Rezinka's and others' [confiscated] property was locked up.

The peasants who were standing near Eshchenko—Tikhon Nikishin, V. I. Sheremet (80 years old), Daniil Kurochkin (territorial army conscript), and others began beating him. Citizen Krikun[ok] who performed forced labor at the village soviet prevented a lynching [*samosud*] by dragging, together with the peasant Abramenko, the village soviet chairman out of the crowd and hiding him in the stables.

Having failed to find the keys, the crowd broke the premises open, took the expropriated property out, and brought it to Fomushkin's and Rezinka's homes.

Part of the women who participated in the pillage of property gathered stones and went around the village looking for communists. In particular, they were looking for the party member Strel'tsova. When the crowd came up to the children's nursery, it attacked a female guard, demanding that she hand over the keys to the nursery and tell them where Strel'tsova was; otherwise the women threatened to murder the guard.

After a fruitless search for communists and komsomols who had fled the village upon learning of the disturbance, the crowd started to disperse at about 10 p.m., as people left to go home. At that moment, two militiamen (communists) from the village of Uspenskaia and a people's investigator (nonparty) arrived by cart in the village. Men and women started coming up in groups to the cart that had stopped at the house of the disenfranchised<sup>42</sup> Eres'ko. The people's investigator entered the building, asking for the chairman. "We have laundered him and hanged him out to dry"—came the shouts from the crowd. The people's investigator, seeing the peasants' excitement (shouts from the crowd: "Why talk to him? Beat him!"), attempted to calm the crowd, promising to find the village soviet chairman. The crowd started throwing stones at the militiamen who remained in the cart, threatening to murder them. As a result, the militiamen fled without waiting for the investigator and shot twice at the crowd that was chasing them. In response to these shots, several shots came from the crowd (witnesses report that it was senior sergeant of the territorial troops Shotskii who was shooting).



The people's investigator who remained alone in the crowd attempted to run away from the mob violence, but he was hit over the head and knocked down, whereupon the crowd started beating him. The demobilized Red Army soldier Serdiukov stepped in and stopped the beating; but the investigator, having reached the nearest alley, stopped and began telling the surrounding peasants that he was not to blame. Despite that, he was hit several times again. The peasant Kovalenko began trying to persuade the crowd to stop the beating. As a result, the peasants gave the beaten investigator some water, so that he could wash himself, and then let him out of the village. At the time of the beating of the investigator and the chasing of the militiamen, 1,000 to 1,500 people took part in the disturbance (the crowd was summoned by ringing the tocsin).

At 10:30 a car with the raion party committee secretary and the OGPU plenipotentiary came to the village and was immediately surrounded by the crowd. The disenfranchised V. Eres'ko shouted to the crowd: "Why are you waiting, beat him!" after which the peasant Lysenko and others began shouting: "Why look at them, they came to beat us, kill us, shoot us. Beat them, beat!" and so forth. Under the pressure of the enraged crowd, the officials had to leave the village.

After the car had left, the crowd went to the barn of the agricultural cooperative. Failing to find the manager, the peasants went to his home and forcibly took cooperative employees Strel'tsov and Dashkov with them, demanding that they open the barn. When the barn was opened, the peasants made sure that the procured grain had not been taken away and then ordered the employees not to send the grain anywhere but to distribute it to the poor through the Committee for Peasants Mutual Social Assistance.

By 4 p.m., an operational detachment arrived at the village. Not a single party member remained in the village: everyone was either hiding or had fled to Armavir. Up to 700 peasants assembled in the square. The members of the detachment found several village soviet members and komsomols and held a meeting. The peasants who spoke at the meeting complained about the unbearable grain procurements plan and spoke especially harshly against expropriations.

On June 3, after the arrest of the instigators of the disturbance, the daughter of the arrested kulak Rezinka ran around the village crying and asking for help. A group of women assembled and tried to call the peasants together for another disturbance but did not succeed, since the women were not allowed to ring the church bell.

An investigation is underway. Twenty-two people have been arrested.

Director of the OGPU Information Department Alekseev  
 Director of the Seventh Section of the OGPU Information Department  
 Vizel

· DOCUMENT 28 ·

Letter of M. D. Mikhailin, a peasant from the village of Dement'evka, Samara Guberniia, to his son about grain procurements, 16 July 1929. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 376, l. 2. Copy of a copy.

16 July 1929

A letter from your parents.

Good day dear son, we are sending you greetings from all the family, and from the relatives, and from the acquaintances. We have received your letter and the money, 15 rubles, for which we are very grateful.

You asked about the harvest. From spring till Trinity there was a drought, and since Trinity it has been raining. So now the grains have rested a bit, and we will collect grain for the family. Though we will collect the grain, they will hardly give it to us, for we are having grain procurements here. They have imposed 20 poods on us, and we ourselves have been buying since the winter. With [us], they have confiscated a colt and four sheep; they take away everything from everyone in the village on credit. Whoever has two horses and two cows—they take away a horse and a cow and leave one horse and one cow per home. The rest they take away. They take away every single sheep. And whoever lacks a beast—they take whatever goods they have: clothes, furniture, and dishes. In Korolevka, from Uncle Vasia Badinov they took a horse, a cow, a heifer, a year-and-a-half-old bull, seven heads of sheep, a sowing machine, a samovar, a cloth coat, a feather bed, a tow, and even wool; and from Len'ka they will probably take a cow and two year-and-a-half-old bulls. They go from house to house and look for grain everywhere; where they find a pood or half a pood, they take everything away, leaving only one pood per eater. One can't buy grain anywhere, can't find [it], and can't sell [it]. They want to bring the new grain to one threshing-floor and thresh it all together there, and starting in the fall they want to give us a norm of one pood per month per eater, and all the rest they will take away and pour together in a common barn. Thus, Mitiunia, write to us how this whole business should be explained; there are rumors that there will be a big war soon and if not war, that they want to drive everyone into a collective farm, and we will all work together.

Write what is going on with you in the center. The people are greatly frustrated. They even don't want to sow grain. Write to us about all this, and write to us whether this decree has been sent out from the center, or it is the local authorities that manage things so; we know nothing about this. Also this is what happened: they hired us to put up house [*izba*] frames, we wanted to put up the frames 12 arshin long and 7 arshin wide. Now that they confiscated our animals we have postponed this, and we want to wait till the autumn; perhaps there will be some change. If they drag us together into one collective farm, then we do not need this. When you receive this, write what rumors you have [heard]. Even though we have no grain, still we do not wander around looking for grain, we have savings from the spring, so that there will be enough till the fresh reap; soon we will reap the new grain. With this, good-bye. Write in response; we are all alive and healthy and wish you the same. We all together send you our greetings. Write as soon as possible what is going on there with you.

• DOCUMENT 29 •

Politburo resolution "On Grain Procurements," 15 August 1929.  
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 753, l. 3. Certified copy.

15 August 1929

14. On grain procurements (Comrade Mikoian).

In order to completely fulfill the yearly plan for grain procurements in January and February and ensure a firm price policy, the Politburo resolves:

a. to issue a directive to OGPU organs to carry out decisive measures of repression against urban speculators in grain products and speculators who have connections with the cities;

b. to require Tsentrosoiuz, Khlebotsentr, and Soiuzkhleb to issue a rigorous directive to all of their agencies to immediately dismiss all grain procurement agents proven guilty of engaging in competition, not excluding communists, as persons who maliciously harm the cause of the workers' state. To direct the OGPU and judicial bodies to issue a directive to combat grain competition through their own channels.

To instruct the Transport Commissariat and the CC of railroad and water-transport workers, along with the Trade Commissariat, to take additional measures through their own channels to curb grain speculation;

c. to instruct Kolkhoztsentr to investigate collective farms with a view

to immediately removing and placing on trial those leaders of collective farms who defraud the state and engage in wrecking activities, and who are convicted of holding up grain surpluses or selling them on the side. To direct the Trade Commissariat, OGPU, and party organizations to oversee the implementation of this;

d. to send out this decree to all party organizations in procurement areas.<sup>43</sup>

· DOCUMENT 30 ·

OGPU circular "On Measures to Increase Grain Procurements," 21 August 1929. TsA FSB RF, f. 66, op. 1, d. 196, ll. 70-70ob. Original. RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 76-77. Certified copy.

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21 August 1929<sup>44</sup>

No. 178/EKU

To all OGPU representatives and to the okrug department in the city of Tula

With a view to ensuring the most complete possible fulfillment of the plan for grain procurements within the time frame set by the government and the need for developing them in the most intensive manner from the very first days of the grain procurement campaign, the OGPU deems it necessary:

1. To take decisive measures to combat urban grain speculators and speculators who have connections with the cities and by their actions disrupt the organized progress of grain procurements and the supply of grain-consuming centers. To carry out the aforementioned measures in accordance with the order of the USSR Trade Commissariat through our agencies in the provinces, with which immediate contact is to be established.

If it is necessary to conduct a broad operation to hold the above category of persons accountable, to coordinate the matter with the local party committee, and to conduct the investigation on an urgent basis, completing it in no more than a week.

Upon completion of the investigation, cases are to be forwarded to the EKU, to be heard at the Special Conference of the OGPU.

Pursuant to the order of the USSR Trade Commissariat of 17 August 1929, no. 6/469, take decisive measures to combat bag-trading and, barring the issuance of permits by village soviets or other soviet bodies to ar-

tisans, workers, and peasants, and other categories for the purchase of grain, to initiate court proceedings against officials guilty of issuing such permits.

2. To remove immediately from their positions all grain procurement agents proven guilty of engaging in competition (not excluding communists), holding the most inveterate of them accountable.

3. In every instance of confirmed speculation in individual sectors of railroad and water transport, to notify immediately the OGPU EKU so that the necessary measures can be taken through the Commissariat of Transport.

4. To set up vigilant observation of state and collective farms, in cooperation with the local party committee, with a view to immediately removing from their positions and holding accountable if necessary for defrauding the state and engaging in wrecking activities, those leaders of state and collective farms who are proven guilty of holding up grain surpluses or selling them on the side.

To inform the OGPU EKU on a weekly basis in regular summary reports on the progress of implementation of this circular.

To notify the OGPU EKU by mailgram of all mass operations.

Deputy chairman of the OGPU Trilisser

Secretary of the Economic Directorate of the OGPU N. Bannikov

• DOCUMENT 3 I •

CC directive "On Measures to Increase Grain Procurements," 20 September 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 759, ll. 10-13. Certified copy. Appendix 3 to protocol no. 99 of the Politburo session of 26 September 1929.

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20 September 1929

In view of the extremely poor work by party organizations and oblast party committees in fulfilling the Politburo's directives on grain procurements, in addition to previously issued directives<sup>45</sup> the Politburo of the CC of the VKP(b) resolves:

1. To issue a reprimand to the oblast and krai party committees of Siberia, Northern Caucasus, the Middle Volga, Kazakhstan, the Urals, Bashkiria, and the Crimea for the lack of preparedness and slow pace of grain procurements displayed in the organizations of their oblast (or krai).

2. To warn the oblast party committees of the Western, Ivanovo-Vozne-

sensk, and Moscow oblasts and the Nizhny Novgorod Krai party committee that a further slowing of grain procurements will compel the CC to take harsher measures of pressure.

3. In view of the endless debating in a number of areas, especially in Siberia, the Urals, and Bashkiria, on the size of the grain and forage stocks and of the grain procurement plan, to instruct all oblast party committees, in particular the Siberian, Urals, and Bashkir committees, to immediately convey the plan to the countryside and to begin fulfilling it.

4. The Politburo calls special attention to the fact that the lag in procurements of food crops and their replacement with fodder-crop deliveries pose the greatest threat of derailing the grain procurement plan, a matter that cannot be viewed as anything but a kulak maneuver. The Politburo instructs all oblast and krai party committees, especially the Central Black Earth Oblast and the CC of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine, where this replacement of food crops with fodder crops is assuming threatening proportions, to take immediate measures to stop this kulak derailment of the grain procurement plan and to ensure fulfillment of the procurements of food crops.

5. The CC cites in particular the criminal nonperformance by a number of collective farms of their direct obligations, as well as their failure to deliver grain under contract.

To require local party organizations, collective-farm centers, Khlebot-sentr, the Union of Unions,<sup>46</sup> and Selgospodar<sup>47</sup> to take decisive measures to place pressure on both contractors and collective farms so that they deliver grain by the agreed deadlines, making use for this purpose of all means provided for by the contracts (forfeits, criminal proceedings, and so forth). At the same time party organizations and grain procurement agents must take every measure to increase the inflow of grain from middle peasants' individual farms in the form of separate procurements. In particular, to direct VTsSPS<sup>48</sup> [party] cells to mobilize immediately no fewer than 100 trained workers and put them at the disposal of the All-Union Council of Collective Farms to check for surpluses on collective farms and to speed up the pace of their delivery of grain.

6. To call the attention of all party organizations to the fact that the inflow of grain from well-to-do kulak elements, who continue to put up tenacious resistance in order to disrupt the grain prices set by Soviet authorities, plays a minuscule role in the total amount of grain procurements. To instruct all party committees to ensure fulfillment of firm assignments for the sale of grain by kulak and well-to-do segments of the countryside to the principal procurement agents by imposing on kulaks

who evade fulfillment of the assignments the established repressive measures (a fivefold fine, art. 61 [of the Criminal Code] in the RSFSR and the relevant articles of the law in the republics).

To direct the OGPU, without relaxing the measures outlined for Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus, to intensify repression in all other grain procurement areas. To increase the use of internal exile as a means of combating inveterate speculators.

To instruct the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR commissariats of justice to issue a directive to the provinces to conduct several show trials immediately with severe punishments for particularly inveterate kulaks and speculators.

7. To instruct the Commissariat of Finance, the Central Agricultural Bank, and the cooperative centers to report within a week on implementation of the Politburo decree of 13 September<sup>49</sup> on measures of financial pressure in connection with grain procurements.

8. In places where available grain repositories cannot provide storage for all of the grain, all of the remaining storage facilities in the given locality must be put at the disposal of grain procurement organizations, and vacant facilities belonging to industry and transport must also be adapted as repositories.

To mobilize available packing materials (sacks and tarpaulins) at all nonprocurement organizations to use for grain shipments.

In places with a significant accumulation of grain consignments, continuous unloading and removal of grain is to be maintained (by the commissariats of transport, labor, and internal affairs, and consignees).

To immediately enlist organs of the OGPU to carry out all of these measures.

To direct the STO to draw up appropriate practical measures and to issue a decree through state channels<sup>50</sup> with regard to this entire item on the most urgent basis.

9. To require the Commissariat of Trade to submit to the transportation organs in a timely manner a plan for shipments of all food consignments, specifying both the places of departure and the destinations of the food consignments.

To require the Commissariat of Transport to provide the full amount of railroad cars necessary for the shipment of grain consignments, and to make up the full arrears in railroad cars and protective grain screens for Ukraine in the shortest possible time.

To require the Commissariat of Transport and the CC of Railroads [*TsK zh.d.*] to take immediate measures to improve and discipline the

work of transport as much as possible. To ensure an acceleration in the turnover of railroad cars by the next few days. To ensure an increase in shipments from Ukraine to the technically highest possible shipment levels in the most important directions. To eliminate immediately “bottlenecks” and “logjams” at the major railroad hubs and to prevent railroad cars from turning into warehousing facilities in the future.

10. The CC points out that CC directives on developing mass work and mobilizing poor and middle peasants are being carried out extremely poorly in all grain procurement work. The CC instructs party organizations to intensify this work and, in particular, to coordinate agitation and political work on grain procurements with the basic tasks set by the five-year plan for the industrialization of the country and the socialist reorganization of agriculture. [. . .]

• DOCUMENT 32 •

OGPU circular letter on the struggle against the counterrevolution in the countryside, no later than 25 September 1929. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 7, d. 9, ll. 8–11. Copy.

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No later than 25 September 1929

Top secret

Urgent

To all plenipotentiaries and chiefs of OGPU oblast and okrug departments

The overt group and mass disturbances that began to occur in the countryside in a significant quantity in late March and early April of this year, led by the antisoviet and kulak element and aimed at disrupting the grain procurement campaign and socialist reorganization of agriculture, are continuing. The measures our organs are taking have not reduced them enough to this point. Terror is persisting at a high level. In certain areas there has even been an increase in the incidence of it.

An analysis of the material in our possession proves that OGPU local departments have failed to this point to properly organize their fight against the counterrevolution in the countryside in the main area—in the area of preventing antisoviet disturbances in the countryside. Yet in both the vast majority of group and mass disturbances in the countryside and the vast majority of instances of terror either preliminary illegal, and sometimes overt, activity by the antisoviet kulak element, aimed at or-



ganizing a disturbance, has been established, or there have been at least rather obvious precursors of terror and mass disturbances (threats, anonymous letters, mass circulation of rumors of uprisings and riots, insurrectionist agitation, etc.). Nevertheless, these signs of a disturbance being prepared by the antisoviet kulak underground usually do not produce the necessary swift and decisive operational measures on our part, and these measures are imposed only after a mass disturbance or act of terror has already taken place. This proves that either the antisoviet underground in the countryside is not being exposed, and its preliminary work remains unknown to our organs, or the significance of the warning signs of terror is being underestimated, and not enough attention is being devoted to preventive operational work. As a result, instead of striking at the antisoviet kulak underground, operational measures have been imposed against a broader circle of active participants in a disturbance, who inevitably include individual middle and poor peasants. A disturbance that has taken place often serves as an impetus for similar disturbances in neighboring localities, making the antisoviet element more active, strengthening its positions and weakening our positions in the countryside. A decisive turnaround must be achieved in the shortest possible time in the general orientation of our local organs in the fight against the counterrevolution in the countryside.

Paramount and constant attention must be focused *on the prevention of terror, group and mass disturbances, and overt antisoviet disturbances* in the countryside. Operational work should be done in such a way as to expose in advance the antisoviet underground that is preparing for disturbances and to smash it before it has time to organize a disturbance. The warning signs of terror and overt disturbances—threats, assaults, agitation in favor of disturbances, insurrectionist agitation, anonymous letters and proclamations, attempted disturbances—must immediately prompt operational measures that deal a lethal blow to the antisoviet underground in the countryside.

It is perfectly obvious that if the work of our organs in the countryside moves in this direction and operational measures are imposed in a timely manner and on the scale necessary to smash the underground, *a substantial number of overt antisoviet disturbances in the countryside can and should be prevented*. Accordingly, the degree of success of our organs' work, too, should be evaluated on the basis of the ratio of antisoviet disturbances prevented in the countryside to those that actually occur.

We direct:

1. Without diminishing under any circumstances the pace or scale of the fight against antisoviet disturbances that are actually taking place in the countryside, strengthen all possible preventive measures against them. To this end, mobilize attention to exposing preparatory work by the antisoviet kulak element aimed at organizing disturbances. Take measures to increase the exposure of the antisoviet kulak underground in the countryside. . . . Draw operational conclusions immediately from facts indicating the preparation of disturbances and carry out an operation to crush the antisoviet underground that is conducting this preparation.

2. In the event disturbances actually take place, pay special attention to preventing them from spreading to neighboring localities. . . .

4. Make the widest possible use of trips by operatives of investigative divisions to [local] areas. . . .

5. In furtherance of instructions on the turning over of completed investigative files on the counterrevolution in the countryside (order of the SO OGPU [OGPU Secret Department] no. 155031/3 of 20 June 1929). In addition to files on individual acts of terror, continue, as a rule, to turn over for judicial consideration all investigative files on overt antisoviet disturbances in the countryside (group and mass disturbances, disruptions of campaigns and meetings).

Turn over all files on the prevention of antisoviet disturbances in the countryside and files on counterrevolutionary organizations (including terrorist ones), as before, for extrajudicial consideration. Deviations from this procedure are possible only in coordination with the procurator's office and local [soviet] executive bodies and with the approval of the OGPU.

The turning over of investigative files on overt antisoviet disturbances in the countryside must not, under any circumstances, entail a diminution in the pace or scale of our operational work against the antisoviet movement in the countryside or in the attention of our organs to overt antisoviet disturbances. All operational investigative work regarding [such phenomena], as a general rule, must remain up to our organs, which are responsible in full for the fight against all types and forms of counterrevolution in the countryside.

OGPU deputy chairman Trilisser  
SOOGPU<sup>51</sup> deputy chief Agranov  
For chief of section 3 of SOOGPU

## · DOCUMENT 33 ·

CC directive "On Grain Procurements," 3 October 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 761, ll. 15-16. Certified copy.

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3 October 1929

1. Concentrate the maximum amount of resources on procurements of food crops. Evaluate the general results of food procurements as they progress.

2. Note that in a number of areas the pressure on kulaks to fulfill the procurement assignments set for them is still completely inadequate, and this is a reflection of the unsteady implementation of the party line in a matter that is highly important to the proletariat. Assume that the main task at this time is to ensure steady and timely fulfillment of the obligations placed on the well-to-do and kulak elite of the countryside for the delivery of market grain.

In carrying out decisive measures of repression against kulaks and ensuring active support for these measures from the masses of poor and middle peasants, mete out especially harsh punishments against kulaks who organize terrorist attacks and counterrevolutionary disturbances. Special directives have been issued to the OGPU and to commissariats of justice on the necessary speed with which the appropriate punishments are to be carried out.

3. Confirm the CC directive of 23 September<sup>52</sup> on the inadmissibility of conveying mandatory assignments to middle-peasant households and instruct oblast party committees in appropriate cases to take measures to rectify errors. Middle-peasant and low-income farms are still covered by the directive on social pressure on them and on the sale of grain by them in the amounts of the self-imposed obligations to society that they have adopted.

The chief factors regarding middle peasants are rigorous fulfillment of contract plans by individual farms and the influence of the community of poor and middle peasants toward fulfillment of village plans. It is imperative in this process to intensify work as much as possible to organize poor peasants and increase their role in soviets and cooperatives.

4. Impose decisive measures of pressure for nondelivery of grain against collective farms and individual communists and Komsomol members, as well as members of soviets and cooperative boards.

5. In connection with the increase in the grain procurement plan in October, approve the plan of the Commissariat of Trade for distribution of

industrial goods, which provides for an increase in the supply of the countryside of grain procurement areas at the expense of cities and non-grain-procurement villages. Require Tsentrosoiuz and the syndicates to ship goods to grain procurement areas first. Direct the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate to check on fulfillment of this decree and the State Bank to make decisive use of the funds at its disposal to influence the trade system.

6. Take measures to increase the collection of all payments due on the uniform agricultural tax, insurance, loans and to fulfill the control figures for distribution in the countryside of the loan for industrialization. In October and November, conduct self-taxation and collect the amounts due on self-taxation.

7. Increase the dispatch of workers' groups to carry out grain procurements.

• DOCUMENT 34 •

Politburo directive to the OGPU and commissariats of justice on intensifying repressions, 3 October 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 761, l. 17. Certified copy.

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3 October 1929

Direct the OGPU and commissariats of justice of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR to take decisive and swift measures of repression, up to and including execution by shooting, against kulaks who organize terrorist attacks on state and party officials and other counterrevolutionary actions [ . . . ].

While implementing the appropriate measures, as a rule, through judicial bodies, in certain cases, when there is a special need for swiftness, punishments are to be carried out through the GPU. The OGPU shall take the appropriate measures with the approval of oblast party committees and in more important cases with the approval of the CC.

• DOCUMENT 35 •

From an OGPU Information Department report on peasant mass disturbances, 4 October 1929. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 684, l. 2. Copy.

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4 October 1929

Top secret

Based on materials received from 28 through 30 September 1929

. . . The Middle Volga Oblast. In the village of Tat-Shebeda, Ruzaevka

Raion, Mordva Okrug, after the village executor [*sel'ispolnitel'*, a kind of village bailiff] went from house to house to announce to each farm its grain delivery assignment as determined by the assistance committee, a group of 4 well-to-do peasants summoned a crowd of up to 30 men and, with swearing and all kinds of shouting, went to the village executor's house. After reaching the village executor's house, the crowd demanded the list of grain delivery assignments, threatening to murder the village executor for taking part in grain procurements. Seeing the tense condition of the crowd, the village executor did not leave the premises but instead handed the lists to the crowd through a window. At the same time an unknown individual set the village executor's courtyard on fire, but family members extinguished the fire. Four instigators of the disturbance have been arrested. An investigation is under way.

In the village of Sarga, Staraiia Shaiga Raion, Mordva Okrug, a crowd of women, without informing the village soviet, organized a meeting in defense of the local priest who had addressed the believers during a service with a complaint about his hard life, in particular referring to taxes and grain procurements. In addition, the priest has been disseminating rumors that Soviet power will soon take away the church and turn it into a school. An investigation is under way.

Tataria. In the village of Elaur, Chulpan Volost, Chistopol Canton, a priest has been arrested for sabotaging the organization of a collective farm. A crowd of women assembled to demand that the arrested priest be freed, and when arrests of others guilty of undermining the collective farm began, the crowd did not allow them to be arrested. An investigation is under way.

Assistant director of OGPU Information Department D'iakov  
Assistant director of Eighth Section Nazarbekova

• DOCUMENT 36 •

From the article of I. V. Stalin, "The Year of the Great Turn: On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution," 3 November 1929.

Adapted from J. Stalin, *Works*, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1955), pp. 124-41.

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3 November 1929

The past year was a year of great breakthroughs on all the fronts of socialist construction. The keynote of this breakthrough has been, and continues to be, a determined offensive of socialism against the capitalist ele-

ments in town and countryside. The characteristic feature of this offensive is that it has already brought us a number of decisive successes in the principal spheres of the socialist reconstruction of our national economy.

We may, therefore, conclude that our party succeeded in making good use of our retreat during the first stages of the new economic policy in order, in the subsequent stages, to organize the change and to launch a successful offensive against capitalist elements. [. . .]

### 3. In the sphere of agricultural development

Finally, about the party's third achievement during the past year. [. . .] I am referring to the radical change in the development of our agriculture from small, backward, individual farming to large-scale, advanced, collective agriculture, to joint cultivation of the land, to machine and tractor stations, to artels, to collective farms based on modern technique, and, finally, to giant state farms, equipped with hundreds of tractors and harvester combines.

The party's achievement here consists in the fact that in a whole number of areas we have succeeded in turning the main mass of the peasantry away from the old, capitalist path of development—which benefits only a small group of the rich, of the capitalists, while the vast majority of the peasants are doomed to ruin and utter poverty—to the new, socialist path of development, which pushes out the rich and the capitalists, and re-equips the middle and poor peasants along new lines, equipping them with modern implements, with tractors and agricultural machinery, so as to enable them to climb out of poverty.

The achievement of the party consists in the fact that we have succeeded in organizing this radical change deep down in the peasantry itself, and in securing the following of the broad masses of the poor and middle peasants in spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of the desperate resistance of dark forces of every kind, from kulaks and priests to philistines and right opportunists. [. . .]

There have collapsed and crumbled to dust the assertions of the right opportunists (Bukharin's group) that:

- a. the peasants would not join the collective farms,
- b. the accelerated development of collective farms could only cause mass discontent and estrangement between the peasantry and the working class,
- c. the "high road" of socialist development in the countryside is not the collective farms, but the cooperatives,
- d. the development of collective farms and the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside might deprive the country of grain altogether.

All that has collapsed and crumbled to dust as old bourgeois-liberal rubbish.

First of all, the peasants are joining the collective farms; they are joining by whole villages, volosts, districts.

Second, the mass collective-farm movement is not weakening the *smychka* but strengthening it, by putting it on a new, production basis. Now even the blind can see that if there is any serious dissatisfaction among the main mass of the peasantry it is not because of the collective-farm policy of the Soviet government but because the Soviet government is unable to keep pace with the growth of the collective-farm movement in regard to supplying the peasants with machines and tractors.

Third, the controversy about the “high road” of socialist development in the countryside is a scholastic controversy, worthy of young petty-bourgeois liberals of the type of Aikhenvald and Slepko.<sup>53</sup> It is obvious that, as long as there was no mass collective-farm movement, the “high road” was the lower forms of the cooperative movement—supply and marketing cooperatives; but when the higher form of the cooperative movement—the collective farm—appeared, the latter became the “high road” of development. [. . .]

Fourth, now even the blind can see that without the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside, and without the development of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we would not have achieved the decisive successes of this year in the matter of grain procurement, nor could the state have accumulated, as it has already done, an emergency reserve of grain totaling tens of millions of poods.

Moreover, it can now be confidentially asserted that, thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we are definitely emerging, or have already emerged, from the grain crisis. And if the development of the collective farms and state farms is accelerated, there is no reason to doubt that in about three years’ time our country will be one of the world’s largest grain producers, if not the largest.

What is the new feature of the present collective-farm movement? The new and decisive feature of the present collective-farm movement is that the peasants are joining the collective farms not in individual groups, as was formerly the case, but by whole villages, volosts, districts, and even okrugs.

And what does that mean? It means that the middle peasant is joining the collective farm. And that is the basis of the radical breakthrough in the development of agriculture that constitutes the most important achievement of the Soviet government during the past year. [. . .]

## · DOCUMENT 37 ·

OGPU data on the number of those arrested during grain procurements  
as of 4 November 1929, after 4 November 1929. TsA FSB RF,  
f. 2, op. 7, d. 42, l. 1. Copy.

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After 4 November 1929

<i>Regions</i>	<i>Economic Crimes</i>	<i>Counterrevolutionary Crimes</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ukraine	2,310	2,083	4,393
Northern Caucasus Krai	2,658	2,044	4,702
Central Black Earth Oblast	1,101	411	1,512
Lower Volga Krai	417	1,719	2,136
Middle Volga Oblast	799	1,192	1,991
Kazakhstan	539	669	1,208
Crimea	353	—	353
Central Asia	279	—	279
Bashkiria	165	292	457
Urals	1,074	1,807	2,881
Siberia	3,027	845	3,872
Nizhny Novgorod Krai	523	852	1,375
Tataria	524	—	524
Leningrad Military District	142	109	251
Belorussian Military District	286	430	716
Ivanovo Industrial Oblast	249	—	249
Transcaucasia	142	—	142
Far Eastern Krai	38	—	38
Northern Krai	136	—	136
Moscow Oblast	774	355	1,129
[Total]	15,536	12,808	28,344



· DOCUMENT 38 ·

OGPU Report. Antisoviet incidents in the countryside related to grain procurements, from the start of the grain procurement campaign [July] through 4 November 1929, after 4 November 1929.

TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 7, d. 42, ll. 2–3. Original.

After 4 November 1929.

Kulak Terror

<i>Regions</i>	<i>Murders</i>	<i>Injuries</i>	<i>Arsons</i>	<i>Assaults</i>	<i>Beatings</i>	<i>Property Wrecking</i>	<i>Total</i>
USSR	71	62	370	164	270	36	973
Central Black Earth Oblast	16	17	10	41	45	2	131
Middle Volga Oblast (including Mordva Okrug)	2	4	51	20	23	8	108
Lower Volga Krai	3	5	9	4	8	—	29
Moscow Industrial Oblast	1	2	25	5	16	1	50
Ivanovo Industrial Oblast	—	1	2	2	1	—	6
Nizhny Novgorod Krai	3	1	7	2	3	—	16
Tataria	4	2	13	6	9	1	35
Bashkiria	2	1	9	9	11	5	37
Chuvashia	—	—	6	3	—	1	10
Mari Oblast	1	—	—	—	5	—	6
Kazakhstan	4	6	7	9	20	2	48
Northern Caucasus Krai (including national areas)	6	3	4	6	8	3	30
Crimea	—	1	—	1	9	—	11
Uzbekistan	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Urals	1	1	5	3	9	—	19
Siberia	11	7	23	15	40	4	100
Ukrainian SSR	11	9	78	14	28	2	142
Leningrad Oblast	2	2	5	11	20	4	44
Western Oblast	1	—	7	4	10	1	23
Belorussian SSR	—	—	5	3	2	2	12
Northern Krai	—	—	2	3	1	—	6
Far Eastern Krai	1	—	1	3	—	—	5
Azerbaidzhan	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Buriato-Mongolia	1	—	1	—	1	—	3

## Peasant Mass Disturbances

Since the start of the grain procurement campaign, 91 mass disturbances have been recorded all over the Union. The number of participants has been established in 67 of these cases.

The overall number of participants in mass disturbances—17,825.

The overall number of mass disturbances breaks down by region as follows:

Middle Volga Oblast	23	Bashkiria	6
Kazakhstan	11 (one armed disturbance)	Crimea	2
Central Black Earth Oblast	17	Northern Caucasus Krai (including national areas)	13
Lower Volga Krai	5	Ukrainian SSR	1
Tataria	1	Siberia	12

• DOCUMENT 39 •

Report by G. N. Kaminsky “On the Results and Further Tasks of Collective-Farm Construction,” 14 November 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 431, ll. 2–88. Transcript with author’s corrections.

14 November 1929

The party and the working class have begun in earnest to solve one of the most difficult and complex problems of our revolution—the problem of remaking the small-scale peasant economy on the basis of large-scale socialist production. Collective-farm construction at present has taken on a scope and set a pace that radically change the entire character of development of agriculture, attesting to a tremendous historical turning point in the development of our agriculture. No matter what questions of work in the countryside (and not only in the countryside) we consider—whether it is land reorganization, *raionirovanie* [the rezoning of administrative borders], or, for example, the funding of agriculture, public education, health care, etc.—none of them can now be properly resolved without taking account of the state of the collective-farm movement, its requirements and needs, and the immediate prospects for the collectivization of agricultural production.

The first thing one is struck by when considering the collective-farm movement is its progressively accelerating pace. This pace, if one judges it

by the growth of crop areas in the collectives in 1927, 1928, 1929, and 1930, can be expressed roughly (making 1927 equal to 1) as follows: 1, 2, 5, 17. According to the latest (preliminary) data as of 1 October 1929, totals for the entire Union were: collective farms, 75,000; farms consolidated into collective farms, 1.9 million; crop area in them, more than 8 million hectares. The five-year plan, as you can see from the diagram (see diagrams nos. 1–2), projects 14.5 million hectares of socialized crops by the end of 1932–33 [economic year]; yet at least 15.3 million hectares of crop area are planned for collective farms already in 1929–30 [economic year]. There is no question that even this figure will be surpassed.

*Kosior:* That's right.

*Kaminsky:* How did the movement proceed? You know that the beginning of the collective farms' rapid growth dates to the spring of 1928, i.e., the first spring sowing campaign after the fifteenth party congress. At that time the movement developed mostly through the establishment of a multitude of small collective farms, and overall, the average size of collective farms diminished. The year 1929 already is marked by a shift in the direction of larger collective farms, an increase in their average size and the establishment of hundreds of genuinely large collective farms. The Union at present already has a total of about 600 large collective farms with a crop area of more than 1.5 million hectares, which is about 20 percent of the total sown area on collective farms. [. . .]

The density of collectivization averages 7.5 percent in the Union as a whole, with significant variations in different oblasts and areas. In the Northern Caucasus the ratio of farms that have become part of collectives to individual farms is 25 percent; in the Crimea, 25 percent; in the Lower Volga, 12 percent. In Belorussia the percentage is much lower—5 percent; in the Western Oblast, 2.6 percent; Ivanovo Oblast, 3 [percent], i.e., significantly lower than the average percentage for the Union.

*Molotov:* This is for what period?

*Kaminsky:* According to data as of 1 October of this year.

*Molotov:* This information is out-of-date.

*Kaminsky:* I must say that these figures, unquestionably, lag behind reality. The movement is now progressing in such a way that each new month makes substantial changes in the overall picture of the growth of collective farms. If we take such areas as, for example, Khoper Okrug in the Lower Volga, the percentage of collectivization was 12.7 there in August of this year, but now we already have 63 percent. There you have one illustration of the rate at which collectivization is developing. We see the same picture in many raions of other oblasts as well. Lgov Okrug has also

adopted the objective of wholesale collectivization; the Central Black Earth Oblast has several raions where wholesale collectivization is being carried out. [. . .]

I have heard talk that this changeover to collectivization in certain cases involves administrative pressure. Specifically, some comrades allege that there has been administrative coercion in, among other places, Khoper. This, of course, may have been exerted in certain places, but this is of minimal importance. This is not the main point. It is impossible to draw such an enormous mass of people into the collective-farm movement and bring about collectivization on such a scale by administrative measures. The enormous advances in the collective-farm movement that are occurring before our eyes became possible on the basis of the growth of the proletarian state's material and cultural resources, on the basis of consistent implementation of the party's general line, as a result of the party's whole policy, as a result of all our work in the countryside, specifically the work to bring millions of peasants into cooperatives and the general increase in the political activity of the poor and middle peasants in the countryside under the leadership of the working class.

If we provide a substantial stock of machinery for the collective-farm movement, as has been outlined by the CC, which has adopted a decision to build tractor plants, tractor-combine plants, and so forth at an accelerated pace, then, based on available experience, we can declare that the vast majority of poor and middle peasants will be covered by collectivization in the principal grain and raw-material raions within a year and a half to two years. Next spring will be of decisive importance in this respect, and the attention of the whole party and the working class must be focused on preparing for it.

One sometimes hears from comrades who have visited several raions of wholesale collectivization such comments, for example, about collective farms: "I arrived in such-and-such raion of wholesale collectivization and . . .<sup>54</sup> didn't find any socialism there." Several comrades who visited Chapaev Raion said this. I don't think these comrades noticed or understood the main point. You cannot assume that one need only achieve wholesale collectivization of a raion and the countryside instantly turns socialist. In reality everything evolves in a much more complex way, such as realizing that today's collective farms, even in their simplest forms (in the forms of associations for joint land cultivation), with a low level of socialization of agricultural implements and livestock, represent a giant step along the path of socialist reorganization of the countryside. But this, of course, is not yet socialism. Collective farms still have to traverse a long

path of development, and a lot of work still has to be done so that collective farms really turn into large-scale socialist production. Some comrades, who obviously are disappointed that socialism cannot be attained just by changing over to collective farms and who see that collective farms, especially in their most widespread forms—associations for joint land cultivation—still retain a great deal from the old countryside, are starting to talk this way: couldn't we rein in this movement a little bit (*Voice*: Set limits) by setting certain "limits" here? This view is clearly untenable. What is taking place is such a turnaround, such changes in the attitudes of the masses of poor and middle peasants, in their view of the collective form of management, such a massive collective[-farm] movement, that they indicate that the conditions exist for further intensive growth of collective farms and that a link exists between the quantitative growth of the collective-farm movement and its qualitative changes.

*Krzhizhanovsky*: Being determines consciousness.

*Kaminsky*: [. . .] If we take a closer look at the socialist substance of the present-day collective[-farm] movement in the area where it is linked to the level of socialization of the tools and means of production, we will notice the following here. As a general rule, we must point out the utterly inadequate level of socialization of the tools and means of production, especially in the simplest forms of collective farms. In 1929, however, there have been sharp changes for the better here. Comparing 1929 with 1928, we get the following trend in the socialization of crop area on collective farms: the percentage of socialization in Ukraine has risen from 42 to 63 percent; in the Crimea, from 47 to 65 percent; in the Central Black Earth Oblast, from 27 to 50 percent. These figures, which were obtained on the basis of spring data for 1929, accurately show the development from last year to this year, but they do not precisely reflect the actual situation now, since this summer and fall have brought a new, massive socialization of crops, which is not yet reflected in the statistics. These are average figures, which have to be used only by necessity, since there are no other later data that summarize the situation in any way. [. . .]

. . . You know, comrades, that by the fifteenth party congress collective farms made up approximately only 1 percent of the total crop area and the same proportion of the market output of agriculture. At the time when Comrade Stalin raised the issue, in all its magnitude, of accelerating the development of agriculture along the path of collectivization, when Comrade Molotov issued a slogan in his report—forward to large-scale collective agriculture—at that time it seemed to many people that, with only 1 percent of crop areas on collective farms, this issue could not be raised in

such a pointed and broad way. At the time, reliance on such development of collective farming in agriculture seemed unrealistic to many.

It has turned out that in a very short time (not even two years have passed since the fifteenth party congress) we found a genuinely correct solution specifically on the path of collectivization to the problems of developing agriculture, developing its marketability, and fulfilling practical, priority assignments in food supply to the cities.

. . . Now, as we sum up the results of the phase we have gone through, we must categorically declare that we have achieved major successes in the task of socialist reorganization of the countryside thanks to consistent implementation of the party's general line. The party did this work in spite of the rightists, against them, in conflict with them, and only steady, firm implementation of the party line will be able to guarantee us new successes in the future. The party in the future will do even more vigorous work in the collectivization of agricultural production, based on the rapid pace and large scale of the collective[-farm] movement, and will strive to achieve even greater successes. But the new scale and pace of the movement raise a number of other pressing problems that demand the whole party's closest and most unflinching attention in order to be solved. [. . .]

. . . The present scope of the collective-farm movement confronts us in a pointed way with the issue of the class struggle that is unfolding over collective-farm development and of the transfer to collective farms of the social contradictions that exist in the countryside itself. These class contradictions in today's countryside are especially being felt at the lower levels of collectivization. In practice we sometimes encounter elements of social contradictions on the higher types of collective farms as well. Since many collective farms are very poorly mechanized and inadequately organized and the level of socialization on them is low, these collective farms often show elements of inequality, class contradictions, and class struggle.

The collective farms are established, are living, and are developing in an atmosphere of intensified class struggle, and represent a definite force in this struggle. The kulaks' policy toward the collective-farm movement is familiar enough to everyone and has been exhaustively covered in the press, so I will not dwell on it in detail here. I will only comment on two of the kulaks' tactics. The kulaks attack the collective farms in two ways: in the form of a direct struggle against the collective farms, which goes as far as murders, arson, and other acts, and in an opposite form—in the form of “blowing up” collective farms from within. Facing the fact of wholesale collectivization, the kulak is trying to “reorient himself” by seeking to be admitted to a collective farm. Numerous instances are known in which

kulaks adopted all kinds of ruses just to get into a collective farm in order to subvert it from within. Given this situation, it is clear that at this stage of the intensification of the class struggle in the countryside our policy must be based on barring kulaks from collective farms, on increasing legislative measures and judicial repression against kulaks, and on purging existing collective farms of kulaks.

For a long time the question of where to put the kulaks under wholesale collectivization was considered a complicated one. Here, look where they ended up in practice (points to map no. 8). This is where they are. This sector has five-field crop rotation, and the kulaks have been pushed off to the very edges (plots 35, 130, 140, 94). What for? So that they are not bunched together. (*Voice*: They form an encirclement, that's also dangerous.) Well, you know what, let them form that kind of "encirclement." We drive them to the edge of the crop rotation, to the sparse plots of land, etc. That way they will soon turn into poor peasants.

*Liubimov*: Kaminsky, what length of service does one need to turn into a poor peasant?

*Kaminsky*: That is how the question of kulaks is resolved in a practical way under collectivization. I don't think we will have to argue over this question. [. . .]<sup>55</sup>

• DOCUMENT 40 •

From the speech by V. M. Molotov in the discussion of G. N. Kaminsky's report, 15 November 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 434, ll. 19–45. Transcript.

15 November 1929

. . . Now I will turn to the main question—the pace of collectivization. In this regard I would like to note that our current discussions of the pace of collectivization should be brought into greater conformity with practice. We don't do this enough, we don't always do it to a sufficient degree now. Well, there is no need for us to talk about stepping up the pace, it is a furious pace, a pace we didn't expect, a pace we don't have to spur on, in fact this pace is speeding up. So our plans are lagging behind this pace. Suffice it to cite just one example in the Northern Caucasus. A year ago Comrade Andreev reported here, at the CC plenum, on the Northern Caucasus, and now take his report at this CC plenum. At the last plenum he said that 8 percent of farms in their region had been collectivized, and he said that this was an exceptionally rapid pace for collectivization, and we

all acknowledged that this was indeed the case. At this plenum he said that 25–30 percent of farms there have been collectivized. Let's take even the minimum figure from Comrade Andreev's reference—25—and even then we had almost 20 percent more peasant farms covered, and according to his data, even 23 percent more peasant farms in one year since last November. We all know that this pace at present is not going to slow down, but accelerate further. We must take this into account, too. That this is the situation in the Northern Caucasus, we also know. The development of collectivization that is running closest to this pace is in the Lower Volga. There is no question that the Cossacks' past here and their social life play a certain role, play a certain positive role in speeding up collectivization in these areas, where there is a certain aptitude for public work, local autonomous public work. But we know that the Middle Volga and Ukraine are not far behind these areas.

I now ask, what are our prospects in the task of developing collectivization? It seems to me that we can hardly answer this question with any experience that will be persuasive to everyone. We have different types of comrades—the so-called optimists and pessimists and others. But in any case, when they now develop an answer about the prospects for collectivization, they are engaging in a ridiculous activity. Our five-year plan, adopted by the conference,<sup>56</sup> is a wonderful program. But when, in imitating this five-year plan, which we are now correcting in all of its main sections. . . .

*Mikoian:* And for the better.

*Molotov:* . . .<sup>57</sup> and are correcting for the better, in imitation of this program they are now developing various five-year plans of collectivization. Well, I don't envy those comrades, but in any case I don't agree to read these five-year plans, I consider this nonsense. It seems to me that we should not talk about a five-year plan for collectivization if we are talking about collectivization for the principal areas. I'll take North Caucasus first, where the situation has progressed the most. I think we should talk specifically about this year, 1929–30 [economic year]. I personally do not doubt that we will complete collectivization in the Northern Caucasus, for the most part, in the summer of 1930. We will be able to say already at the end of the summer of 1930, it seems to me, that for the most part the Northern Caucasus has been collectivized, and not just that area alone. That is why I think this requires a little less talk about five-year plans from us, which nobody needs in this matter at the moment, at least for our principal areas, and therefore on the whole as well, and a little more attention to today's tasks and needs for late 1929 and early 1930.



. . . The main issue, it seems to me, is to organize what exists now, what we feel to be an active undertaking, and to pursue this undertaking. And again I think, what is the nub of the matter and what should we pay attention to? Note that our rightists did not half-capitulate for nothing. They half-capitulated (I say half-capitulated because they capitulated in words, but in practice they have remained rightists and opponents of the party line, and saboteurs of the party line), but that is beside the point, the point is that they still did half-capitulate because reality does not allow them to adhere to their previous positions. This has been proved and re-proved by everything that has already been said at the CC plenum.

What is the point? The point is that we have a grain reserve. This is the starting basis for all our work in the short term. The fact that we have 90 million poods of grain in an untouchable reserve, that Ukraine has finished its grain procurements, that the remaining areas are finishing their grain procurements, that our plan will be 100 percent done in a month—that solves all the problems. What does this mean for collectivization? It means that next spring we will have an exceptionally favorable period for agriculture, the kind of period we have never had yet.

*Voices:* That's right.

*Molotov:* And if we allocate all resources to the sowing campaign, then just think what will happen if the Bolshevik Party allocates all its resources to the sowing campaign. The devil only knows what will happen!

*Voices:* That's right.

*Molotov:* It will be a genuine, bolshevik sowing campaign; it will be the final blossoming, the final victory for collective farms in the USSR. This whole sowing campaign is what will resolve the whole matter; this is the crux of the whole issue. Next spring, during the spring sowing campaign, when our resources are unleashed and allocated to the sowing campaign, in that quantity, on that scale, with such unity. . . .<sup>58</sup>

*Kosior:* And knowledge of the task at hand.

*Molotov:* Absolutely right, and with more knowledge of the task at hand than ever before, it will be during that period that the issue of the final collectivization of our countryside will be resolved in all of the decisive areas of the USSR. But if that is the situation, let's think not about five-year plans but about the remaining months of the winter of 1929–30 [economic year] to prepare for the spring. November, December, January, February, March—that is what we have left—four and half months, yet we're engaging in blather about a five-year plan. During these months we must do an enormous amount of work—at the end of 1929–30 [economic year]—arm ourselves for the spring, help the muzhiks and the col-

lective farms to get agriculture on its feet and to develop it in a way that it has never developed in our country. And we can do this, and we will do this for sure, of course, unless war breaks out, and it doesn't look like war will break out during this time. Therefore the point is to make use of these coming months, weeks, and days so that we don't let the job confronting us slip away.

The second issue regards the tasks of the collective farms. I believe that the resolution,<sup>59</sup> for the most part, defines them correctly, but, of course, only the most basic ones, one certainly cannot say that the resolution is perfect, but it covers the three basic issues, just the ones that Comrade Kaminsky discussed in his report: the issues of the technical resources for collectivizing agriculture; second, the tasks of organizing labor on the collective farms, and third, the issue of cadres. These are the three basic issues on which we must focus all of our attention in order to develop the work of the collective farms. We are doing something in this direction, so that we do not find ourselves in a bad position with this effort.

In regard to technical resources, the Politburo adopted a number of decisions on 5 November about tractors—two huge tractor plants, unlike anything in the world—the Cheliabinsk and Ukrainian plants. In a month we will resolve the question of a third new tractor plant. [. . .] And the question of further development of tractor manufacturing is probably around the corner. On 5 November we decided the question of immediately starting construction on two combine plants in Siberia and Rostov-on-Don. In addition, a decision was adopted the same day on an especially enormous plant to make tractor engines. A project of tremendous importance. Standard engines.

. . . The second issue is the realm of labor organization. Here we are in an abominable position. Labor organization on collective farms. Nobody has talked about this matter, yet this is, strictly speaking, the very crux of the issue for the life of collective farms, the very crux of the issue, how to organize the labor of collective farmers, when it will be millions of people, an inexhaustible source of manpower and unprecedented methods of organizing labor, which we cannot fully and completely transfer from factories to the countryside. This has not been done anywhere in the world.

. . . And the third issue—about cadres. Actually, it is not just an issue of cadres, but an issue of culture for collective farmers, because it won't work just to say there will be brilliant organizers on the collective farms when they will have to deal with an uncultured bunch of peasants there.

Finally, the third aspect of the tasks of collective farms is the organiza-

tional issue. What the CC adopted here already with regard to agricultural cooperatives last summer and with regard to contracting,<sup>60</sup> this was a preparation for further practical conclusions that we must draw with regard to reorganizing the system of agencies that operate in the countryside in the area of developing and reorganizing agriculture. It seems to me that everything we mapped out with regard to agricultural cooperatives last summer fully applies to the collective-farm movement as well, which is the framework for collective-farm development.

It goes without saying that all of the views that pit the collective farms against cooperatives are exceptionally absurd. This has already been pointed out many times. There seems to be no longer any need to prove that pitting collective farms against cooperatives represents a lack of understanding of the Leninist cooperative plan.

. . . In this connection, to pit cooperatives against collective farms is an absurdity, especially in the present conditions. The resolution underscores this by establishing autonomous sections of collective farms at all cooperative centers. In this regard we must discuss very soon the prospects for merging Kolkhozsentr and the Union of Unions, for bringing them closer to each other and consolidating them, and a number of other organizational issues.

. . . If cooperatives in our country are turning into a mass movement, and Comrade Andreev is absolutely right, in my opinion, in saying that in view of the fact that the collective-farm movement has turned into a mass movement, then with this rate of collectivization that we have in the Northern Caucasus, where 25–30 percent of farms have already been collectivized, we have to finish this task at the fastest possible pace. We are compelled to do this, it is to our benefit. But if we must finish this task more quickly, and it runs faster on its own, then it goes without saying that the peasant who has gone to these collective farms has not yet been re-educated, he basically remains a small landowner, a petit bourgeois. Therefore all these influences of petit-bourgeois attitudes and the kulaks' influences with such a mass movement—they will be enormous. Any wavering—to admit the kulak or not to admit him to the collective farm—is extremely pernicious wavering. The kulak cannot have a place on the collective farm under any circumstances because he will not only corrupt it but will disrupt this whole undertaking.

. . . The kulak is the worst enemy, but one who has not yet been finished off, and everything follows from this, from the fact that the kulak must be viewed as the worst enemy, as an enemy who has not been finished off, as an enemy who at any moment is ready to deal the most serious blow to us

and deals it wherever we have any weakness. All these measures that follow from this, it seems to me that they will be correct, otherwise we will not really take control of mass collectivization, the kulak will impede us in this undertaking to the utmost.

The resolution instructs that 25,000 workers be mobilized for the countryside very soon, and this must be done immediately. Let the comrades at VsNKh and the VTsSPS help us do this and comment on the question of how this will affect factories and plants. We must do this immediately during the next few months. We want to send 25,000 very good, politically literate people, and this cannot help but affect the situation at factories and plants. But we must take this measure as an urgent measure of the utmost importance. Add to this the dispatch of workers' brigades, which are being sent for various tasks, practical ones that are either specifically local or general, such as procurements, the patronage [*sheftsvo*] of factories over collective farms, etc. Now this undertaking is developing on an enormous scale, individual factories are acting as patrons of individual collective farms, they have direct links with them, they are providing patronage assistance and support. This is of tremendous significance. We must link the dispatch of the 25,000 workers to the countryside in an organizational way with the tasks of patronage of an individual plant's workers over the peasants of the respective areas and the collectives. This is absolutely imperative as there is stronger assistance.

The role of trade unions is tremendous, the role of the Red Army is exceptionally important in the collectivization of the countryside. Red Army men just went off to the countryside in the fall, and they will speed up the pace of collectivization there to a degree beyond our grasp—the pace that the Red Army men who got to the countryside in the fall will achieve. The Red Army men are a tremendous force in the task of collectivizing the countryside. We must go further and train every discharged batch of Red Army men in this, and maybe go so far as to keep several tens of thousands of Red Army men, the most active ones, for two or three extra months before sending them to the countryside, for training in various questions of reorganizing agriculture.

Finally, the soviets. They must also play a leading role. As long as the Soviet state exists, collective farms will be under the leadership of soviets, they must report to soviets, soviets are the supreme body of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Well, we don't have to talk particularly about the tasks of the party and party organization, because everything is guided by the party and party cells, including the lowest-level party cells in the countryside.<sup>61</sup>

## • DOCUMENT 41 •

From the speech by S. I. Syrtsov on the reports by G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and V. V. Kuibyshev, 12 November 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 441, part 1, ll. 35-37. Transcript. Printed copy.

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12 November 1929

*Chairman:* Comrade Syrtsov has the floor.

*Syrtsov:* The results of the past economic year and the foundations on which the control figures<sup>62</sup> are now based demonstrate indisputably and obviously once again that it was not the ideas of the rightists that proved to be the guiding and leading principle. And these ideas cannot be the organizing and leading principle under the conditions of our economic construction. This is clear from every section, every item of our economic construction. I want to dwell on only one group of issues that are closely related to the control figures because the control figures not only represent the totality and sum of economic relations and economic assignments, but they also conceal class relations. And regarding this question, the fundamental question of relations between the working class and the peasantry, based on the results of the economic year and the possibilities and prospects that are opened up by this year's economic targets, we must answer that the countryside at present is at a decisive, highly important economic turning point as a result of a sharp change in the balance of forces between the working class and the peasantry. The key fact of this year is that a significant portion of the main masses of the countryside, which, while under the political leadership of the working class and following it, still tended during certain periods to waver and sometimes emulate the kulak, have now left the kulak, well-to-do elite of the countryside, in the most decisive way, to its own fate, to its own lot. This turnabout was reflected, as the Politburo's theses point out absolutely correctly, in a decisive change in the attitude toward the collective-farm movement. Naturally, there is no need to mention here that the whole mass of poor and middle peasants who are now going to collective farms are filled both with faith in the collective-farm movement and with a conscious expectation that this form will prove to be the most economically expedient one. To be sure, in that milieu there is a great deal, and this will still have an impact in the future, a great deal of economic distrust toward socialized forms of enterprise, and the petit bourgeois nature of the peasant will still be sharply felt. It would be an illusion to think that the most important part has been accomplished in the collective-farm movement by this turnabout. The most important part, undoubtedly, is yet to come. . . .

During these major shifts, undoubtedly, changes are taking place in class relationships and changes are taking place in relationships with regard to “the political equilibrium in the country.” And the change in economic proportions that may have frightened certain comrades because of its suddenness and seemed to them to be a loss of equilibrium is a manifestation of the fact that a drastic shift toward the working class is taking place, as are corresponding changes in the economy and in politics. Of course, this must not lead to the point where we ignore any alarming signs in this area, any such problems as, for example, the food difficulties that become very severe at times and threaten to cause a snag in the area of production, in the area of developing the economy, and pose a danger to the political attitudes of the working class. Of course, we cannot ignore such a fact, which is completely inevitable and natural, as the existence of a dual market system, as two systems existing on parallel tracks in a strange relationship.

*Stalin:* What systems?

*Syrtsov:* A situation where we have, on the one hand, our own system of economic relations, regulated by us, a certain chain of prices and so forth, and alongside this a parallel one in which capitalist elements are taking revenge, have their own objectives, and so forth. But all these facts may seem alarming and frighten only those who thought and counted on peaceful, methodical progress, a peaceful climb up the mountain, without contradictions, without conflicts, based on the expectation that the basic economic proportions in the country and their corresponding political reflection would remain unchanged for a prolonged period of time. But after all, it is clear that the tremendous shifts that are taking place must, of course, inevitably be accompanied by an exacerbation of contradictions.

I would like to dwell on an issue that is directly related to the issue of relations between the working class and the peasantry. The growth of collective farms, which has overwhelmed all targets, is introducing absolutely new factors and is imposing exceptional demands on us, which we are, for the moment, not meeting to any degree. This year the government, in its control figures, failed to pose the problem of the quality of collective-farm construction sharply and clearly enough. We must very soberly take account of our limits in the area of collective-farm construction not in order to adhere to them but in order to overcome them in the most decisive manner. The enormous funds that have been earmarked for agriculture by way of collectivization are, relatively speaking, still so meager compared with what is needed that we must set an objective in the sharpest way of utilizing these funds as expediently and properly as possi-

ble. There is no question about our lack of skill in this area. In the past we have had a number of instances in which funds were not allocated through the channels they should have been. I will point out, for example, that a substantial portion of the tremendous funds for the struggle with drought was used against us, a whole host of additional kulak farms took shape and rose up on the basis of those funds. We cannot risk any significant share of these funds now to use them in an erroneous way.

The available information about the state of our collective-farm movement now outlines for us the prospect of a whole host of dangers and disruptions unless we succeed in overcoming them in time through a whole host of organizational, economic, and political measures. In a situation where, say, only 50 percent of the collective farms in Ukraine have indivisible capital, and a sizable portion of this indivisible capital (more than half) is state property rather than the property of collective-farm peasants, we have no guarantee of the durability or longevity of a great many collective farms. The situation in a whole host of areas of the RSFSR is even worse than in Ukraine in this respect. . . .

In a vast movement that to a considerable degree is spontaneous, a bit of drifting that does not lend itself right away to our organizing influence is inevitable. It is essential to strive as much as possible to strengthen our organizing influence because its absence will inevitably increase the number of collective farms that are corrupt, mismanaged, and influenced by the kulaks. But in order to minimize the number of such collective farms, we must immediately raise the question, in a much more serious and decisive way, of the forms of labor organization on the collective farms, of increasing the degree of socialization of assets on the collective farms, of increasing indivisible capital, and of proper management. We must force the lower-level organizations to stop talking about collective farms in general, when they fail to differentiate either the forms or types of collective farms. The general concept of "collective farm" covers everything, it puts in the same category an association for joint land cultivation, which at present is extremely advantageous to the kulaks in their interests, a commune with a high percentage of socialization, and an *artel*—everything is lumped together without differentiation.

I will read an excerpt from an interesting report, rich in substance, by an official who is familiar with the situation in one of the *okrugs* of wholesale collectivization. Here is what he writes: "As of 1 June 1928, 1.5–2 percent of the farms in the *okrug* had been collectivized. The collective farms that were established were small; as it now turns out, many of them are false collective farms. Collective-farm construction in the *okrug* essentially has

no history. The movement is basically a new one. The growth, the extraordinary growth of collective-farm construction began in the spring of 1929. As of 1 June 1929, collective farms had encompassed about 6–7 percent of peasant farms. As of 1 August, 12 percent; as of 15 October, more than 50 percent. At this pace and under this system of organization of large collective farms, only large ones are set up, and all peasant farms will be collectivized by 1 January 1930. The okrug will have been collectivized in a span of one year. Instead of a five-year plan for collectivization, a course is being pursued toward one-year collectivization. The upshot is that either a directive needs to be issued to restrain the establishment of collective farms or, maintaining this pace, serious thought needs to be given to the consequences of such haste. A couple of words about the methods of organization. There have been and are no preliminary plans for the organization of large collective farms. A few days ago a collective farm of 50,000–60,000 hectares and another of 35,000–40,000 hectares, with oxen, were established. One, I think, has absolutely no tractors, while the other has five or seven of them. A machine-tractor station is not expected next year. It is hard to say how these collective farms will stay afloat with this level of machinery. And there are already quite a few such collective farms, perhaps with a smaller amount of land (15,000–20,000 hectares).

“Local authorities practice a system of shock work and campaign spurts. All the organizational work has been done under the slogan ‘who can go further.’ In the localities, the okrug directives were sometimes transformed into the slogan, ‘whoever doesn’t go into a collective farm is an enemy of Soviet power.’ Mass work on a wide scale was not done. There have been cases in which a collective farm was established by decree of an assembly, and those who didn’t wish to join were instructed to submit a special statement indicating why they don’t want to join. There have been instances of extensive promises of tractors and credits. ‘Everything will be provided—go to the collective farm.’ . . .

“. . . The totality of these factors so far is yielding, nominally, 60 percent, or perhaps while I am writing this letter, 70 percent collectivization. We have not studied the qualitative aspect of collective farms. The complete absence of material prevents us from saying anything definite. Officials have gone out to conduct a survey, after which the picture will be clearer. It has been established from individual surveys, however, that although workhorses and cows on large collective farms are nominally considered socialized, they are housed in the livestock sheds of individual farms. . . . There is practically no indivisible capital. . . .

“. . . As a result, we get an extremely wide gulf between the quantitative



growth and the qualitative organization of large-scale production. Unless measures are taken right now to strengthen these collective farms, the situation may become compromised. Collective farms will start falling apart. There will be no sowing in the spring on the fields plowed in the fall. We must take into account the fact that a very intensive sell-off of livestock—oxen—is underway in the okrug. . . . All this puts us in a difficult situation.” (From a memorandum by Comrade Baranov to the Kolkhoztsestr party cell and other organizations.)

*Voice:* What okrug is that?

*Syrtsov:* Khover. The very randomness of the choice of areas for wholesale collectivization, inadequate preparation, and the [use of] administrative pressure are alarming signs that we cannot refrain from pointing out now.

*Stalin:* Do you think everything can be “organized in advance”? . . .<sup>63</sup>

PART II

Collectivization and Dekulakization

## CHAPTER 4

### The December Politburo Commission

5 December 1929–5 January 1930

In a telegram to Stalin dating no later than 1 January 1930, Molotov wrote, “I don’t understand the need after the [November 1929 Central Committee] plenum for a lengthy new resolution [on collectivization] which in places is obviously vague and lags behind real life and CC decisions.” Molotov objected to the work of a special Politburo commission charged with drawing up plans for the wholesale collectivization of the country. He contended that some of the commission’s work was “bureaucratic planning . . . inappropriate for a tumultuous, mass movement” and in general considered the commission’s draft decree on collectivization “unsuccessful.” Molotov’s telegram was a response to a 25 December letter from Stalin in which the general secretary labeled the draft decree “unsuitable” (see documents 48 and 49).

The story of the December Politburo commission is an important chapter in the history of collectivization. The commission’s work lay directly in the background of the Central Committee’s 5 January decree on wholesale collectivization, a decree which served to release the floodgates of a campaign that radically and violently transformed the life of the countryside. Although the work of the commission in no way constituted a “moderate” approach to collectivization, it differed in significant ways from the visions of Stalin, Molotov, and other radicals within and outside the commission. The work of the December Politburo commission provides a glimpse into Stalinist policy forma-

tion and illuminates important differences of opinion—however restricted since the demise of the Right Opposition—within the upper echelons of the Soviet regime.<sup>1</sup>

## The December Politburo Commission and Collectivization

On 5 January 1930, the Central Committee enacted a decree on wholesale collectivization entitled “On the pace of collectivization and state assistance to collective-farm construction.” The decree celebrated the successes of the collective-farm movement, positing that the First Five-Year Plan control figures for collectivization, set in April 1929, had already been surpassed. The decree also noted that the “material base” to substitute large-scale collective-farm production for kulak agriculture was now present, allowing for the transition from “limiting” the growth of the kulak to his liquidation as a class. In addition to separate clauses on credit, machine-tractor stations, draft power, the mobilization of cadres and specialists, and the centrality of the *artel* as a transitional stage to the commune,<sup>2</sup> the decree established a timetable for wholesale collectivization. The most important grain-producing regions (Lower Volga, Middle Volga, and Northern Caucasus) were to complete collectivization by fall 1930, spring 1931 at the latest; remaining grain-producing regions would follow suit by fall 1931, spring 1932 at the latest. No mention was made of other regions in the country. Finally, the decree specified that the party was to lead the “spontaneously growing collective-farm movement” while at the same time avoiding what it called “a game of collectivization,” or the tendency to decree collective farms into existence from above, as well as any attempt to hold back the movement (see document 52).

The decree was the final and heavily reworked version of a draft decree that came out of the work of the December Politburo commission on collectivization. In response to a recommendation made by Lower Volga party first secretary B. P. Sheboldaev at the November plenum,<sup>3</sup> on 5 December the Politburo created a commission to work out plans for the collectivization of the country (see document 42). The commission arose as a direct result of discussions at the plenum indicating that the “qualitative” level of collective-farm organization and production lagged behind the “quantitative” growth of collectivization. The Politburo appointed Ya. A. Yakovlev, the commissar of agriculture, to serve as chairman of the commission. The commission was to carry out its

work in two weeks and would consist of eight subcommittees. Commission members were drawn largely from relevant central agencies and from among the secretaries of the provincial party committees of key grain-producing regions.<sup>4</sup>

The commission completed a draft of the collectivization decree on 18 December and submitted it to the Politburo on 22 December.<sup>5</sup> The draft decree was by no means moderate in its approach to collectivization; yet it was a far more detailed, nuanced, and cautious document than the 5 January final variant of the decree. Although the draft shied away from setting an exact schedule for collectivization, it suggested that wholesale collectivization would likely be completed within five years and in the main grain-producing areas, within two to three years, “possibly even sooner” in some districts. The main emphasis of the draft, however, was on organizational, production, and managerial issues. The draft decree’s authors warned that numbers alone were no basis for evaluating the success of the movement, a clear reference to the previous months’ leap in collectivization percentages in the ongoing “race for percentages” among provincial officials. It was also clear from the draft that the so-called material-technical base for large-scale collectivized agriculture was not in place and that the countryside would continue to rely on animal draft power and simple implements for the foreseeable future while awaiting the mass production of tractors and other agricultural machinery. The draft stressed the centrality of the *artel* as the basic form of collective farm at the current stage, noting that “each further step toward socialization along the path to the commune must be based on the firsthand experience of collective-farm peasants and on their growing conviction regarding the durability, benefit, and advantage of collective forms of farm management.” The draft also maintained that “special caution must be displayed in the realm of domestic life, where the ordinary peasant’s prejudices are deepest,” thereby implicitly warning against precisely those practices—later called “excesses” and ranging from the forced socialization of domestic livestock to the imposition of *crèches* and an attack on the church—that would push the peasantry into open resistance. Finally, the draft decree carried a series of strong warnings against the application of “administrative enthusiasms” (a euphemism for force) in collectivization (see document 45).

M. M. Khataevich, first secretary of the Middle Volga party organization, penned a report for his provincial colleagues that allows us a glimpse into the workings of the December Politburo commission. In

his 21 December report, Khataevich noted in particular the disagreements within the commission over the pace of collectivization. Yakovlev, the chairman of the commission, had sounded a more cautious note on this key issue, calling for an end to the race for percentages in collectivization and stressing the importance of organizational issues within the new collective farm system. In fact, the subcommittee on the pace of collectivization had initially (14 December) assembled a fairly precise timetable for collectivization according to region that allowed significantly more time for the completion of wholesale collectivization than either the draft or final decrees (see document 43). Yakovlev, however, was challenged by Sheboldaev and A. A. Andreev, first secretaries, respectively, of the Lower Volga and Northern Caucasus party organizations, whose regions led the country in collectivization at this time and who were steadfast proponents of what Khataevich called the “fast pace” and of what they, like Molotov, labeled a “tumultuous movement from below.” Although Khataevich told his provincial party organization that he “basically agreed” with Yakovlev, he hedged by arguing that “we must not allow talk of ‘a lack of organizational capabilities’ to cover up our lag behind real life” and by accusing one of his own county party committees of “disloyalty” to the region for suggesting a lower collectivization pace. Khataevich was more cautious in regard to the issue of socialization. He criticized elements within his own party organization who pushed for what he called “evangelical socialism, under which everything down to the last hen is socialized.” He presciently warned that peasant women—the “weak spot” in collective-farm construction—would resist excessive socialization and noted his general agreement with Yakovlev’s relatively more moderate approach while differing with him on the matter of the socialization of commercial livestock (see document 46).

Stalin and Molotov worked with and through the advocates of a “fast pace” to press for a scaled-down collectivization decree that would leave open the way for the provinces to push the campaign to and beyond the limits. Stalin appears to have been in regular contact with both Sheboldaev and T. R. Ryskulov, the deputy chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom, both radicals on the commission.<sup>6</sup> On 25 December, he wrote to Molotov, declaring the draft decree to be “unsuitable” (*nepodkhodiashchii*). On 1 January, Molotov responded, agreeing that the draft was “unsuccessful” (*neudachnyi*) and arguing that the recommended collectivization tempos were far behind the reality of the rapidly accelerating collective-farm movement. Stalin wrote to Molo-

tov that same day, telling him that his opinion coincided with those of “our friends”—meaning Sheboldaev and Ryskulov—and suggesting that the decree be cut in length four to five times, removing all charter (*ustavnyi*) issues and revising collectivization tempos upward (see documents 48, 49, and 50).

On 3 January, Yakovlev resubmitted a partially revised draft decree to the Politburo and on 4 January sat down with Stalin to finalize it.<sup>7</sup> With Stalin’s prodding, the pace of wholesale collectivization was set and increased, most technical issues regarding organization and production were cut, and any concerns about peasant “experience” or “prejudice” were eliminated. Warnings against collectivization “by decree” remained but fell into second place behind warnings to “struggle against any attempts to hold back the development of the collective-farm movement” (see document 52). Stalin told Sheboldaev, one of the “friends,” “I think the [new] resolution [*sic*] will please you” (see document 51).

The 5 January decree, published nationally in the press the following day, was a landmark in regime-peasant relations, serving to launch the collectivization campaign on a scale and at a pace unanticipated by the pronouncements of the November plenum and even by Stalin and his most radical supporters. The decree unleashed a campaign, on both central and provincial levels, with only the vaguest of guidelines and a fairly open-ended mandate to forge ahead. The decree itself was based on a series of dangerously false assumptions as well as on a Stalinist mind-set that was loath at this point “to organize everything in advance” (see document 41) lest what Molotov called the “tumultuous, mass movement” be stifled (see document 49).

The decree maintained that “we have the material base to replace large-scale kulak production with large-scale production by collective farms” as a way to rationalize both the collectivization and dekulakization campaigns. In fact, as V. P. Danilov’s early work demonstrated, the technical level of Soviet agriculture was woefully low, the “tractorization” of the countryside lay in the future, and the village was nowhere near being technically prepared for collectivization.<sup>8</sup> The decree also overestimated the peasantry’s willingness and capacity to collectivize by positing absurdly high targets for the collectivization campaign, choosing to ignore the fact—implicitly to endorse it—that the high rates of collectivization to date had been achieved largely as a result of provincial campaigns based on coercion and socialist competition between districts and counties. Even more ominously, the decree

stated that the *artel* was “transitional to the commune,” thus legitimizing what would become in many parts of the country an unbridled push for all-out socialization of properties down to the household poultry and the formation of communes based on the complete socialization of property and everyday life (see document 52).

November and December had already witnessed a leap in collectivization rates in many parts of the countryside (see document 44). By the time the decree was published, percentages of collectivized households in the USSR as a whole had increased from 7.5 in October 1929 to 18.1 on 1 January 1930, with the highest percentages registered in the main grain-producing regions (Lower Volga, 56 to 70; Middle Volga, 41.7; Northern Caucasus, 48.1).<sup>9</sup> The 5 January decree would push collectivization rates to new heights in the months of January and February, bringing some regions to wholesale collectivization (on paper) in a matter of weeks and forcing the peasantry into open revolt against what quickly became a campaign of “excesses” and a headlong assault on the peasantry’s way of life.

### The December Politburo Commission and the Kulak

The work of the December Politburo commission proved inconclusive on the question of the kulak. In its draft “recommendations,” the subcommittee on the kulak wrote that “the strength of the kulak is weakening, his economic and political authority has declined.” It continued, “the kulak as an economic category is guaranteed destruction in the shortest possible historical period.” Claiming that proposed measures were *not* a return to the dekulakization of war communism, the subcommittee called for the expropriation of the “means of production” from kulak households and the transfer of such properties to the collective farms. The subcommittee argued that “it would obviously be hopeless to try to solve the ‘kulak problem’ by exiling the entire mass of the kulak population”—estimated by the subcommittee to be not less than five to six million people. Instead, it recommended a differentiated approach to the kulak—arrest or exile of those who rendered active resistance and led counterrevolutionary work; exile of those who, though less dangerous, still resisted the new collective-farm order; and use of the majority of the kulak population as a disenfranchised work force in the collective farms, eligible for full membership rights in three to five years.<sup>10</sup>

Khataevich’s report again provides important insights into the com-



mission's work. His report indicates little of the urgency connected to the "kulak problem" that we see in Stalin's late December speech to the conference of Marxist agronomists (see below) or that would be apparent in January. In regard to the subcommittee's recommendations, he said, "This is a guideline from the commission, it has a certain correct substance, because someday we will have to raise the issue of the kulaks." And although he expressed concerns about the dangers of allowing individual kulak farms to coexist with collective farms, he still seemed to be advocating the Middle Volga's practice of banishing kulak households to the end of the fields. He also stated that "you can't resettle everybody, and moving against [all of] them with GPU measures is also impossible" (see document 46). Khataevich's report demonstrates how far the commission still was from the radical solutions to the kulak problem that would be proposed and instituted in January and February.

The subcommittee's recommendations in any case were clearly not palatable to Stalin, let alone his secret police chief G. G. Yagoda, both of whom argued that kulak resistance was on the rise, threatening the stability of the countryside and the success of the collective-farm movement. On 27 December 1929, Stalin in fact preempted the Politburo commission, announcing at a conference of Marxist agronomists that the kulak would be "liquidated as a class."<sup>11</sup> Stalin declared that "to advance on the kulak means to get down to business and strike the kulak, yes strike him, so he will never be able to get back on his feet again."<sup>12</sup>

If, from this point on, kulak policy meant "liquidation," then it was still not clear exactly what liquidation meant. Although the word carried with it a rather obvious association with physical destruction, the Politburo commission still had in mind a relatively peaceful outcome for the majority of the kulak population, a kind of probationary period working *for* the collective farms, an *economic* destruction of the roots of rural capitalism.

Legislation enabling dekulakization locally on a de facto basis had developed in tandem with the use, first, of extraordinary measures in grain procurements and, then, with the application of the Ural-Siberian method (see chapter 3). As wholesale collectivization gained momentum, the question of what to do with the kulaks assumed a new urgency. The provincial party organizations of a series of regions had begun to experiment with their own solutions to the "kulak problem." In some areas, kulak households were moved to the village outskirts; elsewhere, exile and expropriation were becoming more common. Yet for

some regional party secretaries as well as for Stalin and Yagoda, whose role in policy decisions increased dramatically at this time, these were at best piecemeal solutions that frequently led to more problems. Peasants in danger of falling under the kulak label were increasingly turning to measures which the regime called “self-dekulakization”—flight, property sales and destruction, household divisions, and so on (see document 47). Both central and provincial authorities feared the deleterious economic effect that these practices would have on the emerging collective-farm system, which depended on the acquisition of kulak properties. Thus economic imperative increased the urgency of the situation, joining with political and ideological considerations to push the center toward a more radical solution to the “kulak problem.”<sup>13</sup>

By early January, Stalin’s 27 December declamation and the 5 January collectivization decree’s curt recapitulation of the phrase remained the only and most compelling central indicators of policy, while the practice itself had taken off, in some cases radically, in the provinces. With disorder mounting in the villages and Yagoda and the OGPU increasingly anxious to pacify and secure the countryside, Stalin would be forced to clarify exactly what he meant by the liquidation of the kulak as a class. On 15 January, he appointed a new commission to deal with the question of the kulak, this one to be chaired by Molotov who could and would ensure a Stalinist imprint on the proceedings from the start. In the meantime, Yagoda and the OGPU would see to it this time that as much as possible was indeed “organized in advance,” reining in the collectivization campaign and taking control of dekulakization.

## Documents

### • DOCUMENT 42 •

From protocol no. 108 of the Politburo session on the establishment of the commission, 5 December 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1876, l. 8.  
Mimeograph copy of original.

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5 December 1929

[. . .] [Resolved:] For the elaboration of questions regarding the pace of collectivization in various areas of the USSR and regarding measures of assistance by the state, with a corresponding revision of the adopted plan for collectivization year by year, establish a commission comprising

the following members: Comrade Ya. Yakovlev (chairman), Kaminsky, Sheboldaev (subject to replacement by Khlopliankin), Belenky, Volf, Kosior, Andreev (subject to replacement by Ivanov), Vareikis, Maksimov, Klimokhin, Patrikeev, Ryskulov, Maltsev, Khataevich, Klimenko, Goloshchekin, Syrtsov, Bauman. The term of the commission's work is 14 days.

CC Secretary I. Stalin

• DOCUMENT 43 •

Proposals by G. N. Kaminsky's subcommission on the CC draft decree,  
14 December 1929. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 40, l. 41. Copy.

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14 December 1929

1. The transition of peasant farms to collective forms of agriculture will be completed within five years in every oblast except certain raions of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Yakutia, the northern zone of Siberia, and certain raions of the Northern Krai.

2. By oblast, the completion of wholesale collectivization is scheduled as follows:

by fall 1930	Crimea, Lower Volga;
by spring 1931	Northern Caucasus, Middle Volga, Tatar Republic, Dagestan (lowland region);
by fall 1931	Central Black Earth Oblast, Urals;
by spring 1932	Siberia, Kazakhstan, Bashkiria, Moscow Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Chuvash Oblast;
by fall 1933	Far Eastern Krai, Western Oblast, Kirgizia, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Northern Krai, Buriat-Mongolia, Karelia.

3. By Union republics:

by fall 1932	Ukraine (steppe, fall 1931; left-bank forest-steppe region, spring 1932);
by fall 1933	Belorussia, Transcaucasia (80 percent), Central Asia (75 percent).

4. [We shall] establish throughout the USSR, beginning in 1929–30 [economic year], at least 400 raions of wholesale collectivization, of which 300 are in the RSFSR and 100 in the other Union republics. Among the number of raions of wholesale collectivization, there are to be 30 okrugs of wholesale collectivization.

## · DOCUMENT 44 ·

Data from the USSR Commissariat of Agriculture on the progress of collectivization in USSR okrugs and krais as of 15 December 1929, compiled from reports by the secretaries of okrug party committees, not before 15 December 1929. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 40, ll. 211-206. Copy.

Not before 15 December 1929<sup>14</sup>

No.	Name of Republic, Krai, or Oblast	Number of		Numbers of Raions in Which the Following Percentages of the Total Number Joined Collectives				
		Okrug	Raion	Up to 15	15-30	30-50	50-70	70 or more
1	Lower Volga Krai	10	96	19	7	3	16	51
	Percent		100	19.3	7.3	3.1	16.7	53.1
2	Middle Volga Oblast	8	97	39	20	19	11	8
	Percent		100	40.2	20.7	19.6	11.3	8.2
3	Central Black Earth Oblast	10	147	48	39	33	11	16
	Percent		100	32.6	26.5	22.4	7.7	10.8
4	Ukrainian SSR	36	510	294	119	59	24	14
	Percent		100	57.6	23.3	11.6	4.8	2.7
5	Belorussian SSR	8	100	48	28	13	7	4
	Percent		100	48	28	13	7	4
6	Urals Oblast	14	168	67	45	30	11	15
	Percent		100	39.8	26.8	17.8	6.7	8.9
7	Western Oblast	6	82	64	9	6	—	3
	Percent		100	78	10.9	7.4	—	3.7
8	Moscow Oblast	9	117	89	15	10	1	2
	Percent		100	76	12.9	8.5	0.9	1.7
9	Ivanovo Oblast	6	58	44	11	3	—	—
	Percent		100	75.9	18.9	5.2	—	—
10	Nizhny Novgorod Krai	9	126	113	9	4	—	—
	Percent		100	89.6	7.3	3.1	—	—
11	Northern Krai	5	58	54	3	1	—	—
	Percent		100	93	5.3	1.7	—	—
12	Leningrad Oblast	6	107	98	9	—	—	—
	Percent		100	91.6	8.4	—	—	—
13	Northern Caucasus Krai	15	117	17	49	34	13	4
	Percent		100	14.5	41.9	29.1	11.1	3.4
14	Siberian Krai	17	205	164	27	7	5	2
	Percent		100	80.1	13.1	3.4	2.4	1
15	Kazakh ASSR	11	156	71	41	29	12	3
	Percent		100	45.5	26.2	18.6	7.7	2

No.	Name of Republic, Krai, or Oblast	Numbers of Raions in Which the Following Percentages of the Total Number Joined Collectives						
		Number of Okrug	Raion	Up to 15	15-30	30-50	50-70	70 or more
16	Uzbek SSR	10	65	42	17	5	—	1
	Percent		100	64.6	26.2	7.7	—	1.5
17	Dagestan ASSR		28	21	4	1	2	—
	Percent		100	75	14.3	3.5	7.2	—
18	Armenian SSR		31	29	2	—	—	—
	Percent		100	93.6	6.4	—	—	—
19	Azerbaijan SSR		62	57	4	1	—	—
	Percent		100	91.9	6.6	1.5	—	—
20	Turkmen SSR	3	33	27	1	4	1	—
	Percent		100	82	3	12	3	—
21	Crimean ASSR		10	—	2	4	3	1
	Percent		100	—	20	40	30	10
	USSR total		2,373	1,405	461	266	117	124
	Percent			59.2	19.4	11.2	4.9	5.3
	[ . . . ]							

• DOCUMENT 45 •

CC draft decree on the pace of collectivization, prepared by the commission,  
18 December 1929. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 40, ll. 217-212. Copy.

18 December 1929

1. In recent weeks the collective movement has taken new, enormous steps forward, encompassing not only groups of individual farms but also entire raions and even okrugs. To date, more than 70 percent of all farms in 106 administrative raions have already joined collectives. All plan targets for the quantitative growth of collectivization have been left far behind. By spring at least one-third of the crop area will have been cultivated on a collective basis. Such rapid growth in the number of farms that are deciding to change over from individual farming to collective farming shows that the task of collectivizing the vast majority of peasant farms may be completely fulfilled within five years; in fact, the collectivization of the principal grain areas may be finished within two or three years (and in certain okrugs and even oblasts, possibly sooner), and the collectivization of the grain-consuming zone, within three or four years.

2. At the same time the organization of production in the collectives everywhere lags behind the quantitative growth. The organization of pro-

duction in the collectives is becoming the weakest part of the collective movement. The party's attention must be turned in this direction, especially in regard to the spring sowing campaign. The party's CC will evaluate performance in the area of collectivization not only on the basis of the growth in the number of farms that combine to form collectives but, above all, on the basis of the collective organization of production and labor, how well an area actually manages to expand crop areas, raise crop yields, and improve livestock breeding, and how well an area actually manages to shape, lead, and organize the spontaneously growing movement.

In okrugs and raions where the majority of peasants have already resolved to change to collective forms of farming, the task of properly organizing socialized production that would really demonstrate the advantages of the new forms over individual production becomes paramount and decisive. Considering that, at the rapid pace of collectivization, fulfillment of the task of replacing horse-drawn with machine-drawn equipment will take a number of years, the CC warns party organizations against linking the tasks of organizing socialized production only or primarily to the immediate introduction of the tractor and the most complex machinery. The necessary results in the area of rapid expansion of crop areas and harvests should be achieved in the next few years primarily by utilizing the advantages provided by collective use of available livestock and implements.

The experience of fall plowing, particularly in the Lower Volga and Middle Volga krajs, where the area prepared for spring sowing increased by more than 50 percent as a result of socialized use of available means of production, shows the considerable potential for expanding crop areas that is afforded by the use of available implements on a socialized basis.

In accordance with this, when there are no tractors or a shortage of them, the economy of collective farms should be based on the establishment of collective-farm horse-and-machinery depots or a mixed type of tractor-and-horse depot. The CC stresses the extreme importance in the present conditions specifically of a mixed horse-and-tractor type of organization for the production base of collective farms, where tractors, which the state can supply to collective farms this year and next, are combined with draft horses, which at present are the chief form of draft power.

In order to prepare collective farms for the spring sowing campaign:

- a. socialized seed stocks must be established during the winter out of the resources of the peasant farms that are combined into collective farms, in amounts that would make it possible to expand crop area substantially by allowing collective farms to encompass still undeveloped lands;

b. lands must be allocated, and the fields of collectives divided up, for spring sowing, for early fallow, and for winter sowing. All available land-reorganization experts must be fully deployed for this, and individual land reorganization and settlement completely terminated at the same time;

c. every collective farm must draw up its own production plan that ensures the most efficient use of available means of production and workers. All available agronomists must be used for this purpose;

d. work must immediately be developed in grain cleaning, the exchange of ordinary seeds for high-quality ones, the preparation for seed treatment and for repair of implements so that all preparatory work is finished on each collective farm by the beginning of the sowing campaign.

The task is to make sure that every available plow, every seed drill, every horse is utilized during the collective preparation and cultivation of the crop area to the full extent of their production capacity. The work of party organizations in the area of collectivization will be checked on this basis.

3. Since most collective farms in okrugs with wholesale collectivization will consist of the middle-peasant strata of the countryside, who will take a number of years of working on a collective farm to get rid of the traits of individual peasants with their characteristic wavering, the chief form of organization in this stage must be the agricultural artel, in which the basic means of production (land, implements, draft animals, as well as commercial livestock) have been collectivized while the peasants retain in these conditions private ownership of small implements, domestic livestock, dairy cows, etc., where they serve the consumption needs of peasant families.

Each further step toward socialization along the path to the commune must be based on the firsthand experience of collective-farm peasants and on their growing conviction regarding the durability, benefit, and advantage of collective forms of farm management. Special caution must be displayed in the realm of domestic life, where the ordinary peasant's prejudices are deepest.

On this basis, party organizations must provide comprehensive assistance in genuinely mobilizing in collectives the fixed assets of individual peasant farms, without which the stability of collectives cannot be ensured, in promoting the growth of indivisible assets on collective farms, and in the inclusion in the indivisible assets of collective farms, in addition to entrance fees, of a sizable portion of deductions from profits or gross revenue and all productive implements purchased by the collective farm without exception, while the portion of share contributions and deposits not credited to indivisible assets remains refundable and no administrative

obstacles are to be imposed on an individual peasant who wishes for any reason to withdraw from the collective farm. With regard to farms that squander [*razbazarivaiut*] their implements and livestock before joining a collective farm, the most decisive measures of social pressure must be applied, up to and including a refusal to admit them to the collective farm.

4. Provide state support facilities in areas that are collectivizing. In addition to the principal type of farm (a large collective farm with a horse depot, horse-and-tractor depot, or machine-tractor station), construction must continue on large machine-tractor stations, combined under the All-Union Traktorotsentr.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, in accordance with the conditions in okrugs of wholesale collectivization, a geography of distribution of machine-tractor stations must be established primarily in areas of wholesale collectivization, and these stations must organize their work on the basis of: (a) contracts with collectives rather than individual farms; (b) commitments by peasants to defray the cost of an intervillage tractor station over three to four years by purchasing shares. Concurrently, in areas with a significant number of state farms (for example, the Trans-Volga Region, certain areas of the Northern Caucasus), a type of mixed economy that is chiefly based on the state farm, which provides assistance to neighboring collective farms on a contractual basis and for fees, primarily in tractor plowing and harvesting, should be tried and checked through experience.

5. In order to strengthen proletarian influence on the collective movement in the okrugs and raions with wholesale collectivization, raion centers must immediately be strengthened. Following the experience of pilot okrugs, okrug and raion apparatuses must be reorganized in such a way as to transfer the bulk of the most qualified, most experienced officials from the okrug centers to permanent work in the raions. A decisive rebuff must be delivered to any tendencies whatsoever to abolish the soviets or to minimize their importance in areas of wholesale collectivization—the role of soviets must be strengthened as the organs of proletarian leadership over the entire economic and public life of the village, raion, and okrug. Soviets must reorganize their work in such a way that managing the economy of the collectivizing countryside and providing organizational, technical, and production assistance to the collectives become the basis of their work.

At the same time party organization in the collectives must be strengthened by turning over a substantial cadre of local communists, both from rural raions and okrugs, to collective farms for permanent work, by finishing before the start of the sowing campaign the mobilization of 25,000



workers that is under way, and by reorganizing [Communist Party] cells on the basis of production units. Most of the workers who are mobilized for work on collective farms should be sent to areas of wholesale collectivization.

Therefore the work of party authorities, soviets, collective farms, and cooperative organs must strengthen proletarian leadership of the collective movement, rally the poor- and middle-peasant *aktiv* on collective farms around the party and soviets, and strengthen the influence in collectives of their poor-peasant stratum. In particular, measures must be taken to steadfastly carry out as soon as possible the decisions of the CC plenum<sup>16</sup> to create groups of landless laborers and poor peasants in the associations for socialized land cultivation and other collectives of the simplest form. The upcoming election campaign on the collective farms must further strengthen proletarian influence in the administrative bodies of collective farms, function as a review of the collective farms' preparation for the spring sowing campaign, and end no later than February.

[It is necessary] to establish for collective farms and interconnected associations of collective farms a common membership, which is to be managed by the system of agricultural cooperatives that is in charge of the collective farm in question. In accordance with this, the main form for organizing economic management of collective farms in areas of wholesale collectivization is to be a special raion union of collective farms specializing in the leading sector of the [local] economy. In an okrug, direct economic management of collective farms is to be established by an okrug collective-farm union that belongs to the relevant special system of agricultural cooperatives.

6. Correct and solid relations between collectives and the whole system of state authorities must be based on bilateral agreements (contracting) that obligate collectives to carry out a certain production program and to sell all marketable surpluses from socialized production to state and cooperative authorities, and simultaneously obligate state and cooperative authorities to supply collectives with the means of production, agrotechnical and credit assistance, and consumer goods. This system of bilateral contracts must be implemented in every sphere in okrugs with wholesale collectivization so as to strengthen and establish the necessary durability in relations between the collectives and the whole system of soviet bodies.

7. In order to increase material and organizational assistance to okrugs with wholesale collectivization:

a. out of the overall plan for the supply of machinery, allocate at least 70 percent for the socialist sector while reserving 10 percent in the overall

machinery-supply plan to put at the disposal of the USSR Commissariat of Agriculture specifically for an above-the-plan supply of machinery to raions of wholesale collectivization;

b. require VsNKh to increase the production of complex horse-drawn and tractor-drawn equipment this year by a minimum of 35 million rubles and to send it all to areas of wholesale collectivization;

c. require the Union Commissariat of Agriculture by 15 February 1930 to draw up an order for industry for next year, and to require VsNKh to prepare the capability for fulfillment of the 1931–32 program in agricultural machine-building in 1930–31, with an increase in the proportion of complex horse-drawn machinery and tractor-drawn machinery to 60 percent of overall production;

*Highly secret, not for publication.*

d. import this year for okrugs with wholesale collectivization an additional 20,000 tractors (physical units), including 8,000 for the spring sowing campaign and 12,000 for the fall campaign;

e. allocate in the overall plan for agricultural credits 10 percent to be put at the disposal of the USSR Commissariat of Agriculture for above-plan credits to be provided to okrugs with wholesale collectivization;

f. require krai authorities to revise the plan for the utilization of machinery and credits released to them so as to provide greater supplies for raions of wholesale collectivization, avoiding in particular the dispersion of tractors and towed equipment on small collective farms and concentrating them primarily at the horse-and-tractor depots of collectives in okrugs of wholesale collectivization;

g. require agricultural agencies and agricultural cooperatives to mobilize agrotechnical, livestock specialist, and land reorganization shock brigades for assistance to areas of wholesale collectivization both during the period of preparation of production plans and during the spring sowing campaign. Mobilize veteran [collective-farm] workers who have helped collective farms do high-quality work to areas of wholesale collectivization. Completely convert communist higher educational institutions and soviet and party schools to the training of cadres for collectivizing areas, in particular, by sending this year's entire graduating class to areas of wholesale collectivization. By spring of this year, complete elementary training of a basic cadre of peasant activists in areas of wholesale collectivization through a system of raion, okrug, and oblast courses.

8. The development of the collective movement in areas of wholesale collectivization is a powerful expression of the triumphant offensive by socialism against capitalist elements. The very roots of capitalism are be-

ing extirpated. Resistance by the kulak has become all the more rabid and fierce as he now directly confronts the prospect of his destruction as a class in the Soviet system. The experience of development of the collective movement has shown that only on the basis of a decisive struggle against the kulak, on the basis of decisive suppression of his resistance to the policies of the party and Soviet power, on the basis of a ruthless rebuff to his attempts to infiltrate collective farms and use them for his self-preservation, is sound development of the collective movement feasible. In accordance with this, it is imperative in okrugs with wholesale collectivization not to relax the struggle against the kulak under any circumstances and, in addition to the allotment of the [most] remote and worst lands to them by decision of [peasant] assemblies and local congresses of soviets, to confiscate outright the means of production of kulak farms and to transfer all of them to the indivisible assets of collective farms.

With regard to kulaks who put up resistance to the establishment of the new system of managing agriculture on a socialist basis, it is imperative to continue to impose exile measures by decree of village assemblies and village soviets, allowing the admission to collective farms as workers, without either the right to vote or be elected, of only that segment of the kulak's family that proves in practice its readiness to obey and conscientiously carry out all of the collective farm's resolutions, while ruthlessly banishing from the collective farm, without any compensation from the collective farm's funds, class-alien elements that attempt to blow up the collective-farm movement from within.

9. The rapid and accelerating pace of collective-farm construction, which encompasses not only settlements and raions but also entire okrugs, demonstrating a transition throughout the sector to the extirpation of the roots of capitalism and the laying of the groundwork of socialist agriculture, entails enormous difficulties, which every party organization and every communist is duty-bound to take fully into account.

It will still take a number of years of tremendous efforts by socialist industry and the working class, a number of years of systematic and persistent reshaping of the economy of peasant farms that are combining into collective farms, to transform collective farms into genuinely large-scale socialized farms that are organized on the basis of modern machinery and fit in with the entire system of the country's socialist economy. It will take a number of years to reshape the individualistic mentality of the small-scale peasant, to re-educate him, to eradicate any relapses into individual farming and capitalist distortions in collective-farm construction. Therefore the struggle between the methods of capitalist and socialist develop-

ment in the countryside will continue to take place at the given stage on the collective farms themselves as a special form of class struggle.

The most important task for the party, which is leading the collective-farm movement, is, in this connection, to ensure the organizational and productive scope of the collective-farm movement. It is also to consolidate, with measures of production aid and organizational assistance, each step forward by the movement into the realm where collective farms embrace the peasant masses, in order to make the progress genuinely lasting and convince most of the peasantry of the advantages of the socialist path of development. Therefore the CC warns all party organizations both against attempts to hold back the development of the collective movement and against any manifestations whatsoever of administrative enthusiasms, against replacing socialist competition with sports-oriented fervor, and against unfounded "declarations" by party committees and executive committees that areas have wholesale collectivization when the growth of the collective movement from below in such areas has not yet resulted in the unification of most of the peasant farms into collective farms. Such a practice on any serious scale would pose the threat of bureaucratizing the tremendous movement of millions of peasants that is growing from below, of scaring away certain strata of middle and poor peasants from collectivization, and of replacing genuine collectivization with a just-for-show nominal collectivization, which the proletarian state does not need. Every party member must proceed in his work in the area of collectivization from the premise that the best way to step up the pace of collectivization even more in the future is to organize production in collectives on a genuinely collective basis already during the current sowing campaign.

• DOCUMENT 46 •

Report by M. M. Khataevich at the bureau of the Middle Volga Krai party committee on the work of the commission, 21 December 1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 2542, part 2, ll. 312-17. Certified copy.

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21 December 1929

The Politburo commission on issues of wholesale collectivization was established in connection with a proposal made by the Lower Volga Krai party committee to the Central Committee that one of the okrugs in the Lower Volga be declared a model okrug of wholesale collectivization.<sup>17</sup> In this connection the CC decided to establish a commission<sup>18</sup> that would

discuss all of these issues of collective-farm construction, in particular the pace in individual areas year by year. A number of secretaries of the most important provincial party organizations of areas with wholesale collectivization were included in the commission. The commission asked the provinces to have commission members working in the provinces come to a session of the commission with materials on the following issues: the pace of collectivization, the material-technical base of collective-farm construction, personnel, the organization of administration, the organization of production, and kulaks. These are roughly the issues that special sub-commissions were created to work on, and they got started on their work before the plenary session of the commission to which we were invited from the provinces. We were asked for material on these same issues as well. The first plenary session of the commission took place on 16 and 17 December. The first half of the session consisted of reports by members of the commission who represent krai organizations to answer the questions about which a telegraph inquiry had been sent. Without dwelling on the substance of these reports, I find it necessary to report only on the pace of collectivization in individual areas as it was disclosed in the reports from the Lower Volga, Northern Caucasus, and the Central Black Earth Oblast that we heard. Comrade Sheboldaev reported a figure of 70 percent collectivization of all farms in the Lower Volga Krai as of 10 December, the Northern Caucasus brought in a figure of 35 or 37 percent, a little higher than ours, and the Central Black Earth Oblast, 20 percent. The Central Black Earth Oblast plan is for 100 percent collectivization by the end of 1930–31 [economic year], in two years. They have three or four okrugs with wholesale collectivization, and there are certain okrugs where the percent of collectivization is higher than in certain okrugs of our region, there are certain okrugs with 70 percent, while the highest percentage we have is 52 percent in Samara Okrug.

Comrade Goloshchekin from Kazakhstan did not come, Siberia didn't come, either, they sent telegrams in which their proposal boils down, for example, to Comrade Goloshchekin's proposal that we can carry out wholesale collectivization on the condition that you provide an additional 180 million rubles in credits, many thousands of tractors, etc.

The second half of the commission's work consisted of a discussion of the main guidelines that the commission chairman, Comrade Yakovlev (Union commissar of agriculture), gave in his report. His main guidelines were as follows: since the November plenum of the CC we have had the collective-farm movement develop on a very wide quantitative scale that has not been accompanied by a proper emphasis on quality, on achieving

the best production indicators at every collective farm, in every raion of wholesale collectivization. We should now have all party organizations focus on the task of improving the quality of collective-farm construction, we should do away with the competitive race by certain organizations that is now taking place, the competitive effort to see who crosses the finish line first and takes the prize for 100 percent collectivization. This race for numbers must be stopped, in general we must talk a little less about numbers in the future, so that the competition between raions develops not over the quantity of collectivization but over the highest production indicators, over who manages to increase crop area the most in the collective-farm sector and in his own raion in general, who does the best job of organizing production and setting up the collective-farm economy. This task of achieving the best organization of the collective-farm economy, the greatest increase in output, must become the focus of all of the party's work in collective-farm construction. The Central Committee will measure the performance and results of collective-farm construction in every area primarily by the specific production successes that are achieved during the spring sowing campaign in expanding crop areas, in expanding livestock breeding, in raising crop yields, etc. It is now imperative to focus on the task of obtaining the best production indicators and making the best collective use on a mass scale of peasants' own small implements. Comrade Yakovlev illustrated, with a number of telegrams from the provinces, a situation in which people in the provinces are refusing to use simple small and medium agricultural implements; they are demanding only large equipment. (A telegram from Siberia and from some other areas.) They refuse even to take 11-row seed drills, plows, binders, and self-rake reapers; they want only large, complex equipment. But the situation is such that re-equipping our agricultural machine-building all at once so that it switches from the production of small implements to large equipment—this takes time. Ford had to shut down his plants for a whole year in order to convert to the production of a new make of automobile. Of course, we can't follow Ford's example and shut down our plants in order to produce new equipment later, and besides, there is no need for this. We have a tremendous number of areas where the most antiquated, ancestral implements predominate—the wooden plow, the wooden harrow, etc. Clearly, it would be nice to switch all at once from the wooden plow to the highest technology, but we don't have this capability yet, and therefore the step forward from the wooden plow will be the iron plow with broadcast sowing and the 11- and even 9-row seed drill. It is therefore imperative to resolutely remove from the agenda the refusal to accept small, simple im-

plements; nor can there be demands for some special, big appropriations in connection with wholesale collectivization. Work in raions of wholesale collectivization is to be done, for the most part, within the limits of the means that we have available now. People should not count on any special, big appropriations, because there is nowhere to take these additional appropriations from. [. . .]

It is also necessary to devote much more attention than has been devoted until now to the question of creating socialized seed funds<sup>19</sup> on all collective farms.

A great many facts now indicate that when a muzhik goes to a collective farm, he seems to lose the particularly frugal attitude toward conserving seeds for the sowing period that he had always had before. It used to be that there could be a brutal famine, he would be swollen from hunger, yet he would conserve the seeds, but now there is often a situation when people think this way—the state will provide, it will help, we have a collective-farm board, let it have the headache, but my job is a small one—and the seeds get eaten up.

We should organize all of our agitation so that there is no reason to expect seed assistance from the state; it is essential immediately to apply pressure everywhere to create socialized seed funds on every collective farm within the limits of total seed requirements. This is one of the most important tasks for the immediate period. In general, a much more serious attitude should be taken than has been taken up to now on the issue of socialization and the practice of creating socialized funds on collective farms. The old collective-farm charters that exist are now completely outdated and are of no value at all. I don't know what percentage they specify for indivisible capital, but now we need to assign an urgent task for every collective farm to have at least 50 percent of the collective farm's total capital as indivisible capital.

It is imperative to create immediately as many shock brigades of agronomists and livestock specialists as possible, which would concentrate solely on organizing the collective-farm economy and provide assistance in person to collective farms with their work.

In order for the entire production side to be organized as well as possible on collective farms by the time of spring sowing, the basic organizational work in forming the collective farms that according to the plan are to be established by the spring sowing campaign must be completed no later than the beginning of March.

All of our work with regard to organizing operations and labor inside collective farms must be deemed unsatisfactory. In general, collective

farms were established, but [attention] to questions of organizing operations, labor, production, and mobilizing resources, not in general, in the form of phrases and resolutions, but by incorporating concrete experience in giving practical instructions and monitoring their implementation—we have not had this to a sufficient degree.

Comrade Yakovlev also cited the need to carry out socialization itself in such a way as to create a greater incentive among individual peasants who go to collective farms and to encourage them to contribute, above all, as much livestock and machinery as possible to the collective farm's capital. Here Comrade Yakovlev proposed introducing special bonuses, special material incentives for farms that bring more cows and horses into a collective farm's capital. The point is that the muzhik must not be excessively idealized, because he still responds to individual incentives, and we must, of course, stick with these incentives, so bonuses should be introduced for collective farmers who bring more property, more inventory, more draft animals, and so forth, and conversely, collective farmers who sell their horse and go to a collective farm without a horse, they must be kicked out. Socialization itself must be conducted in a more businesslike way. Around our krai, however, there are instances, although not that many, when attempts are made to build downright evangelical socialism, under which everything down to the last hen is socialized, there is a changeover straight to a commune charter without the proper foundation for this, etc. But this should not be done because most of all we are going to run into resistance here from peasant women, who are the weakest spot in collective-farm construction; they need to have some personal reserves, and if hens are socialized as well as all kinds of other little farm items, then there will be great harm to socialization instead of success. So the task of socializing secondary, nonmarketable farm items must be approached more cautiously. Above all we need to set a task, in areas where the main farming item is field-crop cultivation, of completely socializing it and socializing inventory, crop areas, livestock and implements, and draft animals. But even the socialization of draft animals requires flexibility; it is essential above all to socialize production processes, and wherever there is no communal stable, where a great deal of capital needs to be spent on construction of this stable, where, like it or not, the peasant keeps his horse, here we should make use of these various kinds of individual incentives so that he treats it well, feeds it well, so that he has an opportunity, apart from fulfilling the production program and plan of the collective farm in socialized production, to use the horse for his personal needs as well without an order from the board. We need great flexibility here, we need to make use of



all types of kulak buildings to house draft animals. This issue requires closer and more flexible review. Comrade Yakovlev spoke about commercial livestock, that its socialization should be approached with greater caution wherever there is no livestock breeding for the market. He is not quite right in this respect, because we cannot delay the socialization of commercial and dairy livestock in the principal grain areas. But a thoughtful and flexible approach is definitely essential here: it is clearly necessary to leave certain reserves with peasant *babas*<sup>20</sup> so that they can buy something on an individual basis. We have to think about this.

Regarding cadres, things should be organized in such a way that a portion of those 25,000 [workers mobilized for collectivization] go into the raion apparatus. Our proposal to expedite measures to reorganize and strengthen the raion structures in okrugs of wholesale collectivization has met with complete support; obviously this will be included in the resolution. We must utilize and coordinate the mobilization of the 25,000 with the strengthening of raion structures, [and] this will partly solve the problem of funds to pay wages to the mobilized personnel.

Regarding the pace of collectivization, the guidelines that Yakovlev proposed for the commission are basically as follows: grain areas, in two to three years, and the whole USSR in five years, with perhaps some loose ends where it will not be feasible right away to carry it out in five years; and he stressed that this guideline is issued with a certain leeway; it is better to let the CC have leeway than if the CC adopts a decree and then it turns out to be unfulfilled.

Regarding kulaks, a special subcommission<sup>21</sup> was established with Comrade Bauman as its head, and it concluded that we can already raise the issue of the outright destruction of classes in the USSR in a more concrete way right now, so they propose setting the following guideline against kulaks in raions of wholesale collectivization: for kulaks who sharply and actively resist, apply all measures of state coercion against them that flow out of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kulaks who resist but not as actively are to be exiled and resettled in outlying regions of the USSR. As for kulaks who do not put up active resistance, it is to be considered permissible, by decrees from village assemblies, to confiscate their property for the collective-farm fund and to take them into the collective farm on probationary status for a few years, without voting rights, without suffrage or the right to be elected, so that they are used as workers, and in two or three years, if they have been tried and tested, then we will see. This is a guideline from the commission, it has a certain correct substance, because someday we will have to raise the issue of the kulaks. Our current practice

is to banish them to individual outside fields, to the end of the crop rotation, but all of these are halfway measures, after all kulaks make up 5 percent [of the peasant population] in the USSR, there are 1.5 million kulak farms, that means 7 to 8 million people, maybe even 9 million. You can't resettle everybody, and moving against [all of] them with GPU measures is also impossible. The issue can be framed this way: expropriate kulak property and admit them to the collective farm so that in two or three years, when they become convinced that their positions are totally hopeless and see that they must submit, then they will take this step without strong resistance. But if this is implemented immediately, then the resistance at this point from the kulaks will undoubtedly be stronger. We need to weigh here whether to allow individual kulak farms to exist alongside collective farms for several years even though the kulak farms, for their part, will do everything they can to negatively influence, affect, and corrupt our collective farms. Clearly, a kulak inside a collective farm may be even more dangerous than outside a collective farm. The commission has not adopted a final decision on this issue, but this option will obviously be adopted, along with another option that experience now suggests—banishment to outside fields and so forth. Another expedient measure is to expropriate kulak property by decision of village assemblies and to include them [kulaks] in collective farms with probationary status.

Regarding the basic propositions that Comrade Yakovlev advanced at the commission's session, there were several disputes. The comrades from the Lower Volga and the Northern Caucasus argued against the rate of collectivization that Comrade Yakovlev proposed and in general against the suggestion that there is a competitive race for numbers in the provinces. As for me, I basically agreed with the proposals made by Comrade Yakovlev and argued with only certain points. After a long discussion the commission adopted these basic propositions, which may not have conformed with Comrade Yakovlev's justification but had to conform with the guideline of turning most of the attention to the quality of work, to the collective use of small peasant implements.

Regarding the rate of collectivization, the opinions that were voiced in the commission during the discussion of this issue were as follows: that there is no artificial acceleration of the collective-farm movement from above, that what is taking place here is a powerful, tumultuous movement from below. The party organization's task is to know how not only to provide organizational support for this movement in a timely fashion but also to bring it out and shape it at the lower levels. It was pointed out that there are two kinds of attitudes in the provinces regarding the pace: there is the race for numbers, but on the other hand there is also the attitude that we

should slow down because we lack organizational capabilities. The supporters of a “fast pace” said that if Comrade Yakovlev’s guideline is adopted, it will play into the hands of those who want to slow down.

It is absolutely correct that any party organization’s task is not only to order the formation of, and register, the collective farms that have taken shape, but also to help organize them. If there is a wish among the peasant masses at the lower levels to organize a collective-farm association, it is our duty to take charge, to lead this effort, to promote the quickest possible expression of this desire for collectivization, and there can be no excuses here about a lack of organizational capabilities and so forth. We must not allow talk of “a lack of organizational capabilities” to cover up our lag behind real life in this highly important effort. If we agreed with such talk, it would mean that we intend to trail behind and disregard the powerful mass movement from below. All of the commission members basically agreed with this, and Comrade Yakovlev declared that he did not object to this, but none of this refutes the fact that elements of a race for numbers exist, that attention needs to be focused on questions of the qualitative strengthening of collective farms.

If we take the situation in our krai, we must state that we are lacking a great deal from the standpoint of the best production indicators, a very great deal. Although large collective farms have existed and operated in our krai for a whole year already, is their experience being taken into account, is there ample data and material on the organization of their production for use at other collective farms? Have we properly posed the issue of horse-and-machine columns, of the best mass use of peasant inventory, of creating socialized collective-farm seed funds on collective farms? Did we place sufficiently urgent emphasis on establishing socialized, indivisible capital in the maximum quantities on collective farms? Is there material in the rural department of the krai party committee and in the krai collective-farm union about how much indivisible capital we have, what percentage it makes up—unfortunately, we have none of this. Unfortunately, we have devoted little attention to these issues, there have been general resolutions, we have written about labor organization, about production organization, but there has not been, unfortunately, a daily emphasis, checking, monitoring, and urgent pressure in this direction. We must now make a decisive turn in all our work to further encompass collective-farm construction [and] without waiting for the CC decree, which will be published in a week, we must adopt a whole host of decisions for ourselves.

In our region, comrades, if we characterize the pace of the collective-farm movement that prevails, the upshot is that it looks like the task set by

the plenum of the krai party committee calling for 50 percent of all the peasants in our krai to be in collective farms by 1 May will be not only fulfilled but overfulfilled. Clearly, we must not hold back in any way the desire for collectivization that has emerged in our countryside. I think that in this area I will have to argue a little with Comrade Milkh and with the plenum of the Ulianovsk Okrug party committee, which adopted a decree calling for 40 percent by 1 May. The okrug committee plenum proved doubly wrong here, first, because this decision contains elements of disloyalty to the decision of the krai committee's plenum, which called for 50 percent of peasant farms throughout the krai. Is it really possible that the Ulianovsk Okrug, which is partly situated on the left bank, where we are supposed to have 80 percent, is it really planning to have a rate of collectivization lower than the krai average? After the debate at the krai committee plenum, in which the comrades from Ulianovsk found no support from the plenum, they should not have been so obstinate in their position. Aside from disloyalty to the krai committee, the okrug committee's decree implies a direct threat of artificially holding back the movement. Yesterday I spoke with Comrade Prokofiev from Ulianovsk, and that is just what he said, that we don't have enough resources for organizational support. That is just what he said: registration is one thing, but organizational support is another. We must fight against such an approach. We must know not only how to register but also how to provide full organizational support for the collective-farm movement in the form in which it is actually developing. In general, we don't have to pose the issue of numerical rates in a sharp and pressing way now, attention must now be focused on qualitative indicators, but the way the question was framed about numbers, about the pace, at the plenum of the Ulianovsk Okrug committee, that is wrong and harmful. I think we should instruct Ulianovsk to rectify its viewpoint, otherwise the collective-farm movement will be artificially held back there. But in the krai as a whole we have a situation such that we will obviously have more than 50 percent of the peasant masses in the collective-farm movement in a couple of months. We must not get preoccupied with speeding up the pace, but at the same time there must be no artificial slowdown of any kind. There must be no artificial acceleration, but a slowdown is also dangerous. What we need everywhere is the most timely incorporation, guidance, and leadership, guidance of this powerful collective-farm movement by the party. That is today's principal slogan.

With regard to the organization of production on collective farms I have said here that we were very late, that things are worse in our region than elsewhere. I confess, I deliberately laid it on a bit thick. We also have some pretty good production indicators. We have the best results in fall plow-

ing, which attests to the fact that the collective-farm movement has been accompanied by production successes. But from the standpoint of incorporating experience in systematic checking and monitoring of this aspect of the effort, things are very bad in our region. We must immediately take the most decisive measures to rectify things in this area, and not only decisive measures by sending another resolution or directive to the localities, but by achieving an urgent and decisive turnabout in the work of the krai collective-farm union, the rural department, etc.

We come up with a lot of questions about collective-farm construction; there is no possibility of raising all these questions in the bureau of the krai committee—this work must be assigned to the krai sowing troika. This troika will also have to be charged with resolving all the practical issues and problems of collective-farm construction that come up in the process of work. We will not be able to hear each of them individually in the bureau of the krai committee. We will have to verify this and issue a whole host of specific instructions for our krai organizations and for the outlying areas. Collectivization headquarters have been set up in some places. In my view, they aren't needed, because wherever a headquarters exists, there is artificial acceleration. I am against this, but we must still have a body that, without being called a headquarters, will work in a hard-nosed manner and advance and resolve every issue quickly and efficiently.

M. Khataevich

• DOCUMENT 47 •

Report by the OGPU Information Department on the mass sell-off and slaughter of livestock based on materials as of 15 December 1929, 22 December 1929. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 61, ll. 26–28. Mimeograph copy of original.

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22 December 1929

Top secret

Available materials on a number of areas (Central Black Earth Oblast, Middle Volga Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Northern Caucasus Krai, Far Eastern Krai, Western Oblast, Belorussian SSR, and Tataria) note an increase lately in the sell-off and slaughter of work animals and commercial livestock (horses, cows, pigs, and sheep), which are occurring on a mass scale in some locales. In Mogilev Okrug (Belorussian SSR), 2,074 head of all types of livestock were killed in October, and 3,016 head in November. The Leather Syndicate alone in the same okrug bought up and slaughtered

130 horses in October, 509 in November, and 220 just in the first four days of December. Molzhivsoiuz [the Dairy Livestock-Breeding Union] slaughtered 307 head in October, 662 in November; various artels slaughtered 37 in October, 155 in November; Belmiastorg [the Belorussian Meat Trade Administration], 863 and 1,245, etc. In the village of Novo-Troitskaya in Armavir Okrug (Northern Caucasus Krai), a single center of the TsRK [Central Workers' Cooperative] has procured up to 8,000 sheep and 866 head of cattle in the past two months. In some areas cases have been reported in which pregnant cows with two or three weeks left until calving and purebred and young livestock (Belorussian SSR) were delivered to the slaughterhouse. Up to 40 head of purebred livestock has been turned over to the dairy union from the slaughterhouse in Mogilev Okrug over the past three weeks, and in the village of Izobilnaia, Armavir Okrug, and the villages of Dulenkovo, Zemtsovo, Verbovka, and others in Donets Okrug (Northern Caucasus Krai), the population butchers purebred livestock for meat and sells it at the nearest markets.

We should also note, as a rather common occurrence, the slaughter by peasants of their livestock for salted meat and personal use in areas where this was not observed in previous years. The mass slaughter of livestock is also taking place outside slaughterhouses, without any medical examination or monitoring.

The mass shipment of livestock to the market has caused a drastic drop in livestock prices everywhere. In certain okrugs of Lower Volga Krai, Belorussian SSR, and Central Black Earth Oblast, cases have been reported in which peasants have suffocated horses and deliberately starved livestock to death in order to get insurance, since the low level of prices for livestock makes it disadvantageous to sell.

The mass sell-off and slaughter of livestock are primarily being carried out by the well-to-do segments of the countryside and the kulaks who do not deliver surplus grain and by individual farmers who fear the use of art. 61 of the Criminal Code.

One of the main motives for the sell-off and slaughter of livestock by middle peasants, mostly by the strongest of them, in the majority of cases is their unwillingness to turn in work animals and commercial livestock above the norm when they join collective farms. For example, in a number of areas in Northern Caucasus Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Middle Volga Krai, Central Black Earth Oblast, and Belorussian SSR where work is being done to establish large collective farms, and almost everywhere in raions of wholesale collectivization, prices for livestock are extremely low because of its mass delivery [to the markets], and sellers usually attribute the sell-off of livestock at low prices to the fact that "people will have to

join the collective farm and lose their livestock anyway” (Maikop Okrug and elsewhere). “We’re going to the collective farm anyway, what do we need livestock for, but it’s all right to have money, that will come in handy there, too” (Bobruisk Okrug). In a number of raions of wholesale collectivization one can see a tendency for people to sell off all their livestock, keeping one cow and horse each or trading better livestock for worse (“even this kind will do in the collective”—Lower Volga Krai); in fact in a number of cases even village communists who have become heads of collective farms sell work animals before joining the collective farms (Pugachev Okrug and elsewhere). In many cases, middle peasants and, in part, poor peasants, have tried to conceal their property from bookkeeping at the time of their entry into collective farms or to sell it off beforehand (Belorussian SSR). The sell-off of livestock by middle and poor peasants, in a number of cases, is motivated by a lack of sufficient fodder (Northern Caucasus Krai). The mass sell-off and slaughter of livestock by a segment of middle and poor peasants is being prompted in large measure by provocative rumors that kulaks and antisoviet elements are spreading in a number of areas about a forthcoming requisitioning of livestock, “forced meat requisitioning,” etc. (Belorussian SSR, Northern Caucasus Krai and elsewhere).

The sharply increased supply of livestock, which has entailed a price drop, is being utilized everywhere by profiteering kulaks and various speculator-resellers, who are buying up livestock at sometimes extremely low prices. Speculation in the livestock market is often abetted by the inaction of cooperative and state trade organizations that fail to take sufficiently decisive measures to stop the speculation, and by administrative organs (Mogilev, Bobruisk, Gomel, and other okrugs).

OGPU INFO assistant director Zaporozhets  
Division 7 chief Agaiants

· DOCUMENT 48 ·

From a letter by I. V. Stalin to V. M. Molotov, secretary of the CC,  
on the CC draft decree on the pace of collectivization, prepared by the  
commission, 25 December 1929. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5388,  
l. 112. I. V. Stalin’s original manuscript.

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25 December 1929

6. In a few days we are planning to adopt a decision on the pace of collective-farm construction. Yakovlev’s commission has produced a draft.

The draft, in my view, is unsuitable. You should already have it. Let me know your opinion.

• DOCUMENT 49 •

Telegram from V. M. Molotov to I. V. Stalin on the draft decree of the CC of the VKP(b) on the pace of collectivization, prepared by the commission, no later than 1 January 1930. From N. A. Ivnikskii, *Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie (nachalo 30-kh godov)* (Moscow, 1996), pp. 43–44.

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No later than 1 January 1930

I consider the draft on the pace of collectivization to be unsuccessful, with false notes in some places, for example in items 3, 8, and 9.

I don't understand the need after the plenum for a lengthy new resolution, which in places is obviously vague and lags behind real life and CC decisions, for example item 5. The generalizations for the whole USSR in the first item, in my view, are inappropriate now, they lead to bureaucratic planning, which is especially inappropriate for a tumultuous, mass movement on such a vast scale. It makes more sense now to issue directives for only a number of areas, which, however, are of decisive importance for agriculture. It is better to analyze the situation in these areas more deeply.

It is better to issue a number of practical supplements through soviet and cooperative and collective-farm channels. Item 8 should be redone in a more specific way.

• DOCUMENT 50 •

Telegram from I. V. Stalin to V. M. Molotov on points of revision for the CC draft decree, prepared by the commission, 1 January 1930. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 38, l. 1. Certified copy.

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1 January 1930

By cipher

No. 4/sh

I received your telegram regarding the resolution on collective farms. Your criticisms completely matched the practical criticisms of our friends.<sup>22</sup> We are planning to shorten the resolution by 75 to 80 percent, discarding everything pertaining to the charter from the resolution, and



leaving only the revised directive. A brief resolution is needed to set down a new pace for the collective-farm movement, to revise the pace set recently by planning and other organizations, and to lay out shorter deadlines for collectivization in the principal grain areas. The resolution is being revised in this vein. You will get the text of the resolution by telegraph. 7:30 p.m.

Stalin

• DOCUMENT 51 •

Telegram from I. V. Stalin to B. P. Sheboldaev, secretary of the Lower Volga Krai party committee, on the upcoming consideration of the CC draft decree, 4 January 1930. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 38, l. 7. Certified copy.

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4 January 1930

By cipher

No. 14/sh

Today Yakovlev and I shortened the draft resolution on collective farms, which you are familiar with, threw out everything that pertains to charter items and reworked it, focusing on the shift of funds, resources, land reorganization work, etc., in the direction of maximum support for the growing collective-farm movement to the detriment of individual farming. We are sending out the resolution, as reworked in this form, to Politburo members today for adoption at tomorrow's Politburo session. I think you should like the resolution.

5 p.m.

Stalin

• DOCUMENT 52 •

Decree of the CC of the VKP(b) on the pace of collectivization and state assistance to collective-farm construction, 5 January 1930. *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, vol. 5, pp. 72-75.

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5 January 1930

1. In recent months the collective movement has taken a new step forward, encompassing not only groups of individual farms but also entire

raions, okrugs, and even oblasts and kraiss. The movement is based on the collectivization of the means of production of poor and middle peasant farms.

All of the planned rates of development set for the collective movement have been surpassed. In the spring of 1930 already the crop area cultivated on a socialized basis will substantially exceed 30 million hectares, i.e., the five-year plan for collectivization, which was to make it possible by the end of the five-year plan period to incorporate 22–24 million hectares into collectives, will be substantially overfulfilled already this year.

As a result, we have the material basis to replace large-scale kulak production with large-scale production by collective farms and for major progress in the establishment of socialist agriculture, not to mention state farms, whose growth is substantially outstripping all planning assumptions.

This fact, which is of decisive importance for the entire USSR national economy, has given the party a solid basis for moving in its practical work from a policy of restricting the kulaks' exploitative tendencies to a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

2. On the basis of all this it can be established beyond a doubt that within five years, instead of collectivizing 20 percent of the crop area as assigned by the five-year plan, we will be able to collectivize the vast majority of peasant farms, in fact the collectivization of such highly important grain areas as the Lower Volga, the Middle Volga, and the Northern Caucasus can be completed for the most part in the fall of 1930 or, at the latest, in the spring of 1931; the collectivization of other grain areas can be completed for the most part in the fall of 1931 or, at the latest, in the spring of 1932.

3. In accordance with the accelerating pace of collectivization, it is imperative to intensify work even more in the construction of plants manufacturing tractors, combines, and other tractor and towed equipment, so that the deadlines set by VsNKh for completion of the construction of new plants are not delayed under any circumstances. At the same time, the CC instructs VsNKh to report to the CC, no later than 15 March, on measures that will ensure as soon as next year both a further increase in the overall scale of production of complex agricultural machinery at old plants and an especially significant increase in the production of tractor-drawn and complex horse-drawn equipment rather than simple implements.

4. Since the task of totally replacing horse-drawn equipment with machine-drawn equipment cannot be completed in a short period and will take a number of years, the CC of the VKP(b) demands that a decisive re-

buff be delivered to tendencies to underestimate the role of draft horses at this stage of the collective-farm movement, tendencies that lead to the squandering and sell-off of horses. The CC of the VKP(b) stresses the extreme importance in the present circumstances, as a transitional measure, of establishing on collective farms horse-and-machine depots and mixed tractor-and-horse depots that combine tractors and draft horses.

5. In connection with the accelerating pace of the collective-farm movement, the CC instructs the Union Commissariat of Agriculture to regroup land-reorganization resources and funds in such a way as to fully meet the land-reorganization needs of areas of wholesale collectivization, while postponing individual land reorganization, except for certain national [non-Russian—trans.] areas and certain areas in the grain-consuming zone, where the collective movement has not yet been widely developed.

6. Pursuant to the foregoing, the CC deems it absolutely essential to increase the total amount of credit for 1929–30 [economic year] in the collective-farm sector from 270 million rubles to 500 million rubles, while reducing credit for other sectors accordingly.

7. In accordance with the change in conditions in raions of wholesale collectivization, the machine-tractor stations covered by the All-Union Tractor Center must reorganize their work on the basis of:

- a. contracts primarily, if not exclusively, with collectives;
- b. peasants' obligations to defray the cost of the stations within three years.

Concurrently, a type of combined enterprise should be tested in practice in areas where state farms are widespread (such as the Middle Volga and certain areas of the Northern Caucasus)—basically a state farm operating under contract and for fees and providing assistance to contracting collective farms primarily in the area of tractor plowing and machine harvesting.

8. In view of the special importance of cadres, the CC instructs the Union Commissariat of Agriculture, Kolkhozsentr, and oblast party committees to speed up work in developing collective-farm cadres and supplying them to collective farms by creating a broad network of accelerated courses for this purpose. Those who should be recruited above all for the accelerated courses are practical experts from the peasantry who have excelled in the collective-farm movement and organizers of the collective-farm movement from workers' brigades who have distinguished themselves.

9. Since the experience of wholesale collectivization at this stage of collective-farm development pushes to the fore the agricultural artel, in

which the principal means of production (implements, draft animals, farm buildings, and marketable commercial livestock) are collectivized, as the most common form of collective farms rather than the association for socialized land cultivation, which has socialized labor but retains private ownership of means of production, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) directs the Union Commissariat of Agriculture, with the broad enlistment of collective-farm organizations, to draw up as soon as possible a model Charter of the Agricultural Collective-Farm Artel, as a form of collective farm that is transitional to a commune, while bearing in mind that the admission of kulaks to collective farms is not permitted.

10. Party organizations must take charge and give shape to the collective-farm movement that is spontaneously growing from below, so that genuinely collective production is organized on collective farms and the plan for expansion of crop area and crop-yield increases is not only totally fulfilled but that the current sowing campaign is also transformed, in accordance with the decision of the November plenum of the CC, into a starting point for a new surge of the collective-farm movement.

11. The CC of the VKP(b) stresses the necessity of a resolute struggle against any attempts to hold back the development of the collective-farm movement due to a shortage of tractors and complex machinery. At the same time, the CC seriously warns party organizations against any "ruling by decree" from above whatsoever with regard to the collective-farm movement that could pose the danger of changing a genuinely socialist competition for the establishment of collective farms into a game of collectivization.

## CHAPTER 5

# The Campaign Against the Kulak

### 5 January 1930–1 March 1930

The Central Committee decree of 5 January 1930 (see document 52) inaugurated a new phase in the collectivization of Soviet agriculture. Collectivization rates increased throughout the country, reaching dizzyingly unreal heights by the beginning of March. Although the Central Committee decree provided the main impetus for the collectivization campaign in the wake of the provincial campaigns of the summer and fall and the momentous decisions of the November 1929 plenum, collectivization rates would increase the most dramatically in the month of February when the campaign to liquidate the kulak as a class provided the major “stimulus” for the peasantry to sign up for the collective farms.

Yet as late as early January, Stalin’s 27 December declamation and the collectivization decree’s curt recapitulation of the phrase remained the only and most compelling central indicators of the policy to liquidate the kulak as a class, whereas the practice itself had taken off, in some cases radically, in the regions. With disorder mounting in the villages and a lack of clarity surrounding exactly what liquidation meant, Stalin was forced by circumstance on 15 January to create a special Politburo commission to work out exact plans for dekulakization (see document 57).<sup>1</sup>

Even before the January Politburo commission was created, however, the OGPU had begun to take the initiative in dekulakization as Yagoda witnessed the increasing mayhem in the countryside that, ac-

ording to his intelligence sources, threatened to spill out to the cities and army (e.g., see documents 53 and 56). The OGPU's recommendations became the foundation for the work of Molotov's commission and demonstrate the central role of the OGPU in the campaign to liquidate the kulak as a class.

### The OGPU and the Molotov Politburo Commission

On 11 January 1930, OGPU (deputy) director Genrikh Yagoda sent a memo to his top lieutenants (Yevdokimov, Messing, Prokofiev, Blagonravov, and Boky) calling for a purge (*ochistka*) of "kulak elements" from the countryside. "The kulak," he wrote, "must be destroyed as a class. . . . [The kulak] understands perfectly well that he will perish with collectivization and therefore he renders more and more brutal and fierce resistance, as we see already, [ranging] from insurrectionary plots and counterrevolutionary kulak organizations to arson and terror. They [the kulaks] will and are already burning grain, murdering activists and government officials. Unless we strike quickly and decisively . . . we will face a whole series of uprisings. . . . By March-April, we must deal with the kulak, breaking his back once and for all" (see document 54).

Yagoda ordered that OGPU PPs (*polnomochnye predstaviteli*, or regional plenipotentiary representatives) in the North, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East report on locations for resettlement and the numbers of kulaks that could be settled in their regions.<sup>2</sup> He called on the OGPU's Secret Operations Department to determine the regions where arrests and exiles must occur first and, by 14 January, to report on the numbers of arrests in the last six months, the numbers of "counterrevolutionary" organizations to be liquidated, the numbers of kulaks to go to concentration camps, where it would be necessary to open new camps, and whether it would be possible to organize kulak villages without guards. Yagoda called a meeting with his lieutenants for noon the next day (12 January) to discuss plans (see document 54).<sup>3</sup> On that same day, Messing and Yevdokimov sent out a memo to all OGPU plenipotentiary representatives asking for information by 14 January on the numbers of kulak bands, groups, and participants in their regions, clearly in preparation for the operation against category 1 kulaks (see document 55).<sup>4</sup>

On 18 January, the OGPU in Moscow moved into a more operational mode. A coded telegram directive (no. 776) from Yagoda and

Yevdokimov to their plenipotentiary representatives in the Northern Caucasus, Ukraine, the Central Black Earth Region, Lower Volga, Middle Volga, and Belorussia set up the framework for the dekulakization operation centrally, preceding the Molotov Politburo commission's work by almost two weeks (see document 62). In a 23 January follow-up to coded telegram directive 776, Messing and Yevdokimov instructed plenipotentiary representatives in the Northern Caucasus, Lower Volga, Middle Volga, Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Central Black Earth Region to carefully formulate and immediately report information on a series of key questions pertaining to the dekulakization campaign. They ended their instructions by noting, "Final directives, the timing of the operation, and the number of exiles will be provided to you in a timely manner, after the issue is decided at the highest level" (see document 63).<sup>5</sup>

The OGPU had taken the initiative in dekulakization from early January in an attempt to gain control of the rapidly developing provincial campaigns against the kulak. The provincial campaigns, however, continued to develop according to a momentum of their own through the month of January. On 24 January, Yagoda condemned the Moscow regional party committee's decree on dekulakization, noting that the dekulakization of 520 kulaks in Orekhovo-Zuevskii district took place without prior warning to OGPU. He concluded by defensively noting that "we lead *all* of the Union" [emphasis in original—L.V.] (see document 64).<sup>6</sup> On 25 January, Messing and Yevdokimov issued a telegram on dekulakization to plenipotentiary representatives in Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, the Central Black Earth Region, Lower Volga, Middle Volga, Belorussia, the Urals, and Siberia stating that information from a series of places told of the beginnings of a "spontaneous" exile and expropriation of kulaks, meaning dekulakization by provincial or local officials—decidedly not peasant-initiated dekulakization. They instructed plenipotentiary representatives to ensure that measures were taken to raise the issue in party organizations to carry out the campaign in an organized way according to OGPU directives. They further warned plenipotentiary representatives to ensure that Red Army families were not among the exiles and to hasten the submission of exile plans with all calculations and maps to the OGPU.<sup>7</sup> Stalin himself issued a directive to all party organizations, warning of the danger of substituting dekulakization for collectivization, which, he said, was "radically incorrect" (*v korne nepravil'na*).<sup>8</sup>

It was only on 30 January that the Politburo approved the Molotov

commission's draft decree "On Measures for the Liquidation of Kulak Farms in Raions of Wholesale Collectivization" (see document 61). Like the 5 January decree on wholesale collectivization, this decree bears the radicalizing imprint of Stalin and Molotov, especially in regard to the increase in the numbers of peasants targeted for dekulakization (compare documents 58 and 61). Furthermore, there is little doubt that the OGPU's work in the first half of January provided the basis for the commission's work and the final decree on dekulakization. In addition to the dekulakization decree, the Politburo issued a special decree ordering that the 30 January directives not be published, after reprimanding the Northern Caucasus and Lower Volga regional party committees for practically publishing the secret directives.<sup>9</sup> The USSR Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom provided the necessary legislative sanction for dekulakization in the 1 February decree "On the Measures for Strengthening the Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in Regions of Wholesale Collectivization and the Struggle with the Kulaks," followed by detailed, unpublished accompanying "secret instructions" on 4 February.<sup>10</sup>

The Politburo decree began by revoking laws on the right to lease land and hire labor in districts of wholesale collectivization. Kulaks were forbidden to dispose of their property and possessions, a ruling that had already been legislated on 16 January 1930 in the Central Executive Committee-Sovnarkom decree, "On Measures against the Willful Destruction of Livestock."<sup>11</sup> They were also forbidden to leave their villages by a Central Executive Committee-Sovnarkom decree of 1 February, which reiterated the ruling against kulak sales or disposal of properties.<sup>12</sup> In districts of wholesale collectivization, kulaks would additionally be subjected to the expropriation of their property, defined (in brief) as the means of production, livestock, homes and other auxiliary buildings, manufacturing enterprises, and fodder and seed reserves. The numbers of liquidated kulak households were not to exceed 3 to 5 percent of the peasant population.

A special district soviet executive committee plenipotentiary was to take charge of the expropriation process, with the "obligatory" participation of the village soviet, the collective farm chairman, and groups of poor peasants and landless laborers. The plenipotentiary was responsible for compiling an exact inventory of properties, with estimated values, while the village soviets were entrusted with guarding the confiscated property. The value of the confiscated property was to be applied first to covering kulak taxes and other obligations to the



government, then to the payment of debts to the government and the cooperatives, and finally to covering the collective farm “entrance fees” of the poor in the form of a part of the collective farm’s indivisible capital.<sup>13</sup> Confiscated buildings and homes were to be used for the collective needs of the village soviet and the collective farm as well as for housing for the poor. Confiscated lands were to be given to the collective farms with the proviso that the new lands be planted and the crops delivered to the government. The savings of kulak families above 500 rubles were also confiscated and transferred to the Commissariat of Finance. All work on the expropriation of the kulaks was to be based on the “initiative and activism of the broad collective farm masses, and their support.” What this meant, in theory, was that collective farm general assemblies and meetings of the poor were expected to pass decrees on expropriation before its implementation. In the meantime, in districts without wholesale collectivization, the finance commissariat instructed village soviets to inventory all kulak properties and to carry out bimonthly inspections to ensure that kulak farms remained intact.

The Politburo decree divided kulaks into three categories. The first category consisted of the “counterrevolutionary kulak *aktiv*,” which was to be quickly liquidated by way of incarcerating heads of households in concentration camps and, if necessary, executing those who organized terrorist attacks and counterrevolutionary disturbances or participated in insurrectionary organizations. Their families were subject to exile. The Politburo established a control figure of 60,000 for the first category. The OGPU would implement all repressive measures (except expropriation) against this category of kulak. The second category was to be made up of the remaining elements of the “kulak *aktiv*,” especially the most wealthy kulaks; they and their families were to be exiled to distant parts of the Soviet Union beyond or within their native regions. The control figure for this category was set at 150,000 families, with the following regional designations: 70,000 were to go to the Northern Region, 50,000 to Siberia, 20–25,000 to the Urals, and 20–25,000 to Kazakhstan. The selection of second-category kulaks was to be made by the district soviet executive committee on the basis of decisions taken at meetings of collective farmers and poor peasants, and confirmed by the county [okrug] soviet executive committee, while the OGPU was placed in charge of the exile process. Families were allowed to bring with them no more than 500 rubles in cash, essential household items, and the most basic means of production. The implementation of all measures against first- and second-category ku-

laks was to take place between February and May 1930, with 50 percent of the operation complete by 15 April.

The third category of kulaks, the majority, were to be resettled beyond the collective farm but within the district's borders. They would be moved into small settlements selected by the county soviet executive committee and administered by the district soviet executive committees. These kulaks could be used as a work force in forestry, road construction, and the like, but they would *not* in any way be a part of the collective farms, unlike the early plans proposed by the December Politburo commission. All operations pertaining to this category were under the jurisdiction of county and district soviet and party organs, not the OGPU.

To assist the provincial party organization in the implementation of dekulakization, the Politburo ordered the mobilization of 2,500 party members from Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhnyi Novgorod, Kharkov, and other industrial centers. The Politburo issued strict warnings not to allow dekulakization to touch poor and middle peasants or the families of Red Army soldiers and to take a cautious approach in the dekulakization of families with close relatives in industrial employment. The decree also instructed the Central Committee's Organizational Bureau to issue a directive on the closing of churches as well as issuing orders to purge industrial enterprises of "individual kulak elements" and "to take decisive measures in higher educational and higher technical educational institutions to combat counterrevolutionary youth groups linked to kulak elements" (see document 61).

On 31 January at 5:00 p.m., the OGPU collegium held a meeting with its plenipotentiary representatives and responsible workers involved in the kulak question, which Molotov supposedly addressed. The protocols to this meeting indicate the formation of three commissions to work out plans of arrest and exile.<sup>14</sup> These three commissions very likely participated in the drafting of the OGPU's own decree on dekulakization: the 2 February 1930 OGPU decree 44/21, "Measures for the Liquidation of the Kulak as a Class" (see document 65).

In essentials, the OGPU decree resembled the Politburo decree on dekulakization. Control figures in the OGPU directive followed closely, in most cases exactly, the figures set out in the Politburo decree. The numbers of second-category kulaks to be exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan were reduced by 6,000 and 20,000, respectively, in view of

those regions' admitted unpreparedness and unwillingness to accept exiles from outside their regions. The OGPU's definition of first-category kulaks was broader than that of the Politburo and included the most notorious and active kulaks opposing government policy; fugitive kulaks who were hiding underground or who had joined gangs of bandits; active white guards, insurgents, former bandits, former white guard officers, repatriates, former active members of punitive expeditions (*karateli*), active members of church councils, sects or religious associations or groups, the wealthiest peasants, moneylenders, speculators, former landlords, and so on. The OGPU planned to complete the operation against first-category kulaks before beginning the operation against second-category kulaks. The OGPU regional troikas with representatives from the regional party committee and the procurator's office were to review, in extrajudicial order, all first-category cases.<sup>15</sup> Decrees on the exile of families were to be formulated by county soviet executive committees, taking into account the degree of social danger and presence of able-bodied members in families. The troikas were to work through the county soviet executive committees in the matters of expropriation and exile. Those arrested would be sent out to county- and regional-level OGPU offices to await sentencing. Those sentenced to concentration camps and exile were not to be allowed to return home at the end of their sentence but would be sent on to the North. The OGPU also ordered a "100 percent review" of all letters going or coming from abroad and all letters going to or coming from the army.<sup>16</sup> Plenipotentiary representatives were additionally instructed to create locally secret reserves of workers, komsomols, and communists for help in dekulakization and to be used in addition to OGPU reserve troops coming from Moscow and Leningrad to strengthen forces in the North and in the Urals.<sup>17</sup>

The OGPU decree also expanded the second category to encompass "local kulak authorities and the whole kulak cadre." For implementation of the operation, the OGPU regional plenipotentiary office was to organize operative troikas, with analogous groups on the county and district levels. The district operative groups would participate directly in the operation along with maneuverable OGPU troops. Finally, the OGPU extended the application of dekulakization beyond districts of wholesale collectivization to include border zones where dekulakization was to be implemented regardless of the level of collectivization (see document 65).

## Dekulakization

The dekulakization campaign nevertheless continued to develop according to a logic, mainly a provincial logic, of its own, as it had through the course of January. On 3 February, the Central Committee sent out a telegram condemning a number of areas (Ukraine, Belorussia, North Caucasus, Lower Volga, Middle Volga, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Central Black Earth Region) for running ahead with dekulakization, ignoring central plans and the level of collectivization set for the region (see document 66).<sup>18</sup> In early February, the OGPU continued its condemnation of out-of-control regions. On 5 February, Messing ordered plenipotentiary representatives to follow “strictly” the given control numbers and not to exceed them. He ordered them to halt “categorically” the competition to see who could make the most arrests.<sup>19</sup> On the same day, the OGPU called a halt to the expropriation and exile of “foreign citizens” from countries with which the USSR had formal relations, a reference to the many peasants of diaspora nationalities living in the country.<sup>20</sup>

The inevitable confusion generated by the rapid regional momentum of the campaign and the relative tardiness of the center to formulate plans and issue instructions resulted in revision of plans by the OGPU and conflict with regional organizations. On 4 February, Yagoda revised the deportation control figures in view of the unpreparedness of several regions to accept out-of-region exiles, reducing the numbers of families scheduled for deportations in the first round. He sent telegrams to his plenipotentiary representatives in the Central Black Earth Region, Belorussia, the Northern Caucasus, Lower Volga, Middle Volga, and Ukraine reducing the numbers of families scheduled for deportations in the first round, with a follow-up telegram of 7 February outlining the schedule of deportations.<sup>21</sup> On 10 February, Yagoda halted all deportations to Kazakhstan for the next three months.<sup>22</sup>

Reports of “naked dekulakization” (i.e., dekulakization separate from wholesale collectivization), night raids on villages, dekulakization of Red Army families, unauthorized (by OGPU) exiles, flight, and all manner of atrocities flooded into Moscow. Everywhere there were reports of poor and especially middle peasants being dekulakized (e.g., see documents 67 and 68). The central decrees on dekulakization had been, in part, an attempt to stem the tide of what Yagoda called “spontaneous dekulakization.”<sup>23</sup> As late as 24 February, the OGPU re-

ported that unorganized exile continued to take place in the Leningrad Region, the Middle Volga, Siberia, and Central Asia, and it warned its plenipotentiary representatives that exile was not to occur in the absence of OGPU orders.<sup>24</sup> Reports from Ukraine told of kulaks arriving in Artemovsk county from the neighboring Central Black Earth county of Lgov with certificates ordering them to leave in one week. Local officials were “dumping” their kulaks by pushing them across regional or republic borders. Consequently, large groups of kulaks and their families were crowding into railroad stations and disorganizing regular transportation.<sup>25</sup>

Kulaks continued to destroy or sell their property and to flee the countryside.<sup>26</sup> *Razbazarivanie* (literally, the squandering of property and livestock through sale or destruction) was a major impetus pushing dekulakization on the regional and local levels and struck a near-fatal blow to the new collective farm system through the destruction of millions of head of livestock. As peasants sought to avoid the kulak label by altering their economic status, there was a massive sell-off of properties. For a short time, markets were loaded with samovars, feather beds, carpets, sheepskin coats, mirrors, and clothes. Livestock markets were so well stocked with animals that the price for horses and cattle declined precipitously in many regions. Potential candidates for kulak status also fled the countryside in the tens of thousands, most heading for the cities and industrial sites, some crossing the border in a desperate attempt to save themselves.<sup>27</sup>

The intense secrecy surrounding dekulakization, especially the Politburo and OGPU decrees, also increased the likelihood of disorder. The Politburo and OGPU made every attempt to keep the directives on dekulakization secret, despite the very public nature of the campaign in the village. Molotov told delegates at the special Central Committee conference on collectivization in national regions that the 30 January decision on dekulakization remained secret because (to paraphrase Molotov) “we do not want our enemies to know. Many things are complex and we do not need to inform them.”<sup>28</sup> Reports of executions of first-category kulaks were also not to be published without Central Committee permission for each case according to a 15 February Politburo protocol.<sup>29</sup> In the regions, discussions of dekulakization were held at closed meetings of party committees and in some areas (the Northern Region, Lower Volga, Middle Volga), all preparatory work on dekulakization was carried out in “strictest conspiracy.”<sup>30</sup> In several parts of the country, dekulakization was to be carried out simulta-

neously, on one day, to lessen chances of resistance.<sup>31</sup> And in at least one region, members of the dekulakization commission were required to sign statements not to talk about dekulakization or face prosecution under article 121 of the penal code (for divulging secret information which entailed the deprivation of liberty for up to three years).<sup>32</sup> As a consequence of secrecy and the use of “conspiratorial methods,” local officials were sometimes not even familiar with the instructions on dekulakization.<sup>33</sup>

For the OGPU, whose concern was a well-ordered police operation, the “spontaneity” of dekulakization was creating a major security threat. In the towns, kulaks were reportedly registering at employment offices and, with the help of networks of *zemliaks* (peasants from the same districts) and fake papers from their village soviets, finding employment in industry. The OGPU ordered its plenipotentiary representatives to strengthen operative work to find these kulaks, increasing surveillance of night lodging, seasonal workers’ dorms, tea houses, railroad stations, and especially Peasant Houses (the *doma krest’ian*, which provided overnight accommodation and social and legal services to peasants in many cities). The OGPU also strengthened its work with the trade unions which, following the Politburo 30 January decree, were supposedly carrying out a purge of *individual* kulaks from industrial enterprises.<sup>34</sup> An OGPU memo of 3 April to plenipotentiary representatives noted an ongoing purge of towns of counterrevolutionary elements fleeing from the countryside while it simultaneously decried arbitrary arrests of poor and middle peasants who lacked correct documentation and demanded stepped-up surveillance and informant (*agentura*) work among *zemliak* networks and in the towns in general.<sup>35</sup>

The OGPU feared kulak penetration into towns, resort areas, and border zones, with its consequent socially destabilizing infection as much as, perhaps more than, it feared rural instability. The OGPU 2 February decree had already ordered a strengthening of the guard at government installations, arsenals, and grain elevators as well as reinforced informant (*agentura*) work (see document 65).<sup>36</sup> The OGPU ordered the arrest of all runaway kulaks, as first-category kulaks if they were counterrevolutionary elements and as second-category kulaks for the rest. The OGPU also ordered village soviets not to give personal documents to kulaks and to report on cases of self-dekulakization.<sup>37</sup>

The OGPU also worried about border zones. Illegal emigration, contraband activity (in kulak property), and security were behind the

OGPU's 2 February orders to strengthen border guards (see document 69) and, later, a 5 March 1930 Politburo decision to exile from the border zones of Belorussia and right-bank Ukraine the families of those arrested for banditry, espionage, counterrevolutionary work, and contraband, as well as all kulaks, especially those of Polish nationality, irrespective of the level of collectivization. Subject to exile were 3,000–3,500 families from Belorussia and 10,000–15,000 families from Ukraine.<sup>38</sup>

The army, by this time, figured no less importantly in the OGPU's worries. The OGPU decree of 2 February stipulated that Red Army troops were not to be drawn into operations "under any circumstances" (*ni v koem sluchae*) (see document 65). Their use was limited to extreme cases (insurrections) and then only with the agreement of regional organizations and revolutionary-military soviets, and even then plenipotentiary representatives would use only soldiers carefully screened by the OGPU special organs (see document 65).<sup>39</sup> Although this directive was violated at times,<sup>40</sup> its motivation was security, the fear of using peasant recruits to repress their families. The 2 February OGPU decree also ordered a 100 percent review of letters to soldiers.<sup>41</sup> In the villages—despite central directives—the families of soldiers were frequently subjected to dekulakization. On 1 March, Yagoda sent an angry note to his plenipotentiary representatives reminding them that the "directives of OGPU were clear" on this issue.<sup>42</sup>

Dekulakization quickly became a purely political exercise, aimed less at specific economic categories of peasants than at village leaders, rural elites, and anyone who dared to oppose regime policies in the countryside. Dekulakization became a cudgel to pacify the countryside and intimidate peasants into joining collective farms, as well as a means to stem the vast tide of property destruction. The result was mayhem, with violence escalating on both sides. "Excesses" were widespread. Repression became a substitute for control and an acceptable approach to governing the peasantry. Yagoda's worst fears of the consequences of not "dealing with the kulak" by March appeared to have been realized.

### Toward Retreat

Between January and March, the percentages of peasant households collectivized in the USSR leaped from 21.6 percent on 20 January 1930 to 52.7 percent on 20 February to 53.5 percent by 20 March.<sup>43</sup>

The percentages of collectivized households in many regions—and not just in the principal grain-growing regions—were even higher, reaching by 1 March, 85 percent in the Northern Caucasus; 71.8 percent in the Urals; 71.3 percent in the Lower Volga; 62 percent in the Middle Volga; 86.6 percent in the Central Black Earth Region; 72.8 percent in the Moscow Region; and 60.8 percent in Ukraine (see document 70).<sup>44</sup> The campaign against the kulak played no small part in the wild acceleration of collectivization percentages. The high percentages belied the fact that most collective farms at this time were “paper collectives” attained by means of force exercised by thousands of collectivization brigades with full plenipotentiary powers to override local officials and to use the threat of dekulakization to get “wavering” peasants to join. To make matters worse, an officially sanctioned assault on the church and religion accompanied collectivization, alienating millions of peasants. The result was a wave of peasant disorders that rocked the countryside, eventually forcing a retreat. As millions of peasants rose up against the state’s policies, riots spread throughout the land, leading to the temporary fall of Soviet power in some villages, and a wave of peasant terror left local authorities and peasant activists in disarray. The unrest, along with the threat it posed to the upcoming spring sowing campaign, led Stalin on 2 March to publish his famous article, “Dizzy with Success” (see documents 69 and 71), signaling a temporary retreat from collectivization and resulting in the plummeting of collectivization percentages.

## Documents

### • DOCUMENT 53 •

Report by the OGPU Information Department on arbitrary administrative conduct in connection with wholesale collectivization in the Central Black Earth Oblast, not before 5 January 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 20s, op. 8, d. 35, ll. 53–55.  
Original.

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Not before 5 January 1930

In addition to a whole host of organizational shortcomings accompanying the work of wholesale collectivization in the Central Black Earth Oblast, the extremely flagrant violations committed by brigades sent to



the countryside merit special attention. The most striking cases of this kind took place in Usman Okrug. A brigade comprised of 11 people that arrived in Anna Raion literally terrorized the population: prior to the start of a meeting on collectivization at the Zhelannoe village soviet, brigade leader Tatarinsky (a member of the VKP) declared, "If anybody talks a lot, we will not consider him, whether he is in a skirt or trousers, we'll tie him up and send him where he belongs." The next day another member of the brigade in the same village said to the meeting: "We haven't tied up anybody yet, but I've brought enough rope for 20 people." Before the meeting opened, 7 people who had been collecting signatures for the release of a group of arrestees were placed under arrest. A large number of peasants, intimidated by the brigade members, did not take part in the meetings. There are similar situations in other villages in Anna Raion. In the village of Berezovka, while delivering a report on collectivization, a member of the raion executive committee declared: "We will find a place on Solovki<sup>45</sup> for whoever is against Soviet power, and his property will go to the collective farm." After the report the question "Who is against the collective farm?" was put up for a vote, as a result of which it was "unanimously resolved to join the collective farm." The next day, when peasants outraged by the raion executive committee member's behavior protested, the latter declared: "You don't want to know what we intend to do with the Nashchekino Village Soviet, they were very stubborn there; we're going to tie up 150-200 people, we have some rope, and the rest will unanimously join the collective farm."

The abuses assumed especially crude forms in the villages of Mosolovka, Saburovka, and Pervaia Staraia Toida in the same Anna Raion. The organizational work on collectivization there began with arrests. To justify the arrests, fictitious reports on disruptions of meetings were created; the reports were signed under duress, and persons who were not present at the meetings at all were arrested. Afterward it was announced, "We have come to build a collective farm, and we will put whoever is against the collective farm on the road to the moon," and so forth. As a result a majority of those attending left the meetings, and the remaining minority "unanimously" adopted decisions to join the collective farm. Following these resolutions, rounds were made of households, property was confiscated, and peasants were instructed to sign without question a statement that they had "joined the collective farm." Those who were unwilling to sign were arrested and dispatched to the village soviet. As for the organizers themselves, they went on drinking binges with the wives of the arrested men.

All told, 144 people were arrested in Anna Raion between 24 December

1929 and 5 January 1930, 80 percent of them poor and middle peasants. This figure covers 16 village soviets out of a total of 25 in the raion. The arrests were carried out in bunches. For example, in the village of Sadovoe 35 people were arrested at one time, including women with babies. All of the arrestees were held without charges being filed. The reports drawn up by the brigades served as material for charges and for holding the arrestees in custody.

By these methods, collectivization in the raion rose from 26 percent to 82.4 percent in 10 days.

In addition to these and other types of arbitrary conduct and distortions cited above and a number of other forms, most areas have in common a lack of any comprehensive explanatory work among the principal segments of the peasantry.

Because of the flagrant distortions, the lack of organizational and mass work, and increased agitation by the kulaks, certain large collective farms were reported to have broken up by the end of 1929 in some okrugs of the Central Black Earth Oblast. The Gigant Collective Farm in Prokhorovka Raion, Belgorod Okrug, which had a land area of up to 15,000 hectares, now has only 6,000 hectares. About 70 percent of the members of the collective farm have quit, and an inclination to leave is apparent among the remainder. The New Path Agricultural Artel in Belgorod Okrug had 60 households; 18 remain. The Voroshilov Collective Farm in Belgorod Okrug had 218 households; 100 are left; and so on. Mass withdrawals from collective farms and refusals to join can be seen in other okrugs.

OGPU INFO assistant director Zaporozhets  
Division chief Agaiants

• DOCUMENT 54 •

Memorandum by OGPU deputy chairman G. G. Yagoda to leading officials of the OGPU with a proposal for devising repressive administrative measures against the kulaks, 11 January 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 21, ll. 393-94.  
Certified copy.

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11 January 1930

To Comrades Yevdokimov, Messing, Prokofiev, Blagonravov, and Comrade Boky

The kulak problem is now so pressing, given the exacerbated situation (ongoing class struggle as agriculture is restructured) in the countryside,

that it is necessary immediately to plan a whole host of measures to totally purge the countryside of the kulak element.

The kulaks must be destroyed as a class. With the wholesale collectivization of the countryside, as kulaks are thrown out of collectives, he (the kulak) understands perfectly well that he will perish with collectivization and therefore he renders more and more brutal and fierce resistance, as we see already, [ranging] from insurrectionary plots and counterrevolutionary kulak organizations to arson and terror. They will and are already burning grain, murdering activists and government officials. Unless we strike quickly and decisively, as we did during the grain procurements, by the time of the spring sowing campaign we will face a whole series of uprisings and a disruption of the campaign. By March-April, we must deal with the kulak, breaking his back once and for all. Apart from economic measures that we must also plan (which ones), it is imperative above all to devise measures of a repressive administrative nature, for instance: SOU [OGPU Secret Operations Administration] must work out oblasts from which kulak riffraff should be immediately exiled, arrested, and put in camps. This is the approach: (1) the especially inveterate ones go to camps, the family is exiled; (2) a kulak who conducts antisoviet agitation is banished to another locality, etc. This is a rough approximation. It is important to take account of the number with families and the exile locales, areas of the Far North and desolate places in Kazakhstan and other areas. It is essential to designate [the places of exile].

Please give me a brief summary by 14 January:

1. How many people have been arrested altogether in six months, i.e., since the beginning of grain procurements, by all authorities.

2. What the most dangerous areas are with regard to the level of activity (i.e., where people should be removed from first).

3. How many organizations, and which ones, we have liquidated during this span of time or for the year.

4. Comrade Boky, please tell me: (a) how many people can be taken into existing camps; (b) where new camps can be opened (besides Vaigach Island); (c) is it not feasible to set up, rather than a camp, an organized settlement where they (kulaks) can be voluntarily set up to work, without guards, and they can be given food and clothing during the initial period. They could be used not only to develop natural resources but also for agricultural work—plowing the land, etc.

We must approach the question of utilization from all sides, estimating the amount of money both for resettlement and for the setting up of camps. First we should expand to the limit those already operating, then

open new ones, and organize and utilize the labor of exiles with their families. As a rule, all kulaks are to be exiled with their families.

I ask each of you to think through a whole host of measures for this operation. Please drop by to discuss this matter at about noon tomorrow.

Please do not pass on this memorandum to anybody or any place.

G. Yagoda

· DOCUMENT 55 ·

OGPU directive to all plenipotentiary representatives on the urgent provision of information on agents' activities relating to cases under investigation, 11 January 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 337, l. 3. Copy.

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11 January 1930.

Personal

No. 771

Memorandum

In connection with the focus in the Center on an extremely serious political issue—striking at the kulak—report no later than 12 noon on 14 January by telegraph: (1) how many ongoing investigations there are of organizations, groups, and individuals of the kulak–White Guard–bandit element; (2) how many participants there are in these cases; (3) how many cases in the same categories are in the investigation phase; (4) how many participants there are in these investigations. The number of organizations and groups must be specified separately and precisely.

Messing

Yevdokimov

· DOCUMENT 56 ·

Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda to S. A. Messing, OGPU deputy chairman, and Ye. G. Yevdokimov, chief of the OGPU Secret Operations Administration, on the necessity of stopping unorganized mass arrests, not before 11, and no later than 24 January 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 21, l. 395. Certified copy.

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Not before 11, and no later than 24 January 1930

The number of people arrested has surpassed 93,000. It is imperative:

1. To stop further mass arrests.

2. To arrest people only in connection with active cases and bandit gangs.

3. During this time everybody “who felt like it” made arrests: poor peasants and UZO [*sic*]<sup>46</sup> alike, and everybody took those [arrested] to our representative, but unless the latter was a fool he didn’t accept them, but the fools took all of them (Kaluga, Ostrogzhsk, and other areas). Therefore it is necessary to point out in this order that arrests may be made only by persons who have the right to do so under the law (the procurator, the militia).

4. To specify in the order that arrestees must be immediately screened, with nonbandits, poor and middle peasants, and city dwellers (where this applies) released; it is better to keep fewer, and [only] those who must be kept.

5. To issue the order, written with possible excesses in mind, at our agency (OGPU) to regional plenipotentiary representative offices and all okrug departments for transmission to plenipotentiaries. I told Comrade Olsky the details of this order yesterday already, but for some reason it has not been drawn up yet.

G. Yagoda

Documents 57–61. Materials of the Politburo Commission,  
Chaired by V. M. Molotov, for the Elaboration of  
Measures against Kulaks, 15–30 January.

• DOCUMENT 57 •

From protocol no. 113 of the Politburo session on the establishment of the  
commission, 15 January 1930. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 772, l. 3.  
Mimeograph copy of original.

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15 January 1930

Top secret

16. [Heard:] On the commission for the elaboration of measures against kulaks (Comrade Molotov).

[Resolved:] To confirm the following composition of the commission: Comrades Molotov (chairman), Yakovlev, Yagoda, Yevdokimov, Bergavinov, Goloshchekin, Eikhe, Vareikis (the last four subject to substitution), Muralov, Karlson, Demchenko, Sheboldaev, Andreev, Kabakov,

Kalmanovich, Khataevich, Yanson, Leonov, Yurkin, St[anislav] Kosior, Syrtsov.

CC Secretary I. Stalin

· DOCUMENT 58 ·

Proposals of the subcommittee chaired by I. D. Kabakov, secretary of the Urals Oblast party committee, on the resettlement and utilization of exiled kulaks, no later than 23 January 1930. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 78, ll. 57–56. Copy.

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No later than 23 January 1930

Secret

1. All kulaks exiled to the Northern Krai and other remote places in the Union are to be settled in unpopulated areas (in order to exploit natural riches, fish, timber, mineral resources) in settlements without village soviets, but rather with the appointment of heads of settlements, raions, etc.

2. It is deemed feasible at the same time to settle less inveterate kulaks in sparsely populated areas, also in separate settlements on similar terms, without village soviets, etc.

3. Party organizations must conduct special work in these settlements among young people, organizing them into brigades for special projects—road work, tree cutting, etc.

4. It is deemed imperative to transfer simultaneously to the Northern Krai up to 5,000 horses taken from kulak farms.

5. In order for the kulaks to build the settlements, the Northern Krai is to be instructed to release the necessary lumber on credit with preferential terms.

6. All output produced by the kulaks, no matter what it is, is to be turned over to state cooperative organizations on terms stipulated by them.

7. Families are to be concentrated in inhabited localities until navigation opens. To this end it is essential to start immediately the construction of barracks to house the families and to allocate the necessary funds for this purpose.

8. Families settled in barracks are to be provided with food on a hunger ration,<sup>47</sup> for which purpose the Commissariat of Trade is to transfer the necessary quantity of food to feed them for four months (until navigation).

9. For the temporary lodging of families of exiled kulaks, the OGPU is instructed to house them primarily in monasteries, other residential facilities, and in the villages.

10. The Commissariat of Health is instructed to provide the exiles with medicines and sanitary services in places where they are concentrated and while they are transported.

11. All exiled kulaks are required to take along a two-month supply of food and must also have a saw, an ax, a shovel, and warm winter clothing. The total load per family must not exceed 30 poods [491 kg].

12. Cash on hand up to a maximum of 3,000 rubles is not to be confiscated.

• DOCUMENT 59 •

Politburo draft decree on the liquidation of the kulak as a class, prepared by the subcommittee of I. D. Kabakov, 23 January 1930. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 78, ll. 40–36. Mimeograph copy of a certified copy.

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23 January 1930

Top secret

In order to destroy the kulaks as a class and ensure the socialist reconstruction of agriculture, it is deemed necessary to take the following measures against kulak and White Guard elements in the countryside, especially in raions of wholesale collectivization and in the western border zone:

1. Instruct the OGPU to intensify repression on an extrajudicial basis against: (a) participants in counterrevolutionary organizations and groups; (b) instigators and organizers of acts of terror, arson, and mass disturbances; (c) wreckers of various types who cause all manner of damage to the property and inventory of state and collective farms, imposing on these elements confinement in a concentration camp, exile, and the death penalty.

2. In this connection, grant the OGPU the right to delegate its powers to OGPU plenipotentiary representatives along with representatives of the krai party committee and the procurator's office.

3. With regard to the remaining kulak elements in the countryside, especially in raions of wholesale collectivization and the western border zone, impose:

a. exile to the areas specified below, with confiscation of property and appropriation of inventory above the labor norm;

b. internal resettlement within raions and okrugs to places where the resettled people will be most effectively neutralized economically, with the worst land provided to them, their property confiscated, and only the labor norm of agricultural inventory allowed them.

4. Carry out measures under clause 3 on the basis of a special law and complete them no later than 1 April of this year, especially in the Northern Caucasus Krai, the Lower Volga Krai, the Central Black Earth Oblast, the Middle Volga Krai, and the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, revise current law on the leasing of land and hired labor in agriculture<sup>48</sup> so as to allow this on a limited scale on collective farms and to completely prohibit this on individual farms.

5. Transfer all confiscated property on preferential credit terms to the indivisible fund of the relevant collective farms, at fixed prices.

6. Exile kulak elements first from the following areas: Northern Caucasus Krai, Ukrainian SSR, Lower Volga Krai, Central Black Earth Oblast, Middle Volga Krai, Belorussian SSR, Western Oblast; second: Leningrad Military District, Urals Oblast, Kazakhstan, Far Eastern Krai, Siberia. Approximately up to 100,000 families are to be exiled.

7. Designate okrugs of the Northern Krai (up to 60,000 families), Siberia (30,000 families), and the Urals (10,000 families) as sites for exile.

8. Lists of persons subject to exile and internal resettlement shall be determined by village soviets and approved by raion executive committees, and oblast and okrug executive committees shall report in a timely manner the places of exile and areas of resettlement.

9. It is feasible to allow at the same time the voluntary resettlement of kulaks against whom resettlement to worse land is being imposed.

10. Krai and oblast party committees and executive committees are to designate specific sites for local resettlement and voluntary relocation, as well as methods and the procedure for utilizing resettled people in economic jobs (logging, excavation work, road construction, fishing, etc.).

11. Kulaks resettled on worse land must give a pledge to fulfill state assignments for the expansion of sown area, for contracting, for raising crop yields, animal husbandry, and so forth, and hostages must be taken from among them to ensure their loyal behavior.

Soviet and party organizations must secure the division of resettled kulak families by establishing artels and associations out of loyal elements of young people and utilizing them to carry out special assignments in construction, logging, land reclamation, and similar work.

12. Forbid the unauthorized resettlement of kulak elements without the permission of the appropriate soviet organs.



13. Families of Red Army soldiers and Red partisans shall not be exiled. As for the kulaks' families whose members work in production or were participants in the civil war, an especially careful approach should be employed with regard to their exile.

Permit kulak families in German, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and other [ethnic] colonies to move abroad, with their property transferred to the collective-farm fund.

14. Revise immediately the laws on organizations of religious groups so as to expel from them all disfranchised persons, nonworking elements, and their ilk.<sup>49</sup>

15. Direct the Commissariat of Labor and the VTsSPS to elaborate measures to purge industrial enterprises of kulak elements who have infiltrated them and also to take measures to prevent them from getting back into production through lower-level trade union organizations.

16. Direct the Commissariat of Education to elaborate practical measures for the organization of work in higher educational institutions and second-stage secondary schools, with a view to neutralizing the influence of antisoviet elements and children of kulak elements and disfranchised persons, without stopping at repression against the most inveterate of them while intensifying indoctrination work among the rest.

17. In order to successfully implement the measures to exile kulak and other counterrevolutionary elements from the countryside, it is deemed necessary:

a. to increase the staff of the OGPU by 700–800 plenipotentiaries, allocating the funds required for this purpose, to serve the administrative areas that lack such plenipotentiaries;

b. to authorize the OGPU to mobilize old Chekists from the reserves;

c. to allocate to the OGPU the necessary funds to carry out the necessary operation. To instruct the OGPU to submit immediately its estimate of necessary expenditures.

18. In order to implement the aforementioned measures and to provide proletarian leadership, it is expedient [to conduct] a special mobilization of workers at factories and plants and responsible party officials to be sent to work in various okrugs and raions.

19. Take measures so that the campaign proceeds in an organized manner, not allowing any spontaneous breaches, excesses, [or] unauthorized measures such as arbitrary confiscations, divvying up of property, and so forth.

20. Carry out all the necessary legislative revisions on an urgent basis within 10 days.

Kabakov  
 N. Krylenko  
 Yevdokimov  
 Yagoda

• DOCUMENT 60 •

Proposals by the subcommittee of Ya. A. Yakovlev regarding the Politburo draft decree on measures to liquidate the kulak as a class, no later than 25 January 1930. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 78, ll. 35–33.  
 Mimeograph copy of a certified copy.

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No later than 25 January 1930

I. Grant okrug executive committees in raions of wholesale collectivization the right to issue decrees:

1. prohibiting the hiring of workers and the leasing of land by all kulak farms;

2. authorizing raion executive committees and, at their behest, village soviets to confiscate kulaks' means of production, farm and residential structures, processing enterprises, and fodder and seed reserves so that kulaks retain means of production that are no more than the minimum needed for farming on the plots allotted to them;

3. granting the right to raion executive committees and village soviets to exile kulaks from collective farms or to allot to them remote land plots that lie outside collective-farm fields;

4. granting the right to raion executive committees and village soviets to issue decrees, pursuant to decisions by collective farmers' meetings and meetings of poor peasants and landless laborers, to exile kulaks to remote localities of the country if they actively resist and damage the cause of collective-farm construction;

5. ordering the confiscation, in part or in full, of the deposits and shares of kulaks in all forms of cooperatives and agricultural credit agencies.

II. In order to prevent kulaks from ruining and squandering their property, grant village soviets and raion executive committees the right to register all kulak property and to forbid kulaks to sell it without permission from the village soviet.

III. In order to establish the following procedure for confiscating means of production from kulaks and for utilizing them:

1. the confiscation shall be carried out by the village soviet with the mandatory participation of representatives of collective farms, agricultural workers' committees, farm-laborer activists, and groups of landless laborers and poor peasants;

2. the means of production and property confiscated from kulaks shall be turned over by the village soviet or raion executive committee to the collective farm as dues from landless laborers and added to the collective farm's indivisible fund, except for the portion that is used to repay the kulak farm's indebtedness to agricultural credit agencies or cooperatives;

3. the confiscated shares of kulaks in all forms of cooperatives, as well as deposits in agricultural credit associations, shall be added to the fund for the establishment of cooperatives and collectivization of landless laborers and poor peasants;

4. a collective farm that receives confiscated kulak means of production, enterprises, structures, property, seed, and land used by kulaks shall be required, pursuant to a special contractual addendum, not only to sow the land previously used by kulaks but also to increase the overall assignments under the contract by an amount at least 50 percent greater than the area of the land previously used by the kulak and turned over to the collective farm;

5. kulaks' residential structures that are confiscated in full or in part shall be used either for the communal needs of the collective farm or village soviet or as a dormitory for landless laborers who join the collective farm and do not have their own housing.

IV. All these measures must be carried out on the basis of the widest possible development of initiative and activity by the broad masses of collective farmers, landless laborers, and poor peasants. Decisions of village soviets and raion executive committees to confiscate kulak property must be preceded in each case by decrees of general meetings of collective-farm members and meetings of landless-laborer and poor-peasant groups and landless laborers and poor peasants so that, as a result, the liquidation of the kulaks as a class is indeed an integral component of wholesale collectivization.

Subcommittee chairman Ya. Yakovlev

## · DOCUMENT 61 ·

Politburo decree "On Measures for the Liquidation of Kulak Farms in Raions of Wholesale Collectivization," 30 January 1930. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 64–69. Certified copy; *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1994, no. 4, pp. 147–52.

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30 January 1930

Top secret

I. On Measures to Liquidate Kulak Farms in  
Raions of Wholesale Collectivization

Proceeding from the policy of the liquidation of the kulak as a class and, in this connection, from the necessity of carrying out, in the most organized manner, the process of liquidating kulak farms, which has begun in raions of wholesale collectivization, and of resolutely suppressing the kulaks' attempts at counterrevolutionary resistance to the collective-farm movement of the peasant masses and recognizing the urgency of these measures in connection with the approaching agricultural campaign, the CC resolves:

To implement the following measures in raions of wholesale collectivization immediately and in the remaining areas as collectivization takes on a genuinely mass scale:

1. Repeal the applicability of laws on the leasing of land and the use of hired labor in agriculture (sections VII and VIII of the General Principles of Land Use and Land Reorganization) to individual peasant farms in raions of wholesale collectivization. Exceptions to this rule with respect to middle-peasant farms must be regulated by raion executive committees under the leadership and supervision of the okrug executive committee.

2. Confiscate from kulaks in these raions their means of production, livestock, farm and residential structures, processing enterprises, and fodder and seed reserves.

3. At the same time, in order to resolutely undermine the kulaks' influence on certain segments of the poor and middle peasantry and completely suppress any attempts at counterrevolutionary resistance by the kulaks to the measures being implemented by Soviet power and collective farms, take the following measures against the kulaks:

a. Category 1—immediately liquidate the counterrevolutionary kulak *aktiv* elements by incarcerating them in concentration camps, not stop-

ping at the death penalty for organizers of terrorist acts, counterrevolutionary disturbances, and insurrectionist organizations;

b. Category 2 should be comprised of the remaining elements of the kulak *aktiv*, especially the richest kulaks and quasi-landowners, who are to be exiled to remote localities of the USSR and, within the borders of a given region, to remote areas of the region;

c. Category 3 consists of kulaks who are left within the borders of the raion; they are to be resettled on new land plots allotted to them outside collective farms.

4. The number of kulak farms liquidated in each of the three categories must be strictly differentiated by raion, depending on the actual number of kulak farms in the raion, so that the total number of liquidated farms in all of the principal raions amounts to an average of about 3–5 percent. This guideline (3–5 percent) is designed to concentrate the strike on genuinely kulak farms and to prevent these measures under any circumstances from being extended to any segment of middle-peasant farms.

The families of Red Army men and commanders of the RKKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] are not subject to exile or confiscation. As for kulaks whose family members have been working at factories and plants for a long time, an especially careful approach must be employed, and the position of the relevant persons not only in the countryside but also in the relevant factory organizations should be ascertained.

## II. On the Exile and Resettlement of Kulaks

To implement the following measures in the immediate future:

1. Instruct the OGPU to carry out repressive measures against the first and second categories of kulaks during the next four months (February–May), based on an approximate calculation—send 60,000 kulaks to concentration camps and exile 150,000 kulaks to remote areas; ensure that everything is done so that by 15 April these measures will have been implemented, in any event, against at least half of the aforementioned numbers. The implementation of these measures must be based on the specific rate of collectivization in each oblast of the USSR and coordinated with krai committees of the VKP(b).

2. Members of the families of kulaks who are exiled and incarcerated in concentration camps may, if they wish and with the consent of local raion executive committees, remain temporarily or permanently in their former raion (or okrug).

3. Based on information from the regions, establish tentatively the fol-

lowing distribution by oblast of kulaks to be incarcerated in camps and exiled:

	Concentration Camp	Exile
Middle Volga	3,000–4,000	8,000–10,000
Northern Caucasus and Dagestan	6,000–8,000	20,000
Ukraine	15,000	30,000–35,000
Central Black Earth Oblast	3,000–5,000	10,000–15,000
Lower Volga	4,000–6,000	10,000–12,000
Belorussia	4,000–5,000	6,000–7,000
Urals	4,000–5,000	10,000–15,000
Siberia	5,000–6,000	25,000
Kazakhstan	5,000–6,000	10,000–15,000

With regard to the remaining oblasts and republics, instruct the OGPU to set a similar plan in coordination with the respective krai party committees and the CC of the VKP(b).

4. Exile 70,000 families to okrugs in the Northern Krai, 50,000 families to Siberia, 20,000–25,000 families to okrugs in the Urals, 20,000–25,000 families to okrugs in Kazakhstan. The areas of exile must be unpopulated and sparsely populated localities, with the exiles utilized in agricultural jobs or trades (timber, fishing, etc.). Exiled kulaks are to be resettled in these areas in small settlements, which are to be administered by designated commandants.

5. When the property of exiled and resettled kulaks is confiscated, they are to be allowed to keep only the most essential household items and some elementary means of production consistent with the nature of their work in the new locality and the minimum food reserves necessary for the initial period. The cash of exiled kulaks shall also be confiscated, while allowing the kulaks, however, to keep a certain minimum amount (up to 500 rubles per family) needed for their journey and getting settled in the locality.

6. With regard to kulak farms that are left in place, with new plots of land outside collective-farm fields allotted to them, adhere to the following guidelines:

a. okrug executive committees must specify the areas of resettlement with a view to allowing only small settlements in the allotted relocation areas, which are to be administered by special committees (a troika) or by plenipotentiaries appointed by raion executive committees and confirmed by okrug executive committees;

b. resettled kulaks in this category shall be allowed to keep means of production in the minimum quantities needed for farming on the newly allotted plots;

c. resettled kulaks in this category shall be given certain production assignments in agriculture and obligations for the delivery of marketable output to state and cooperative authorities;

d. okrug executive committees are to work out on an urgent basis methods of utilizing resettled kulaks as workers on special labor squads and in colonies in logging, road, land reclamation, and other work;

e. with regard to kulak families that are exiled beyond the borders of the raion, it is imperative, in particular, to bear in mind the possibility of dividing them and setting certain elements of the young generation—where possible—against the remaining kulaks. This effort should include the use of such methods as the gathering of newspaper subscriptions and literature, establishing libraries, setting up common canteens and other cultural and general service measures. It is possible in certain cases to recruit specific groups of young people to perform jobs as a volunteer activity for local soviets, to support poor peasants, etc., and also to establish production artels and agricultural associations of a special type, for example, in connection with construction and land-reclamation work, forestation, uprooting of trees, etc. All these measures must be implemented under the strictest supervision of the local authorities.

7. Lists of kulak farms (category 2) to be exiled to remote areas shall be determined by raion executive committees on the basis of decisions by collective farmers' meetings and meetings of landless laborers and poor peasants and shall be approved by okrug executive committees. The procedure for resettlement of the remaining kulak farms (category 3) shall be determined by okrug executive committees.

### III. On the Confiscation and Disposition of Property

1. Confiscation of the property of kulaks shall be carried out by special plenipotentiaries of raion executive committees with the mandatory participation of the village soviet, collective-farm chairmen, groups of landless laborers and poor peasants, and farm-laborer committees.

2. At the time of confiscation, a precise inventory and appraisal of the confiscated property shall be conducted, and village soviets shall be assigned responsibility for keeping the confiscated items fully intact.

3. Means of production and property confiscated from kulaks shall be turned over by raion executive committees to collective farms as a dues payment for poor peasants and landless laborers and shall be added to the collective farms' indivisible fund, while the obligations (debts) owed state and cooperative authorities from the liquidated kulak farm shall be fully repaid out of the confiscated property.

4. Collective farms that receive land and confiscated property must sow all of the transferred land and deliver all marketable output to the state.

5. Residential structures confiscated from kulaks shall be used for the collective needs of village soviets and collective farms or for a dormitory to lodge landless laborers joining the collective farm who do not have their own housing.

6. Savings books and state loan bonds in the possession of kulaks in all three categories shall be seized and included in the inventory, and a receipt stating that they have been sent to the appropriate organs of the Commissariat of Finance for safekeeping shall be issued. Any issuance of funds to exiled kulak farms from deposits in savings banks, or issuance of loans secured by bonds, in raions of wholesale collectivization shall be completely discontinued.

7. The shares and deposits of kulaks of all three categories in cooperative associations shall be turned over to the fund for the collectivization of poor peasants and landless laborers, and their owners shall be expelled from all types of cooperatives.

In adopting these decisions regarding the liquidation of kulak farms in raions of wholesale collectivization, the CC categorically directs that the implementation of these measures must be organically linked with the genuinely mass collective-farm movement of poor and middle peasants and be an integral component of the process of wholesale collectivization. The CC resolutely warns against instances, which are taking place in some areas, where the work of mass collectivization is replaced by naked dekulakization. Only when combined with the broadest organization of poor peasants and landless laborers and when the masses of poor and middle peasants are unified on the basis of collectivization can the necessary administrative measures for dekulakization result in the successful fulfillment of the tasks set by the party with regard to the socialist reorganization of the countryside and the liquidation of the kulaks.

The CC stresses that all of the aforementioned measures must be implemented on the basis of the maximum development of initiative and activity by the broad collective-farm masses, above all landless laborers and poor peasants, and with their support. Decisions to confiscate kulak property and exile kulaks must be preceded by decrees of a general meeting of collective-farm members and a meeting of landless laborers and poor peasants. In warning against underestimating the difficulties involved in the implementation of these measures and demanding that local organizations take every measure to ensure that they are implemented in the most organized manner, the CC requires krai party committees and republic



central committees to establish permanent leadership of the implementation of these decisions not just in words, but in practice.

#### IV. Special Decrees

1. To assist local party organizations in the implementation of the aforementioned measures, the CC resolves that 2,500 party members be mobilized, not below the okrug level, from industrial oblasts (Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Kharkov-Donets Basin, etc.) for four months. Mobilized personnel are to depart for the provinces no later than 20 February.

2. Grant the OGPU the right for the duration of the campaign to delegate its plenipotentiary powers for the extrajudicial consideration of cases to OGPU plenipotentiary representatives in the oblasts. In these instances the cases are to be considered jointly with representatives of krai committees of the VKP(b) and procurators' offices.

3. For the current 1929-30 fiscal year, increase the OGPU staff by 800 plenipotentiaries, with the allocation of the funds needed for this purpose, to support administrative areas that have no plenipotentiaries. Authorize the OGPU to mobilize these 800 comrades first of all from among old Chekists in the reserves. In addition, increase OGPU troops by 1,000 infantrymen and cavalrymen (for the current fiscal year). The RVSR [Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic] is directed to transfer the appropriate number of personnel to the OGPU.

4. Instruct the USSR Sovnarkom to consider within three days the estimate for necessary expenditures for the aforementioned measures, the estimate for expenditures on the expulsion of kulaks to remote areas, and the estimate for the establishment of new, additional camps in areas of Siberia and the Northern Krai. The OGPU is directed to submit these estimates.

5. Direct the Commissariat of Transport and the OGPU to draw up, within five days, a plan for the necessary rail transports.

6. Instruct the Commissariat of Labor and the VTsSPS, and at the same time VSNKh and the Commissariat of Transport, to take immediate measures to purge industrial enterprises in the cities of individual kulak elements (without allowing any general purge campaign to occur at enterprises), and to take tough measures to bar such elements from going to work in industry in the future.

7. Require party committees (especially in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and Kiev), the OGPU, and the Union-republic commissariats of education to take more decisive measures in higher educational and higher

technical educational institutions to combat counterrevolutionary youth groups linked to kulak elements in the countryside.

8. Revise, on an urgent basis, laws on religious associations with a view to completely eliminating any possibility whatsoever of transforming the leading bodies of these associations (church councils, sectarian communities, and others) into bases of support for kulaks, disfranchised persons, and antisoviet elements in general.

Instruct the CC Organizational Bureau to issue a directive on the closing of churches, houses of prayer of sectarians, and other facilities and on the struggle against the religious and sectarian movement in order to eliminate impediments in the soviet apparatus to the implementation of the decisions adopted by the vast majority of the peasantry to close churches, houses of prayer of sectarians, and so forth. Specify in this directive as well the necessity of carrying out these measures with particular caution in backward national areas.

9. Direct the USSR Sovnarkom to issue the legislative revisions necessitated by this decree within five days so that they are put into effect by krai executive committees and the governments of national republics in raions of wholesale collectivization immediately and in the remaining areas according to the rate of development of wholesale collectivization.

10. Issue on an urgent basis (within three days) a decree, not for publication, requiring the following to be implemented everywhere (not only in raions of wholesale collectivization):

a. a ban on free migration by kulaks from their places of residence without permission of raion executive committees, on pain of immediate confiscation of all property;

b. a ban on the selling off by kulaks of their property and inventory, on pain of confiscation and other repressive measures.

• DOCUMENT 62 •

OGPU directive on the creation of operational groups at OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices and on the elaboration of specific plans for exiling kulaks,  
18 January 1930. GARE, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 13-14. Copy.

18 January 1930

No. 776

To OGPU Plenipotentiary Representatives: Northern Caucasus Krai, Ukrainian SSR, Central Black Earth Oblast, Lower Volga Krai, Middle Volga Krai, and Belorussia

In connection with the forthcoming resolution of the matter [of] mass exiles of kulak and White Guard elements, primarily in raions of wholesale collectivization, in addition to general measures, pursuant to our directive no. 775<sup>50</sup> of 18 January sent by telegraph, I hereby order:

1. The establishment of an operational group at OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices to consolidate all work for the forthcoming operation. Immediately draw up and submit to the OGPU a detailed plan for the operation that takes account of all operational, personnel, troop, and technical issues.

2. Immediately set about closing all active files and concluding investigations on an urgent basis so as to unload the apparatus and places of incarceration.

3. Take into account precisely in the plan and report by telegraph which raions kulak and White Guard elements are to be exiled from and in what numbers.

4. Take into account precisely the number of operatives from the Chekist mobilization reserves that is needed for the operation and may be mobilized by you on site.

5. [In] areas from which people are to be exiled and which have been contaminated by counterrevolutionary antisoviet elements, where our work has been weak, deploy workers from the [OGPU] plenipotentiary representative offices immediately.

6. Determine the railroad stations where persons being exiled will be concentrated before departure and calculate the quantity of transport units and rolling stock that must be delivered to these places.

7. Rigorously take account of the situation in the raions and the possibility of outbreaks [*vspysbki*] so that any such incidents can be stopped without the slightest delay. Ensure uninterrupted information and agent work in the raions of operation.

8. Rigorously calculate the deployment and utilization of available troops of the OGPU and RKKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]. Plan locations for the deployment of reserves.

9. Communicate [on] all the aforementioned matters by telegraph and afterward in detailed reports.

Communicate from now on about how the work is proceeding in special operational summary reports on important matters by telegraph.

Yagoda

Yevdokimov

## · DOCUMENT 63 ·

OGPU directive on preparatory measures for the exile of “kulak and White Guard elements” from raions of wholesale collectivization, 23 January 1930.

GARE, f. R-9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 15. Copy.

23 January 1930

No. 3299

To OGPU Plenipotentiary Representatives: Northern Caucasus Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Middle Volga Krai, Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, Central Black Earth Oblast

In elaboration of item 1 in cipher telegram no. 776 of 18 January.<sup>51</sup> When drawing up the plan, carefully develop and communicate on an urgent basis data on the following issues:

1. in which raions, how many and what categories of kulak and White Guard elements are scheduled for exile, and the sequential order of the raions;
2. at what stations you intend to concentrate exiles for further transport along the railroad. What quantity of transport units—railroad cars and trains [*eshelony*—will be needed;
3. what number of executive and rank-and-file operational personnel is needed to fill out the apparatus, especially of raion [OGPU] plenipotentiaries, and how many reserve Chekists you will be able to mobilize on site;
4. what amount of troops (RKKA and OGPU) is needed to support the operation and in what raions;
5. places where reserves are concentrated, especially in the most dangerous areas where outbreaks may be expected;
6. your measures to empty out places of incarceration;
7. an estimate of necessary expenditures for the operation.

Final directives, the timing of the operation, and the number of exiles will be provided to you in a timely manner, after the issue is decided at the highest level.

Messing

Yevdokimov

• DOCUMENT 64 •

Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda to leading OGPU officials on increasing the intervention of OGPU central organs in dekulakization, 24 January 1930.

TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 1, ll. 396–97ob. Certified copy.

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24 January 1930

No. 44224

To Comrades Messing, Yevdokimov, Vorontsov, Prokofiev

The work in Moscow Oblast is in very poor shape. Yesterday there was a decree by the oblast bureau on the resolute dekulakization of kulaks in the oblast, especially kitchen gardeners [*ogorodniki*] outside Moscow. I found out at the bureau that 520 kulaks had been dekulakized in Orekhovo-Zuevo and that the okrug chief, Yevstafiev, took a most active role but did not find it necessary to warn us of this.

We lead OGPU work throughout the Union, yet next door, right under our nose, we don't know what is going on. And this Yevstafiev—he didn't even give thought to whether he should ask for instructions at all on this matter.

I am afraid that our leadership in Moscow Oblast may evaporate and the entire dekulakization will proceed, if not without us, then with weak participation on our part unless we take decisive measures at once, such as against comrades like Yevstafiev, and focus at once on the oblast.

The kulak issue, as you know, is very serious. The localities are rushing things. Our strike at the kulak, which must be devastating, may become weaker unless we take charge in the localities.

1. A directive must be issued at once to mete out a harsh punishment to the kulak counterrevolutionaries.

2. We should begin at once to send out a portion of the trainees (from the border guards' school, the OGPU Transport Department, and plenipotentiaries). Put them in the dangerous places first (Lower Volga, Middle Volga, Central Black Earth Oblast, and Moscow).

3. Empty out the prisons, and for that purpose move all cases through quickly.

4. For this period take trainees out of the schools in the center (after reviewing the most talented) and assign them to various branches. Credit the trainees with time served in practical work.

5. Begin arrests in Moscow Oblast of especially inveterate kulaks and of kitchen gardeners, and for this purpose assign trainees to Moscow's

raions, after giving them thorough instructions (I can speak at a general meeting of the border guards' school). Moscow's experience is very important for us.

6. The Moscow Oblast Bureau has formed a commission of seven members: Bauman, Yagoda, Ukhanov, Shumiatsky, Ryndin, and two others—I don't remember—for dekulakization.

7. The preparation of the operation in the city should take its normal course, roughly the end of February, unless something unexpected happens, although it should be accelerated. We must quickly and decisively derail any opportunities for activity by counterrevolutionaries.

8. We must always have the schools (those who are left) and a division at the ready. There could be minor disturbances.

9. Keep in the closest contact with the localities and okrug apparatuses of Moscow.

10. A directive must be issued to the localities to mobilize Chekist ranks, which once again have a tremendous, difficult job ahead of them, where integrity and our discipline are of tremendous importance. We are engaging in a new battle, we must wage it with minimal losses on our side. This requires a sudden, devastating strike, the force of which depends solely on our preparation and organization, and discipline.

G. Yagoda

· DOCUMENT 65 ·

OGPU Order on Measures for the Liquidation of the Kulak as a Class,  
2 February 1930. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 17-25. Copy.

2 February 1930

No. 44/21

Moscow

In order to carry out the liquidation of the kulak as a class in the most organized manner and to decisively suppress any attempts by the kulaks to counteract the measures of Soviet power for the socialist reorganization of agriculture—above all in raions of wholesale collectivization—a devastating blow must be delivered to the kulaks as soon as possible, especially the richest and most active counterrevolutionary part. The kulaks' resistance must be and will be decisively broken.

The implementation of this historic task will demand exceptional inten-

sity in every area of party and soviet work. The tasks entrusted by the party to the OGPU organs are especially serious, complex, and responsible.

What will be demanded of our organs more than ever is an exceptionally intense effort, determination, and perseverance, an exceptionally rigorous class line, and efficient and swift action.

The tasks that have been set will be successfully carried out only if there is unconditional support for them from the majority of landless laborers and poor and middle peasants; only when these tasks are organically linked to the process of mass collectivization. The support of the masses of landless laborers and poor and middle peasants will be at its fullest if our measures have a strict class orientation.

The blow must be inflicted solely on the kulaks. A blow at the kulak *aktiv* must disorganize and neutralize all of the kulaks.

The measures of the OGPU organs should develop in two basic directions:

1. Immediate liquidation of the counterrevolutionary kulak *aktiv*, especially the cadre of active counterrevolutionary and insurrectionist organizations and groups and the most inveterate, diehard individuals (category 1).

2. The mass exile (from raions of wholesale collectivization and the border zone first) of the richest kulaks (former landowners, quasi-landowners, local kulak leaders, and the entire kulak cadre from which the counterrevolutionary *aktiv* is formed, and the antisoviet kulak *aktiv* of clergymen and sectarians) and their families to remote northern areas of the USSR and confiscation of their property (category 2).

In order to carry out the campaign to exile kulaks and their families in the swiftest and most painless manner, it is imperative above all that our organs decisively and immediately liquidate all existing counterrevolutionary kulak–White Guard and bandit cadres, and especially the counterrevolutionary organizations, groups, and bands that they have set up.

The liquidation of such counterrevolutionary entities and the most active individuals is already underway in all of the principal areas of the Union, pursuant to telegraphed OGPU directives.

This operation must be basically completed by the time the campaign to exile the kulaks and their families begins to unfold. Resolute operational actions against such counterrevolutionary elements and especially against manifestations of organized counterrevolution and bandit activity must naturally be carried out as well during the exile campaign and afterward.

A blow must be dealt first to the active kulak elements of category 1:

1. The most diehard and active kulaks who are resisting and disrupting the measures of the party and the government for the socialist reorganization of the economy. Kulaks who flee from their raions of permanent residence and go underground, especially those who ally themselves with active White Guards and bandits.

2. Kulaks who are active White Guards, insurgents, former bandits, former White officers, repatriates, former active members of punitive detachments, and others who are now conducting counterrevolutionary activities, especially of an organized nature.

3. Kulaks who are active members of church councils and any kind of religious or sectarian communes or groups and are conspicuously active.

4. The richest kulaks—moneylenders, speculators who destroy their farms, former landowners, and owners of large tracts of land.

The following numbers of above-mentioned active kulak and White Guard counterrevolutionary elements (category 1) have been slated for removal during the operation, broken down by areas of the USSR:

Ukraine	15,000
Northern Caucasus and Dagestan	6,000–8,000
Middle Volga	3,000–4,000
Central Black Earth Oblast	3,000–5,000
Lower Volga	4,000–6,000
Belorussia	4,000–5,000
Urals	4,000–5,000
Siberia	5,000–6,000
Kazakhstan	5,000–6,000

Arrestees in this category shall be concentrated in okrug and oblast departments of the OGPU. Their cases shall be completed by investigators on an urgent basis and shall be considered by troikas for the extrajudicial consideration of cases that will be set up at OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices. The majority of such arrestees shall be incarcerated in concentration camps; resolute measures must be meted out against the most inveterate and diehard *aktiv* of counterrevolutionary organizations, groups, and individuals, up to and including the death penalty.

Families of arrestees who are incarcerated in concentration camps or are sentenced to the death penalty must be exiled to northern areas of the Union, along with kulaks and their families who are exiled in the mass campaign, while taking account of the presence of able-bodied persons in the family and the degree of social danger posed by these families.

The property of such families shall be confiscated according to the same procedure as that of exiled kulaks' families.



Campaigns to exile kulaks and their families shall be conducted first in the following areas of the USSR:

- |                                   |                                       |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Ukrainian SSR                  | —30,000–35,000 families to be exiled. |
| 2. Northern Caucasus and Dagestan | —20,000 families to be exiled.        |
| 3. Middle Volga Krai              | —8,000–10,000 families to be exiled.  |
| 4. Central Black Earth Oblast     | —10,000–15,000 families to be exiled. |
| 5. Lower Volga Krai               | —10,000–12,000 families to be exiled. |
| 6. Belorussia                     | —6,000–7,000 families to be exiled.   |
| 7. Siberia                        | —25,000 families to be exiled.        |
| 8. Urals                          | —10,000–15,000 families to be exiled. |
| 9. Kazakhstan                     | —10,000–15,000 families to be exiled. |

The pertinent calculations for the remaining oblasts and republics will be done very shortly, in coordination with OGPU plenipotentiary representatives.

Departure locations and numbers are subject to change, depending on conditions.

Localities for the settlement of exiled kulaks and their families and the families of the ousted kulak and White Guard counterrevolutionary *aktiv* are tentatively as follows:

- |                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| a. from Northern Caucasus Krai      | —23,000 to the Urals; 5,000 to Kazakhstan; |
| b. from the Ukrainian SSR           | —50,000 to the Northern Krai,              |
| from the Central Black Earth Oblast | —20,000 to the Northern Krai;              |
| c. from the Lower Volga Krai        | —18,000 to Siberia,                        |
| from the Middle Volga Krai          | —14,000 to Siberia,                        |
| from the Belorussian SSR            | —12,000 to Siberia.                        |

Tentative starting dates for the exile operation are as follows:

- |  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| Northern Caucasus Krai, Middle Volga Krai,<br>Lower Volga Krai | —10 February 1930; |
| Ukrainian SSR, Central Black Earth Oblast                      | —15 February 1930; |
| Belorussian SSR  | —1 March 1930.     |

Starting dates for the shipment of exiled persons from collection points by train are as follows:

- |  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| Northern Caucasus Krai, Middle Volga Krai,<br>Lower Volga Krai | —15 February 1930; |
| Ukrainian SSR, Central Black Earth Oblast                      | —20 February 1930; |
| Belorussian SSR  | —1 March 1930.     |

In order to carry out all of the aforementioned tasks, I hereby order:

1. The conclusion, as quickly as possible, of the liquidation of all active counterrevolutionary organizations, groups, and active counterrevolutionary individuals. Liquidate existing gangs. Conduct a speedy investigation of all such cases and priority consideration of cases on an extrajudicial basis—in troikas at OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices. Dispose, without the slightest delay, of all cases of such categories that arise during the campaign to exile kulaks.

2. For the consideration of cases involving individuals implicated in such cases (category 1), immediately create troikas at OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices, with representatives from the krai party committee and the procurator's office. The make-up of the troika is to be submitted for approval by the OGPU board.

3. Create operational troikas, by directive of the plenipotentiary representatives, for the direct leadership of the overall operation to exile kulaks and their families (category 2), for the purpose of concentrating all materials on the operation and organizing continual communications with the center and with outlying regions.

For the same work in okrugs (or oblasts) and OGPU okrug departments, create operational troikas, headed by the chief of the OGPU department.

In raions, establish raion operational groups to participate directly in the operation.

Establish collection points, headed by a commandant, to receive, record, and continuously dispatch the exiles. Set up agent-investigative groups at the points. The commandants of collection points are to establish direct contact with the cells of OGPU Transport Department organs in the localities that are in charge of putting together and dispatching transport trains.

4. Set up a Chekist-military reserve at OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices for the contingency of possible complications. Establish mobile groups from OGPU units and put them at the disposal of OGPU okrug departments, especially in the most threatened areas (in the sense of possible complications).

Red Army units are not to be used for the operation under any circumstances. Their use is to be permitted only in extreme instances; if there is an uprising, by agreement with krai organizations and the Revolutionary Military Council, OGPU plenipotentiary representatives are to set up military groups in covert form from reliable Red Army units that have been screened by OGPU special organs, in places where there are not enough OGPU troop units.

5. The OGPU plenipotentiary representative in the Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Middle Volga Krai, Central Black Earth Oblast, and the Belorussian Military District are to submit, no later than 7 February, final and detailed plans of operation, based on these instructions.

The remaining OGPU plenipotentiary representatives are to submit their plans by 20 February 1930.

For the final determination of the location of collection points and the number of persons to be exiled through these centers, OGPU plenipotentiary representatives in the Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Middle Volga Krai, and Central Black Earth Oblast are to submit precise information no later than 10 a.m. on 4 February 1930, after coordination with krai organizations. The OGPU plenipotentiary representative in the Belorussian Military District is to submit this information by 10 February 1930.

6. Ensure (especially in raions and okrugs) close supervision of the compilation of lists of kulaks and their families (for exile and confiscation of property) and of the exile campaign itself. Take appropriate measures through raion and okrug executive committees with regard to sounding alarms and eliminating observed defects, excesses, and so forth. Monitor precise adherence to the schedule and scale of the operation, in accordance with existing directives.

7. The OGPU Transport Department is to arrange continuous transportation of exiles in trains and draw up instructions immediately on the procedures for moving and guarding trains.

At the time of departure, exiles shall be permitted to take property and food with them within the specified limits. Require exiled kulak families, with regard to means of production, to take with them axes, saws, shovels, carpenter's tools, and to the extent possible, horses' neck collars and breast collars and enough food for two months, with a total weight of not more than 25–30 poods [410–490 kg] per family. At the time of embarkation, axes, saws, shovels (and other means of production) shall be taken away and loaded onto separate cars of the same trains. Packaging must be soft.

Organs of the OGPU Transport Department are to maintain a continual supply of boiled water for exiles throughout the train journey, as well as service and medical aid through the Commissariat of Transport. The OGPU Transport Department is to set up eating centers at stations (not intended for troop units), where hot food is to be served at least once every two days. Report to the relevant plenipotentiary representatives, in a

timely manner, the location of the eating centers and the times trains will pass through.

8. Take measures to empty out places of incarceration once and for all by the time the mass exile campaign begins.

9. OGPU plenipotentiary representatives in the Northern Krai, the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan are to complete, as soon as possible, arrangements for receiving and settling the exiles and to submit their ideas regarding the procedure for administering the exiles.

10. Intensify informational-gathering and agent work in every possible way throughout the period of the aforementioned measures, so as to provide a thorough and comprehensive explanation to local areas.

Exercise particular vigilance with regard to the timely exposure of all active counterrevolutionary disturbances in preparation and activities by bands of counterrevolutionary organizations, with a view to preventing such disturbances and, if they occur, liquidating them immediately and decisively.

The OGPU Transport Department is to intensify information-gathering and agent work on the railroads. The special departments must do the same in the army, especially in territorial formations and units that may be used for the operation.

For the period of the operation, intensify the inspection [*perliustratsiia*] of correspondence, specifically to provide for a 100 percent review of letters going to the Red Army, and also to intensify the review of letters going abroad and coming in from abroad. Bolster the political control apparatus with mobilized Chekist reserves.

11. OGPU plenipotentiary representatives in whose territories kulaks will not now be exiled are to gather information and conduct agent work with the special task of exposing as fully as possible the effects of the exile operation.

12. Intensify protection of the borders in every possible way.

Strengthen guard units and agent support for all of the most important state installations and enterprises. Pay special attention to grain elevators.

Intensify protection and agent support for all facilities where weapons, artillery supplies, and the like are kept.

13. Intensify the work of our organs in the cities in every possible way, in order to fully uncover the attitudes of urban strata and their links with the countryside and to liquidate manifestations of organized counterrevolutionary activity.

14. Achieve a comprehensive intensification of the fight against criminal banditry and criminal activity in general through the criminal investigation divisions.

15. Establish efficient and uninterrupted communications between all OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices and the center. These communications must fully reflect the progress of the operation on a daily basis. Conduct communications on the basis of the instructions that have been issued.

Establish close communications between OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices in adjoining territories for the purpose of fully coordinating actions.

16. Take every measure so that all the personnel in our organs fully comprehend how exceptionally serious and critical the tasks entrusted to the OGPU organs are. Focus attention in particular on ensuring that all the measures adhere to the most rigorous class line. Explain at the same time that our organs' performance of day-to-day work in the most important areas must not diminish in the least during the exile campaign.

Send the OGPU copies of all orders and basic directives issued by plenipotentiary representatives in outlying regions in connection with the exile campaign.

Tentative instructions on the organizational structure of the operation and the work of collection points and of agent-investigative groups at these sites, and instructions from the OGPU Transport Department, are appended.<sup>52</sup>

OGPU deputy chairman G. Yagoda

• DOCUMENT 66 •

Decree of the CC Secretariat on implementation of the CC decree on measures regarding the kulaks, 3 February 1930. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 38, l. 23.

Certified copy.

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3 February 1930

By cipher

No. 128/sh

To the Northern Krai party committee, the CC of the Ukraine, the CC of Belorussia, the Siberian Krai party committee, the Kazakh Krai party committee, the Northern Caucasus Krai party committee, the Lower Volga Krai party committee, the Middle Volga Krai party committee, the Urals Oblast party committee, the Central Black Earth Oblast party committee

The CC has determined that leading organizations in a number of regions (Middle Volga, Northern Caucasus) are incorrectly implementing the CC directive of 30 January<sup>53</sup> on measures regarding the kulak, rushing with the arrest and exile of kulaks, disregarding the plan and schedule for exiles issued from the center, and thereby creating a danger of anarchy and uncoordinated actions in this serious effort. To avert this danger, the CC resolves:

1. to instruct krai committees and the central committees of national oblasts mentioned in the CC directive of 30 January to coordinate in advance the timing of arrests and exiles, as well as routes to be taken, with the OGPU;
2. to instruct the OGPU to set, within five days, a plan of exile, times, and directions of the first group of exiles to specified raions and to report them to the appropriate oblast organizations.

In addition, the CC calls attention to the fact that certain raions are trying to increase the number of kulaks being exiled and thereby are violating the CC decision. Therefore the CC categorically demands precise implementation of the CC decision adopted on 30 January.<sup>54</sup>

5:40 p.m.

Secretariat of the CC

• DOCUMENT 67 •

Special summary report from the OGPU plenipotentiary representative for Middle Volga Krai on the progress of dekulakization in the krai as of 13 February 1930, 14 February 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 823, ll. 342–51. Certified copy.

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14 February 1930

Top secret

No. 3

Active Participation of the Masses of Poor and Middle Peasants

The practical implementation of dekulakization continues to be accompanied by widespread active participation and initiative on the part of the masses of poor and middle peasants. Furthermore, these activities are mostly taking place in the villages and raions where ample preparatory

work for dekulakization was done. Typically, "patrols" have been set up in some villages on the initiative of the masses of poor and middle peasants themselves; these patrols were assigned the task of not allowing those kulaks whose property was to be expropriated to leave their village (Promzino, Astradamovka and Tagai raions, Ulianovsk Okrug).

At the moment dekulakization was carried out, poor and middle peasants rallied in crowds, in some villages with red flags, approving the dekulakization, and demanded its swiftest possible implementation while taking an active part in the expropriation.

Here are typical examples:

1. In the village of Levzha (Mordvin) in Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, 200 poor and middle peasants came out into the street in an organized manner, expelled the kulaks, and confiscated their property.

2. In the village of Mogilovka (Mordvin) in Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, 50 members of the poor-peasant *aktiv* with red flags carried out dekulakization, and in the process a poor peasant named Admaikin addressed the other poor peasants participating in the dekulakization and said, "Now we are seeing that Soviet power is indeed fighting the kulaks not just in words but in deed."

3. In the village of Zadnee Selishche in Zubova Poliana Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a general meeting of peasants considered the question of collecting funds to purchase a tractor. In the process the question of imposing a new levy on kulak farms was raised. The meeting unanimously approved this proposal and passed a resolution to immediately dekulakize eight kulak farms and demand the disfranchisement of a former merchant named Shchukin and a former lumber dealer named Palatkin, neither of whom had been disfranchised yet.

4. In the village of Bolshoe Kuzmino in Ardatov Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a general meeting of poor peasants passed a resolution to dekulakize eight farms and simultaneously elected a commission to distribute the lodgings and the livestock for feeding.

5. In the village of Vtoroe Krasnoe in Sorochinsk Raion, Orenburg Okrug, poor peasants have exposed five farms that are subject to dekulakization.

6. In the village of Kliuchevka in Sorochinsk Raion, Orenburg Okrug, poor peasants identified 14 kulak farms that are [now] being dekulakized.

7. In the village of Chufarovo in Buzuluk Raion, Samara Okrug, [politically] active poor peasants unanimously adopted a decision to disfranchise and exile from Middle Volga Krai a former large-scale landowner and Baptist preacher named Barsukov, who has yet to be disfranchised.

8. In the village of Lipovka in Talyzino Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a general meeting of poor peasants passed a resolution to dekulakize 20 kulak farms. The next day the property was inventoried, and within two days the kulaks' families were evicted from their houses and their property expropriated.

Along with the active participation of the masses of poor and middle peasants, in a number of areas in some okrugs, due to a lack of mass explanatory work, some poor and middle peasants have treated the kulaks with either sympathy or indifference, and in isolated cases, with pity, helping them with lodgings and providing physical and material assistance.

In the village of Krutoe in Zubova Poliana Raion, Mordvin Oblast, those attending a meeting of the *aktiv* of poor and middle peasants raised for discussion the question of dekulakizing 10 kulak farms and exiling them from the oblast. This proposal met with approval, but because of a statement by a former party member named Laluev, who said, "This policy (of dekulakization) by the party and Soviet power is wrong, property must not be taken away from the laboring peasantry," no one spoke out in opposition to this statement and as a result the question of dekulakization was derailed.

In the village of Shishkeevo in Staroe Shaigovo Raion, Mordvin Oblast, during the expropriation of kulak farms, 50 poor peasants, without putting up resistance to the expropriation, wept with the kulaks and helped them take out their household belongings and also [helped] with lodging them.

In the village of Yelovy Kust in [Novo-]Malykla Raion, Ulianovsk Okrug, a general meeting had before it the question of the establishment of a collective farm and dekulakization, and it adopted a decision to join the collective farm, but 10–15 minutes later a crowd that was participating in the meeting demanded that the okrug executive committee's plenipotentiary, Umpelev, tear up the protocol, and under pressure from the crowd this protocol was torn up.

### The Kulaks' Tactics and Their Activities

The kulaks' response to expropriation consists of the following basic features: (a) spreading various kinds of provocative rumors; (b) self-dekulakization and the distribution of [their] property to poor peasants; (c) flight; and (d) intensive counterrevolutionary activity (threats, arson, mass disturbances, making use mostly of women in the latter instance).

In order to win over the masses of poor and middle peasants, the kulaks spread various types of provocative rumors, such as: "a dark night is go-



ing to be declared soon, and the communists are going to slaughter the disfranchised and their children,” “girls are going to be sent to China,” “life on Solovki is good, people are getting four pounds of bread a day and making 4–5 rubles a day,” “they’re going to stop withdrawals from savings accounts,” “confiscated property will be returned, since the communists have gotten frightened of the Chinese, who have come back to attack Russia,” and so forth.

In many cases these provocative rumors have not been adequately dispelled by local party authorities, and as a result the rumors are having an impact on poor and middle peasants.

In the village of Rucheiki, Syzran Raion, in the okrug of the same name, kulaks have unleashed a rumor that a message written in gold lettering has fallen out of the sky, saying that Judgment Day is approaching and therefore nothing else is needed, so people should join the collective farms without livestock. As a result of this agitation, people have increased the slaughter of livestock.

In a number of raions in Syzran Okrug, a rumor has been spread that withdrawals will not be allowed from savings accounts, and as a result of this there has been a big rush of depositors, demanding their deposits back, on the savings banks.

A rumor was circulated on the collective farms of Syzran Okrug that the collective farms are a venture by the landowners, who have entrenched themselves in power, that they are the ones who are collecting their land, livestock, etc., so that when war breaks out, the bolsheviks will be destroyed, the landowners will come to the collective farms, i.e., their estates, and will live a life of leisure, while all of the collective farmers will become their slaves. This rumor has caused an increase in pullouts from collective farms.

In Shigony Raion, Syzran Okrug, rumors are being spread that a dark night will soon be declared and the communists will slaughter the disfranchised and their children. The result of this agitation has been that disfranchised persons, women, and children are going to church in groups, confessing their sins and receiving communion in preparation for death.

In Bogdashkino Raion, Ulianovsk Okrug, the kulaks have unleashed a rumor that girls will soon be sent to China; as a result of this, girls are getting married on a massive scale, and kulaks’ daughters, as a rule, are marrying poor peasants.

In [Novo-]Malykla Raion, Ulianovsk Okrug, kulaks are spreading a rumor that on Solovki people get four pounds of bread a day and are making 4–5 rubles a day. As a result of this there has been a mass exodus to the North not only of kulaks but also of poor peasants.

In Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, kulaks have circulated a rumor that confiscated property will be returned, since the communists have gotten frightened of the Chinese, who have come back to attack Russia, and as a result there has been an exodus from the collective farms.

#### Self-Dekulakization

Self-dekulakization is being carried out primarily through the sale of draft animals and farm implements, the physical destruction of livestock, and the distribution by kulaks of their property among poor peasants.

In the village of Novo-Troitskoe in Staroe Shaigovo Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a kulak named I. T. Sernov killed 120 of his 200 bee hives, and gave away the rest. In addition, he distributed 40 poods [655 kg] of honey and delivered his horse and a load of clothing and textile goods to citizen Kuzin in the village of Letka, Staroe Shaigovo Raion.

In Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, some kulaks are destroying their property and selling off their livestock in order not to give it to the collective farm.

Similar cases have been observed in other okrugs (Orenburg, Ulianovsk, and Syzran).

#### The Flight of Kulaks

Kulaks are fleeing on a massive scale, according to information that is by no means complete or precise. Available information indicates that kulaks are fleeing not only on an individual basis, but also in groups, often abandoning their farms and families to the mercy of fate. They are mostly fleeing to Central Asia and Siberia.

There have been cases in which kulaks have fled to major industrial cities, in particular to Magnitostroi [Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Integrated Plant construction project] and Stalingradstroi [Stalingrad Tractor Plant construction project].

By okrug, the number of kulaks who have fled (as already indicated, according to incomplete information) is as follows: Buguruslan Okrug, 158; Ulianovsk Okrug, 164; Kuznetsk Okrug, 70.

In several raions of Ulianovsk Okrug, 90 kulaks were recorded as having fled to Magnitostroi and Stalingradstroi.

In the village of Novo-Troitskoe in Staroe Shaigovo Raion, Mordvin Oblast, 16 kulaks have fled.

In Achadovo Raion, Mordvin Oblast, kulaks are abandoning their property and families and fleeing primarily to Siberia and Central Asia.

In the village of Kulikovo in Tengushevo Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a kulak named Korobov has abandoned his farm and 10-year-old daughter and fled to an unknown destination.

In the settlement of Golovsky in Ilek Raion, Orenburg Okrug, as many as 50 families have departed, mostly for Central Asia.

In the settlement of Kindelia in Ilek Raion, Orenburg Okrug, six kulaks have fled, some of them with their families, abandoning their property.

In the settlement of Griazny Artek in Ilek Raion, Orenburg Okrug, 100 of 456 households have departed.

In the settlement of Rassypnoi in Ilek Raion, Orenburg Okrug, three kulaks have fled, and eight people from other settlements joined them at the Platovka station, headed for Central Asia.

(Some facts have been reported in previous special summary reports.)

In addition to overt antisoviet and counterrevolutionary manifestations (terror, mass disturbances, proclamations), the kulaks are attempting to undermine the activities of poor peasants through intimidation and threats. For example, in the village of Shishkeevo in Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, as a kulak named Yevseev was being exiled, he threatened poor peasants, saying, "The poor peasantry has sold us out to Soviet power, but they won't get away with it."

Similar incidents have been observed in other okrugs.

Besides this, there have been instances of feigned resignation by people being dekulakized, saying "obviously our time has come," and thereby stirring sympathy for themselves on the part of poor and middle peasants.

Antisoviet and Counterrevolutionary Manifestations in the  
 First 11 Days of February (information incomplete)  
 May Be Summed up by the Following Data:

Acts of Terror				
Okrug	Type		In Connection with	Total
	Arson	Injuries		
Orenburg	2	—	social activism	2
Penza	1	—		1
Ulianovsk	—	1		1

Mass Disturbances		
<i>Okrug</i>	<i>In Connection with</i>	<i>Total</i>
Penza	establishment of collective farms	1
Mordvin Oblast	dekulakization	1
Mordvin Oblast	dekulakization	1
Samara	dekulakization	1
Syzran	dekulakization	1
Total		5

Proclamations		
Kuznetsk Okrug	threatening poor peasants	1
Buguruslan Okrug	calling for overthrow of Soviet power	1
Orenburg Okrug	opposing dekulakization	1
Total		3

In addition, there have been cases where kulaks have destroyed the live-stock belonging to people who are carrying out dekulakization:

In the village of Staraiia Sloboda in Staroe Shaigovo Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a kulak named Panov used a scythe to slit the throat of a horse that belonged to a candidate member of the VKP(b) and sales clerk at the local branch of the consumers' cooperative who was carrying out dekulakization.

In the village of Bulgaki, Mordvin Oblast, one night a horse and a cow that belonged to the secretary of the village soviet were ripped open with a pitchfork.

### Dekulakization

According to information that is by no means complete or precise, as of 12 February 1930 a total of 11,975 farms had been dekulakized in the Middle Volga Krai, with the following breakdown:

Orenburg Okrug	—4,403
Ulianovsk Okrug	—2,048
Samara Okrug	—2,070
Syzran Okrug	—1,600
Buguruslan Okrug	—824
Kuznetsk Okrug	—800
Mordvin Okrug	—230

Dekulakization by raion can be illustrated by the following facts from Ulianovsk Okrug:

In Ulianovsk Raion, 334 farms, which is 1.4 percent of the total number

of farms in the raion, have been dekulakized within the territory of 47 village soviets. The confiscated property has been appraised at 231,000 rubles, of which . . .<sup>55</sup> rubles has been turned over for cultural institutions, 68,000 rubles to collective farms, 4,800 rubles to procurement organizations, and 490 rubles for the establishment of a seed fund. The confiscated property consisted of 315 houses, 40 industrial enterprises, 203 workhorses, 60 young animals, 170 cows, and 1,077 sheep.

In Bogdashkino Raion, 100 farms have been dekulakized, which is 2.5 percent of the total number of kulak farms.

In Popovka Raion, 400 farms have been dekulakized, which is 3.5 percent of the total number of kulak farms.

	Raion Dekulakized
Koshki	300 farms
Sengilei	116 farms, or 1.25 percent
Melekess	141 farms
Novo-Malykla	70 farms, or 1.3 percent
Staraia Maina	109 farms
Cherdakly	89 kulak farms within the territory of 13 villages, or 1.5 percent
Promzino	216 farms
Tagai	173 farms, or 1.75 percent

### Shortcomings and Excesses

In a number of raions, because of a failure in some places to understand the directives and an absence of mass explanatory work, dekulakization has assumed the form of naked administrative command methods, which in some villages has generated resistance to expropriation on the part of the masses of middle and even poor peasants.

Because of bungling by certain officials, middle peasants and even Red Army soldiers' families are being dekulakized. In addition, there are cases in which expropriated property is being divided among poor peasants.

In the villages of Voetskoe and Sosnovka in Popovka Raion, Ulianovsk Okrug, four instances of dekulakization of middle-peasant farms have been recorded.

In the village of Putilovskoe in Insar Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a well-to-do peasant named Rzhovsky, whose son at present is a company commander in the Red Army, was subjected to expropriation.

In the village of Levzha in Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, the village soviet distributed property taken away from kulaks to poor peasants.

In the village of Bolshoi Uren in Tagai Raion, Ulianovsk Okrug, 17 farms were dekulakized and their property divided among poor peasants.

In the village of Yakovshchina in Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, plenipotentiary Moskin distributed confiscated property back to the former owners.

Besides this, there have been cases in which certain candidate members and full members of the party have harbored in their homes the property of individuals who are subject to dekulakization:

In the village of Podvalie in Sengilei Raion, Ulianovsk Okrug, a member of the VKP(b) named Churiaev hid his father-in-law's property.

In the village of Levzha in Ruzaevka Raion, Mordvin Oblast, a dekulakization commission was selected, which included a member of the VKP(b) named Golychev. A former large-scale landowner named Uchvatov got the whole commission drunk, and as a result the kulaks were exempted from expropriation.

In the village of Lipovka in Talyzino Raion, Mordvin Oblast, poor peasants persistently demanded the expropriation of property from a kulak named Shuvalov, who has a flax comb, a hulling mill, and complex agricultural machinery, but since Shuvalov is a relative of village soviet chairman Strukalev, the latter is not expropriating this property.

In the town of Ruzaevka in Mordvin Oblast, a member of the VKP(b) named Abozhanov harbored property (two trunks containing textile goods, a jug of honey, gold items, and gold) that belongs to a woman named Koralina who used to be a trader. [. . .]

OGPU plenipotentiary representative for the Middle Volga Krai Bak  
INFO director Krestiankin  
INFO Section 2 director Romanovsky

• DOCUMENT 68 •

Report by I. M. Vareikis to the CC on the progress of collectivization and on the measures to liquidate the kulaks in the Central Black Earth Oblast, 18 February 1930. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 49, ll. 118-103. Mimeograph copy of original.

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18 February 1930  
Urgent  
Secret

Out of a total of 3,302,515 peasant farms in the Central Black Earth Oblast, 73.6 percent of 17,168,000 hectares of land under cultivation

have been collectivized as of 10 February 1930. The pace of collectivization in the oblast is illustrated by the following data:

As of 1 October [of each year], collectivization had covered the following:

1927:	32,513 farms	169,070 hectares	0.98 percent
1928:	67,669 farms	351,885 hectares	2.04 percent
1929:	254,215 farms	1,322,544 hectares	7.7 percent

In recent months collectivization in the oblast has been proceeding at an accelerating pace and is illustrated by the following okrug data:

Okrug as of:	10 Jan- uary	20 Jan- uary	1 Feb- ruary	10 Feb- ruary
Belgorod	21.6	23.4	38.1	54.5
Borisoglebsk	30.8	38	63.6	85.9
Yelets	12.6	20.2	31.1	58.1
Kozlov	13.8	24.4	51.9	75.4
Kursk	16.4	24.8	38.3	69.7
Lgov	86	90.1	92.7	93.2
Oryol	46	53.7	63.2	87.6
Ostrogzhsk	59.8	92.1	98.3	98.5
Rossosh	48.2	61	79.3	79.6
Sary Oskol	10.5	31.9	51.6	69.8
Tambov	35.6	44.4	45.5	2.5
Usman	28.4	37.9	41.8	57.4
Averages for Central Black Earth Oblast	33.7	44.9	56.6	73.6

It is clear from this table that some okrugs have basically completed wholesale collectivization. A portion of the okrugs are approaching completion of this task. The mass work and mass collective-farm movement that have developed in the oblast in connection with collectivization are proceeding at a pace that gives us every reason to expect the wholesale collectivization of the oblast to be basically completed during the spring sowing campaign of 1930.

Along with mass collectivization, a process of enlargement of collective farms is under way. For example, as of 1 October 1929 the average land area of a collective farm was 246 hectares; as of 10 January 1930, 951 hectares; as of 1 February 1930, 1,107 hectares. As of 10 February there were 6,530 collective farms in the oblast, with a total area of 12,704,320 hectares in use (9,633,980 hectares of plowed fields), and each collective farm has an average of 1,950 hectares. A number of giant collective farms are being organized on an area of 20,000–50,000 and even 100,000 hectares. [. . .]

The types of collective farms are changing as well: as of 10 January communes accounted for 4 percent in the oblast; agricultural artels, 27 percent; TOZes [associations for joint land cultivation], 68.6 percent. Over the past month collectivization has proceeded mostly through the establishment of agricultural artels. Previously established TOZes are switching to the charter of an agricultural artel; one indicator of this is the breakdown of collective farms in Kozlov Okrug as of 1 February 1930: TOZes, 41 percent; artels, 56 percent; communes, 3 percent. As a result, the agricultural artel has become the predominant type of collective farm in the Central Black Earth Oblast.

The socialized material resources of collective farms are also growing. We don't have overall data for the oblast at present, but in individual raions the situation stands as follows. In the Talovaia Raion of wholesale collectivization:

Collective farms had:	As of 1 October 1929	As of 1 January 1930
Shared capital	192,900	563,969
Indivisible capital	81,650	282,867
Contributions	—	756,514 <sup>56</sup>
[. . .]		

#### On the Liquidation of the Kulaks

The liquidation of the kulaks (dekulakization) began on a mass scale in the oblast after the January plenum of the oblast party committee, basically in February. At this point the Central Black Earth Oblast had, in effect, already moved on to wholesale collectivization, and as a consequence dekulakization was under way, in effect, in every okrug of the Central Black Earth Oblast.

It is impossible at present to submit detailed results of dekulakization. Data are available for individual okrugs. For example, Borisoglebsk Okrug reports: as of 10 February, 85 percent of the farms and sown area have been collectivized; 35,000 horses and 10,000 cows have been socialized, and beyond that—according to incomplete information—2,766 farms in 10 raions of the okrug, or an average of 2.3 percent, have been dekulakized. The following property has been confiscated and turned over to collective farms: 1,145 houses, 554 storehouses, 64 enterprises, 1,746 horses, 1,870 cows, 4,000 head of domestic livestock, and 3,830 centners of grain. The kulak farms proved to have only 169 pigs.

Ostrogzhsk Okrug reports that from 1 to 8 February 7,825 kulak farms have been identified for dekulakization. During these eight days



5,636 farms were dekulakized. All told, 98 percent of the okrug has been collectivized.

Dekulakization is proceeding with the active participation of poor peasants, and in a number of raions, middle peasants as well. Large groups of poor peasants are accompanying the commissions to kulak households and are taking away property. At night, by their own initiative, they stand guard on the roads at points of egress from the villages in order to detain fleeing kulaks, and at general meetings they adopt decisions that demand the immediate exile of especially inveterate kulaks from the oblast.

The most prosperous middle peasants are reacting to dekulakization with some wariness; they are afraid that, after the kulaks, the authorities might "do the same thing" with them. Such apprehensions are being voiced particularly in villages where kulak agitation is developing: "Soon the middle peasants will be robbed as well." The kulaks say, "They are dekulakizing us, and then they will get to work on the middle peasants."

The kulak, seeing his inevitable demise, is directing all of his efforts against collectivization and Soviet power. At every step of collective-farm construction the kulak tries to fight our measures and in some cases, because of poor public work, succeeds.

In the first phase of the struggle the kulak attempted to oppose the establishment of collective farms openly, but he failed, so he switched to another tactic—he began to incite his followers among the middle and poor peasants (especially women, religious hysterics [*klikushi*], and nuns) into anti-collective-farm disturbances. When these forms of struggle did not succeed either, the kulak switched to new methods—to blow up the collective farm from within. The kulaks are developing furious agitation in favor of destroying livestock and seeds and damaging agricultural implements. There have been incidents in which buildings subject to socialization have been set on fire. One must say that in this effort the kulak has managed to achieve certain results. Our party and soviet organizations in the countryside were late in seeing through this kulak maneuver, and it proved to be very costly to collective-farm construction in some raions.

Now that the kulak has been convinced that this form of struggle will not give him the desired result either, that the collective farms have taken shape, are getting on their feet, and have taken decisive measures to stop the predatory destruction of the fixed assets of agriculture, he is switching to efforts to organize overt counterrevolutionary disturbances.

Mass disturbances in the oblast may be illustrated by the following data from the OGPU on the Central Black Earth Oblast: between January 1929

and mid-December, 94 mass disturbances took place in the oblast, with a total number of 33,221 participants. Of these 94 disturbances, 51 occurred in connection with the closing of churches; 28 in connection with grain procurements; 8 in connection with land reorganization; and only 4 in connection with collectivization. From December 1929 through 14 February 1930, 38 mass disturbances were recorded in the oblast, with 25,170 participants. The overwhelming majority of mass disturbances occurred in connection with collectivization and dekulakization; in Ostrogozhsk Okrug alone between 12 January and 14 February, there were 16 kulak mass disturbances, in which kulaks managed to involve a segment of the middle and even poor peasantry, especially women, by using various provocative methods, measures, and means. In certain places the crowds staging the disturbances numbered two or more thousand people. Some of the disturbances were of a semi-insurrectionist nature. The disturbances were prepared in advance, something akin to headquarters were set up to direct them, and the mob was armed with pitchforks, axes, stakes, and in certain cases with sawed-off and hunting shotguns. In one village a black banner was put up with the inscription, "Down with Collective Farms, Long Live World Revolution" (Nizhny Ikorets) or these slogans: "Soviet Power, but without Collective Farms," "We Are for Soviet Power, but against the communists," "Return All Fines Taken from the Kulaks and Confiscated Property!"

There have been incidents when people ransacked socialized barns, seized socialized livestock, pilfered a portion of the property taken from kulaks, and tried to plunder the seed fund (village of Podserednoe).

In the village of Kazatskoe, a mob besieged a school where representatives of the raion and the OGPU okrug department were located, smashed all the windows with rocks, and kept them under siege until 2 a.m.

Decisive measures were taken to crush the kulak disturbances. Six kulak disturbances in Ostrogozhsk Okrug had to be liquidated with armed force. Operations to remove the counterrevolutionary insurrectionist and kulak *aktiv* have now concluded. Despite the kulak disturbances, the collective farms established in these villages have not fallen apart, and work is now being done here, as well as in other localities, to socialize implements, work animals, seeds, etc.

The main factors that caused these mass disturbances boil down to the following three points:

- a. insufficient mass preparatory work in connection with the practical measures to socialize property and inadequate work with poor peasants;
- b. administrative methods in collectivization and excesses in the treat-

ment of middle peasants, which the kulaks utilized to win middle peasants over to their side; and

c. increased resistance on the part of the kulaks, which has become more violent lately.

Preparatory work is under way at present for exiling 8,000 kulak households out of the oblast; the actual exiles will take place from 20 February through 14 April. All of those exiled are being sent to the Northern Krai.

It should be pointed out that in the practical work of dekulakization there have been a number of flagrant distortions, which boil down to the following: the dekulakization of several middle peasants, school employees, Red Army soldiers' families, and Red partisans. Incidents have taken place in which, for example, supporters of kulaks "dekulakize" the farms of old communists and soviet officials (the farm belonging to the parents of the chairman of a raion executive committee in Rossosh Okrug). There have been attempts to pressure the families of Komsomol members, agronomists, etc.

Incidents have also taken place in which literally everything is taken from kulaks, up to and including children's underwear. In certain places there have been cases when property taken from kulaks has been divvied up "among friends" or it has been sold for a song. For example, in Yelets Okrug there have been cases when a nickel-plated samovar was sold for 1 ruble and a bed for 1 ruble 50 kopeks. Cases of pillaging have also taken place, when confiscated property has been stolen, damaged, or destroyed. Even a member of a workers' brigade from a Voronezh factory, a communist, took for himself a fur coat confiscated from a kulak and cooked a duck taken from the same place.

In Ostrogozhsk Okrug the farm of a Turkish citizen was dekulakized; all of his property is worth no more than 1,000 rubles. In a number of places, party members failed to restrain enraged poor peasants from abusing kulak families (they kicked them out into frigid weather and so forth). Oblast and local organizations are taking decisive measures against all of these distortions and excesses and are immediately rectifying the mistakes. On the whole, it should be noted that such isolated facts are inevitable in an effort as immense as the liquidation of the kulaks.

The general political attitudes of the masses of poor and middle peasants in the countryside are characterized by the following: poor peasants, for the most part, support the party's slogans; as a rule, they actively participate in the collective-farm movement and take a harsh view of the kulaks. In many villages kulaks agitating against collectivization were met by

poor peasants carrying stakes. Poor peasants organize mass demonstrations by collective farmers and travel on horseback to neighboring villages to agitate for collectivization. Meetings of poor peasants adopt resolutions expressing complete confidence in the party and its measures. The most typical incident took place in zone 4 of the Tishanka village soviet, where a meeting of 20 poor peasants and 8 middle peasants assembled without representatives of party, Komsomol, or soviet organizations, and they put on the agenda the question "On merging the poor peasantry with the middle peasantry and on close coordination in building socialism." The rapporteur was Comrade Borisov.

They resolved: "We, poor peasants, the *aktiv*, and middle peasants are merging into a single unit and are marching together with the party and the government along the path of socialism and the reorganization of agricultural life; we, poor peasants, the *aktiv*, and middle peasants vow to the party and the government that we will fulfill all of the directives of the party and the government at a rapid pace and will toss overboard all traitors who interfere with our reorganization of agriculture. We also promise the party of the VKP(b) that we will not lag behind the leadership of the party and the government and we send ardent greetings to the leader of the party, Comrade Stalin. Hurrah for the party of the VKP(b)! We are with you! Long live socialism! Meeting chairman A. Aniktov. Secretary Kisurin."

The work of party and Komsomol organizations with the poor peasantry and the guidance provided for it are still completely unsatisfactory.

One can see a mass attraction to the party on the part of collective farmers and middle peasants. In the next two or three months we expect to handpick for admission to the party the most advanced and dedicated collective farmers and those who have actively excelled in the collective-farm movement and in the task of liquidating the kulaks.

The mood of the middle peasants in the countryside may be characterized as follows: the middle peasants have firmly decided for themselves that they cannot go on living this way, and they have been joining collective farms en masse. But as they join the collective farms, the middle peasants are wavering. They say, "We don't know what life will be like, we'll see, but since Soviet power is campaigning for collective farms, it seems that life will be better."

The mood of workers at enterprises and in transport is basically healthy and completely fine. Despite significant difficulties with food supply, no discontent is being expressed of the kind that prevailed, in any case, a year and a half to two years ago. No complaints are being voiced. A lot of workers worked in grain procurements, which served as an excellent

school for the workers. They saw what the countryside is like—and what the kulak is like.

They saw the kulak's hostile attitude in practice. The workers saw the difference between collective and individual farms and are now actively participating in the collectivization of agriculture. They have become genuine frontline organizers of this movement. [. . .]

Secretary of the oblast party committee of the Central Black Earth  
Oblast  
I. Vareikis

• DOCUMENT 69 •

Politburo decree on the collective-farm charter and on I. V. Stalin's article, 28 February 1930. Adopted by a poll of the members on 28 February 1930, incorporated in protocol no. 119 of the Politburo session of 5 March 1930. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 778, l. 5. Mimeograph copy of original.

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28 February 1930

a. Instruct the commission comprised of Comrades Syrtsov, Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Rykov, Mikoian, Voroshilov, Yakovlev, and Yurkin to settle once and for all the question of the collective-farm charter on the basis of an exchange of opinions. Comrade Rykov is to call the meeting. The work is to be accomplished within 24 hours so that the charter is published in the press on 2 March.

b. Instruct Comrade Stalin to publish an article in newspapers on the same day.<sup>57</sup>

c. Instruct the same commission, within the same amount of time, to determine the amount of seed assistance to areas that have suffered crop failures, as well as the amount of forage assistance.

CC Secretary I. Stalin

• DOCUMENT 70 •

Data from the RSFSR Commissariat of Agriculture on the course of collectivization in the RSFSR on March 1, 1930, 7 March 1930. RGAE, f. 7446, op. 1, d. 12, l. 51. Copy.

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7 March 1930

Regions	All Farms, Spring 1930, Central Statistical Administration Data (in thousands)	Collective Farms		Number of Collectivized Farms (in thousands)		Percent Collecti- vized from the Total Number of Farms	
		Planned	Organized	Planned	on March 1		
Northern Caucasus	1,325.2	8,345	4,304	840	1,126.5	134.1	85
Siberia	1,430.6	7,935	8,109	600	720	120	50.3
Urals	1,230.6	1,630	3,946	600	883.8	147.3	71.8
Lower Volga	943.3	2,755	1,404	695	672.8	96.8	71.3
Middle Volga	1,236.3	2,355	3,961	750	766	102.1	62
Central Black Earth	2,020.3	5,860	5,876	1,090	1,749.7	160.5	86.6
Leningrad	885	1,980	3,783	145	166.7	115	18.8
Far East	237.2	655	1,368*	60	81.3*	135.5	34.3
Northern	444.6	1,165	2,388*	90	193*	215.4	43.6

Western	1,330	2,915	4,615	158.3	190	466.3	245.4	35.1
Moscow	1,487.7	5,480	11,154	203.5	300	1083.2	361.1	72.8
Ivanovo-Voznesensk	839	1,775	3,230	181.2	130	258.4	198.8	30.8
Nizhny Novgorod	1,331.9	3,045	5,620	184.6	315	671.1	213	50.4
Kazakh ASSR	1,150.6	2,055	6,899*	335.7	285	461.6*	162	40.1
Bashkiria	482.2	3,245	2,523	77.8	140	420.2	300.1	87.1
Tataria	509.7	1,485	3,484	234.6	200	413.6	206.8	81.1
Crimea	86.4	905	1,060	117.1	60	71.1	118.5	82.3
Dagestan	172.6	655	418	63.8	70	31.8	45.4	18.4
Buriat-Mongolia	—	365	345*	94.5	20	11.5*	57.5	—
Iakutia	—	65	no data	—	5	no data	—	—
Kirgiz ASSR	216.4	1,330	855*	55	—	39.9*	—	—
Total RSFSR, with autonomous republics	17,359.6	56,000	75,342	—	6,640	10,289.4	—	—
Total raions that have provided data	55,935	75,342	134.7	6,635	10,289	155	59.3	—

\* Statistics for February 20 (note from the original document).

## CHAPTER 6

### Dizzy with Success

2 March 1930–1 July 1930

In “Dizzy with Success,” Stalin claimed that “*a radical turn of the countryside toward socialism may be considered as already achieved.*” He argued against “adventurist attempts . . . to solve all questions of socialist construction ‘in a trice’” and firmly stated that the party’s task was “to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilize* them systematically for our further advancement.” He explained away “violations,” “distortions,” and “excesses”—to use some of the party’s preferred euphemisms of those times—by referring to the dizziness and intoxication from success that had taken hold of the cadres of collectivization (see document 71).

Stalin’s claims of success were soon countered by reality. With the publication of “Dizzy with Success,” the wholesale collectivization campaign of the winter of 1929–30 came to a grinding halt. Percentages of collectivized households plummeted in March as peasants quit the collective farms in droves and “paper” collectives vanished almost as quickly as they had appeared. Collectivization rates for the USSR as a whole declined from 52.7 percent of all peasant households in collective farms on 20 February to 37.3 percent by 1 April. The rates of decline were the most precipitous in the Central Black Earth Region (from 79.4 percent in February to 38.9 percent in April) and Moscow Region (from 73.6 percent in February to 12.3 percent in April), two regions that had experienced especially violent collectivization drives. Rates also declined, though somewhat less so, in most of the key grain-



producing regions, with only the Northern Caucasus maintaining its pre-March rates of collectivization.<sup>1</sup>

“Dizzy with Success” in no way constituted a retreat from policy. Collectivization would resume the following September at a slightly less breakneck pace, by which time it was clear that the peasantry no longer had the will or strength to resist. In the meantime, Stalin and the Politburo responded to what had become an alarming situation in the countryside with a temporary abatement of pressures, efforts to “consolidate” the “successes” achieved in collectivization and dekulakization, and the scapegoating of lower-level officials.

### Collectivization and the Excesses

Stalin cast the blame for the “excesses” (*peregiby*) of collectivization and dekulakization on lower-level party and soviet officials, primarily those at the district level who had played the most important role in the implementation of central policy. Although some blame was assigned to officials at the regional level—most notably Karl Bauman, the first secretary of the Moscow Region party committee who lost his job as a consequence<sup>2</sup>—neither Stalin nor the Politburo assumed any responsibility for what was publicly labeled a “distortion” and “violation” of the essentially correct party line.

Instead, in what was to become a routine Stalinist political ploy designed to deflect responsibility for the center’s extremism, the party leadership in Moscow scapegoated its lower-level officials. According to Stalin, they “became dizzy with success, los[ing] all sense of proportion and the capacity to understand realities; [and showing] a tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate the strength of the enemy.” “The party’s task,” Stalin continued, was “to wage a determined struggle against these sentiments, which are dangerous and harmful.” “Is it not clear,” Stalin asked rhetorically, “that the authors of these distortions, who imagine themselves to be ‘Lefts,’ are in reality bringing grist to the mill of right opportunism?” (see document 71).

The officials who supposedly had become “dizzy with success” were labeled *peregibshchiki*—those who commit *peregiby*—and subject to punishment in the form of party reprimands, administrative sanctions, and in relatively few cases judicial penalties. In all, some 10,832 officials would be subject to investigation; of these, 4,998 would receive convictions, and a rather paltry 743 would actually serve sentences. The largest numbers of *peregibshchiki* were from the Central Black

Earth Region where by the end of February an estimated 10 to 15 percent of the peasant population had been dekulakized in several districts and where first party secretary Vareikis later commented that legality would “come with time.”<sup>3</sup> In the end, most *peregibshchiki* were simply transferred out of the locale in which they had distinguished themselves, often ending up in another location where their reputations had not preceded them.

Many rural officials reacted negatively to Stalin’s attempts to scapegoat them. In some places, Stalin’s article was confiscated, withheld from distribution at the post, refused publication in local newspapers, or unofficially banned as illegal reading material.<sup>4</sup> Many lower-level officials resisted the center’s attempts to blame them for implementing what they believed to be nothing more than central policy. A Dnepropetrovsk worker who took part in collectivization captured this sentiment in a letter to Stalin:

Comrade Stalin! I, a rank-and-file worker and reader of the newspaper, *Pravda*, follow the newspaper articles all the time! Is he who failed to shut out the noise and cries created around collectivization . . . guilty? All of us, the lower [officials] and the press overlooked this basic issue about leadership of the collective farms, but c[omrade] Stalin, incorrectly slept like a bogatyr [legendary warrior-hero] during this time and heard nothing and did not see our mistakes and therefore it is also necessary to straighten you out. But now c[omrade] Stalin heaps all the blame on the locals, but defends himself and the leadership.<sup>5</sup>

Other cadres rejected the very idea that anyone had been “dizzy,” refusing to “retreat” and accusing the center of “playing into the hands of the kulak.”<sup>6</sup>

Although Stalin’s article was a cynical attempt to deflect responsibility for central policy, there is no doubt that the extensive “excesses” were at times as much the fault of traditional *proizvol* (arbitrary conduct) on the part of officialdom as a central policy poorly and ambiguously conceived. In a top secret letter to Stalin from 7 March, Yagoda described the “excesses”—the dekulakization of poor and middle peasants as well as soldiers’ families, the use of force in collectivization, and the pillage of kulak property. The appendix to his letter provides ample evidence of what both he and Stalin attributed to the handiwork of lower-level officials (see document 72). This report, moreover, was the tip of an iceberg of official reports that flooded the center *before and after* 2 March, informing it fully of the violence that had been unleashed in the countryside.<sup>7</sup>

The Central Committee followed up on Stalin's article with a 10 March decree, "On the struggle with violations of the party line in the collective farm movement." This decree echoed much of what Stalin had written a week earlier, indicating that "in a whole series of districts" the voluntary principle in collectivization had been replaced by the use of force. The decree also noted that dekulakization had affected "a significant part of the middle peasantry," reaching as many as 15 percent of all peasant farms in some areas. The Central Committee ordered the secretaries of district, county, and regional party committees to concentrate their attention on the economic consolidation of the collective farms, to halt the socialization of poultry and other domestic livestock, to reopen markets, to review all lists of dekulakized peasant households, and to stop the administrative closures of churches.<sup>8</sup>

On 2 April, the Central Committee issued a closed letter to provincial party committees, entitled "On the tasks of the collective farm movement in connection with the struggle with violations of the party line." In this letter, the Central Committee frankly indicated the degree to which the collectivization campaign had alienated the peasantry. The Central Committee claimed that the collectivization campaign had violated the union with the middle peasantry through the use of force and the arbitrary dekulakization of middle-peasant families. The letter assumed a defensive tone, quoting from the 5 January collectivization decree (see document 52) to show the extent to which certain regions had leaped ahead in the application of policy. For the first time, moreover, the issue of blame rose above the district level, reaching the regional level as the Moscow Region, the Central Black Earth Region, Transcaucasia, and Turkistan were singled out for censure. The letter went on to say that as a result of the violations of the party line, the trust of the "wide masses" of the peasantry in Soviet power had been undermined and the situation in the countryside had become dangerous.<sup>9</sup>

Reports of peasant rioting flooded the center.<sup>10</sup> According to official OGPU statistics, the month of March witnessed as many as 6,528 mass disturbances with almost 1.5 million participants.<sup>11</sup> Peasants used "Dizzy with Success" as a cudgel to challenge local officials and to quit the collective farms. Stalin ironically became the hero of the day. His article was passed from hand to hand as peasants sought the backing of the "good tsar" in Moscow in their display of naive monarchism against local officialdom. Peasants rode miles to obtain a copy of the article and paid as much as 15 rubles for a newspaper contain-

ing the article.<sup>12</sup> “Dizzy with Success” became the herald of peasant rebellion throughout the USSR as the month of March witnessed an explosion of peasant rebellion against which that of January and February would pale (see document 78).<sup>13</sup>

To make matters worse, it soon became clear that peasants were sending letters about the atrocities in the countryside in the tens of thousands to their sons, brothers, and husbands in the Red Army. On 17 March, Yagoda wrote to Olskii, Yevdokimov, and Messing about an increased “kulak mood” among soldiers. He noted that relatives were not only sending letters but coming directly to the barracks to complain and solicit support. He ordered the arrest of kulaks who complained directly to the army as well as strict enforcement of the confiscation of letters.<sup>14</sup> Yagoda was especially concerned about cases of the dekulakization of Red Army families. Fears of the penetration of “kulak moods” into the army were also expressed in relation to the towns and factories and to a series of national areas.<sup>15</sup>

The fears generated by peasant reactions to collectivization led not only to a temporary cessation of collectivization and the scapegoating of lower-level officials, but also to a series of concessions to the partially collectivized peasantry. On the eve of the publication of “Dizzy with Success,” on 1 March, the Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom issued a new decree on the collective farm *artel*, allowing households to maintain one cow, small domestic livestock and poultry, and a household plot for the family’s own needs. The decree went on to define collective farm membership, administration, a series of key labor issues, and other particulars which had largely been ignored in the 5 January collectivization decree and subsequent race for percentages.<sup>16</sup>

The peasantry appeared to have won the first round of collectivization, yet the victory proved Pyrrhic. Collectivization resumed the following fall and the campaign against the kulak expanded well beyond the scale of the winter 1930 operation. In fact, there had been little in the way of policy abatement in the campaign against the kulak. By the time Stalin published “Dizzy with Success,” the first trainloads of kulaks were on their way to the frozen hinterlands of the Soviet Union’s far north and east.

### The Special Settlements

Although removals of second-category kulak families from the village came to a temporary halt in some places in March given the general

disorder in the countryside and the difficulties of moving large numbers of people in winter and spring, tens of thousands of peasants had already begun the long journey into exile. These families were destined to live and work in the *spetsposelki* or special settlements, a euphemism for the villages that the kulak exiles (now labeled special settlers) would construct from the frozen tundra. The special settlements were, in theory, to serve as self-sufficient penal colonies, supplying cheap (and replenishable) labor for the extraction of the rich natural resources found in the remote, labor-scarce regions of the far north and east. Early plans envisioned kulak labor in the North and Siberia primarily employed in agricultural pursuits, working seasonally in forestry; in the Urals and Kazakhstan, the special settlers were to be used mainly in forestry, fishing, and industry; and in the Far East they would work in the gold mines (see document 73).<sup>17</sup>

Trainloads of kulak families began to leave for their destinations in the middle of winter, beginning in mid-February. Transport occurred in numbered echelons, by train, leaving from regional collection points and disembarking at transit points in the cities of exile regions to await further transport into the interior to the as yet nonexistent special settlements. Some trains traveled as long as 16 days between points of embarkment and disembarkment. Each family was permitted officially to bring up to 30 poods of supplies and up to 500 rubles in cash, and the OGPU pledged an “uninterrupted supply” of boiled water en route.<sup>18</sup>

Conditions were terrible. The plunder that accompanied dekulakization frequently (if not generally) meant that families lacked the requisite food supplies and warm clothing for their journey. According to an OGPU report, there were cases of a “second dekulakization” of exiles en route in the Urals, suggesting that theft and continuing “expropriations” may not have stopped in the village.<sup>19</sup> The OGPU reported that many exiles, especially those from the south, lacked warm clothing; exiles from Maikop arrived in summer clothing, some barefooted. On 23 February, in view of the freezing weather and possibility of mass frostbite, especially among children, the OGPU instructed its plenipotentiary representative in the Urals to halt further transport into the interior and to house exiles in the nearest villages.<sup>20</sup> On 5 March, the OGPU “categorically” ordered its plenipotentiary representatives to ensure that kulak families had the requisite food supplies.<sup>21</sup>

Infants and children, the elderly, families without able-bodied workers, and families separated from mothers all appeared on the trains.

Echelon 401 from the Lower Volga carried more than 190 people over 70 years of age alongside fathers and small children without mothers.<sup>22</sup> A 3 March note from the OGPU to its plenipotentiary representative in the Lower Volga stated, with reference to echelon 401: "It is hard to imagine that 80- and 90-year-olds represent a danger to the revolutionary order," adding that it was "completely incomprehensible" that families should be exiled without the head of the family—an interesting contradiction to stated policy, at least in regard to the fate of category 1 kulak families who explicitly were to be deported without their arrested heads of households.<sup>23</sup> On 18 March, the OGPU again ordered its Lower Volga plenipotentiary representative not to exile the families of first- and second-category kulaks if there were no able-bodied family members. The OGPU also ordered the cessation of the exile of non-able-bodied elderly peasants.<sup>24</sup>

On 20 March, the OGPU wrote to all plenipotentiary representatives in districts of wholesale collectivization that the time when the roads would be impassible (the *rasputitsa*) was fast approaching in Siberia and the Urals. Kulaks were to arrive with boots or else be detained in the collection points.<sup>25</sup> On 23 March, the OGPU again wrote its plenipotentiary representatives that "despite our directives" echelons continued to arrive on which large numbers of families had neither food nor money. Arriving on 19 March, families in echelon 421 from the Lower Volga had food for no more than one week. The OGPU warned its plenipotentiary representatives that if all food had been "expropriated" from a family, then it became the responsibility of local organizations to provide food *before* sending families off into exile.<sup>26</sup> Data on 189 echelons indicated that 390 people (173 children, 168 women, and 49 men) were removed from trains due to illness, while 58 (47 children, 10 men, 1 woman) died en route.<sup>27</sup> Doubtless these numbers say little about actual cases of illness given that families often hid illness to prevent separation.

Once at the transit points in the cities of the exile region, the able-bodied were separated from the non-able-bodied so that they could be transferred to local industries for work while their families were kept in place temporarily or sent on to the new special settlements.<sup>28</sup> Initially, at least in the Urals, no temporary barracks existed, so on de-training, kulaks left immediately for the interior. The local population was forced to provide some 30,000 carts for transport. In the Northern Region, kulaks remained temporarily housed in barracks or churches until weather conditions permitted transport into the inte-

rior.<sup>29</sup> By 20 March, 134,131 people had arrived in the Northern Region, with 29,042 still en route and 70,827 still to transport; in the Urals, 60,141 had arrived, 1,838 were en route, and 29,021 awaited transport.<sup>30</sup>

Conditions in the transit points were as bad if not worse than on the trains. On 20 March, a Commissariat of Health inspector issued a report on conditions in transit points in Arkhangelsk (where up to 24,000 people were housed) and Vologda (with up to 20,000 people). The inspector decried the unhygienic conditions of barracks, the lack of bathing facilities (especially for children), and the absence or distant placement of waste facilities. He wrote that all available buckets were used for waste products, thus making it impossible to boil water. He claimed a huge mortality rate among the children and concluded that epidemic illnesses would soon threaten the local population.<sup>31</sup>

On 28 March, OGPU Northern regional plenipotentiary representative R. I. Austrin filed a report on the conditions of exiles. By 26 March, 95 of 130 echelons had arrived in the North, carrying 169,901 people (63,847 of them children), from whom 45,613 were able-bodied workers and 124,288 not. The able-bodied were put to work immediately in the forestry industry or in the construction of the special settlements while, in the meantime, many of their families were housed temporarily in district towns. There was no clear decision about how to feed the families, although a “hunger” norm of 1,300 calories was initially set. By the end of March, in Arkhangelsk alone, 5,293 people (including 2,677 children) had fallen ill and 200 (including 189 children) had died.<sup>32</sup> Very few had continued their journey into the interior. Most remained in transit points, housed in barracks or churches. Living conditions were crowded, with about one square meter of space per person. Sanitary conditions were wretched, leading in consequence to high mortality rates among the children. The report concluded that the North—the region expected to take in the largest number of kulak exiles in 1930—was not prepared for the settlement of the exiles and lacked any clear plan for fulfilling their material needs.<sup>33</sup>

Cold, hunger, inadequate housing, and outbreaks of infectious disease, including typhus, were leading to increasing incidences of illness and death among special settlers, with the mortality rates among children described as “colossal.” As early as 15 February (but still not early enough), the OGPU had instructed its plenipotentiary representatives in the North and the Urals to take measures for the timely localization of epidemics, enlisting them to see that Commissariat of

Health local organizations were prepared.<sup>34</sup> On 16 February, the OGPU told its Urals plenipotentiary representative that 75,000 rubles had been allotted to provide for sanitary measures and bathhouses.<sup>35</sup> On 7 March, the OGPU informed its Northern plenipotentiary representative that 50,000 rubles had been allotted to the regional Commissariat of Health agency for medical servicing and that medical personnel were on their way.<sup>36</sup> Commissariat of Health inspectors reported on the conditions among Northern special settlers in mid-March, calling for a mobilization of doctors and medicine.<sup>37</sup> By 10 April, 1,500,000 rubles had been allotted for epidemic prevention as disease spread among local populations as well as among special settlers.<sup>38</sup> On 27 March, Northern regional party chief S. A. Bergavinov sent an urgent telegram to the Politburo pleading for medical aid for the North. The Politburo's response was to forbid any mention of typhus in the press.<sup>39</sup> Throughout the months of spring and early summer, central directives urged the Commissariat of Health to mobilize medical personnel, disinfection units, and medicine for settler regions.<sup>40</sup> In the meantime, decisions were taken to send home children under 14.<sup>41</sup>

On 7 March, the Commissariat of Trade was instructed to guarantee provisions for special settlers in the North for six months (until self-sufficiency could be achieved) according to hunger norms.<sup>42</sup> As of 28 March, according to a report from the North, there was still no decision taken as to how to provision families without laborers.<sup>43</sup> On 7 April, the OGPU instructed its Urals plenipotentiary representative to provide the food for its special settlers, also according to hunger norms.<sup>44</sup> On 27 June, the Politburo instructed the Commissariat of Trade to supply special settlers in the North and in the Urals from the emergency reserve fund (*neprikosnovennyi fond*), but the rule seems to have been chaos in supply, with some instructions indicating that economic administrative agencies that employed special settlers were responsible for food supply and others pointing to the Commissariat of Trade and/or local organizations.<sup>45</sup>

The center was flooded with reports of the rapidly developing human disaster of the winter 1930 kulak deportation operation, and it responded on 10 April with the formation on the regional levels of temporary commissions to weed out peasants who had been "incorrectly exiled."<sup>46</sup> These commissions followed the example of a Politburo commission set up on 5 April under the leadership of Bergavinov (with members V. N. Tolmachev, Yagoda, D. Z. Lebed, E. A. Tuchkov, and I. G. Yeregin) to check mistakes in exile in the North.<sup>47</sup> Prior to



the organization of these commissions, haphazard decisions en route or at collection points to release incorrect exiles were sometimes taken. The OGPU told its Northern plenipotentiary representative on 7 March to house incorrect exiles separately, close to railway stations, in order to return them if necessary.<sup>48</sup> According to a 9 March report on echelon 308 from the Central Black Earth Region, 153 people were freed (including two 80-year-old parents of soldiers) on local initiative.<sup>49</sup> On 28 March, the OGPU instructed its plenipotentiary representatives in the North, Urals, and Siberia to check all complaints and to separate incorrect exiles, improve their conditions, and tell them that they would be resettled in special settlements as free citizens, with land, inventory, animals, and seed.<sup>50</sup>

Information from the Bergavinov commission on the North indicated that as of May, 35,000 of 46,261 exiled families had submitted complaints, of which the commission (via special county subcommissions, barracks commissions, and personal investigations) had examined those of 23,360 families. The commission concluded that 77.7 percent of these families were exiled correctly, 8 percent were doubtful, and 6 percent incorrectly. The doubtful cases would be reviewed again by the OGPU through the special county commissions by 1 June.<sup>51</sup> Tolmachev and Yereimin both objected to the commission's report, arguing that up to 60 percent of exiles had been incorrectly exiled in some cases and that the general percentage was around 15 percent with doubtful cases at 10 percent. They attempted to insert into the report the following clause: "given that it is impossible to define fully [and] precisely the number of incorrect exiles" and taking into account that some troikas found up to 60 percent incorrect exiles, "10 percent incorrect exiles is a minimal figure . . . [and we] consider it essential to return to the village all 10 percent."<sup>52</sup> Bergavinov objected strenuously, writing that all of the "rumors" of incorrect exile were tantamount to the "slander of local party and soviet organs and through them the policy of the party."<sup>53</sup> In the end, very few "incorrectly exiled" peasant families would actually be returned to their native villages; most remained as "free workers" in the North.<sup>54</sup>

All exiles were supposed to be transported to their final destinations by September at the latest. The industries employing kulak labor were responsible for the construction of the special settlements. The demands of construction, however, were in direct contradiction to the short-term interests of local industries which were loathe to release kulak laborers in their employ to work on the construction of the special

settlements. As a result, special settler families would arrive in, at best, partially constructed villages, facing a difficult winter, plagued by cold, hunger, illness, and death (see document 74).<sup>55</sup> To make matters worse, through the fall and the following winter, a new and larger wave of kulak exile began, bringing more than one million more people to the special settlements.<sup>56</sup>

In the meantime, it was becoming increasingly clear to the Politburo that the administrative infrastructure for this enormous undertaking had developed too quickly, in a haphazard, emergency fashion, that led at times to the formulation of plans and policy “*na khodu*” (or along the way) as one functionary put it.<sup>57</sup> Yagoda’s plans for a well-ordered police operation were frustrated from the start. The rapidly deteriorating situation in the countryside placed the center of gravity on security operations, pacification, and the removal of kulaks from the villages. As a consequence, all attention was centered on dekulakization, while the resettlement operation remained secondary through most of 1930.

In fact, there had been no clear determination of how the actual resettlement operation would be coordinated. Although the OGPU had exclusive control over category 1 kulaks and a central role in the deportation and transportation of category 2 kulaks from the very beginning of operations, its role was, in theory, to end once the kulaks had been deposited in the exile regions. It was only on 1 April that the USSR Sovnarkom created a commission to take charge of these issues. A special USSR Sovnarkom commission, headed by deputy Sovnarkom chair V. V. Shmidt, was to serve as the main central institution in charge of special settler issues.<sup>58</sup> Concrete work on policy implementation (provisioning, land clearing, resettlement, and labor use) was left to the regional soviet executive committees. The OGPU was to remain in charge of observation and other “chekist services.”<sup>59</sup> On the RSFSR level, Tolmachev chaired an additional (RSFSR Sovnarkom) commission on second- and third-category kulak issues, a commission that existed from 9 March to 13 August 1930 and appears to have paralleled the Shmidt commission in directing the work of the commissariats and regional soviet executive committees in kulak resettlement issues. The Commissariat of Internal Affairs administered the special settlements through its commandant departments (*komendantskie ot-dely*) and the militia, with the participation of the district soviet executive committees and the district departments of the GPU.<sup>60</sup>

From the early spring of 1930, very nearly every institution in the

USSR would become involved in one aspect or another of the operation. When the Tolmachev commission was dissolved on 13 August 1930, responsibility for the special settlers in the Russian Republic devolved directly on to the relevant republic-level commissariats. The two most important roles in special settler affairs now belonged to the Commissariat of Agriculture for the Russian Republic (land and agricultural issues) and VSNKh for the Russian Republic (industrial employment issues).<sup>61</sup> The commissariats of Finance, Trade, and Supply would be drawn into supply issues; the Commissariat of Education into the construction of a school network for exile children; the Commissariat of Labor and VSNKh into industrial employment issues; the Commissariat of Justice into complaints and legal matters; the Commissariat of Transportation into transport; the Commissariat of Health into epidemic and other health measures; while all levels of the party, OGPU, commissariats, and soviet apparatus were involved in one aspect or another of the operation. During this time the OGPU played the combined roles of conductor, information conduit, troubleshooter, and whistle-blower, constantly involving itself and interfering in resettlement issues. The organizational structure remained decentralized and chaotic at least until 11 March 1931 when the Politburo established the Andreev commission to oversee all matters relating to dekulakization and special settlers.<sup>62</sup> Finally on 1 July 1931, Sovnarkom transferred from the regional soviet executive committees all administrative and financial issues to the OGPU, leaving it to farm out, via contract, exile labor to the economic administrative agencies.<sup>63</sup> An OGPU department of special settlements (*otdel spetsposelenii*, or OSP) replaced the Commissariat of Internal Affairs commandant departments with the latter's personnel transferred to the OGPU's department of special settlements.<sup>64</sup> By mid-1931, the OGPU had full control of the kulak special settlements, which now formed their own archipelago within the emerging empire of the Gulag.

The overall results of the special resettlement policy were catastrophic: tens of thousands of people died and equal numbers simply ran away. In the Northern Region, the mortality rate was estimated to be 15 percent as of mid-July 1931 (and higher for children), and there were 39,743 recorded escapes (many no doubt repeat attempts) by the end of 1930.<sup>65</sup> The population of the special settlers declined steadily through the 1930s, from its peak of 1,803,392 in 1931 to 1,317,000 in early 1933, to 930,000 on the eve of the Second World War.<sup>66</sup> From 1935, the special settlers were eligible, on a selective basis, for rehabil-

itation, but they would be tied to their exile regions regardless until 1954 when their term of exile officially ended.<sup>67</sup> They would only be completely “exonerated” of their “crimes” in 1990, when special decrees from the Supreme Soviet and, the next year, the Yeltsin administration removed all culpability from the former kulaks.<sup>68</sup>

## Documents

### • DOCUMENT 71 •

I. V. Stalin, “Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement,” 2 March 1930. *Pravda*, 2 March 1930. From J. Stalin, *Works*, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1955), pp. 197–205.

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2 March 1930

The Soviet government’s successes in the sphere of the collective-farm movement are now being spoken of by everyone. Even our enemies are forced to admit that the successes are substantial. And they really are very great.

It is a fact that by 20 February of this year 50 percent of the peasant farms throughout the USSR had been collectivized. That means that by 20 February 1930, we had *overfulfilled* the five-year plan of collectivization by more than 100 per cent.

It is a fact that on 28 February of this year the collective farms had *already succeeded* in stocking upwards of 36,000,000 centners, i.e., about 220,000,000 poods, of seed for the spring sowing, which is more than 90 per cent of the plan. It must be admitted that the accumulation of 220,000,000 poods of seed by the collective farms alone—after the successful fulfillment of the grain procurement plan—is a tremendous achievement.

What does all this show?

That a *radical turn of the countryside towards socialism may be considered as already achieved*.

There is no need to prove that these successes are of supreme importance for the fate of our country, for the whole working class, which is the directing force of our country, and, lastly, for the party itself. To say nothing of the direct practical results, these successes are of immense value for the internal life of the party itself, for the education of our party. They im-

bue our party with a spirit of cheerfulness and confidence in its strength. They arm the working class with confidence in the victory of our cause. They bring forward additional millions of reserves for our party.

Hence the party's task is: to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilize* them systematically for our further advancement.

But successes have their seamy side, especially when they are attained with comparative "ease"—"unexpectedly," so to speak. Such successes sometimes induce a spirit of vanity and conceit: "We can achieve anything!" "There's nothing we can't do!" People not infrequently become intoxicated by such successes; they become dizzy with success, lose all sense of proportion and the capacity to understand realities; they show a tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate the strength of the enemy; adventurist attempts are made to solve all questions of socialist construction "in a trice." In such a case, there is no room for concern to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilize* them systematically for further advancement. Why should we consolidate the successes achieved when, as it is, we can dash to the full victory of socialism "in a trice" "We can achieve anything!" "There's nothing we can't do!"

Hence the party's task is: to wage a determined struggle against these sentiments, which are dangerous and harmful to our cause, and to drive them out of the party.

It cannot be said that these dangerous and harmful sentiments are at all widespread in the ranks of our party. But they do exist in our party, and there are no grounds for asserting that they will not become stronger. And if they should be allowed free scope, then there can be no doubt that the collective-farm movement will be considerably weakened and the danger of its breaking down may become a reality.

Hence the task of our press is: systematically to denounce these and similar anti-Leninist sentiments.

A few facts.

1. The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the *voluntary character* of the collective-farm movement and on *taking into account the diversity of conditions* in the various regions of the USSR. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. Examples of the formation of collective farms in the developed areas must not be mechanically transplanted to underdeveloped areas. That would be foolish and reactionary. Such a "policy" would discredit the collectivization idea at one stroke. In determining the speed and methods of

collective-farm development, careful consideration must be given to the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the USSR.

Our grain-growing areas are ahead of all others in the collective-farm movement. [. . .]

Can it be said that these especially favorable conditions also exist in other areas, the consuming areas, for example, such as our northern regions, or in areas where there are still backward nationalities, such as Turkestan, say?

No, it cannot be said.

Clearly, the principle of taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the USSR is, together with the voluntary principle, one of the most important prerequisites for a sound collective-farm movement.

But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account are not violated in a number of areas? No, that cannot be said, unfortunately. We know, for example, that in a number of the northern areas of the consuming zone, where conditions for the immediate organization of collective farms are comparatively less favorable than in the grain-growing areas, attempts are not infrequently made to *replace* preparatory work for the organization of collective farms by bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper resolutions on the growth of the collective farms, organization of collective farms on paper—collective farms which have as yet no reality, but whose “existence” is proclaimed in a heap of boastful resolutions. [. . .]

Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants? Nobody, except our enemies!

What may these distortions lead to? To strengthening our enemies and to discrediting the idea of the collective-farm movement.

Is it not clear that the authors of these distortions, who imagine themselves to be “Lefts,” are in reality bringing grist to the mill of right opportunism? [. . .]

Can it be said that this line of the party is being carried out without violation or distortion? No, it cannot, unfortunately. We know that in a number of areas of the USSR, where the struggle for the existence of the collective farms is still far from over, and where artels are not yet consolidated, attempts are being made to skip the artel framework and to leap straight away into the agricultural commune. The artel is still not consolidated, but they are already “socializing” dwelling houses, small livestock and

poultry; moreover, this “socialization” is degenerating into bureaucratic decreeing on paper, because the conditions which would make such socialization necessary do not yet exist. [. . .]

One such overzealous “socializer” even goes so far as to issue an order to an artel containing the following instructions: “within three days, register all the poultry of every household,” establish posts of special “commanders” for registration and supervision; “occupy the key positions in the artel”; “command the socialist battle without quitting your posts” and—of course—get a tight grip on the whole life of the artel.

What is this—a policy of directing the collective farms, or a policy of *disrupting and discrediting* them?

I say nothing of those “revolutionaries”—save the mark!—who *begin* the work of organizing artels by removing the bells from the churches. Just imagine, removing the church bells—how r-r-revolutionary!

How could there have arisen in our midst such block-headed exercises in “socialization,” such ludicrous attempts to overleap oneself, attempts which aim at bypassing classes and the class struggle, and which in fact bring grist to the mill of our class enemies?

They could have arisen only in the atmosphere of our “easy” and “unexpected” successes on the front of collective-farm development.

They could have arisen only as a result of the block-headed belief of a section of our party: “We can achieve anything!” “There’s nothing we can’t do!”

They could have arisen only because some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision. [. . .]

I. Stalin

• DOCUMENT 72 •

Letter from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin with an appended OGPU report on excesses in the conduct of collectivization and dekulakization, 7 March 1930.

TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 40, ll. 6–17. Certified copy.

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7 March 1930

Top secret

Reports continue to come in from the provinces about distortions and excesses in the process of collectivization and dekulakization in all areas.

Despite measures by regional party organizations, the presence of alien,

unstable, and corrupted elements in the local soviet apparatus and poor selection of certain brigades, along with weak explanations and leadership on the part of a number of okrug organizations, has produced unending distortions in practical work in the countryside.

The most serious and widespread type of distortion is the assignment of middle peasants, poor peasants, and even landless laborers and workers, as well as Red partisans and Red Army soldiers' families, to the category of persons to be dekulakized and exiled. These cases are occurring almost everywhere to one degree or another.

In addition, the public is receiving rough treatment from brigades and soviet officials: threats of arrest and of exile for refusing to join a collective farm and illegal arrests of middle peasants; instances of abuse even against poor and middle peasants; beatings, in particular of women and old men.

Other occurrences of equally negative significance include the divvying up of confiscated kulak property, the inappropriate use of it, the auctioning of it to [uncollectivized] individual peasants on the cheap, and theft.

Serious attention should be given to cases of dekulakization, sometimes even on a mass scale, in areas of nonwholesale collectivization.

At the same time, there is noticeable wavering among certain groups of officials in the soviet apparatus and rural communists on issues of collectivization and dekulakization. A conciliatory attitude toward the kulaks is evident in refusals to participate in the confiscation of kulaks' property. One can also see overtly kulak-oriented attitudes on the part of village soviet officials, protection of kulaks, assistance to them in joining collective farms, advance warnings of the confiscation of property, the concealment of kulak property, etc.

Individual instances of distortions that are typical for almost all the areas of the Union are appended below.

OGPU deputy chairman Yagoda

## Appendix

### *The Ukraine*

*Zinovievsk Okrug.* There have been acts of criminal hooliganism and provocative mischief here by the brigades that have been collecting seed in Novo-Ukrainka Raion of wholesale collectivization.

The Malaia Pomoshnaia headquarters called in a 28-year-old middle peasant and instructed him to immediately sign a statement pledging to fulfill the plan for the sowing campaign. When the peasant refused to sign, he was forced to dance to the sounds of a string orchestra until he fainted,



after which he was placed in a cold room and kept there for an hour and a half.

The same brigade has raped two kulak women and has beaten up a 65-year-old man, whom they forced to dance and sing, poured water on him, put a dirty *papirosa* [a crudely rolled cigarette] between his teeth, and so forth.

At the Perchunovo headquarters, all the work is set up so as to allow for clandestine beatings of peasants. When the public learned on 14 February of the beating of a poor peasant, the poor peasants declared outright that “they would get even with these representatives of the government.”

In the village of Novo-Alekseevka, the brigade ordered a 65-year-old man who had refused to turn in seed to undress and remove his boots, then forced him to march around the room for about 30 minutes and began to fling him from one side to another until the old man collapsed from exhaustion. Right after that a crate was placed on top of the old man and the whole brigade sat on it, then he was forced to dance and ordered to drink 40 small glasses of wine. Some turpentine was added to the third glass. Then a belt was thrown around his neck, and one of the brigade members began to hang him. The old man lost consciousness, and the next day the brigade ordered him to keep quiet, or else [it threatened] next time would be worse.

In the village of Novo-Aleksandrovka, secretary Yerokhin from the Komsomol cell forced a middle peasant to pull the end of a noose that had been thrown around his neck. The peasant was gasping for breath, the secretary mocked him, saying “Here’s some water, drink it.”

*Poltava Okrug.* In Shishaki Raion 500 farms have been dekulakized, whereas the raion has 340 experts’ farms<sup>69</sup> altogether and it is not a raion of wholesale collectivization.

In Belotserkovka Raion, the property of two middle peasants was confiscated on the basis of dekulakization for a refusal to join an association for joint land cultivation.

In Sakhnov[shchina] Raion, during dekulakization in the village of Kolomiitsevo, all warm clothing was removed from kulaks. In one case several women were forcibly undressed. The raion executive committee’s plenipotentiary in the village of Nadezhdino, Shapoval, dekulakized a middle peasant, who left the very next day for three days of territorial military training.

Middle peasants have been arrested and exiled in a number of villages in Rublyovka Raion.

*Uman Okrug.* Middle peasants have been dekulakized in a number of

villages. Certain officials of village soviets and village activists “didn’t have clear-cut instructions as to whether middle peasants could be dekulakized.” The worst situation is in Buki and Oratovo raions.

In the village of Yankovka in Buki Raion, 45 farms have been dekulakized, including 35 belonging to middle peasants. Dekulakization was carried out by Lysenko, who is in charge of agitprop [agitation and propaganda] for the raion committee of the KP(b)U [Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine], and Levazhdovsky, plenipotentiary and member of the raion executive committee. During dekulakization activists beat up a woman with a rifle butt. A portion of her belongings were appropriated. Some middle peasants were evicted and ended up on the street.

In the village of Sologubovka in Oratovo Raion, a decree was adopted to evict 25 farms, including some belonging to middle peasants. A middle peasant named Nazarchuk, who landed on the list of those being evicted, hanged himself. The dekulakization work in the village was carried out with the approval of the raion executive committee’s plenipotentiary.

Middle peasants were listed for dekulakization in Talnoe, Zvenigorod, and other raions.

*Kherson Okrug.* Extremely flagrant distortions are being recorded in Bereznegovatskoe, Kachkarovka, Golaia Pristan, and Tsiurupinsk raions. Distortions, malfeasance, and abuses in Bereznegovatskoe Raion merit especially serious attention.

In the settlement of Bereznegovatskoe, during dekulakization the property was not inventoried. A portion of the confiscated property was stolen. A brigade led by Butenko, secretary of the local KP(b)U cell, undressed the daughter of one kulak and began to strangle the father. The property of two middle peasants was also taken without an inventory. One of them was stripped, and his 12-year-old daughter was left wearing nothing but a shirt. Brigade members led by the chairman of the Committee of the Village Poor<sup>70</sup> (a member of the KP[b]U), removed the pantaloons from the 17-year-old daughter of a kulak. One kulak was chucked out onto the street barefoot, without his hat, in his underwear. One middle-peasant woman and her child were stripped and thrown out onto the street. When the mother asked to have her sacking back, a brigade member and a party member refused.

The secretary of the Bereznegovatoe Raion committee of the KP(b)U and the chairman of the raion executive committee were promptly informed of what was happening in the raion, but, after repeated warnings, the raion party committee confined itself to delivering only a reprimand to certain officials. Several participants in the outrages that were perpetrated

during dekulakization went into hiding from Bereznegovatoe Raion in other okrugs.

*Kharkov Okrug.* In the village of Sukhiny in Bogodukhov Raion, Komsomol members beat up a kulak for refusing to give up his gold and money. The raion executive committee's plenipotentiary took an active part in the beating. After the beating the Komsomol members, along with the raion executive committee's plenipotentiary, tied a rope around the kulak's neck, bound him to a horse's shafts, and dragged him this way through the whole village to the raion center. The kulak's screams brought out a large crowd of peasants, who voiced great outrage over this abuse.

*Melitopol Okrug.* The Novo-Savelievka village soviet listed a middle peasant for dekulakization and ordered him "to get out of his house in five minutes."

Similar incidents have been recorded in Kremenchug, Tulchin, Kupiansk, Lubensk, Artyomovsk, Zaporozhie, Kharkov, Mogilev-Podolsk, and a number of other okrugs. (Measures have been taken in regard to all of the incidents. The guilty persons are being held accountable.)

*Moldavian ASSR.* In the village of Slobodzeia, the raion executive committee's plenipotentiary expropriated up to 150 farms, most of them belonging to middle peasants. In the village of Shershintsy, a middle peasant who was a landless laborer before the revolution and was a member of the Committee of Poor Peasants until recently was listed for dekulakization.

*Proskurov Okrug.* In the village of Kopchevka in Volochisk Raion, two middle peasants were added to the dekulakization lists. In the village of Knishkovtsy, 10 farms belonging to middle peasants were included among the 13 farms scheduled for dekulakization. Similar incidents were recorded everywhere.

The Proskurov Okrug committee of the KP(b)U made copies of the theses of the CC of the KP(b)U on the liquidation of the kulak as a class and sent them out to raion party committees for immediate implementation. The secretary of the okrug committee telegraphed an order from Kharkov that the liquidation of the kulak as a class commence within 24 hours.

Upon receiving the directive, the raion party committees began to implement it. About 40 farms were dekulakized in Chorny Ostrov Raion. Similar results took place in Medzhibozh and Volkovintsy raions. A total of 60 farms were dekulakized in Derazhnia Raion. All dekulakized persons were evicted from their houses.

On the basis of a directive from the okrug party committee, the property of all persons subject to dekulakization was inventoried. In some places middle and poor peasants were listed for dekulakization on the jus-

tification that they were “loudmouths.” The rush to carry out the operations without any mass work led to a total slaughter of livestock and other property not only by kulaks but by other [peasant] strata as well. In raions where dekulakization has been carried out, a mass exodus of kulaks has begun. Many of the kulaks who fled had been designated for arrest.

Raion party committees continued this spontaneous dekulakization for eight days.

*Central Black Earth Oblast*

*Yelets Okrug.* In the village of Bratovshchina in Dolgorukovo Raion, a deacon was dekulakized in the presence of the chairman of the village soviet; the deacon’s last pair of boots was taken away, and a pair of warm felt boots was removed from his wife’s feet.

*Borisoglebsk Okrug.* In the village of Kalmyk, kulak property was expropriated by a militiaman with the help of two disfranchised hooligans who were serving a term of forced labor at the village soviet. The belongings of kulaks and middle peasants were taken away at home and on the street, bribes were collected for leaving property, and so forth.

In the village of Kurlak in Shchuchinsk Raion, the chairman of the village soviet, the raion executive committee’s plenipotentiary, and three members of the village soviet came to the apartment of the village correspondent of the newspaper *Novaia derevnia* [New Countryside] and announced, “[your] property is to be inventoried and confiscated as kulak property.” In the correspondent’s absence, his wife and half-undressed, small children were kicked out onto the street, their belongings inventoried, gathered and locked in a trunk, and the keys taken.

Similar incidents occurred in a number of other villages in Borisoglebsk, Yelets, Rossosh, Lgov, and Kozlov okrugs.

*Yelets Okrug.* In the village of Pady in Lipetsk Raion, during dekulakization a kulak’s mentally ill daughter had her fur coat and skirt removed, and, wearing just a shirt, she was placed in the stove.

*Lgov Okrug.* In the village of Tetkino in Glushkovo Raion, during dekulakization, a kulak’s sick wife had her felt boots removed and the linen she had been lying on was removed from the bed.

*Rossosh Okrug.* In the village of Novoselovka, shockwork brigades comprised of poor-peasant activists and Komsomol members were set up. The “brigade members” entered kulaks’ huts and ordered, “Hands up,” conducted searches, indiscriminately took away all property, and kicked out the kulaks themselves with their families onto the street. The evictees are walking around the village, evoking the sympathy of the public.

*Yelets Okrug.* In the village of Butyrki, a group of 30 young people led by the secretary of the Komsomol cell came to the house of a middle peasant, took all of his belongings, beat up the peasant's wife, locked her in a room, and pocketed small items.

In the village of Lenino in Lipetsk Raion, brigade members took 150 rubles from a middle peasant's wife.

In the village of Pady in Lipetsk Raion, during the dekulakization of a middle peasant, the person carrying out the dekulakization removed a new pair of felt boots from the peasant's feet and put them on, and left his own old pair.

*Ostrogzhsk Okrug.* In the village [*khutor*] of Sergeevka, a member of the village soviet organized a group of Komsomol members and activists, armed them with hunting shotguns, and began to carry out dekulakization. The group arrested a poor peasant. Property was confiscated from another poor peasant. Various property was taken from many citizens and not turned in anywhere. The group calls itself "the organization of poor peasants."

*Ostrogzhsk Okrug.* In the village of Sadki in Budyonny Raion, the raion executive committee's plenipotentiary arrested 11 people, including 6 men and 6 women [*sic*] (all poor peasant women). The arrested men included only 1 kulak; the others were economically weak middle peasants.

In the village of Martynovka, a pleni[potentiary] brigade arrested the wife of a Red Army soldier.

In the village of Selivanovo in Valuiki Raion, several people were arrested; they turned out to be poor peasants.

At the Alekseevka Raion administrative department [*raiaadminotdel*], 100 poor and middle peasants were arrested for a disturbance opposing collectivization.

*Borisoglebsk Okrug.* In the village of Zherdevka in Zherdevka Raion, a landless laborer who is a member of the village soviet was arrested on the orders of the raion executive committee's plenipotentiary. The action was taken because the laborer had replied to an inquiry from peasants about whether they could be members of a collective farm by saying, "Whoever doesn't want to belong to a collective farm can submit a request to the board of the collective farm."

Similar incidents have occurred in the village of Pichaevo in Zherdevka Raion, where two middle peasants were arrested on the orders of the secretary of the VKP(b) cell. Three middle peasants were arrested in the village of Rybkino in Zherdevka Raion.

*Oryol Okrug.* In the village of Vetchinkino in Verkhovie Raion, the raion executive committee's plenipotentiary struck a poor peasant woman

(an illiterate one) in the face for saying, "What do we need a collective farm for, we already have a poor life." There was an uproar at the meeting, and it broke up. The okrug executive committee's plenipotentiary arrested the peasant woman.

In the village of Mavrino in Droskovo Raion, a poor peasant, speaking in response to a report delivered by the raion executive committee's plenipotentiary, voiced his opinion that he was unwilling to join the collective farm. The peasant was arrested on the spot by the raion executive committee's plenipotentiary and sent to the raion administrative department.

*Rossosh Okrug.* In the village of Solonetskoe in Vorontsovka Raion, when the chairman of a meeting saw that few people were voting for the establishment of a collective farm, he decided to cast a second vote, while proposing a resolution as follows: "We, citizens of cooperative no. 2 in the village of Solonetskoe, oppose collectivization and in general are against the measures being implemented by Soviet power and the VKP(b)." This resolution was actually adopted by a majority of the vote.

*Lgov Okrug.* In the village of Shchekino in Rylsk Raion, the chairman of the village soviet, while speaking at a general meeting before a vote, said, "Whoever is against collectivization is against Soviet power—raise your hands." After this statement, despite the fact that the groundwork for establishing a collective farm had been fully prepared, the peasants cried, "You're a counterrevolutionary yourself if you put it that way. That's a threat."—and they broke up the meeting.

*Lgov Okrug.* The Lgov Raion committee of the VKP(b) sent the Lgov Okrug committee of the VKP(b) a list of the kulak households to be exiled. The lists include poor and middle peasants. As many as 100 such "kulaks" in the raion have been targeted for exile.

*Rossosh Okrug.* In the village of Vorontsovka in Vorontsovka Raion, a farm belonging to Petliakov, who served as a volunteer in the Red Army from 1918 to 1923 and worked at a consumers' cooperative for six years, was dekulakized. His father was police commissar in 1918 and afterward, until 1924, served as a people's judge. His brother was murdered by bandits.

The Kantemirovka village soviet in Kantemirovka Raion dekulakized the family of Red Army soldier Stepanenko. His farm is that of a middle peasant.

In the village of Krasnoselie in Petropavlovka Raion, the village soviet resolved to exile a former Red Army soldier who has a testimonial from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Separate Caucasus RKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army].

In the village of [Novaia] Kalitva in Novaia Kalitva Raion, the village listed a middle peasant for exile.

*Yelets Okrug.* In the village of Berikopets in Bolshaia Poliana Raion, the father of a former Red Army soldier was dekulakized. His second son works in the city and has an Order of the Red Banner medal.

The Troitskoe village soviet in Borinsky [Zavod] Raion dekulakized a middle peasant because his father had a tearoom 20 years ago.

In the village of Kazki in Yelets Raion, a former Red Army soldier was dekulakized. He had taken away from him 20 poods [330 kilograms] of spring straw, a horse's collar, a double-blade plow, and a winnowing machine.

A middle-peasant farm belonging to a Red Army soldier's family was also dekulakized in the same location. The Kazeevo village soviet in Yelets Raion dekulakized the family of a Red Army commander. When his sister came to the chairman of the village soviet to complain, he responded, "I don't know who your brother is serving—the Reds or the Whites."

*Lgov Okrug.* In the village of Kevino in Rylsk Raion, a poor peasant was added to the list of persons to be dekulakized.

In the village of Suchkino in Rylsk Raion, at the conclusion of dekulakization work it was discovered that the list of those dekulakized included three poor peasants and one landless laborer who was the son of a former trader.

### *Northern Caucasus*

*Donetsk Okrug.* The Makeevka, Novo-Pavlovka, Marievka, Gemo-daevka [Gemodaevsky], and Kashary village soviets in Kashary Raion carried out, in certain communities, total dekulakization and exile of kulaks from villages [*stanitsy*] and hamlets [*khutory*]. Everything was taken away from kulaks, even clothing. Some kulaks left their children with the village soviets, since an order was issued that kulaks' relatives could not take them into their apartments.

*Shakty-Donetsk Okrug.* The Morozovsky Raion committee of the VKP(b) and the raion executive committee issued a directive to the localities that boiled down to imposing on all kulaks special purpose assessments and down payments for tractors with a view to selling and liquidating all property by the beginning of February. As a result, a total sell-off of all the property from kulak farms got under way throughout the raion. Everything was taken away from kulaks, priests, and former traders, up to and including crosses and chasubles. In the settlement of Morozovsky, one priest and the members of his family were forced to change into tattered clothing.

The most varied, provocative rumors circulated throughout the raion. *Donetsk Okrug*. In the village of Kamyshinskoe, the chairman of the village soviet arrested four middle peasants. The Leonov-Kalitvenskaia Raion administrative department arrested middle peasants and even middle-peasant women.

In the village of Kraskovo, two middle peasants were arrested for refusing to join a collective farm.

At the Anno-Rebrikovo village soviet, the chairman of a meeting on collectivization and the chairman of the village soviet arrested eight people, including three female landless laborers, merely for saying that the chairman of the meeting could not clearly explain issues of collectivization.

*Kuban Okrug*. In the village of Tikhoretskaia, the VKP(b) cell and the village soviet sought to increase the inflow of seed into the seed fund by summoning grain growers to the village soviet at night to “work on them,” demanding that they sign a pledge to preserve their sowing grain. If the reply was in the negative, a report was drawn up, specifying that “such-and-such a grain grower categorically refused to sign a pledge, that he is conducting systematic agitation against the sowing campaign, supports the tsar, does not recognize Soviet power, and is prepared to oppose Soviet power by force of arms.” Those summoned included many middle and poor peasants.

*Armavir Okrug*. In the village of Novo-Bekeshinskaia, when a Komsomol member learned of an [dekulakization] operation that was being prepared, he warned two kulaks whose property was to be confiscated. The kulaks managed to go into hiding before they were arrested.

*Maikop Okrug*. In the village of Sukhaia Balka, a candidate member of the party and five Komsomol members categorically refused to take part in an operation to remove kulaks.

*Tersky Okrug*. In Kuma Raion, those subject to dekulakization included a large number of civil war veterans who have revolutionary services to their credit.

In the village of Arkhipovskoe, a former commander of a partisan detachment (Red), later a battalion commander in the Red Army and a political activist, had all his property taken away and was exiled with his family.

In the village of Praskoveia, all the property belonging to a civil war veteran, who had served in the Red Army for four years, was confiscated.

The liquidation of kulak farms in the raion was accompanied by numerous instances of abuse of the people being dekulakized and by the confiscation of all their property, up to and including dirty laundry, and so forth. This has generated a negative mood among the masses of poor and middle peasants in many villages of the raion. [. . .]



## · DOCUMENT 73 ·

From a report by the OGPU operations group on the results of the work to exile category 2 kulaks, 6 May 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 329, ll. 1-28, 31-33, 37-44. Copy.

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6 May 1930

Top secret

A. Exile

1. *Organizational and Preparatory Work*

On 30 January the OGPU collegium convened a conference of all OGPU plenipotentiary representatives, where a detailed discussion took place concerning all issues of the operation against the kulaks, including the exile of category 2 kulaks.

The directive on the exile of category 2 kulaks was issued on 2 February in OGPU order no. 44/21.<sup>71</sup> The main points of order no. 44/21 and of subsequent directives [include the following]:

1. The immediate liquidation of the counterrevolutionary kulak *aktiv* (category 1). This operation must be concluded, in the main, by the time the campaign to exile the kulaks of category 2 is launched.

2. The mass exile (above all from raions of wholesale collectivization and the border zone) of the richest kulaks (former landowners, semi-landowners, local kulak leaders and the entire kulak cadre, the antisoviet kulak *aktiv* of clergymen and sectarians) and their families to the northern areas of the USSR and confiscation of their property (category 2).

3. The formation of operational troikas in the provinces which will direct firsthand the operation to exile category 2 kulaks and their families (closely monitoring the selection of people to be exiled and the conduct of dekulakization).

4. The establishment of collection points, managed by a commandant, to receive, record, and continuously dispatch people to be exiled.

5. The close monitoring in raions and okrugs of the compilation of lists of kulaks and their families (for exile and the confiscation of property), as well as the exile campaign itself. The taking of appropriate measures through raion administrative departments and okrug executive committees in order to sound alarms and eliminate defects and excesses that are spotted.

6. The exile of the kulaks shall be carried out locally by the *aktiv* of the

local party, Komsomol, soviet, workers, and landless laborers along with poor peasants.

7. The property of people being exiled shall be confiscated locally by representatives of raion executive committees under the procedure defined by special directives from the executive committees.

8. At the time the exiles are dispatched, they shall be permitted to take with them property and food within the quota. Kulak families who are being exiled shall be required to take with them axes, saws, shovels, carpenter's tools, and enough food for two months, with a total weight of not more than 25–30 poods per family.

9. Organs of the OGPU Transport Department are to arrange for guards during the train journey, to maintain a continual supply of boiled water for exiles, to set up feeding centers at stations, and medical care through the Commissariat of Transport.

10. The property of kulaks who are foreign citizens of the countries with which the USSR maintains official relations is not subject to confiscation, and such people and their families are not subject to exile (no. 3378 of 5 February).

11. A strict class line must be followed in all cases (involving persons in category 1), so that poor and middle peasants are not touched (no. 775 of 18 January).<sup>72</sup>

12. Kulak families being exiled, without fail, must not include families whose children are serving in the Red Army (no. 3310 of 25 January).

13. The exile plan is to be designed to take three months (February, March, and April). Given the extended time frame, the operation is to be carried out in a manner as organized, planned, and rigorously calculated as possible, in order to strike hard during the three months at the kulak *aktiv* in raions of wholesale collectivization (no. 3376 of 6 February).

14. People being exiled are to provide themselves with warm footwear (no. 3498 of 20 February).

15. The property of former Red partisans and actual civil war participants (with wounds or other deeds to their credit) is not subject to exile and confiscation either, excluding cases in which the aforementioned persons have turned into kulaks who are waging an active struggle against collectivization and are taking part in counterrevolutionary groups (no. 538 of 25 February).

16. Kulaks' families that have no able-bodied members are not to be exiled to the north and must not be included in transport trains.

17. It is categorically ordered that the directive permitting kulaks' fam-

ilies to take food and money with them within the quota be carried out precisely (no. 595 of 5 March).

18. The directors of OGPU okrug departments shall bear personal accountability for the dekulakization and exile of Red Army soldiers' families prior to receiving notification from the appropriate special department that a member of a family from the Red Army has been removed.

In all cases of excesses against Red Army soldiers' families, immediately raise the matter through soviet and party channels and ensure rectification of the mistakes (no. 597 of 5 March).

19. Category 2 kulaks and their families who are exiled shall be permitted to receive food, parcels, and money orders, pursuant to the standards and regulations of the Commissariat of Posts and Telegraph (no. 587 of 4 March).

20. A struggle is to be waged against excesses of any kind in connection with collectivization, with the matter raised at soviet and party organizations (no. 804 of 10 February).

21. All kulak families must be supported (in resettlement localities) at their own expense (no. 594 of 5 March).

22. Exiled kulak families who are put to use in resettlement localities are to be lodged separately from the others, in proximity to stations (no. 610 of 7 March).

23. For exiled kulak families who are put to use in agriculture, it is necessary, as a rule, to establish land-cultivation artels (no. 678 of 18 March).<sup>73</sup>

24. Kulak families who are being exiled and lack the specified food quota are not to be loaded into transport trains until local organizations supply them with the full quota (no. 12820 of 23 March).

25. Exiled category 2 kulak families who do not have family heads or other able-bodied members must be supported by artels of able-bodied kulaks. The same shall apply once such families are permanently settled (no. 12848 of 28 March).

26. Immediate permission is to be granted for children under 14 years of age of exiled category 2 kulaks to be transported [out of places of exile] by relatives, provided the parents give their consent (no. 12918 of 20 April).

27. Kulaks are not to be exiled by local authorities to another oblast without OGPU orders (no. 3537 of 24 February and no. 12910 of 17 April).

28. On the basis of memoranda by okrug executive committees to return improperly dekulakized families to their previous place of residence, such families are to be dispatched from places of exile and supplied with papers for free travel back to their previous place of residence (no. 3880 of 10 April).

29. OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices (in the Northern Krai,

the Urals, and Siberia) are to begin immediately the investigation of petitions from persons arriving in kulak transport trains who claim to have been improperly exiled. All poor peasants, low-income middle peasants and their families, families of Red Army soldiers, of former Red Army soldiers and Red partisans, middle and poor peasants who prove they were improperly exiled and have the appropriate papers in their possession are to be moved to separate barracks, and their food, lodgings, and living conditions improved as much as possible (no. 12850 of 28 March).

30. The return of improperly exiled persons is to commence only after the commission's<sup>74</sup> work is completed and all information is carefully verified. The commission's work (in considering petitions by improperly exiled persons) should be accelerated in order to conclude the work by the time people are dispatched to their places of permanent settlement.

The return of improperly exiled persons is to be organized so that, in the main, the return transport is unnoticed by the remaining exiles.

Former Makhno and Petliura followers and active bandit elements, even those who were considered middle or poor peasants at the time of dekulakization, are not to be returned under any circumstances.

Persons designated [for] return should be separated from the rest of their group, lodged in separate, better rooms, provided more tolerable conditions and with generally improved standards (nos. 12935 and 12936 of 25 April).

## 2. *The Exile Plan*

The tentative numbers of category 2 kulaks to be exiled first and the dates on which they will begin to be dispatched have been set as follows by OGPU order no. 44/21:

<i>Place of Origin</i>	<i>Planned Destination</i>	<i>Number of Families</i>	<i>Date of First Departures</i>
Ukrainian SSR	Northern Krai	30,000-35,000	20 February
Northern Caucasus	Urals	20,000	15 February
Middle Volga	Siberia	8,000-10,000	15 February
Central Black Earth Oblast	Northern Krai	10,000-15,000	
Lower Volga Krai	Siberia	10,000-12,000	15 February
Belorussian SSR	Siberia	6,000-7,000	
Siberia	Siberian interior	25,000	
Urals	Urals interior	10,000-15,000	
Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan interior	10,000-15,000	

Since certain regions (Siberia and Kazakhstan) are unprepared to receive exiled category 2 kulaks, on 4 February the number of persons to be

exiled and the dates for the operation were revised and set once and for all as follows:

<i>Place of Origin</i>	<i>Destination</i>	<i>Number of Families</i>	<i>Transport Begins</i>	<i>Transport Ends</i>
Ukrainian SSR	Northern Krai	20,000	20 February	15 April
Northern Caucasus	Urals	10,000	11 February	15 April
Middle Volga Krai	Northern Krai	6,000	20 February	15 April
Central Black Earth Oblast	Northern Krai	8,000	20 February	15 April
Lower Volga Krai	Northern Krai	8,000	20 February	15 April
Belorussian SSR	Urals and Northern Krai	8,000	5 March	15 April

On the basis of these directives, OGPU plenipotentiary representatives were instructed to draw up their own detailed plans for all of the work in exiling the kulaks, taking account of local conditions and specific factors.

Taking account of the percentage of collectivization of raions, the level of kulak activity, the territorial location of okrugs (the border zone), and a variety of other information, OGPU plenipotentiary representatives have set control figures on the persons to be exiled from oblasts, broken down by okrug.

### *3. Implementation of the Exile*

With regard to organizational and preparatory measures, special attention was paid to maintaining a correct class line in carrying out the exile, ensuring that the people exiled had the necessary warm clothing, footwear, food, etc., as well as to the most rigorous, continual screening of persons being exiled in order to prevent the exile of families of poor and middle peasants, families of Red Army soldiers and former Red partisans, families that do not have able-bodied members, etc.

The preparatory and organizational measures resulted, on the whole, in a quite satisfactory implementation of the operation to exile the kulaks from the aforementioned oblasts.

There were, in certain oblasts and okrugs, isolated mistakes and abnormalities in the process of the work to exile the kulaks, and they were pointed out right away to OGPU plenipotentiary representatives so that they could be immediately rectified and prevented in the future.

Based on the political condition of the Crimea and the Tatar Republic,

which had been listed for the exile of category 2 kulaks during the second phase, they were granted permission to exile kulaks simultaneously with the first phase from other oblasts. Tentative figures for category 2 kulaks and their families to be exiled are as follows: for the Crimea, 3,000 families; for the Tatar Republic, 2,000 families. The OGPU plenipotentiary representative office of the Middle Volga Krai was also permitted to ship out one additional transport train—350 families from Mordvin Oblast.

In order to purge border areas of smuggler and bandit elements, permission was granted to exile, in addition, “specially designated” individuals: from the Ukrainian SSR, 15,000; from the Belorussian SSR, 3,000.

The number of category 2 kulaks and their families who were exiled to other oblasts, compared with control figures, can be seen in the following table:

<i>Place of Origin</i>	<i>Planned Exiles</i>		<i>Actually Exiled</i>		<i>Note</i>
	<i>Families</i>	<i>People</i>	<i>Families</i>	<i>People</i>	
Ukrainian SSR	20,000	100,000	20,761	98,743	“specially designated” individuals
		15,000	32	14,894	
Belorussian SSR	8,000	40,000	9,231	44,083	“specially designated” individuals
		3,500	183	3,579	
Central Black Earth Oblast	8,000	40,000	8,237	42,837	two more transport trains are to be shipped out
Lower Volga Krai	8,000	40,000	7,931	40,001	one more transport train is to be shipped out— 350 families from Mordvin Oblast
Middle Volga Krai	6,000	30,000	5,566	29,211	
Northern Caucasus Krai	10,000	50,000	10,595	51,577	excluding Dagestan, from where exiles have been postponed
Crimea	3,000	15,000	3,179	14,029	four additional transports will be shipped out by a water route
Tataria	2,000	10,000	650	3,310	
Central Asia	400	2,000	80	281	
Transcaucasia	200	1,000			
Total	65,600	346,500	66,445	342,545	

*Note:* 1. People will no longer be exiled from Central Asia, in view of the decrease in the percentage of collectivization.

2. People have not yet been exiled from Transcaucasia, in view of the deterioration in the political situation.

As the above table shows, the control figures for the exile of category 2 kulaks and "specially designated" kulaks were overfulfilled. If one also considers that in the immediate future 700 families, 3,500 people, will be exiled from the Central Black Earth Oblast; 350 families, 1,750 people, from Mordvin Oblast; and 1,350 families, 6,750 people, from Tataria, for a total of about 2,400 families, 12,000 people, the total of all exiles to other oblasts will be 68,845 families, 354,545 people. The number of category 2 kulaks and their families resettled within oblasts (to northern raions and unpopulated lands), compared with the control figures, can be seen in the following table:

<i>Place of Origin</i>	<i>Planned Exiles</i>		<i>Actually Exiled</i>		<i>Note</i>
	<i>Families</i>	<i>People</i>	<i>Families</i>	<i>People</i>	
Siberia	30,000	150,000	16,061	80,305	to northern unpopulated areas of Siberia
Urals	14,800	74,000	13,708	66,115	to similar areas of the Urals
Kazakhstan	6,000	30,000	1,341	7,535	to the area of the Aral Sea
Leningrad Military Okrug	—	3,000	—	2,555	from Novgorod and Pskov okrugs to apatite mines in Murmansk Krai
Far Eastern Krai	4,000	20,000	447	2,235	to Amur, Zeia, and Vladivostok okrugs, within villages, including category 3 and category 1 families
Northern Krai	1,500	7,500	—	—	
Total	56,300	284,500	31,557	158,745	

*Note:* No resettlement data is available for the Northern Krai. Exiles were to be carried out simultaneously with the dispatch of newly arrived kulaks to their places of permanent settlement.

Of the above numbers of resettled kulaks, exiled kulaks were transported by horse-drawn carts as follows:

Within Siberia	4,943 families	24,715 people
Within the Urals	4,140 families	18,944 people
Total	9,083 families	43,659 people

Everyone else was transported by rail.

Resettlement within regions fell far short of fulfillment, except for the Urals Oblast, where the shortfall was very minor, only 1,100 families.

The main reason for the underfulfillment of the plan for intra-oblast resettlement of category 2 kulaks was the extensive dekulakization of kulaks down to their last thread and, in part, the sell-off of their property in advance—during the period of grain procurements and fivefold taxation. As a result, they did not have the minimum quota of food and means of production. In addition, okrug executive committees failed to allocate for kulaks being resettled, from the total amount of confiscated property and food, the minimum quotas of food, seed, draft animals, and implements, without which it is impossible to send them to remote, unpopulated areas. This (dekulakization down to the last thread) applied especially to Siberia and the Far Eastern Krai. The remaining category 2 kulak families are to be settled within okrugs under the procedure for settling category 3 kulaks from raions of wholesale collectivization.

In view of the lack of preparedness of areas that are to receive exiles, the Far Eastern Krai was permitted on a temporary basis to exile category 2 kulaks and their families under the procedure for exiling category 3 kulaks (i.e., settle them within the okrug while exiling them from raions of wholesale collectivization).

In the Far Eastern Krai, however, category 2 kulaks (along with category 3 and category 1 families) are being settled in Amur, Zeia, and Vladivostok okrugs (except for two raions in Vladivostok Okrug) within collectivized villages—on their outskirts. As a result, in Amur Okrug alone during one five-day period there were 80 reported threats to poor peasants by kulaks exiled to the outskirts of the village. Poor peasants therefore continue to refuse to occupy kulaks' houses and issue resolutions calling for the exile of kulaks beyond the borders of the okrug.

The overall results of the exile of category 2 kulaks and their families from oblasts and resettlement to unpopulated northern areas of their oblasts can be seen in the following table:



	Planned Exiles		Actually Exiled		To Be Exiled		Total	
	Families	People	Families	People	Families	People	Families	People
Settled in other oblasts	65,600	346,500	66,445	342,545	2,400	12,000	68,845	354,545
Resettled within the same oblast	56,300	284,500	31,557	158,745	1,500	7,945	33,057	166,690
Total	121,900	631,000	98,002	501,290	3,900	19,945	101,902	521,235

## DEFICIENCIES IN THE OPERATION TO EXILE KULAKS TO OTHER OBLASTS

The principal and most important shortcoming in the operation to exile category 2 kulaks, a shortcoming that exists in every oblast from which kulaks were exiled, is the absence of a class approach to the people being exiled, which was evident in the superficial attitude toward selecting candidates, in the settling of sometimes personal accounts, and so forth. In addition, the lists of persons being exiled were not adequately checked in advance, and as a result when the operational troikas checked the lists and the loading of transports, they discovered a large number of individuals who were not supposed to be exiled. For example:

In the Middle Volga Krai:

a. In Samara Okrug, when the okrug headquarters checked the papers that the raion headquarters had sent on the persons being exiled, 1,670 of 3,400 families were confirmed; therefore, 1,730 families (51 percent) were screened out because they were either middle peasants or individuals who were not supposed to be exiled. In the same okrug, another 150 families were screened out during the loading onto transports.

b. In Kuznetsk Okrug, the okrug headquarters screened out 120 families, and in Pavlovka Raion alone in the same okrug, among the 110 families selected for exile there turned out to be: 8 well-to-do families and 10 middle-peasant families, and the latter included 3 families of former Red partisans and 4 Red Army soldiers' families.

c. In Ulianovsk Okrug, during the loading onto transports, authorities discovered individuals of advanced age, former Red Army soldiers who had wounds from the civil war period, etc., and as a result 306 middle-peasant farms were screened out [from dekulakization] in the okrug as a whole.

d. In Buguruslan Okrug, of the 867 families selected for exile in 11 raions who were reviewed by the operational troika, only 448 families were confirmed—therefore 48 percent were screened out in the okrug. In certain raions of the okrug a much higher percentage was screened out (in Pokhvistnevo Raion, 51 percent; in Sergievsk Raion, 57 percent; in Kliavolino Raion, 73 percent); the OGPU okrug department took immediate measures against these mistakes.

In the Ukrainian SSR, a significant number of persons incorrectly selected for exile were screened out in Zinovievsk Okrug.

A similar picture—the lack of a class approach in selecting people for exile—was also evident in other oblasts from which people were exiled.

These incidents were promptly uncovered by OGPU organs and measures were taken through party and soviet channels to rectify the excesses.

Other negative features were: insufficient guidance of village soviets by raion headquarters; unprepared facilities at collection points for people being exiled; an inadequate supply of food, warm clothing, and footwear; unprepared carts and a lack of forage for delivering people being exiled to the collection points for loading onto transports; occasional abuses; transports not loaded to capacity (due to the tardy delivery of people being exiled to the collection points; the screening out at the collection point sites themselves, prior to loading onto transports, of people being improperly exiled; and even isolated instances where people being improperly exiled were unloaded from railroad cars, and also due to the mass flight of kulaks just before they were evicted [from their villages]).

We must stress in particular that in many cases raion headquarters, due to the lack of energetic guidance from okrug headquarters, operated in an unplanned manner, without proper care and initiative. Plenipotentiaries of raion executive committees also displayed a great lack of concern and irresponsibility, and therefore the technical preparation of documents was often done in the localities on the day of exile.

Another typical occurrence in all oblasts and okrugs was that the majority of raion headquarters and plenipotentiaries of raion executive committees sought to pile the entire burden of the preparatory work, up to and including the actual eviction, on the raion plenipotentiaries of the OGPU. Most raion executive committees and many okrug executive committees formed the mistaken opinion that the exile of the category 2 kulaks was solely the job of the OGPU; hence their inaction and a definite trend—to pile all of the work in exiling the kulaks solely on OGPU organs.

Thanks only to pressure from OGPU organs and direct guidance in localities by OGPU raion plenipotentiaries (evictions from the villages, organizing batches of kulaks for shipment to collection points, etc.), the exile operation, on the whole, was completed in a relatively satisfactory manner.

By way of illustration, we can cite the following selected incidents:

*Middle Volga Krai*

a. Ulianovsk Okrug: the Novo-Malykla Raion headquarters sought to pile all of the preparation on the OGPU raion plenipotentiary. Technical paperwork was done on the day of eviction. The raion executive committee's plenipotentiaries treated the work in an irresponsible and unconcerned manner. In the village of Novo-Besovka, people being exiled were notified of their departure 15 minutes before boarding, and at the time of boarding they ran to find bread for the people being exiled. Papers were

sent to the village of Novo-Malykla for the wrong people, at the same time people being exiled were forced to put up some dough [for baking bread] four hours before their eviction, etc.

b. Samara Okrug: the secretary of the Borskoe Raion party committee, Klindukhov, gave this reply to a request from our plenipotentiary for officials to be sent to localities to carry out evictions: "The sowing campaign is more important to me, and I can't release any of our officials."

The Alekseevka Raion headquarters did a poor job of preparing the transportation of kulaks to the collection point, therefore the people being exiled were delivered very late, the loading was consequently rushed, and the papers on the exiles turned out not to be in order.

In certain instances plenipotentiaries of raion executive committees, and sometimes even party members themselves, openly spoke out against the exile of the kulaks and actually refused to carry out their assignments, for example: "I ask to be removed from this job, since I cannot watch all this without any emotions" (VKP[b] member Filatov, Yekaterinovka Raion, Samara Okrug); "they've sent off one batch, we'll wait and see what else they think of, let this end as soon as possible" (plenipotentiary of Novo-Malykla Raion, Ulianovsk Okrug). Similar, isolated remarks were made in other okrugs and oblasts as well.

All of the aforementioned abnormalities were eliminated as they were uncovered during the work itself, and by the middle of the operation they had been almost completely expunged from the practices of local organs.

The center not only issued appropriate instructions regarding shortcomings that were noticed in a certain oblast that was exiling people, but simultaneously also informed other oblasts. Thanks to this, a considerable number of deficiencies and abnormalities were prevented in the oblasts where the kulaks were exiled later (the Crimea and Belorussian SSR).

#### RESETTLEMENT WITHIN REGIONS

The main shortcomings in the resettlement of category 2 kulaks within regions are, on the whole, the same ones as in the exile of kulaks to other oblasts. It is notable that Siberia and Kazakhstan gave priority to resettling kulaks within the region while absolutely refusing to receive designated kulaks from other oblasts.

In the Urals, there were isolated instances of repeated dekulakization during the journeys by cart of dekulakized kulaks and kulaks being resettled in the north.

## THE WORK OF TRANSPORT

Rail transport did a good job of fulfilling its assigned task of the mass shipment of exiled kulaks. The exiled kulaks were supplied with boiled water and hot food during the journey without any interruptions. Except for isolated minor delays for technical reasons, all trains kept strictly to the schedules drawn up in advance.

The Commissariat of Transport did a worse job of organizing medical care for exiled kulaks. Only after a significant number of persons were found to be sick (especially children with measles and scarlet fever) and after appropriate pressure from the center did doctors examine the sick at stations more regularly. Because of the brevity of the station stops, doctors did not have a chance to examine all of the exiles but examined and provided medical aid only to those who said they were sick. Therefore a considerable number of sick people (especially children) were delivered to the destinations, since many mothers were afraid that their sick children would be left by themselves in a hospital and, not wanting to part with their children, did everything they could to conceal their sick children.

During the entire time on 189 transports of exiled kulaks to other oblasts (no data is available yet on shipments within oblasts):

- a. 320 sick people were removed en route—49 men, 168 women, and 173 children [should be 390—trans.];
- b. 58 people died en route—10 men, 1 woman, and 47 children;
- c. 10 people—9 men and 1 woman—were arrested for attempting to escape and inciting other transportees [to escape];
- d. 11 people escaped—10 men and 1 child.

(The escapees included three “specially designated” individuals, one of whom was killed while trying to escape.)

## THE POPULATION'S REACTION

The attitude of most of the poor and middle peasants toward the exile of the kulaks in all oblasts from which people were exiled remained positive throughout the campaign.

Most of the material that has come in from the localities reports that the party's policy on this question has met with approval from most poor and middle peasants. They took an active role in carrying out the exile operation, unanimously approved the lists of people being exiled at almost every meeting, submitted additional candidates, and demanded immediate implementation of their resolution.

The highest levels of activity by the poor segment of the countryside were displayed in the Ukrainian SSR, in the okrugs of Kherson, Krivoi Rog, Zinovievsk, Kremenchug, Mariupol, Poltava, Priluki, and Kharkov.

In *Krivoi Rog Okrug*, not only poor peasants but a substantial proportion of the middle peasantry took an active part in the exile operation. The level of activity by the entire peasantry was so high that at no time during the operation was there any need to resort to armed force for the guarding and escorting of kulaks and so forth.

When the kulaks saw the enthusiasm and high level of activity by the masses of poor and middle peasants, they became convinced that it was absolutely impossible to find support from any strata of the peasantry, and they did not even attempt to resist while being exiled.

There were no excesses whatsoever on the part of the public in this okrug during the exile of kulaks.

In *Poltava Okrug*, the entire operation of exiling kulak families proceeded with the direct participation in this work of most of the poor peasants in the countryside, former Red partisans, and members of associations for joint land cultivation. A typical feature in this okrug was the peasantry's assistance in uncovering assets that the kulaks were hiding. Gold and Soviet paper money [*sovznaki*] worth a large sum were found in an evicted kulak's possession in Rublyovka Raion, Poltava Okrug, with the help of a poor peasant.

A similar incident occurred in *Priluki Okrug*, where 4,000 rubles in gold and silver were found in one kulak's possession, and more than 600 rubles in gold and tsarist coins in another's.

Highly positive attitudes have also been reported in *Zinovievsk Okrug*, where the poor peasantry took an active part in dekulakization and in drawing up lists of kulaks to be exiled. It was thanks to the favorable attitudes of the poor and middle peasantry that the operation of exiling the kulaks took place without excesses or resistance.

Along with these positive features, there were isolated instances everywhere in which middle peasants wavered, heeded all sorts of agitation and rumors, and reacted to every occurrence that affected their economic interests.

But the positive manifestations by the entire poor and middle peasantry predominated by a wide margin over the resistance to the exile operation and various excesses in this connection that did occur in certain okrugs and oblasts.

It must be noted that poor explanatory work, excesses, antisoviet kulak activity, ties of kinship, and economic dependency exerted a strong influ-

ence in some places on the mood of some portion of the poor and middle peasantry in the countryside. As a result, a number of places had these negative developments: lists of people to be exiled were rejected at meetings, group and mass disturbances (primarily by women) took place in defense of the kulaks, the exile operation was prevented from proceeding, panicky attitudes erupted, and sympathy was expressed toward the kulaks.

The categorical protests against the exiling of the kulaks had undesirable consequences, especially when kulaks were being loaded and sent off—group and mass disturbances by crowds that had initially gathered as spectators, which then grew into organized resistance, with attempts to prevent the exile operation from proceeding.

The most serious of these mass disturbances occurred in certain raions of *Syzran and Buguruslan okrugs* in the Middle Volga Krai, where they consisted of “reprisals” against members of the local government (beatings, murders) by the enraged mob, necessitating the dispatch of armed detachments. In certain places this created great difficulties for the exile operation and, in certain cases, even a suspension of work until appropriate preparatory measures were carried out.

#### THE MOOD OF THE KULAKS

Even before the operation to exile the kulaks began, there had been an increase everywhere in activities by kulaks, who were infuriated by dekulakization and the impending exile operation. There were antisoviet kulak activities everywhere, consisting of agitation against the exile operation, the spreading of various provocative rumors, and attempts to gain the support of the poor and middle segment of the peasantry in the countryside (mostly women) by getting them drunk, bribing them, and so forth, throughout the period of preparatory work for the exile operation, as well as during the operation.

Provocative rumors, accompanied by defeatist notions (“springtime themes”), and threats of “reprisals” against the poor peasants and the party and rural activists, circulated by the kulaks, were extremely widespread throughout the exile operation.

The kulaks were also active in putting up some resistance during the exile operation. The resistance consisted of attempts by kulaks to refuse to leave and to provoke the masses into active disturbances, in certain cases while wrecking their farms and using physical violence against local officials. For example:

*Kuznetsk Okrug* (Middle Volga Krai): in the village of Mord-Shemolak, a kulak who did not want to get into the cart flung every possible insult at government representatives who were present and at Soviet power and bit them. In the village of Novo-Pecheur one kulak who found out about the decision by the poor peasantry to exile him, set fire to a bathhouse that belonged to him. In the same village, a kulak named Dvornin, armed with a knife, assaulted the poor peasant guarding him but was immediately disarmed.

In the village of Machkasy, a kulak named Uyauvalov did all he could to resist being put on the cart and, trying to incite the crowd, shouted: "Well, peasants, why are you just watching us being evicted, what did we do to you—and you went against us." Women voiced sympathy for him and criticized the exile decree.

*Samara Okrug*: In the village of Aleksandrovka, Kinel Raion, Ivan Kuznetsov tried forcibly to free himself and his parents from eviction, while threatening murder. In the village of Totskoe, a kulak named Trofimov, who was to be exiled, tried to hang himself.

Ukrainian SSR: in a number of villages in *Izium Okrug* kulaks who were to be exiled tenaciously resisted the brigades that had arrived, refusing to leave the village, and were evicted only after the use of armed force.

In *Lubensk Okrug*, as kulaks were being arrested in one village, kulaks attempted to provoke the population with an offensive by a bandit gang. For several days in a row a group of kulaks fired in the direction of the village with sawed-off shotguns, creating the impression that there was a large bandit gang on the outskirts. The village activists became flustered, and there was even a proposal to postpone the exile from this locality. Measures were taken, and the group of kulaks was arrested and their weapons taken away.

In *Sumy Okrug*, in Khoten Raion there was one incident of armed resistance by a kulak who was to be exiled. The kulak was surrounded by a militia squad and, during a shoot-out, shot himself to death.

It was also common among kulaks who were to be exiled to employ ruses. For example, there were cases everywhere in which the wives of kulaks applied for divorce, the daughters of kulaks married poor peasants and Komsomol members, and children disavowed their families and other relatives—all for the purpose of avoiding exile.

A typical case occurred in *Kremenchug Okrug*, where one kulak who was being exiled tried to spare his three daughters from exile by listing his three female landless laborers as family members.



At the same time there have been instances in many places where some of the kulaks have reacted with outward calm to their exile beyond the borders of the region, regarding this occurrence as inevitable, and have closed down their farms and stocked up on food in advance.

There have also been more than a handful of these incidents: when authorities arrived at a kulak's house and instructed him to gather his things for departure, the latter, sitting on his bound belongings, replied, "I'm ready, I've been waiting for you for a long time already" (*Kuznetsk Okrug*, Middle Volga Krai).

In *Kherson Okrug*, some people being exiled have not only displayed no hostility or displeasure, they have even rejoiced at their exile, held dance parties, sang songs, etc.

#### THE FLIGHT OF KULAKS

In part even before the exile of the kulaks began, last August, as a result of the accelerated pace of the grain procurement campaign and the resolute pressure on the kulaks, there were cases in certain oblasts where kulaks walked and rode out of villages. In the Northern Caucasus in particular, more than 2,000 of the kulak-White Guard element ran off from their longtime homes even before the exile of the kulaks began.

The flight of kulaks everywhere especially increased during the period when the lists of people to be exiled were being approved at general meetings of peasants.

The places of greatest "attraction" for the people fleeing are industrial centers and certain regions of the USSR (Siberia, the Ukraine, Turkestan, the Caucasus, the Donets Basin, Central Asia, the Northern Krai, Aldan, and the Tatar and Bashkir republics)—in the hope of getting jobs at large enterprises or taking up some trade and becoming stronger economically.

At the same time, some kulaks made attempts to get to the USSR border and defect to the camp of White Guards with patently counterrevolutionary tendencies. This pattern was especially noticeable among fleeing Cossacks, former White officers, and White bandits.

According to incomplete data, from the start of the exile campaign until 25 April, a total of 20,433 kulaks, including 3,184 with families, fled from their permanent places of residence. During the same period 8,305 kulaks, including 652 with families, were detained. Of the total number of 8,305 detained kulaks, 4,141 were detained while in transit. Detailed data on escaped and detained kulaks are appended to the report.<sup>75</sup>

## B. Resettlement

*Organizational and Preparatory Work*

Already before directives on the exile of the kulaks were issued, OGPU plenipotentiary representatives in the Northern Krai, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far Eastern Krai were asked on 10 January to wire their ideas by 14 January as to the places where exiled kulaks could be settled and in what numbers. The question of places for resettling kulaks was also discussed at a conference of OGPU plenipotentiary representatives convened by the OGPU collegium.

To ensure the best implementation of resettlement, personnel were sent to localities as follows:

to the Northern Krai	—20 trainees from the OGPU Tashkent School
to the Urals	—30 trainees from the OGPU Tashkent School
to Siberia	—30 trainees from the OGPU Tashkent School
to Kazakhstan	—20 trainees from the OGPU Tashkent School

In order to strengthen local OGPU troop units, an appropriate number of reserve OGPU troop units were sent to the Northern Krai and the Urals from Moscow and Leningrad to guard resettled kulaks and to prevent possible excesses. In addition, all OGPU plenipotentiary representatives were instructed to set up covert operational reserves locally, made up of workers, party members, and Komsomol members. Such covert reserves made up of workers, party members, and Komsomol members were organized in the form of platoons of companies of various numbers in Siberia and the Urals, and they fully justified their purpose with their subsequent performance.

*The Resettlement Plan*

Initially the plan was to resettle exiled kulaks from other oblasts as follows:

in the Northern Krai	—40,000–50,000 families
in Siberia	—24,000–30,000 families
in the Urals	—20,000 families.

Since Siberia and Kazakhstan were unprepared to receive kulaks being exiled from other oblasts, the original exile plan was revised downward, causing a revision of the plan for settlement of the kulaks as well. Before the exile of the kulaks began, the resettlement of exiled kulaks was to be carried out as follows:

in the Northern Krai	—45,000 families
in the Urals	—15,000 families.

A typical tendency was not only the absence of any desire on the part of officials in Siberia and Kazakhstan to receive and resettle kulaks exiled from other oblasts, but also their effort, under various pretexts, to completely avoid receiving exiled kulaks (making excessive monetary demands and so forth). But because of the additional shipment of kulaks—“specially designated” individuals—from the border raions of the Ukrainian SSR and Belorussian SSR and the overcrowding of lodgings for the temporary housing of resettled kulaks in the Northern Krai and in the Urals, Siberia was categorically ordered to accept a portion of the exiled kulaks.

We cannot help but point out the following typical tendency among officials at the OGPU plenipotentiary representative’s office in Siberia who view the operation to exile the kulaks solely from the standpoint of economic “gain”: while they stubbornly continue to refuse to take in any quantity whatsoever of exiled kulaks with their families, they immediately responded to a proposal to receive 5,000 “specially designated” individual men from the Ukrainian SSR by agreeing to receive not only this number but even 55,000 individual men, who could be sent “at any time.” . . .<sup>76</sup>

#### *How the Exile Operation Proceeded*

Based on data on the number of kulaks who were to be resettled in the Northern Krai and the Urals, the OGPU plenipotentiary representative office for the Northern Krai and the Urals drew up a detailed plan for resettling the kulaks: receive the transport trains; unload them; deliver kulaks to their temporary housing sites; build and equip appropriate lodgings; provide food supplies, medical care, guards, and Chekist support; utilize the able-bodied in work projects, etc.

To receive kulak families being resettled, receiving centers (or commandants’ offices) were set up at unloading sites and assigned the entire responsibility for receiving and unloading transport trains, separating the able-bodied from those unable to work, turning over the able-bodied to representatives of economic organizations, dispatching family members to temporary housing sites, receiving informants who arrived with the transport and recruiting new informants, as well as for drawing up lists and unloading freight cars.

Employees at the receiving centers (or commandants’ offices) would inspect each car’s occupants, consider and implement measures to isolate the sick, suggest that they set apart food and warm clothing for themselves and, once families were dispatched to temporary housing sites, would

send the able-bodied off to work. The unloading of transports did not take more than the specified three hours and averaged two hours.

Simultaneously with this work, a special three-member group would receive informers who arrived with the transport and recruit new ones. It should be noted that the number of informers on many transport trains was very insignificant, and on several trains there were none at all. [. . .]

The overall results of the resettlement of kulaks who were exiled from other oblasts and resettled within regions can be seen in the following table:

<i>Destination</i>	<i>Shipped in from Other Oblasts</i>		<i>Resettled within the Region</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Families</i>	<i>People</i>	<i>Families</i>	<i>People</i>	<i>Families</i>	<i>People</i>
Northern Krai	46,562	230,065	—	—	46,562	230,065
Urals	17,835	85,134	13,708	66,115	31,543	151,249
Siberia	1,135	20,176	16,061	80,305	17,196	100,481
Kazakhstan	80	281	1,341	7,535	1,421	7,816
Far Eastern Krai	833	5,097	447	2,235	1,280	7,332
Leningrad Military Okrug	—	—	—	2,555	—	2,555
Subtotal	66,445	340,753	31,557	158,745	98,002	499,498
Still to be resettled	2,400	13,792	1,500	7,945	3,900	21,737
Total	68,845	354,545	33,057	166,690	101,902	521,235

As the above data show, the plan for receiving exiled category 2 kulaks and members of their families was substantially overfulfilled by the Northern Krai and the Urals Oblast. What is more, notwithstanding the abbreviated time frame allowed for preparing to receive them, the large number of kulaks to be resettled, and the winter season, officials of the OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices in the Northern Krai and the Urals, for the most part, fulfilled the task assigned to them in a highly satisfactory manner.<sup>77</sup>

#### *Medical Care and Sanitary Services*

During the rail journeys the total number of persons who became ill or died was relatively low: on 189 transport trains, 58 people died and 320 were removed due to illness.

The crowded conditions in the rail cars during the journeys, the crowded conditions in temporary lodgings, the inadequate nourishment (especially the absence of baby food), the unfamiliar, harsh climate, the

initially insufficient [number] of bathhouses and laundries, and the sluggish response by the Commissariat of Health in meeting requests to send doctors, medicines, and means for disinfecting—all this created a highly fertile environment for the wide propagation of various diseases among the resettled kulak families (especially among children: measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, pneumonia, dysentery) and a high mortality rate, primarily among children.

It is typical that in a number of cases mothers do not report their children's illnesses, especially with regard to toddlers (1–3 years old), and the latter have died before being shown to a doctor. In addition, a number of cases have been established where mothers have deliberately put their children in conditions that inevitably caused illness and death, apparently wanting to rid themselves of an extra burden.

There have been several recorded cases in the Northern Krai and the Urals of typhus and typhoid fever among exiled kulak families. Considering the high rate of lice infestation and the impossibility of providing frequent bathhouse services for them, this may transform kulak families into breeders of typhus and other epidemic diseases.

Considering the harsh conditions for children in the North, permission was issued to give children under 14 years of age, with their parents' consent, to relatives so they could return to their previous places of residence. (A detailed background paper on the measures taken for medical care and sanitary support for resettled kulak families is appended to the report.)<sup>78</sup>

#### *Categories of Improperly Exiled Persons*

During the journey of the train transports, the commandants of the transports began to receive complaints from certain exiled kulaks that they had been improperly exiled. Such complaints took on a mass scale especially after the exiles were placed in temporary lodgings.

At the beginning of March instructions were issued to the provinces to house all improperly exiled persons in the resettlement localities separately from the others and close to the station in order to have the capability of sending them back as quickly as possible if it is proven that they were improperly exiled.

At the end of March instructions were issued to the provinces (the Northern Krai, the Urals, and Siberia) to immediately start checking, through the resources of OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices, the complaints by persons who arrived in the kulak transports that they were improperly exiled. All poor peasants, low-income middle peasants and their families, families of Red Army soldiers, former Red Army soldiers

and Red partisans, middle and poor peasants who prove they were improperly exiled and have the appropriate papers with them are to be placed in separate barracks, improving, as much as possible, their food, lodgings, and living conditions.

At the beginning of April a directive was issued to the provinces to send improperly dekulakized families back from their places of exile, based on memoranda from okrug executive committees on the return of improperly dekulakized families to their previous place of residence, and to supply them with travel vouchers to their previous place of residence.

To date, about 30,000 such complaints of improper exile have been made in the Northern Krai alone. To speed up the investigation of the complaints, 15 trainees of the OGPU Higher Border Guard School were sent to the Northern Krai to assist local officials at the end of March.

In addition, a CC commission dispatched especially for this purpose is working in the Northern Krai at present to investigate complaints of improper exile and to supervise the work of local okrug subcommissions.

The vast majority of improperly exiled persons are adamantly demanding that they be returned home. Only some of them agree to voluntarily remain in the north, but they are asking to be given an opportunity to get settled.<sup>79</sup>

### Economic Utilization

#### *Northern Krai*

The principal occupation of exiled kulak families must be agriculture, with an emphasis (in Vologda Okrug and on the Pechora in Komi Oblast) on livestock breeding, which to some degree should alleviate the krai's food supply.

During periods when they are at liberty from agricultural work, able-bodied members of kulak families should be employed in forestry work and log floating and thereby supplement their agricultural income.

Small groups of families who are being settled on the coast of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean are utilized to develop the fishing industry and to provide manpower for water-related production.

Resettled kulaks will be utilized in other work—wood chemistry, road building, the production of building materials, etc.—as they are released from forestry work.

These guidelines—the opportunity to work in agriculture and the prospects of developing the timber industry in the coming years—served as the basis for the resettlement plan.

Tentatively breaking down all of the kulaks resettled in each okrug according to the dominant occupations, we get the following proportions:

<i>Name of Okrug</i>	<i>Forestry Work</i>	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Fishing</i>	<i>Total</i>
Arkhangelsk	84 percent	6 percent	10 percent	100 percent
Vologda	60 percent	40 percent	—	100 percent
Severnaia Dvina	90 percent	10 percent	—	100 percent
Niandoma	83 percent	10 percent	7 percent	100 percent
Nenets	—	—	100 percent	100 percent
Komi Autonomous Oblast	75 percent	15 percent	10 percent	100 percent
Average	65.3 percent	13.5 percent	21.2 percent	100 percent

At present 41,350 able-bodied kulaks whose families are in places of temporary resettlement are being utilized in forestry work.

Resettled kulaks are being assigned to the following economic organizations in these numbers:

Severoles [Northern Lumber]	34,500 families
Komiles [Komi Lumber]	5,000 families
TLO [Transportny lineiny otdel; Transport Security Department] of the Northern Railroad	3,500 families
Stroiotedel [Construction Department]	1,500 families
Volgokaspiiles [Volga-Caspian Lumber]	1,000 families
Total	45,500 families

### *Urals Oblast*

The plan for resettling the kulaks was based on the intention to utilize the labor of the resettled kulaks mostly in forestry work and the fishing industry. But in order to give the resettled kulaks incentives to do forestry work, it is also planned to allot land to them for agriculture. For people employed in forestry work, however, agriculture must play a supporting role that meets minimum needs for their own consumption, mostly in vegetables and partly in grain and forage products, so as to spare the state apparatus from delivering these products to them.

Only for 2,500 families who were resettled in Tobolsk Raion, Tobolsk Okrug, the main occupation during the initial period will be agriculture.

Under agreements with economic organizations, the following have committed themselves to employ resettled kulaks:

Kamuralles [Kama-Urals Lumber and Paper State Trust]	12,000 families
Vologokaspiiles [Volga Caspian Lumber]	9,500 families
Uralmet [Urals Mining and Metallurgical Trust]	7,500 families
Rybtrest [Fishing Trust]	3,060 families
Uralugol [Urals State Coal Trust]	500 families
Total	32,760 families

To date, 27,090 people have already been utilized in forestry work.

### *Siberian Krai*

The raions of resettlement for kulaks are remote, northern, unpopulated raions that are not part of the resettlement rosters [for voluntary peasant migration].

The main occupation of resettled kulaks is agriculture, with prospects for the development of the timber industry and various trades.

In addition, under an agreement with Tsvetmetzoloto [All-Union Association for the Mining, Processing and Sale of Nonferrous Metals, Gold, and Platinum], 3,550 families are being assigned to Soiuzzoloto [All-Union Association of the Gold and Platinum Industry] to work in gold mines:

1) in the Aldan mines	800 families
2) in the Southern Yakut mines	200 families
3) in the Barguzin mines	500 families
4) in the Northern Yenisei mines	800 families
5) in the Southern Yenisei mines	300 families
6) in the Sarala mines	200 families
7) in the Martaiga [Mariinsk-Taiga] mines	300 families
8) in the Minusinsk mines	250 families
9) in the Norilsk platinum mines	200 families
Total	3,550 families

Most of the kulaks resettled from other oblasts are already being utilized now in various projects.

### *Far Eastern Krai*

All of the kulaks who are being resettled in the Far Eastern Krai are being assigned to Soiuzzoloto to work in gold mines:

1) in the Sretensk mines	1,000 families
2) in the Zeia mines	1,300 families
3) in the Selemdzha mines	750 families
4) in the Mogocha mines	350 families



5) in the Bira-Sutara mines	3 50 families
6) in the Lower Amur mines	7 50 families
Total	4,500 families

### *Kazakhstan*

All of the kulaks have been resettled in the area of the Aral Sea, and will mostly be used in the fishing industry. Some of the resettled people are already working.

### *Leningrad Oblast*

All 3,000 kulaks who have been resettled in Murmansk Krai are employed in apatite mines.

### *The Mood of the Resettled Kulaks*

The main factor defining the mood of the exiled kulaks is that they didn't know about their further transfer to places of permanent settlement and about how they would get set up. For this reason there have been a lot of cases of stubborn unwillingness on the part of able-bodied members to separate from their families and head for the areas of their assigned work.

In addition to individual cases of agitation against the party's policy and threats against accompanying guards, there have been several mass disturbances:

*Northern Krai.* At 9 a.m. on 18 March, exiled kulaks who arrived at the Semigorodniaia station in Vologda Okrug on transport train no. 139, unwilling to stay in barracks, left them without permission and moved toward the station, demanding that they be sent home. The commandant and two Red Army soldiers stopped the movement by firing five shots in the air. The kulaks returned to the barracks, threatening to take action again in two hours.

At 8 a.m. on 19 March, a group of about 1,500 resettled kulaks was supposed to head from their camp, which is five kilometers from the town of Kotlas, for their zones of permanent residence. Under the influence of counterrevolutionary agitation that had been conducted, the group refused to proceed to the settlement site, and when the kulaks came outside, they began to hold a rally and raise an alarm summoning the entire camp, which numbered as many as 7,000 people, to join them. Simultaneously the aforementioned group of kulaks attempted to disarm OGPU officials. By the time a detachment of OGPU troops that had been called in arrived, a mob numbering about 2,000 people was rallying in a state of extreme

arousal. They prevented representatives of party and soviet organs from speaking, and screamed: "Down with you, go away," "down with Soviet power, bring in the Poles," "send us back," "down with the coercers." As the mob was broken up, there were attempts to take rifles and revolvers away from Red Army soldiers.

On 5 April, following the arrival of transport train no. 416 from Lower Volga Krai (comprising kulaks from the Cossack okrugs of Khoper and Stalingrad, among whom insurrectionist attitudes were observed already as the train was being dispatched) at Luza station in Severnaia Dvina Okrug, as preparations were in progress for dispatching the able-bodied kulaks to their places of permanent settlement, the latter crowded around the commandant's office, demanding that their exile be reversed and refusing to go to their assigned destination. In the process, they tore up telephone wires and smashed windows in the commandant's office. As order was being restored and the disturbance liquidated, heavy objects, rocks, and cast-iron pots were thrown at the riflemen. Komsomol members were beaten, Red Army soldiers were subjected to threats and abuse, and the platoon commander's arm was badly cut by a thrown rock.

*The Urals.* From the very first day, 6 April, that a group of 60 former landowners and kulaks exiled from the Crimea arrived at the Tura mines in Tagil Okrug, they began agitating in order to organize a disturbance by exiles opposing their being sent to forestry work. They raised these demands: to send them back or to warm areas, to allocate land to them, and to supply them with food. As a result, 950 men refused to travel to timber work. On 14 April a mob of 1,000 exiles demonstrated in front of the village soviet with the above-mentioned demands. The mob freed previously detained exiles and released exiles who had been loaded into transport trains that were to take them to work. On 15 and 16 April the exiles repeated their demonstrations with the same demands.

When they come into contact with the surrounding population during their journey, certain groups of kulaks use agitation in an effort to incite local peasants to rise up against the party's policy of collectivization and dekulakization.

One of the most serious problems for resettled kulaks is the food question; inadequate nutrition is causing great discontent among the exiles. There is also discontent about the very crowded conditions in the barracks, and the high morbidity and mortality rates among children are producing a mood of despondency among mothers.

At the same time, cases in which kulaks have fled from their work sites and their temporary lodgings have become more frequent. There have

been several dozen cases of flight by teen-agers, mostly boys 14–16 years old.

### C. The Resettlement of Category 3 Kulaks

On 23 March localities were issued directive no. 12823—to inform the OGPU on the progress of resettlement of category 3 kulaks.

On 30 March directive no. 3816 was issued, citing the chaotic manner in which resettlement work was being carried out. Instructions were given to focus the attention of party organizations, to report what was being done in the localities to organize resettlement, and we were instructed to provide supervision.

To date, we have information from the following oblasts:

*Central Black Earth Oblast.* 60,000–70,000 families are to be resettled. Preparatory work is proceeding extremely sluggishly (Usman Okrug). There have been a number of scandalous excesses and distortions; shepherds and families of Red Army soldiers have been included in the lists of exiles. In the village of Ozerki, Bobrov Raion, when the exile of a Red Army reservist's family was blocked, the chairman of a collective farm beat up the reservist's wife and arrested her (Ostrogzhsk Okrug).

*Middle Volga Krai.* Resettlement has been suspended until the sowing period ends; preparatory work is under way.

*Northern Caucasus Krai.* Resettlement has not begun, because of the tense political situation in the krai.

*Bashkir Republic.* By decision of the administrative authorities, resettlement has been suspended until the sowing period ends.

*Leningrad Military Raion.* No exile operation is taking place.

*Far Eastern Krai.* People are being exiled primarily to the outskirts of collectivized villages since the majority of the exiles have been so thoroughly dekulakized that they have no means of production left.

*The Urals.* Preparatory work is under way in the localities.

*Siberia.* The krai organizations set a final resettlement deadline of 15 April, but because the zones were unprepared and lacked supplies (since most of the kulaks had been thoroughly dekulakized already before they were exiled), it was decided to exile people only from raions of wholesale collectivization. The initial plan was to exile about 60,000 families. Practical resettlement has been started only in several okrugs; resettlement has been accompanied by excesses.

*Central Asia.* Resettlement is being implemented for now only in the Pastdargom Raion of wholesale collectivization.

*The Crimea.* The plan was to resettle kulaks in three raions; information is available only on 300 households that are being resettled in Dzhankoi Raion.

*Nizhny Novgorod Krai.* It is planned to resettle 500 families in four okrugs of the oblast.

*Tataria.* Preparatory work is under way. Category 3 kulaks will be exiled after the sowing period ends.

No information is available on the other oblasts.

Until recently this issue—the organized exile of category 3 kulaks—received almost no attention from local officials. This is the only explanation for the chaotic state of the exile operation. Despite directives from the center, significant improvement has yet to be achieved on this matter. This may be attributed to the fact that many local soviets believe (as they did during the exile and resettlement of category 2 kulaks) that this is solely the job of the OGPU organs.

Operational group director Puzitsky

· DOCUMENT 74 ·

Survey by the OGPU Information Department of letters from kulaks exiled to the Northern Krai, Not before 1 July 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 653, ll. 375–79. Mimeograph copy of original.

Not before 1 July 1930

Series “K”

This survey is based on materials from Division 3 of the INFO OGPU for the period from 20 June through 1 July 1930.

In all, 16,790 communications have been processed and read. Of this total, 10,504, or 63 percent, had a negative content; 143 communications, or 0.9 percent, had a positive content; 6,143 communications, or 36.1 percent, were apolitical; and 8,871 communications, or 53 percent, were confiscated.

The most typical statements are quoted below:

“En route we had to go through harrowing experiences, such as the death of children, childbirths both in railroad cars and on horse-drawn carts, the death of women during childbirth, and the loss of children in the woods, and now we are beset by real famine” (“K,” Shakhty Okrug).

“People are getting written messages saying that soon everything will be milled into flour, and life will be like it was 20 years ago, but this chaos is

so bad it will take 50 years to set Russia right. But that's all right, God is merciful, luck will come to the Cossack. Someday the sun will come up over us, and maybe we will give somebody the same medicine that our bloodsuckers gave us, so let them enjoy themselves for now" ("K," Novocherkassk).

"Our work is horrible, a lot of people have been killed by [falling] pine trees, a lot have died [from other causes], a lot of people are swollen with hunger, many people are losing their minds, so it is horrible to watch. You ask how we are fed—worse than dogs, a good owner feeds his dog better than we get fed here. There's nothing in the shops" ("K," Tagil).

"How many cripples, widows, and orphans there are here, people get killed by [falling] timber, they die from other causes, mothers strangle their children, they throw them in the river and leap in themselves, and they starve to death like flies. People here look at us as if we are animals, they don't even sell us needles in the shops" ("K.")

"All right, we could have been allowed to suffer, but why on earth are the children with us being tormented, after all, one is eight and the other is two years old, after all, how does Soviet power view children. Vania, after all, was a Young Pioneer, and we were landless laborers and didn't have our own farm or land. The children cry bitterly because there is nothing to eat. They went to the woods and out of hunger filled themselves up with grass, but it was a kind of grass that could have poisoned them, and so people came to me and said that my children are walking around the woods and throwing up. I ran out and brought them back to the barracks, we began to take care of them, they're alive for now, but they walk around like shadows, because we get 16 kilograms of flour a month for six people" ("K").

"Write what's new with you. We already have a lot of news—people are swollen with hunger and are hanging themselves. Four people hanged themselves out of hunger and five people have been driven by hunger to suffocate themselves to death"<sup>80</sup> ("K"—Bogoslavsk).

"My life is very terrible, and not only mine, but 10,000 people are dying from cold and hunger and back-breaking work. I live in Siberia in some village in Turinsk Raion.<sup>81</sup> We have been exiled to forced labor, and for what? We are being starved and we are suffering from the cold. We were given almost nothing from our houses, and whoever did take something traded it for a piece of bread. We are treated worse here than a lousy owner treats his dog. There is a terrible epidemic of scarlet fever, and people are dying like flies, especially children. People are getting sick, it's cold, there's nothing to eat, and seven people are dying every day. On 28 April

they did a calculation at the village soviet, and 620 of our exiles have died” (“K,” Nadezhdinsk). [. . .]

“What a wicked fate has befallen me, I still can’t believe that they did this to me, and why they are tormenting me this way, as if I were a rich man or hurt somebody, they are bunglers and bloodsuckers and nothing more. We are starving here, and there’s nothing to buy, nothing to eat. It’s incredible how they abuse us, prisoners have it much better, they get special work clothes, three pounds of bread, but we get nothing, that’s the kind of criminals we are, they’ll probably torture us to death, the snakes. A lot of people are already starving to death. The damned scoundrels, I feel sorry for the people, and myself as well. What are they tormenting us for, for our property? Is it really possible the scoundrels won’t come to their senses and let us live freely?” (“K,” Nadezhdinsk). [. . .]

“With trembling, greedy hearts we are looking forward to war, I think this wish must come true” (“K,” Urals Oblast).

Deputy director of INFO OGPU Gerasimova  
Director of Division 3 Lobov

## CHAPTER 7

### Epilogue

**T**he collectivization of Soviet agriculture resulted in the subjugation of the peasantry. Stalinist state building required a “tribute” from the peasantry in order to fill the regime’s granaries for exports and to feed the cities and the Red Army. Collectivization and dekulakization permitted the extraction of vital resources—grain, raw materials, labor, and military recruits—as well as allowing the regime to control the peasantry through the imposition of a vast range of coercive political and administrative devices.

Collectivization posed a profound threat to the peasantry and its ways of life. In addition to the subjugation of peasant labor and resources, the regime launched a wholesale campaign against peasant institutions such as the *dvor* (household), *skhod* (peasant assembly), land society, mill (a gathering place for informal politics), market, and the church. Under the rubric of dekulakization, village elites were silenced or removed, priests were arrested, and members of the rural intelligentsia who refused to serve as state agents were hounded and harassed. Collectivization was an all-out attack on the peasantry and on peasant culture.

The peasantry did not accept collectivization fatalistically or passively. It resisted the regime’s attempts at “socialist transformation” with a wide variety of self-defense techniques ranging from rumor and threats to arson and other forms of property destruction to riots and assaults on officials and peasant activists. Although not all peasants re-

sisted and some portion may have actually welcomed collectivization,<sup>1</sup> the violence of the campaign served largely to bring peasants of all social strata together as they endeavored to defend common economic interests and cultural practices against the incursions of the regime. The spring of 1930 would witness the last of the great peasant uprisings to take place on Russian and Soviet territories.

### The Peasant Uprising of Spring 1930

The Central Committee's closed letter of 2 April 1930, "On the tasks of the collective farm movement in connection with the struggle with violations of the party line" (see chapter 6), included the following frank assessment of the situation in the countryside:

Information about mass disturbances of peasants in the Central Black Earth Oblast, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Siberia, [and] Moscow Oblast coming into the CC in February cannot be characterized as anything but threatening. If we had not immediately taken measures against the violations of the party line, we would have had a vast wave of insurrectionary peasant uprisings, a good part of our lower-level officials would have been slaughtered by the peasantry, the sowing would have been disrupted . . . and our internal and external situation would have been threatened.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, Stalin and the Central Committee's attempts to halt the so-called violations of the party line resulted in a vast peasant uprising that engulfed large parts of the countryside in the spring of 1930.

In 1930, the OGPU recorded a total of 13,754 rural "mass disturbances." Most were localized village riots with only 176 characterized as "insurrectionary," and relatively few were quelled with the use of armed force. Roughly 70 percent of all mass disturbances occurred as a result of collectivization or dekulakization, with church closings, the removal of church bells, and food shortages following in importance as reasons for revolt. Mass disturbances skyrocketed between January and February, climbing from 402 to 1,048 incidents. They reached a peak in March (6,528) as peasants rose up against local officials in order to quit the collective farms and retrieve their property. High levels of rioting continued into April (1,992) and May (1,375). Ukraine led the nation in the sheer number of mass disturbances (4,098), followed by the Central Black Earth (1,373), the Northern Caucasus (1,061), the Lower Volga (1,003), and the Middle Volga (777). The OGPU es-



estimated that close to 2.5 million peasants in all participated in the uprisings of 1930 (see document 78, appendices 2, 3, 4).<sup>3</sup>

The OGPU also recorded incidents of what were labeled “terrorist acts,” meaning in most cases murder, attempted murder, and assaults on local officials and peasant activists as well as arson and other forms of property damage. In all, the OGPU claimed that there were 13,794 incidents of terror, including 1,198 murders and more than 6,000 cases of arson. Close to 60 percent of these acts occurred as a result of collectivization and dekulakization, while agricultural procurements and the work of peasant activists were the next most important causal agents. Terrorist activity reached its peak in April (2,013 acts), followed by the months of March (1,895), February (1,368), and May (1,219) (see document 78, appendix 5).

In an often tendentious report, entitled “On the forms and dynamics of the class struggle in the countryside in 1930,” the OGPU summarized and assessed the peasantry’s opposition to regime policies (see document 78). This report is significant not only for *what* it reveals about the peasantry’s response to collectivization—especially in the statistical appendices—but for *how* it describes and analyzes such activities. Its language presents a case study in Stalinist semantics and as such the document must be approached with caution. We have no way, for example, of determining how individual acts of peasant violence, politically inspired or not, fell under the terrorist rubric. It is impossible to judge whether all cases of “arson” were in fact arson or in some cases simple fires. It is also difficult to assess the precise meaning and significance of counterrevolutionary “groups” and “organizations,” whether they existed as organized entities or existed only in the paranoid imagination of a police official or local informant. Words like “terror” and “mass disturbance” also need to be carefully assessed as to meaning as they clearly encompassed a wide variety of expressions and behaviors. Until the archives of the FSB are fully accessible to researchers, we will not be able to analyze these issues fully.

The OGPU report is also interesting for its circumlocutory approach to the all-important political issue of *which* peasants participated or supported the uprising. According to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the kulak would—by nature—be the main opponent of the regime’s policies, perhaps supported by some middle peasants and opposed by the poor peasantry, who would side with the regime. Although the OGPU stated in its report that “the kulaks had a more or less constant ally only in a relatively small stratum of the well-to-do

middle peasantry,” other statements and the evidence presented in the document seem to belie this conclusion, suggesting that peasants from all strata participated in the uprisings. Politics and prejudice, for example, served to obfuscate the role of youth in the peasant rebellion. Young people who took part in oppositional activities were said to be the children of kulaks and/or under the sway of the kulak. The participation of poor and middle peasant youth was explained away by reference to drunkenness or “hooliganism” (see document 78).

The OGPU was, interestingly, far more frank in its explanation for the widespread participation of peasant women in the mass disturbances (see document 78, appendix 2). Although the Communist Party tended to minimize the significance of women’s revolts (*bab’i bunty*) by portraying them as the acts of “backward,” “ignorant,” “hysterical” women—and the women themselves clearly seemed to make the most of these assumptions—the OGPU understood the women’s rebellion as the result of the “excessive leniency of the punitive organs toward women” and the consequent assumption on the part of men and women that women would not be subject to arrest. Men, in the meantime, “would stay on the sidelines” of the disturbances in fear of the severe penalties that they could expect. Granted political agency, peasant men were far more vulnerable to repression than peasant women who, in being denied political agency, covertly or naively assumed their own kind of agency, and with a vengeance.

The peasant uprising receded in the summer of 1930.<sup>4</sup> By this time, the peasantry had largely achieved its objective—the temporary dismantling of the collective farms and in some cases a reversal of local policy towards the village’s kulaks and the church. When the second phase of wholesale collectivization came in the fall of 1930, the peasantry was already too exhausted by food shortages and repression to continue active forms of collective resistance. With the traditional leadership of the village decimated and peasant institutions largely dismantled, peasant resistance was no longer a possibility in most parts of the countryside. And by fall, the reality and finality of collectivization was much clearer than it had been in the winter and spring of 1930.

The regime had also learned a lesson and would make fewer “mistakes” as it resumed collectivization. In the second round of dekulakization, *all* peasants classified as kulaks would be subject to exile and resettlement; no longer would kulaks be divided into categories with some allowed to remain in the vicinity of their native villages. The entire operation of collectivization and dekulakization would be more

orderly, more conspiratorial, although no less tragic to its subject population. Most peasants would be forced, through necessity, fatigue, and despair to live within the system, channeling protest into other less dangerous forms. Those who did not fled to the cities or faced slow economic ruin in the heavily taxed and ever-shrinking private sector of agriculture.<sup>5</sup>

## The Aftermath of the Winter Campaigns

The liquidation of the kulak as a class had initially been planned as a preemptive strike to remove village elites and troublemakers from the countryside. Yagoda had stated in January that “unless we strike quickly and decisively [against the kulak] . . . we will face a whole series of uprisings” (see document 54). Dekulakization had been intended not only to ward off peasant uprisings by purging the village, but to put an end to the massive property destruction of *razbazarivanie* and to serve as a “stimulus” in intimidating the peasantry into joining the collective farms. Although the OGPU did, in fact, “strike quickly and decisively,” dekulakization did not prevent the peasant uprisings of the spring of 1930. From this time, dekulakization would continue no longer simply as a preemptive measure, but as a weapon of pacification and continuing purge following the spring uprising.

In all, as many as 337,563 families were subject to some form of dekulakization in 1930.<sup>6</sup> The vast majority of these families fell into the third category, which, according to decree, was to be expropriated and removed to the worst lands within the district. Party and soviet organs on the county and district levels, rather than the OGPU, were in charge of this operation, although these organs frequently attempted to rid themselves of this task, claiming that dekulakization was OGPU business. In most places, work on removal of third-category kulak families, if begun at all, ceased after “Dizzy with Success,” to be resumed only after the end of the spring sowing.<sup>7</sup> By August 1930, only 26,033 families (136,182 people) had been relocated according to highly incomplete data, with plans in the offing to move an additional 4,500 Ukrainian families and 20,756 Northern Caucasus families by 1 October. The reasons for these low figures are multiple, combining elements of inertia, neglect, bureaucratic overload, and the prioritizing of campaigns. Additionally, the removals of these families continued to provoke disorder in the villages as other peasants attempted to block the removals.<sup>8</sup> As late as December, OGPU called the operation

against third-category kulaks “*bezsystemnaia*” (unsystematic), with each region taking its own approach to the operation.<sup>9</sup> By February 1931, the numbers of third-category kulaks resettled outside the collective farm fields still amounted to little more than 44,000.<sup>10</sup> Peasants in this category left the countryside in droves, fleeing to the cities where jobs were plentiful and anonymity a possibility. They formed some part of the 250,000 families who, according to official statistics, dekulakized themselves by selling, destroying, or giving away their property and fleeing the countryside. From 1931, it becomes increasingly difficult to track this category. No doubt the largest number of families eligible for category 3 status were either administratively dekulakized through taxation, fled the villages, or were simply subsumed into the second category of kulak as the exile operation resumed in fall 1930 and in 1931.<sup>11</sup>

By early May 1930, 98,002 peasant families (501,290 people) designated as category 2 kulaks had left their villages to journey under guard to their places of exile; of this number, 66,445 families (342,545 people) were exiled beyond their native regions, while 31,557 families (158,745 people) were resettled in distant and desolate, uninhabited areas in their own regions (see the sometimes self-congratulatory OGPU report in document 73 and the less sanitized report in document 74).<sup>12</sup> According to data based on 510,096 exiles (from 20 May), 194,230 of the exiles were children, 162,889 adult men, and 147,906 adult women.<sup>13</sup> By the end of 1930, from 112,000 to 113,000 families (550,558 to 551,330 people), depending on source, had been subjected to category 2 exile, most ending up in the North (46,623 families, 230,370 people), the Urals (30,474 families, 145,205 people), and Siberia (27,637 families, 132,723 people) (see document 76).<sup>14</sup>

In addition, a total of 179,620 individuals passed through the OGPU extrajudicial tribunals in 1930 (see document 77). Category 1 kulaks make up the lion’s share of this number, accounting for as many as 124,889 individuals from the total, a far larger number than specified in the original decrees on dekulakization.<sup>15</sup> Available statistics suggest that the number of individuals receiving death sentences through OGPU troikas in 1930 ranged from 18,966 to 20,201, depending upon the source consulted; it is likely that the largest numbers of these sentences were imposed on first-category kulak heads of households.<sup>16</sup>

In the meantime, collectivization rates continued to decline through the spring and summer of 1930, reaching a low point of 20.6 percent for the USSR as a whole by August 1930.<sup>17</sup> In spite of the dramatic decline

in collectivized households, the party reported that the collective farms had succeeded in fulfilling their spring sowing plans by 94.5 percent, accounting for about 40 percent of all sown acreage. The collectivized sector fulfilled these plans despite the chaos of the previous winter, not to mention the fact that the mechanization of agriculture remained woefully low with the average collective farm limited to the use of collectivized peasant livestock and implements (see document 75). According to R. W. Davies, “the draft power of tractors amounted to 7.7 percent of all draft power by the end of 1930,” with something under 90,000 tractors available in all of the USSR.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, the decline in fodder crops and the massive destruction of livestock the previous winter contributed to the decrease in available animal draft power.<sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, the harvest of 1930 turned out to be an excellent harvest, blessed by good weather and equal to the record harvest of 1926.<sup>20</sup>

The actual procurement of grain from the harvest would prove to be less successful.<sup>21</sup> In a letter of 24 September 1930, the Central Committee called on all regional party committees to link continuing work in grain procurements with renewed efforts in collectivization. The Central Committee set the rates of collectivization for the forthcoming year at 65 to 75 percent for the major grain-producing regions, 35 to 45 percent for other grain-producing regions, and 15 to 20 percent elsewhere.<sup>22</sup> From September and increasingly from the beginning of 1931, collectivization rates would begin to climb again, although at a more gradual pace than the previous winter.<sup>23</sup>

In and out of the collective farms, peasants would live within an economy of scarcity as a result of collectivization. Industrial and state aggrandizement took place at the peasantry’s expense. The continuing export of grain in conjunction with high grain procurements, low productivity, and the disastrous decline in livestock all contributed to the pauperization of the countryside. Peasant consumption and access to manufactured goods fell precipitously. As early as spring and summer 1930, many peasants—mainly the poor with fewer resources and reserves—faced hunger.<sup>24</sup> The regime’s policies would result by 1932–33 in a devastating famine that would claim millions of fatalities, laying waste to the Soviet Union’s villages.

## Conclusion

Collectivization was tantamount to the colonization of the countryside. In the struggle over resources and manpower, the countryside

had long served as a repository for extractions—extractions of grain, taxes, labor, and military recruits—enabling the Russian state to grow in power and to develop its economy and military might. Periodically, the peasantry rose up against the state, generally in times of crisis and weak state control. Stalinist state building continued earlier historical practices, but it did so through the imposition of a police-colonial relationship with the peasantry that brought with it an unwavering brutality in the subjugation of the peasantry and an end to the peasantry's ability to actively resist the incursions of the state.

Collectivization played a critical role in the development of a police state based on the dictatorial powers of Stalin and the organizational and economic powers of the OGPU. Stalin solidified his power through the implementation of extraordinary measures and collectivization, emerging as an uncontested ruler once he had defeated the Right Opposition and placed his personal imprint on policy. The OGPU assumed an increasing role in both the rural economy and politics from 1927 on as Stalin relied more and more upon his secret police to control the country. By 1931, Stalin and the OGPU would be at the helm of a vast economic empire founded on the labor of deported kulaks and serving as the cornerstone of the Gulag, while the peasantry would be reduced to a collective-farm work force and a replenishable resource for the state's continuing economic and military needs.

## Documents

### • DOCUMENT 75 •

Results of collectivization, compiled on the basis of data from the USSR Commissariat of Agriculture, Kolkhozsentr, and the Statistical Sector of the USSR Gosplan, for the sixteenth party congress, not before 1 July 1930.  
RGAE, f. 7446, op. 1, d. 142, ll. 1–29. Copy.

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Not before 1 July 1930

The collectivization of agriculture stabilized by the time of the sixteenth party congress at a level that greatly exceeds the projections of the five-year plan.

Collectivization of Agriculture in the USSR (based on data from the USSR Commissariat of Agriculture)

	<i>On 1 October 1929</i>	<i>On 1 June 1930</i>
Number of peasant households in collective farms (in thousands)	1,722.3	6,149.3
Percent of collectivization	6.8	24.5
Number of collective farms (in thousands)	74.1	85.3
Average size of collective farms (according to the number of households)	23.2	72.1
Number of draft animals in collective farms (in thousands) in the spring of the given year	346.7	3,996.4
Percent of collectivized draft animals from the total of draft animals on peasant farms	1.5	16.6

During the spring sowing campaign, according to the data, the collective farms:

	<i>On 10 June</i>	<i>On 15 June</i>
Sowed (in millions of hectares)	30	32
Percent of plan fulfillment	89.1	94.5
Percent of summer sowing area from the total [crop area]	38.3	38.4

The collective farms have fulfilled their plan by 94.5 percent (as of 15 June) and now account for about 40 percent of the entire sown area.

Of the 32.2 million hectares of collective-farm sown area, the machine and tractor stations of the Traktorotsentr and grain cooperative associations have sown 4.7 million hectares, which makes about 15 [percent] of the entire collective sown area.

The growth of collective farms was accompanied by their significant quantitative growth.

The results of collectivization by area show the rate and proportion of collectivization to be higher in the main [grain] producing areas than in the [grain] consuming areas.

## Percent of Collectivization of Peasant Farms

Year	USSR	Ukraine	Belorussia	Russia	Including		
					Grain-Producing Areas	Grain-Consuming Areas	Crimea
1929	3.9	5.6	1.4	3.7	4.7	1.4	16.7
1930	24.1	38.8	11.8	19.9	27.7	7.7	50.0

In the recorded areas, the level of collectivization is apparent in the following table:

Areas	Percent of Collectivization of Peasant Farms			
	1927	1928	1929	1930
Ukraine	1.3	2.4	5.6	38.8
Lower Volga	1.6	2.1	5.9	34.8
Middle Volga	1.3	2.3	3.9	20.4
Northern Caucasus	1.6	5.2	7.3	55.2
Central Black Earth	0.6	1.2	3.2	15.1
Crimea	—	—	—	—
Moscow	—	—	1.8	7.3

The rate [in the growth] of the collective-farm movement in 1930 sharply increased, exceeding the rates of past years by many times. In one year only, the number of poor and middle peasant farms in collective farms has increased 7.7 times for the Northern Caucasus; 5.2 times for Middle Volga; 5.9 times for Lower Volga; 4.7 times for the Central Black Earth Oblast; 6.9 times for Ukraine; 2.8 times for Crimea; 4 times for the Moscow Oblast. [. . .]

The qualitative growth of collective farms reveals itself in a fundamental shift in the types of collective farms, which is seen in the data below [see table on p. 329].

First of all, it is necessary to note the fundamental shift in the types of collective farms in 1929–30 [economic year]. Whereas the share of agricultural artels did not show a tendency to increase in previous years, in 1930 in all raions except Ukraine the overwhelming majority of collective farms turned into artels (not less than 90 percent of the total collectivized sown area; not less than 86 percent of the total number of collectivized farms). All areas showed a decrease<sup>25</sup> of proportionate shares of communes in the collective crop area. In regard to land cultivation associations, everywhere ex-



Types of Charter Forms of Collective Farms (percent of total for the given year)

Republics and Oblasts	Year	Breakdown of Collectivized Farms			Breakdown of Collectivized Soum Area		
		Land Cultivation		Communes	Land Cultivation		Communes
		Associations	Artels		Associations	Artels	
Middle Volga	1928	29	68	3	31.4	56.3	12.3
	1930	3.9	91.4	4.7	3	90.8	6.2
Central Black Earth	1928	74.6	18.9	6.5	57	30.5	12.5
	1930	8	86	6	3	90.8	6.2
Lower Volga	1928	62.9	33	4.1	43.6	47.3	9.1
	1930	0.5	96.2	3.3	0.6	95.1	4.3
Northern Caucasus	1928	85.2	8.5	6.3	73.4	14	12.6
	1930	1.1	94	4.9	1	93.8	5.2
Ukraine	1928	71.8	22.8	5.4	42.8	44.3	12.9
	1930	34.6	60.5	4.8	35.2	57.6	7.2

cept for the Ukraine their proportionate share fell drastically—over 10 times. In Ukraine, the proportionate share of land cultivation associations decreased only from 71.4 percent to 34.6 percent, that is, approximately two times. In absolute figures, in numbers of farms and the amount of sown area, land cultivation associations have obviously grown in Ukraine, whereas in other areas they declined in absolute figures as well. In some areas (for example, Lower Volga), we have almost no land cultivation associations. This situation cannot be considered normal when the absolutely correct thesis about the artel as the main form of the collective-farm movement is understood, in the present stage, as leaving no place at all for land cultivation associations. The insufficient use of land cultivation associations leads to the narrowing of the collective-farm movement even in such areas as Lower Volga. It goes without saying that in other areas, such as, for example, Moscow Oblast, where the proportionate share of land cultivation associations fell from 53 percent to 6 percent and their numbers decreased 3.5 times compared to the last year, this [trend] shows a rather weak collectivization effort and mistakes made while carrying out collectivization.

The struggle for large-scale socialization of production revealed itself in the considerable enlargement of collective farms [see table on p. 331].

Bearing in mind the state of accounts on collective farms, the quality of accounting, differences in the evaluations of socialized tools and means of production in the past years and in the current year, it is necessary to say that the value of collectivized funds is probably somewhat underrepresented [in the table].

The enlargement of collective farms is taking place according to all indicators.

Two areas stand out for the large size of their collective farms: Northern Caucasus and especially Lower Volga. [. . .]

All over the Union, 34.3 percent of administrative raions have a collectivization rate higher than the average Union rate, that is, over 25 percent.

About 400 administrative raions, that is, 13 percent of the total number, have a collectivization rate above 50 percent. The main grain-producing areas have an even greater rate of collectivization. Thus, for example, in the Northern Caucasus, as the table shows, about 32 percent [*sic*] of administrative raions have a collectivization rate above 75 percent, while the average krai rate is only 55.2 percent. In the Lower Volga, about 28 percent of administrative raions have a collectivization rate above 50 percent, while the oblast average is 34.8 percent.

Collectivization rates above 75 percent in a raion fundamentally change the social and economic configuration of a raion. In the raions of wholesale collectivization, there are currently: [see table on p. 332].

Average Size of Collective Farms					
<i>Republics and Oblasts</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Households per Collective Farm</i>	<i>Sown Area per Collective Farm (in hectares)</i>	<i>Value of Principal Means of Farm Production (rubles per collective farm)</i>	
Middle Volga	1928	15.5	29.1	—	
	1929	18.1	67.7	4,067.7	
	1930	76.7	595.4	18,900	
Central Black Earth	1928	14.4	39.6	2,925	
	1929	20.4	58	3,938.8	
	1930	65.4	295.6	10,900	
Lower Volga	1928	11.1	56.5	2,890	
	1929	18	93.4	5,289	
	1930	321	3,246.4	89,500	
Northern Caucasus	1928	12.1	58.1	—	
	1929	16	104.3	4,755.5	
	1930	222.5	1,779	40,300	
Crimea	1928	13.3	46	—	
	1929	13.6	82.4	—	
	1930	49.8	364.4	15,700	
Ukraine	1928	12.6	32.4	2,995.8	
	1929	19.8	66.6	5,750	
	1930	92.5	480.3	14,000	
Moscow	1929	20	33.7	4,815	
	1930	30	68	8,935	

<i>Areas</i>	<i>Number of Raions of Wholesale Collectivization</i>	<i>Average Number of Farms per Raion</i>	<i>Of These, Collectivized Farms</i>	<i>Percent of Collectivization</i>	<i>Number of Machine-Tractor Stations in These Raions</i>
Ukraine	45	12,417	10,266	82.7	24
Northern Caucasus	28	17,293	14,511	84.1	16
Central Black Earth	6	9,975	8,408	84.3	1
Crimea	2	6,365	4,939	77.6	—

This clearly expressed strengthening of collective farms took place, mainly, on the basis of the collectivization of tools and the means of production of poor and middle peasants. The process of socialization may be characterized by the following data: [see table on p. 333].

Due to the fact that the agricultural artel is the prevalent type of collective farm, we see considerable socialization of agricultural implements, reaching 100 percent in regard to improved agricultural tools and the means of production.

Along with the socialization of agricultural implements, in 1930 we have had a drastic increase in the socialization of draft animals as well. The degree of socialization reached in this respect is the highest, covering close to 100 percent of collective farms. The socialization of sown area lags somewhat behind the socialization of draft animals, which is explained mainly by the fact that the sown area figures include the 1929 winter sowing when the degree of collectivization was not as high. Undoubtedly, we have large-scale socialization of land holdings. [. . .]

The production and technical base of the collective-farm movement has not yet moved far ahead of peasant technology, although a swift process of tractorization of agriculture and the influx of new machinery to agriculture are taking place. Overwhelmingly, it [the production and technology base] consists of, so far, collectivized livestock and peasant implements. All over the Union, as noted above, 3,996.4 thousand units of draft animals have been socialized; the number of tractors that serviced collective farms in the current year equaled 90,000 conventional units. In the recorded areas, the number of draft animals on collective farms are seen in the following table:

The data [in the table on p. 334] . . . shows a drastic increase in the rate of socialization of draft animals on collective farms.

Degree of Socialization within Collective Farms (percent of collectivized property from the total property including the collective farmers' individual property)

<i>Republics and Oblasts of the RSFSR</i>	<i>Sown Area</i>			<i>Draft Animals</i>			<i>Cows</i>		
	1928	1929	1930	1928	1929	1930	1928	1929	1930
Middle Volga	26.6	59.2	91.5	6.3	19.8	98.6	3	5.1	18
Central Black Earth	49	60.7	83.3	14.9	22.4	93.2	6.8	6.1	15
Lower Volga	57.6	69.6	92.8	22.3	41.6	99.3	7.8	6.9	19.1
Northern Caucasus	51.3	79.6	88.6	25	36.9	97.4	7.8	9.6	19.3
Crimea	63.3	81.2	87.5	29.2	37.8	92.4	8.6	8.6	25.6
Ukraine	44.5	79.4	86.9	27.8	44.3	94.7	11.1	15.3	16.5

Number of Socialized Draft Animals (in thousands of head)

<i>Republics and Oblasts</i>	<i>on 1 June 1927</i>	<i>on 1 June 1928</i>	<i>on 1 June 1929</i>	<i>on 1 May 1930</i>	<i>Percentage</i>		
					<i>1928 of 1927</i>	<i>1929 of 1928</i>	<i>1930 of 1929</i>
<b>RSFSR</b>							
Middle Volga	1.5	1.9	9	239.4	126.7	437.7	2,660
Central Black Earth	1.4	2.6	8.8	200.1	185.7	338.5	2,273.9
Lower Volga	0.6	2.7	13.5	285.4	450.0	500	2,114.1
Northern Caucasus	4.4	13.3	23.8	773.8	302.3	178.9	3,251.3
Crimea	1.1	1.6	4.4	35.5	145.5	275	806
Ukraine	14.2	25.4	54.6	1,356.4	178.9	215	2,447.6 [2,484.2]

The tractor and machine base of collective farms at the time of recording is characterized by the following data: [see table on p. 335].

A fairly large percentage of collective farms have tractors and traction engines; the number of collective farms with harvesters and threshers is even greater. From this table it follows that from one-tenth to one-fifth of the tractor park did not work in the sowing campaign. The insufficient organization of the tractor force, its scattering, wear and tear, etc.—all this revealed itself in a large percentage of idled tractors.

The mechanical propulsion force (tractors and traction engines) makes up the following share of the entire balance of collective-farm propulsion force [ . . . ]:

Ukraine	8.3
Middle Volga	11.1
Central Black Earth	14
Lower Volga	8.9
Northern Caucasus	14.1

Tractors and traction engines already comprise approximately one-tenth of the entire collective-farm propulsion force.

Speaking of the mechanical power base of collective farms, it is also necessary here to note the enormous role of the MTS [machine and tractor stations] as the best organizational form for the use of the mechanical power base, providing an opportunity for its increased centralization and fullest utilization in production. It was in 1930 that the construction of the MTS under both Traktorsentr and the Grain Cooperative [Network] developed on a vast scale.

Republics and Oblasts	Percent of Collective Farms That Have				Average per Collective Farm				Percent of Tractors not Working in the Conventional Sowing Campaign
	Tractors	engines	Harvesters	Threshers	Tractors	Harvesters	Threshers	Power	
Ukraine	15.2	16.5	77.4	52.5	1.51	7.94	2.12	74	11.6
Middle Volga	15.7	5.2	74.5	64	2.4	10.2	3.4	77.5	18.8
Lower Volga	29.5	15.5	88.5	67.9	4.7	58.2	7	355.6	19.2
Northern Caucasus	36.7	41.3	83	49.7	2.9	34.3	3.7	240.2	14.6
Central Black Earth	17.8	9.7	63.2	58.1	1.8	4.3	2.2	49.4	11.2

The data below shows the number of organized MTS and their work.<sup>26</sup>

<i>In the USSR</i>	Traktorotsentr	Khlebotsentr	<i>Total</i>
Number of machine and tractor stations	158	479	637
Tractors	7,000	13,544	20,544
Crop area, spring 1930, thousands of hectares	2,000	2,913.3	3,913.3
Crop area load per horsepower	23.25	21.2	22

In the current spring sowing campaign, the MTS and cluster associations in recorded areas have serviced collective farms and performed work in the following amounts:

	<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>Middle Volga</i>	<i>Lower Volga</i>	<i>Northern Caucasus</i>	<i>Central Black Earth</i>
Percent of collective farms serviced by the MTS and cluster associations	19.4	16.8	25.7	28.2	17.4
Percent plowed and sown from the summer sowing area	9.8	8.4	9.7	10.5	9.1
Plowed and sown, average per serviced collective farm, in hectares	190.7	261.1	1,061.5	519.3	130

[. . .] Almost one-third of all collective farms are linked with the MTS and cluster production associations, and in three areas we have an increase in the proportionate share of collective farms linked with an MTS organized after the last year's winter sowing campaign. The MTS construction that widely developed precisely in 1929–30 has thus been a powerful factor conditioning the growth of collective farms. [. . .]

• DOCUMENT 76 •

Information from the OGPU Special Department on the number of exiled second-category kulaks and [specially designated] "individuals,"<sup>27</sup>  
10 December 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 329, l. 275. Original.

10 December 1930  
Top secret



Place of Exile	Brought in from Other Regions		Resettled Within the Region		Total		Exiled from
	Families	People	Families	People	Families	People	
Northern	46,562	230,065	61	305	46,623	230,370	Ukraine—19,658 families, 93,461 people Central Black Earth—8,237 families, 42,837 people Lower Volga—7,931 families, 40,001 people Middle Volga—5,566 families, 29,211 people Belorussia—4,763 families, 22,810 people Crimea—407 families, 1,745 people Total—46,562 families, 230,065 people Belorussia—4,468 families, 21,273 people Northern Caucasus—10,595 families, 51,577 people Crimea—2,772 families, 12,284 people Total—17,835 families, 85,134 people (of these, 1,216 families, 6,703 people, were redirected to the Khibinsky apatite mines)
Urals	16,619	78,431	13,855	66,774	30,474	145,205	
Siberia	11,612	49,801	16,025	82,922	27,637	132,723	Ukraine—11,935 families, 52,425 people (of these, 323

(continued)

Place of Exile	Brought in from Other Regions		Resettled Within the Region		Total		Exiled from
	Families	People	Families	People	Families	People	
Kazakhstan	159	197	1,265	7,393	1,424	7,590	families, 2,624 people, were redirected to the Soizzoloto mines in the Far East and to the Aldan)
Far East	3,796	19,374	447	2,235	4,223	21,609	Central Asia—159 families, 197 people Belorussia—1,561 families, 7,309 people Tataria—1,614 families, 7,956 people Middle Volga—307 families, 1,826 people Siberia—314 families, 2,283 people (partly Ukrainians and partly Siberian kulaks)
Aldan	287	2,007	—	—	287	2,007	Total—3,796 families, 19,374 people Belorussia—287 families, 1,522 people Siberia—485 people (partly Ukrainians and partly Siberian kulaks)
Leningrad Military Okrug	1,540	8,499	600	2,555	2,140	11,054	Total—287 families, 2,007 people Urals—1,540 families, 8,499 people (partly kulaks brought to the Urals from Belorussia, Northern Caucasus, and Crimea; and partly Ural kulaks)
Total	80,575	388,374	32,253	162,184	112,828	550,558	

Plenipotentiary of Second Section, OGPU Special Department  
Vin'ke

• DOCUMENT 77 •

Report from the OGPU about the number of individuals repressed by the OGPU organs in 1930, 31 July 1931. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 539, ll. 224–25. Copy.

31 July 1931

Top secret

1. In 1930, 179,620 individuals passed through the troikas of the OGPU plenipotentiary offices, the GPU of the Ukraine, Bashkiria, Tataria, and Iakutia. [. . .]

- |   |                        |
|---|------------------------|
| a. Sentenced to death penalty                               | —18,966, 10.6 percent; |
| b. Sentenced to ITD   | —99,319, 55.3 percent; |
| [ <i>ispravitel'no-trudovoi dom</i> ] <sup>28</sup>         |                        |
| c. Sentenced to exile [ <i>ssylka</i> ] <sup>29</sup>       | —38,179, 21.3 percent; |
| d. Sentenced to banishment [ <i>vysylka</i> ] <sup>30</sup> | —8,869, 4.3 percent;   |

2. 14,287 individuals (7.9 percent) have been sentenced conditionally and transferred to the organs of the Commissariat of Justice or freed.

3. The total number of individuals who have passed through the troikas of the OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices, the GPU of the Ukraine, Bashkiria, Tataria, and Iakutia in 1930 is characterized, for each plenipotentiary office, by the following statistics: [see table on p. 340].<sup>31</sup>

*Note:* Final data has not been received for the Eastern Siberian Krai and Kazakhstan; therefore, the numbers are incomplete.

4. Compared to previous years, 1930 shows an enormous increase in the numbers of accused individuals passing through the troikas of the OGPU plenipotentiary offices, the OGPU of Bashkiria, Tataria, and Iakutia. Thus, for example:

- |  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| a. In 1926, 2,379 individuals passed through   | —100 percent     |
| b. In 1927, 6,654 individuals passed through   | —279.7 percent   |
| c. In 1928, 4,157 individuals passed through   | —179 percent     |
| d. In 1929, 5,885 individuals passed through   | —247.4 percent   |
| e. In 1930, 179,620 individuals passed through | —7,550.2 percent |

*Note:* Data taken from the OUR<sup>32</sup> OGPU final report.

GPU of the Ukraine	22,204	12.4%
Plenipotentiary office of the Northern Caucasus	20,230	11.3%
Plenipotentiary office of Western Siberia	16,553	9.2%
Plenipotentiary office of the Central Black Earth Oblast	13,120	7.3%
Plenipotentiary office of the Moscow Oblast	11,245	6.3%
Plenipotentiary office of Belorussia	8,856	4.9%
Plenipotentiary office of the Middle Volga Krai	8,654	4.8%
Plenipotentiary office of the Lower Volga Krai	8,608	4.8%
Plenipotentiary office of the K[azakh A]SSR	8,115	4.5%
Plenipotentiary office of Bashkiria	6,303	3.5%
Plenipotentiary office of the OGPU of Transcaucasia	6,275	3.5%
Plenipotentiary office of the Leningrad Military District	5,827	3.2%
Plenipotentiary office of the Ivanovo Industrial Oblast	5,721	3.2%
Plenipotentiary office of the Northern Krai	5,502	3.1%
Plenipotentiary office of the Urals	5,362	3.0%
Plenipotentiary office of Central Asia	5,255	2.9%
GPU of Tataria	4,395	2.5%
Plenipotentiary office of the Far Eastern Krai OGPU	3,843	2.1%
Plenipotentiary office of the Nizhny Novgorod Krai	3,403	1.9%
Plenipotentiary office of Crimea	3,055	1.7%
GPU of Yakutia	411	0.2%
Total	179,620	100%

· DOCUMENT 78 ·

Report from the OGPU Secret Political Department on the forms and dynamics of the class struggle in the countryside in 1930, 15 March 1931.

TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 679, ll. 36–72. Certified Copy.

15 March 1931

Top secret

The year 1930 was mostly characterized by a decisive switch on the part of the kulaks and all other counterrevolutionary forces in the countryside from a policy of a kind of “time serving” and economic struggle (grain strikes, economic boycott, and sabotage) to an overt struggle against Soviet power.

What is becoming increasingly apparent in the activities of the kulaks and the counterrevolutionary elements in the countryside lately is an insurrectionary line of struggle that is oriented toward decisive action at the time of the [foreign] intervention that they are expecting.

The kulak is shifting from organizing local groups to fight particular policies in the countryside to organizing conspiratorial, counterrevolutionary organizations whose objective it is to prepare armed uprisings un-

der the slogan of the overthrow of Soviet power (Northern Caucasus Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Siberia, the Urals, Dagestan, etc.).

### The Dynamics and Character of Mass Antisoviet Manifestations in the Countryside

A simple comparison of the statistical records of the principal mass antisoviet manifestations in the countryside in 1930 with previous years shows significant changes in the content and direction of antisoviet activities in the countryside. In 1928–29 [economic year], the most serious manifestations of class struggle in the countryside (mass disturbances, insurrectionism, terror) were focused on grain procurements.

In 1930 the brunt of active antisoviet manifestations in the countryside was directed against collectivization; mass disturbances and terror are, more and more clearly, taking on an anti-collective-farm orientation.

In 1929, out of 9,093 acts of terror, 3,971 (43.9 percent) were committed in connection with grain procurements and only 891 acts of terror (9.1 percent) occurred in connection with collectivization.

In 1930, out of 13,794 acts of terror, only 1,402 (10.2 percent) were committed in connection with grain procurements and 7,885 (57.2 percent) occurred in connection with collectivization and dekulakization.

In 1929, out of 1,307 mass disturbances, 403 (30.7 percent) occurred in connection with grain procurements, 307 (23.5 percent) were related to religion, and only 86 (6.5 percent) occurred in connection with collectivization.

In 1930, out of 13,754 mass disturbances, only 456 (3.3 percent) were recorded in connection with meat and grain procurements, 1,487 (10.8 percent) in connection with religion, and 9,721 disturbances (70.6 percent) in connection with collectivization and dekulakization.

In 1930 the number of mass disturbances during three months (March, May, and June) was far greater than, and in April was almost equal to, the total number of individual acts of terror.

In March there were 6,528 mass disturbances	and 1,845 acts of terror.
In April there were 1,992 mass disturbances	and 2,013 acts of terror.
In May there were 1,375 mass disturbances	and 1,219 acts of terror.
In June there were 885 mass disturbances	and 769 acts of terror.

For nearly the entire year of 1930, terror, mass disturbances, and the circulation of antisoviet proclamations maintained a substantially higher level than during all previous years.

Only in December was the number of mass disturbances in 1930 lower than in 1929, but it was much higher than in 1928. The number of acts of

terror in 1930 was lower than the 1929 level only in June, September, October, and November, and in regard to proclamations, in October, November, and December, respectively. If we follow individually the dynamics of each of the principal antisoviet manifestations in the countryside, we will discover considerable changes here as well.

In 1928–29 [economic year] the dynamics in terror and mass disturbances show a certain pattern, based on the principal content of the struggle in the countryside (“the struggle for grain”). The greatest increase in mass disturbances and terror took place during the development of grain procurements (September, October, November) and at the very end of the procurements. [. . .] (April, May, June).

The year 1930 produced a pattern of antisoviet manifestations that differed considerably from all previous years: a large increase in mass disturbances, terror, and proclamations began right away in January and lasted in regard to mass disturbances until the beginning of April and in regard to terror until the beginning of May. Then a sharp decrease began in regard to all active mass antisoviet manifestations in the countryside.

The decline in mass disturbances lasted until October; in October the number of mass disturbances increased somewhat and in November and December dropped again to the 1929 level of disturbances.

A decline in terror after April lasted only three months (May–July), after which terror increased again, all the way until November (during these months, mostly in connection with grain procurements).

From September until the end of the year, the dynamics of antisoviet manifestations were identical, and the pattern of terror in 1930 coincided with that of 1929.

<i>Months</i>	<i>Mass Disturbances</i>			<i>Terror</i>			<i>Proclamations</i>		
	1928	1929	1930	1928	1929	1930	1928	1929	1930
January	10	42	102	21	642	808	70	246	460
February	10	22	1,048	48	329	1,368	90	129	828
March	11	55	6,528	23	351	1,895	72	222	1,181
April	36	159	1,992	31	247	2,013	66	237	838
May	185	179	1,375	51	546	1,219	64	242	392
June	225	242	885	43	851	796	74	228	253
July	93	95	618	77	474	762	61	127	245
August	31	69	256	76	757	928	46	86	153
September	25	72	159	103	1,167	946	31	130	108
October	25	139	270	135	1,864	1,440	58	230	205
November	33	108	129	216	1,295	954	105	286	280
December	25	125	91	203	570	665	108	228	213

*Note:* A total of 63 mass disturbances, 22 of them in Siberia, were reported in 1926 and 1927 combined.

All told, more than 2,468,000 people participated in mass and group disturbances in the countryside in 1930, as opposed to 244,000 who participated in 1929. Among the mass disturbances, 176 were of an insurrectionary nature.

*Note:* This latter number consists only of armed disturbances that were staged under the slogan of the overthrow of Soviet power, were led by insurrectionary groups, and were accompanied by the dissolution of village soviets, the seizure of hostages, attempts to expand the territory covered by uprisings, and active resistance to the authorities. In addition, 55 armed uprisings around the Union were recorded in 1930 (Northern Caucasus Krai, Kazakhstan, Siberia, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and elsewhere).

In 1,616 cases mass disturbances were accompanied by physical violence against members of the local government, communists, collective farmers, and soviet activists among the poor and middle peasantry. During these disturbances, according to data that are far from complete, there were 3,155 casualties, of whom 147 were killed, 212 were injured, and 2,796 were beaten up.

In 993 cases the disturbances were liquidated through the intervention of armed force (the militia, OGPU operational groups, detachments of communists, etc.). In most cases this intervention was confined to a demonstration of arms.

The terror in the Union's principal grain-growing areas shows a clear wrecking orientation in 1930. Against the background of a general rise in kulak terror in 1930, there were increases especially in the number of incidents in which fires were set to grain, forage, buildings, and other properties on collective farms and village activists' farms.

In addition to huts being set on fire, there has been a significant increase in other manifestations of kulak wrecking activities (damage to tractors and other agricultural inventory, crops, and livestock).

In April, property terror surpassed physical terror for the first time ever. Property terror then predominated for almost the entire course of 1930.

Only in the eastern national republics and oblasts (Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Transcaucasian SFSR, Tataria, Bashkiria, the Crimea, and the national areas of Northern Caucasus Krai) does physical terror predominate over property terror.

In 1929 acts of physical terror (assassinations, wounds, beatings, attempted murders) made up 64.1 percent of all recorded acts of terror across the Union as a whole, while acts of property terror made up 35.9

percent. In the USSR without the East, physical terror made up 60 percent, whereas property terror accounted for 40 percent; in the eastern national republics and oblasts physical terror made up 86 percent, property terror 14 percent.

In 1930, acts of physical terror accounted for 50 percent of all recorded acts of terror across the Union, and property terror made up the same share. In the USSR without the East, property terror made up 54.3 percent, whereas physical terror made up 45.7 percent of the total.

In the eastern national republics and oblasts, physical terror accounted for 74.1 percent of acts of terror, and property terror 25.9 percent.

Cases in which property, and grain in particular, was set on fire occurred on an especially massive scale in Ukraine (1,884 incidents), in the Central Black Earth Oblast (700 incidents), the Lower Volga Krai (383 incidents), in the Belorussian SSR (358 incidents), and the Urals (343 incidents).

Arson incidents in Ukraine destroyed more than 100,000 poods of grain. In Siberia, where arson incidents were not especially numerous in comparison with other areas of the Union, arson destroyed more than 68,000 poods of grain (including about 38,000 poods belonging to collective farms) and more than 100,000 poods of hay. Arson incidents at state farms, and at depots for machinery, seeds, and so forth became more frequent. By setting fire to collective-farm property, especially stockyards, machinery depots, and grain on collective farms, the kulak is pursuing a twofold objective: to undermine the economic foundation of collective farms and cause them to collapse and, on the other hand, to keep the entire active Soviet element in the countryside in constant fear of arson.

In a number of cases in the Ukrainian SSR, Leningrad Oblast, and the Central Black Earth Oblast, arson incidents were preceded by the circulation of anonymous notes with arson threats against certain individuals or an entire group of soviet activists and collective farmers.

In the village of Pichkirievo in Sasovo Raion, Moscow Oblast, fires and especially rumors spread by kulaks that "all activists will burn" terrorized the entire population so much that peasants went to sleep without getting undressed. In the village of Ostroluchie in Baryshevka Raion, Ukrainian SSR, kulaks circulated proclamations in September that said, "Whoever transports grain will be set afire or killed."

The number of proclamations and anonymous notes threatening violence against soviet officials, collective farmers, and poor-peasant activists more than doubled in 1930 over 1929.

In 1929, 2,390 proclamations and anonymous notes being circulated (1,331 proclamations, 1,059 anonymous notes) were recorded.



In 1930, 5,156 proclamations and anonymous notes being circulated (3,512 proclamations, 1,644 anonymous notes) [were recorded].

It is noteworthy that the circulation of proclamations grew much more rapidly in 1930 than the circulation of anonymous notes. Proclamations were primarily of an anti-collective-farm and insurrectionary nature. Out of a total of 3,512 proclamations discovered, 1,250 (35.8 percent) were anti-collective farm and 1,078 (30.7 percent) contained calls for an uprising. The greatest number of insurrectionary proclamations were found between January and May and in November 1930: in January, 70 [were found]; February, 159; March, 281; April, 163; May, 100, and in November, 69, and in the following areas: Ukraine, 282; Northern Caucasus Krai, 185; Transcaucasia, 83; Kazakhstan, 75; Siberia (as a whole), 87; and the Urals, 48.

It should be noted that the number of proclamation authors who have been identified remains extremely low (in the range of 3–10 percent), and in certain areas it even declined from 1929.

In accordance with the main orientation of counterrevolutionary elements in the countryside to overthrow Soviet power by force of arms, the kulak slogans in proclamations have also changed noticeably. The kulak slogans are assuming a clearly counterrevolutionary substance and, in aggregate, provide a detailed program of kulak demands.

Kulak-insurrectionary and White Guard organizations that were uncovered in the Central Black Earth Oblast, the Lower Volga Krai, and a number of other oblasts are orienting their activities toward the possibility of weakening the fortitude of the VKP(b) and splitting it as a result of the struggle by the rightists and have borrowed certain opportunistic propositions from Bukharin for their program and for popularization among the masses.

Here are the most typical antisoviet kulak slogans in the proclamations that were discovered in 1930:

1. "Down with the commune, give us individual farms" (Urals).
2. "Down with collectivization, long live Stolypinism" (Ukrainian SSR).
3. "Down with gigantism. Long live free, individual farming. Down with communism" (Northern Caucasus Krai).
4. "Down with Soviet power and collective farms. Down with collective-farm sowing, don't let collective farmers sow" (Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus).
5. "Down with coercion. Long live free labor. Long live true suffrage" (Siberia, Moscow Oblast, Belorussian SSR); "Down with cooperatives, long live free trade." "We call on everybody to oppose socialist construc-

tion. . . .<sup>33</sup> We don't need socialism, we need cheap bread, cheap goods, we need genuinely free labor and time for rest" (Western Siberia).

6. "Down with Lenin's communism. Down with the five-year plan. Give us the tsar, individual farms, and [our] old rights" (Ukrainian SSR). "The five-year plan is a plague on the peasantry" (Lower Volga Krai).

7. "Soviet power is the enemy, religion is our friend" (Central Black Earth Oblast).

8. "Citizens, rise as one to defend the Constituent Assembly, the only voice of the people's true will" (Moscow Oblast).

9. "Fighting for freedom is the peasant's own task" (Middle Volga Krai).

10. "Down with the communist tyrants. Long live freedom of speech and free peasant labor" (Middle Volga Krai). "Long live a democratic republic" (Middle Volga Krai). "Give us a president" (Lower Volga Krai).

11. "Long live capitalism, the tsar, and God, down with the autocracy of communism" (Central Black Earth Oblast).

12. "Long live the right-deviationism of the old government." "Down with Stalin's dictatorship, long live a real workers' and peasants' dictatorship." "Long live the leaders of the peasantry Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky" (Urals). "Long live the parliamentary government headed by Comrade Bukharin" (Lower Volga Krai). "Down with Stalin, give us Trotsky, the leader of the Red Army, and Comrade Rykov" (Western Oblast).

13. "Long live the Industrial Party,<sup>34</sup> which is fighting against the USSR. The Industrial Party has not yet been completely exposed and it will fight to the last drop of blood. Death to the five-year plan" (Ukrainian SSR). "Down with Soviet bureaucrats, long live equality and freedom. Our slogan is, Long Live the [Foreign] Intervention" (Middle Volga Krai).

14. "Peasants, everyone unite together, so that your peasant organization is invincible" (Ivanovo Industrial Oblast). "Rise up like a wave and strangle Soviet power" (Ukrainian SSR). "Peasants, burn the activist procurement agents." "Death to the *aktiv*, death to whoever abuses peasants" (Ukrainian SSR). "Strengthen our ranks, sharpen your weapons. For an independent Ukraine." "Peasants, take your weapons, sticks, knives, and pitchforks, whatever you have, burn and smash the communists and take control before it's too late" (Western Siberia).

The areas hardest hit by antisoviet manifestations in 1930 were: the Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus Krai, Central Black Earth Oblast, Lower Volga Krai, Middle Volga Krai, Siberia (as a whole), Tataria, Belorussia, the Urals, and Western Oblast. In regard to individual active antisoviet manifestations in the countryside, the following areas especially stand out:

<i>Terror</i>	<i>Mass Disturbances</i>	<i>Circulation of Proclamations</i>
Ukrainian SSR	Ukrainian SSR	Ukrainian SSR
2,779 acts of terror	4,098 mass disturbances	1,211 proclamations
Central Black Earth Oblast	Northern Caucasus Krai	Northern Caucasus Krai
1,088 acts of terror	1,467 mass disturbances	806 proclamations
Urals	Lower Volga Krai	Siberia
977 acts of terror	1,373 mass disturbances	419 proclamations
Siberia (as a whole)	Middle Volga Krai	Transcaucasian SFSR
904 acts of terror	1,003 mass disturbances	326 proclamations
Northern Caucasus Krai (including national oblasts)	Moscow Oblast	Lower Volga Krai
842 acts of terror	773 mass disturbances	295 proclamations
Lower Volga Krai	Siberia	Central Black Earth Oblast
711 acts of terror	673 mass disturbances	273 proclamations
Moscow Oblast	Tataria	Moscow Oblast
707 acts of terror	565 mass disturbances	257 proclamations
Western Oblast	Belorussian SSR	Kazakhstan
679 acts of terror	548 mass disturbances	246 proclamations
Nizhny Novgorod Krai	Western Oblast	Middle Volga Krai
643 acts of terror	508 mass disturbances	158 proclamations
Middle Volga Krai	[Middle Volga Krai]	
636 acts of terror	438 mass disturbances	

### The Cadres, Allies, and Support Base of the Kulaks and the Counterrevolutionary Element in the Countryside

The significant removal [i.e., arrest] by OGPU organs over the past three years of counterrevolutionary elements of the old order (former participants in the White movement, former bandits, insurgents, former members of antisoviet parties, etc.), the freeing of wavering groups of middle peasants from kulak influence and the strengthening of class unity among the poor peasantry have forced the kulaks to look for a new support base and allies in counterrevolutionary work in the countryside.

The kulaks had a more or less constant ally only in a relatively small stratum of the well-to-do middle peasantry, which is a mouthpiece and purveyor of the kulak line at meetings and most of which follow the kulak slogans.

Since the kulak realizes that support from the well-to-do peasantry alone is not enough to achieve his counterrevolutionary objectives, he is doing everything he can to lure into the orbit of his influence, at least for a short time, more substantial groups of the middle peasantry and especially women, young people, corrupt Soviet officials who have been expelled from the VKP(b) and are “aggrieved” and unhappy with Soviet power, déclassé elements, criminals, and poor peasants who are connected in one way or another with the kulaks (relatives, drunkards, etc.), recruiting from them their own cadres of “kulak followers” [*podkulachniki*].

The numerous excesses during collectivization and dekulakization in the spring of 1930 have given the kulak the opportunity to mobilize substantial groups of middle peasants for active antisoviet disturbances under anti-collective-farm slogans.

The unpopularity of overtly counterrevolutionary slogans among the masses of middle peasants forces the kulak to mask his actual objectives. Mass antisoviet disturbances by the peasantry (the main form of the mass antisoviet movement) are therefore organized under the pretext of fighting against the distortion of the class line in the implementation of grain procurements, taxes, and so forth, under the pretext of fighting the removal of church bells, the closing of churches, forced membership in collective farms, etc. The kulaks and other counterrevolutionary elements in the countryside try already during the disturbances to give them organized forms and a counterrevolutionary character.

Typically, the vast majority of mass disturbances began over a minor matter, but then in many cases proceeded under patently antisoviet slogans and grew into serious antisoviet disturbances. This transformation of

minor disturbances [*volynki*] into active antisoviet disturbances occurred especially often in cases where the participants in the mass disturbances were predominantly women. Counterrevolutionary elements in the countryside already made wide use of women in mass disturbances in 1929. In 1930 the kulak devoted most of his attention in training cadres to pressure the backward masses of women in an antisoviet direction, relying on them as his main base of support in antisoviet activities. Of 1,307 mass disturbances in 1929, 486 had only female participants, and in 67 mass disturbances women predominated among the participants.

In 1930, according to data that are far from complete, more than 3,700 mass disturbances that consisted almost exclusively of female participants were recorded; in all of the other disturbances women were either the majority or a substantial percentage of the participants.

The role and participation of women in antisoviet activities in the countryside is continually rising. In the first half of the year 32 percent of the total number of mass disturbances had a predominance of women among the participants. In the second half of the year the percentage of female disturbances rose to 40 percent, reaching 54–55 percent in September and October.

Of the mass women's disturbances in the first half of 1930 (2,897), the majority [*sic*] were of an anti-collective-farm nature (1,154) and primarily took the form of the unauthorized divvying up of socialized livestock, seeds, and implements and the dismantling of collective farms; there were a significant number of mass disturbances based on religious factors (778), disturbances in defense of kulaks being dekulakized and exiled (422), and disturbances linked to food shortages (336).

In the second half of the year disturbances related to grain procurements made up 36 percent of the total; those related to dekulakization and restrictions on antisoviet elements, 20 percent; religious factors, 12 percent; food shortages, 10.7 percent; collectivization, 10 percent; and other disturbances, 10.3 percent.

Disturbances by women opposing grain procurements (resistance to inventories of property, to confiscation of grain, etc.) and the removal of, and restrictions on, kulaks and the antisoviet element, and disturbances based on religious factors were notable in many cases for their level of organization and the tenacity of resistance to local authorities and were accompanied by beatings of soviet officials and soviet activists and by the ransacking of village soviets and other public organizations and institutions (Central Black Earth Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus Krai).

According to data that are far from complete, in the second six months of 1930 more than 50 mass women's disturbances were recorded that were marked by physical violence against local soviet and party officials, representatives of raion executive committees and raion party committees, members of commissions to aid in grain requisitioning, militiamen, activists among the poor peasantry, and against collective farmers. There were several incidents in which women would stage disturbances while armed with pitchforks, sticks, stakes, and knives, and the disturbances would last for several days; the women would set up guards to protect kulak property "against Soviet encroachment," would set up "picket lines," patrols, etc.

Typically, at the time of the women's disturbances, men would stay on the sidelines. A severe penalty for participating in mass disorders keeps men from taking part in the disturbances. On the assumption that "women are allowed to do anything, nothing will happen to women, they bear less responsibility," men would merely incite women to take vigorous action, without intervening in the mob.

The excessive leniency of the punitive organs toward women who participate in antisoviet disturbances (often including kulak women) has helped to bolster the opinion that women go unpunished.

During a disturbance by women in the village of Antonovka in Buki Raion (Ukrainian SSR), the participants in a melee [*volynka*] shouted: "We aren't afraid of anybody, we've already been to the GPU and they didn't do anything to us and won't do anything." During a disturbance in the village of Krasnoe, Nikolo-Pestrovsky Raion, in the Middle Volga Krai, women shouted: "Women [*Baby*], we won't give up church bells, nothing will happen to us for it." In the German colony of Sonnental, Kropotkin Raion, in the Northern Caucasus Krai, women categorically banned men from joining the mob, declaring: "This is our peasant women's cause, you have no business interfering."

Of the 307 women's disturbances for which the methods of quelling them are known, in 213 cases (68 percent) they were liquidated on the basis of explanations and persuasion of the participants; in 57 [cases] (15.5 percent), by meeting the participants' demands; and only in 40 (14 percent), by arresting the instigators and the active participants, and in 7 cases (2.0 percent), by the use of armed force: 5 in Ukraine and 1 each in the Central Black Earth Oblast and the Northern Caucasus Krai.

In several villages almost no campaign (agricultural taxes, self-taxation, grain procurements) goes by without melees [*volynki*] or attempts to dis-

rupt meetings or plenums of village soviets, and the most active role in all this is played by women. In the Ivanovo Industrial Oblast, Western Oblast, and a number of other areas, a large number of meetings on grain procurements, self-taxation, and so forth have been recorded that were disrupted by women. In several villages men have stopped going to such meetings altogether, sending women instead—"They're a little more forceful, a little louder."

In their effort to bring women under their influence, kulaks and anti-soviet elements make skillful use of the church by working on religious women through a priest, through parasitical nuns who hang around the church, through women who command authority among the masses—wives of kulaks, well-to-do peasants, and antisoviet elements.

A kind of women's *aktiv* of "leaders" has emerged from the milieu of kulak women, and all the women in the countryside listen to them. By strengthening their influence on women, antisoviet elements also influenced, through the women, the male segment of the poor and middle peasantry.

In Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, the Lower Volga Krai, and other areas, a large number of cases have been recorded where antisoviet elements have subverted collective farms with the aid of women. By using their wives or a priest to scare poor-peasant women and middle-peasant women with the horrors of collectivization, kulaks kept poor and middle peasants from organizing collective farms and from joining them.

Until 1930 women in the antisoviet movement participated almost exclusively in "melees" [*volynki*] (mass disturbances). In 1930 and especially in the second half of the year, women were lured into antisoviet groups, and kulak women took part in acts of arson and wrecking (Lower Volga Krai, Middle Volga Krai, Western Siberia).

The women in antisoviet kulak groups and organizations are primarily members of kulak and well-to-do families, but among participants in religious antisoviet groups there are also quite a few middle-peasant women and poor-peasant women. Female members of antisoviet groups are used to spread every possible kind of antisoviet and provocative rumor, to discredit local officials, and to subvert collective farms (Central Black Earth Oblast, Ivanovo Industrial Oblast, Bashkir ASSR). Women were also used as liaisons between members of groups and organizations (Middle Volga Krai, Central Black Earth Oblast).

In their struggle against the policies of Soviet power, the kulaks and other counterrevolutionary elements in the countryside are also seeking a

support base among young people. Kulak youth, members of clergymen's families, and disfranchised persons are especially favorable resources from which to form new counterrevolutionary cadres.

Kulak youth, who lack political rights and are economically restricted, are implacably hostile toward Soviet power and represent a ready-made reserve for counterrevolutionary work in the countryside. Some of the young people in rural social-class strata that are close to us—the poor peasantry and the middle peasantry—are also being lured into counterrevolutionary work. These people are initially enticed in a drunken environment, through groups of young hooligan types; this is followed by political hooliganism, terror, and other active counterrevolutionary manifestations.

The kulak does everything he can to encourage the “daring” of the hooligan groups, finding them to be ready executors of their wrecking, pogromist, and terrorist schemes.

Fascist and Black Hundred tendencies are noticeably growing and intensifying among kulak youth, and especially among young people from families of bourgeois specialists, intelligentsia, and among *déclassé* elements.

Counterrevolutionary cadres from among young people are being formed at a rather fast pace. In the Ivanovo Industrial Oblast, for example, 56 young people have been repressed, including 24 former members of the VLKSM, mostly for terrorist activities, participation in antisoviet groups, and circulating proclamations. In Tataria, 190 of the 577 people who were on file as antisoviet elements as of 1 January 1931 were young people under 25 years of age. Roughly the same situation prevails in the other areas of the Union. In the Ivanovo Industrial Oblast, youth groups have been uncovered that were circulating antisoviet proclamations, preparing acts of terror (Rybinsk Raion), and terrorizing young Komsomol members. In Nekouz Raion, a youth group was preparing [to carry out] an expropriation, for which it was stocking up weapons, engaged in active anti-collective-farm agitation, and issued 48 antisoviet proclamations. The antisoviet activities of young people are mostly oriented toward terror, political hooliganism, the formation of terrorist groups, and the circulation of antisoviet proclamations. Acts of terror perpetrated by young people have been recorded in the Urals, the Western Oblast, the Ivanovo Industrial Oblast, the Belorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Nizhny Novgorod Krai, the Central Black Earth Oblast, Tataria, and a number of other oblasts and krais.



Kulaks have sometimes incited children to carry out wrecking activities and acts of arson on the assumption that an act of arson committed by a child will be regarded as a routine “prank,” and the investigative organs will not look for the instigator (Ivanovo Industrial Oblast, Ukrainian SSR).

Lately young people have begun to take an active part in mass disturbances and are the most active element during disorders. Disturbances in which young people were the primary participants have been recorded in the Central Black Earth Oblast and in Ukraine.

In 1930, especially the second half of the year, acts of terror by common criminals who had been bribed or induced to get drunk became more frequent (Leningrad Oblast, the Ukrainian SSR, the Urals, Central Black Earth Oblast, Northern Caucasus Krai, and elsewhere).

Now that they have organized and rallied common criminal and bandit elements around themselves as a force suitable for the constant terrorizing of the poor-peasant *aktiv*, collective farmers, and Soviet officials, kulaks have used this “kulak guard” of sorts in a number of cases to destroy collective farms and Soviet institutions and have perpetrated atrocious acts of violence against local activists.

Many of the acts of arson were carried out with the provocative goal of framing communists, poor-peasant activists, and collective farmers. By accusing them of arson, kulaks stirred up an aroused mob against them.

There were cases in which kulak arsonists and criminal elements and kulak followers bribed by the kulaks did all they could to obstruct the extinguishing of fires at collective farms and farms of soviet officials and communists.

In the village of Aleshkino in the former Buguruslan Okrug, Middle Volga Krai, acts of arson on 13 August destroyed 12 collective-farm houses, 5 former kulak houses in which poor collective farmers were living, a public yard, a granary in which more than 1,000 poods of grain was destroyed, and 51 buildings belonging to individual peasants. During the fire, kulaks (primarily dekulakized kulaks who had fled from exile) and common criminals prevented collective farmers from putting out the fire and beat up the chairman of the village soviet and several collective farmers.

In the settlement of Bereznoe in the former Chernigov Okrug, Ukrainian SSR, common criminals incited by kulaks set fire to a collective farmer's buildings on 31 July; when the collective-farm chairman and his father arrived at the site of the blaze, shots were fired at them. The collective farmer's father died of his wound.

Degenerate elements from among former Red partisans, people expelled from the VKP(b), and the rural intelligentsia play a significant role in kulak groups and organizations and often become leaders of the groups and of counterrevolutionary organizations. Persons expelled from the VKP(b), teachers, agronomists, and rural doctors from alien strata of the rural intelligentsia often become ideologists of the kulak movement, providing political formulations for the counterrevolutionary movement in the countryside.

### Changes in the Methods and Tactics of the Struggle of Counterrevolutionary Elements in the Countryside

Toward the end of 1929, the kulaks, continuing an active struggle against grain procurements under the slogan of organizing a “general grain strike” and economic sabotage, turned the front of the struggle in the direction of collectivization. In order to disrupt grain procurements, the kulaks pursued an absolutely clear-cut line of isolating the middle peasant from soviet and party influence and winning him over and luring him into the antisoviet movement.

The kulak made wide and skillful use of the distortions and excesses in grain procurements that were numerous at that time in almost every principal grain-growing area, the bungling and the distortions of the government line by the local apparatus in closing down churches, removing church bells, etc. Nevertheless, the kulak managed to attract only the most well-to-do strata of the countryside and to obtain brief (until the distortions were rectified and the excesses liquidated) support only in certain circumstances (mass disturbances) from more or less substantial masses of poor and middle peasants.

The kulaks’ methods of struggle have varied and have become increasingly diverse, depending on the general situation.

By the end of 1929, increased agitation to refuse to deliver grain was already accompanied by nearly overt insurrectionary agitation and calls to disobey Soviet power. Kulak groups that were operating regularly were developing more and more often, in regard to the form and content of their work, into counterrevolutionary organizations that in some places spread the sphere of their influence far beyond the boundaries of “their” village, *stanitsa* [Cossack settlement], or *aul* [Central Asian or Caucasus settlement] (especially in the Northern Caucasus Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Siberia, and Kazakhstan). Practically speaking, the kulaks’ activities, in

addition to daily antisoviet agitation, boiled down to a number of measures to disrupt economic activities in the countryside; to attempt to disorganize the grain market; to destroy and squander their grain, livestock, and inventory; and to sabotage the sowing campaign. The counterrevolutionary elements that were partly smashed during the grain procurements period were rebuilding their ranks and refining their slogans, making them more comprehensible and “closer” to the masses and focusing on the struggle against collectivization. The kulak was not only becoming conscious of his class identity but concluded that his liquidation in connection with collectivization was inevitable and therefore embarked quite definitely on a path of active counterrevolutionary activities. “I know you can brutally punish me. It’s up to you. Either way, the kulak is finished,” said one of the arrested initiators of a mass disturbance in Lower Volga Krai.

In addition to an open struggle against Soviet power by means of systematic preparation of counterrevolutionary cadres, with attempts to lure the middle peasant into the movement, the kulak was attempting with increasing persistence to worm his way into collective farms and the soviet apparatus in order to subvert them and “blow them up” from within. By the end of 1929 the kulaks were already displaying certain tendencies to shut down their farms; some of the befuddled kulaks were giving away and “writing off” their agricultural machinery to KKOVs [Committees for Peasants’ Mutual Social Assistance], collective farms, village soviets, counting on the recipients to defend them as “conscientious, repentant kulaks,” and seeking through these peculiar kinds of bribes to infiltrate collective farms and wait until the “wicked times” are over.

In January and February, as collectivization and dekulakization measures unfolded, the kulaks’ tendencies to cut back and liquidate sharply increased. The kulak hastily liquidated his farms, ruinously annihilating livestock, frequently destroying grain and agricultural equipment like wreckers, and fled from his raion, oblast, or krai.

The kulaks have fled in the greatest numbers in the Middle Volga Krai, Lower Volga Krai, Northern Caucasus Krai, Central Black Earth Oblast, Siberia, Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, and the Western Oblast. At the same time there has been a revival of the emigration movement among the kulak and well-to-do peasant echelons of the German population in a number of areas of the Union; the tendencies of kulaks to flee abroad from the Ukraine and the Belorussian SSR have increased; and emigration in the border zones of Armenia and Turkmenistan and in Kazakh-

stan and the Far Eastern Krai has increased. Kulaks fleeing to other areas of the Union headed mostly to Siberia and Central Asia. The kulaks who remained within their own krai made off for the woods, the mountains, the taiga, and the hills (Northern Caucasus Krai, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Central Black Earth Oblast, Middle Volga Krai, Siberia, Far Eastern Krai, Kazakhstan), thereby creating a solid base for bandit formations.

A large portion of the fleeing kulaks tried to get jobs in the cities or in forestry. In the Middle Volga Krai, the Northern Caucasus Krai, and the Lower Volga Krai during this period, a significant number of kulaks infiltrated institutions and especially enterprises. The kulaks who moved to the cities displayed a high level of antisoviet activity there with regard to subversive work among workers in the Middle Volga Krai. At the same time the kulaks are trying with even greater persistence to infiltrate collective farms (during this period there were numerous divorces in kulak families, separations from fathers and relatives, daughters married off to poor peasants, landless laborers, and so forth).

The excesses in collectivization and the distortion of the class line in dekulakization, which had become widespread by February and stirred serious discontent among substantial masses of the middle peasantry, created a favorable atmosphere for the kulak to develop counterrevolutionary work.

After the kulak recovered once and for all from his temporary befuddlement, he launched a counteroffensive in a whole host of areas, organizing resistance to the measures that were being carried out.

The kulaks' antisoviet activities proceeded in three directions: (a) organizing an outright insurrectionary movement; (b) demoralization of the collective-farm movement and (c) a well-tested method—economic sabotage and “a hunger siege of the cities.”

Anti-collective-farm agitation took on a mass scale. Agitation against collective farms was conducted almost overtly at meetings. Cases in which kulak and antisoviet elements called illegal meetings and gatherings and raised the question of the struggle against the collective farms became more frequent. Substantial groups of poor and middle peasants often participated in the meetings. Numerous cases were recorded in which meetings devoted to collectivization and dekulakization were disrupted. Kulaks made the rounds of poor and middle peasants' houses and conducted agitation among them against collective farms, called for active opposition to collectivization and dekulakization, and tried to persuade collec-

tive farmers to quit collective farms, scaring them with the specter of an impending war and retribution of collective farmers should Soviet power fall.

In Ukraine, Moscow Oblast, and the Lower Volga Krai, in order to discredit collective farms, kulaks sent their followers as agents to neighboring villages posing as indigent collective farmers who have been brought to ruin, so as to agitate against collectivization. The circulation of provocative rumors is accompanied at times by overt calls to resist the authorities and to commit violence against communists and activists. In a handful of places kulak and *bai* [Central Asian landowner] elements carried out raids on poor-peasant meetings.

The clergy and sectarians joined the kulaks' antisoviet struggle on a wide scale. There were a whole host of cases in which priests conducted antisoviet agitation in churches. In a number of instances sectarians openly proposed banishing Komsomol members and communists from the village.

Even before articles and government decrees on collectivization and dekulakization appeared in the press, livestock began to be slaughtered and squandered everywhere on a mass scale not only by kulak and well-to-do strata of the peasantry, but also by a substantial part of the middle peasantry. By spreading rumors that absolutely all livestock would be taken away from individual peasants [and given to the] collective farms, the kulak achieved considerable success in carrying out economic sabotage in the countryside.

During this period the kulaks and other counterrevolutionary elements began to bunch up more intensively, and kulak groups and organizations were quickly forming and developing, often covering several villages, *stanitsas*, and *auls*.

The March-April period was marked by a shift by the kulaks and counterrevolutionaries in a number of oblasts to an open armed struggle against the soviets. In the Central Black Earth Oblast, in Ukraine, in the Northern Caucasus Krai, in Transcaucasia, in the Lower Volga Krai, in the Belorussian SSR, in Moscow Oblast, in Siberia, the Far Eastern Krai, Buriato-Mongolia, and Kazakhstan, kulaks and antisoviet elements in a number of instances made attempts, not without success, to coordinate individual local disturbances with the insurrectionary movement of entire raions, to link bandit and insurrectionary disturbances with melees [*volyнки*] in connection with discontent over excesses, and to make them distinctly counterrevolutionary in nature.

A very strained situation developed on Soviet borders in the Ukrainian

SSR, the Belorussian SSR, Transcaucasia, in Buriat-Mongolia, Oirotia, the Far Eastern Krai, and Kazakhstan.

In a whole series of raions [located in] the border okrugs of Ukraine, village soviets were dissolved or they dispersed, and Soviet power, in effect, did not exist for several days. In four okrugs alone—Shepetovka, Volynka, Berdichev, and Korosten—282 village soviets were not operating. In Mozyr Okrug, Belorussian SSR, participants in disturbances put up tenacious resistance even to [OGPU] operational detachments. In the republics of Transcaucasia and Buriat-Mongolia, the insurrectionary-bandit movement became protracted.

In a number of instances the local soviet apparatus and rural activists displayed an extreme lack of fortitude and fled from areas in which insurrectionary bands are active. There were cases in Ukraine when armed detachments of communists and local soviet officials fled under pressure from a mob (a detachment of 50 armed communists disgracefully fled the village of Berezovka in Shepetovka Raion). There were numerous instances during disturbances where militiamen, local officials, and activists were disarmed. The participants in the disturbances set up kulak “picket lines,” patrols, and guard posts, and in a number of cases people staging disturbances took local officials hostage.

In individual cases the mob elected new village soviets and restored the institution of elders. There were incidents in which mobs set fire or ransacked the facilities of village soviets and activists’ apartments. In a number of cases (Central Black Earth Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Belorussian SSR, Ukraine) participants in disturbances carried black, red—with anti-soviet slogans—white, and blue flags, with SVU<sup>35</sup> slogans, Ukrainian SSR flags, and monarchist, and SR [Socialist Revolutionary]<sup>36</sup> slogans. The kulaks, adapting to the attitudes of the masses, trotted out the slogan of “pure Soviet power.”

Among the active participants and leaders of the insurrectionary-bandit movement in the border zone were members of Polish religious groups, former officers under Petliura’s command, a Polish agent, and so forth (Ukrainian SSR).

The activities and tactics of counterrevolutionary organizations during the above period contained the following typical features:

- a. a bloc of counterrevolutionary elements of various orientations and shadings;
- b. mass insurrectionary agitation and widespread recruitment of supporters;
- c. a significant strengthening of the connection between counterrevolu-

tionary elements in the city and the countryside (Siberia, Ukrainian SSR, Urals, Northern Caucasus Krai);

d. the enticement into their sphere of influence of the most unreliable groups of former Red partisans;

e. the coalescence of a number of counterrevolutionary organizations with bandit gangs, and joint disturbances.

The CC decree, the appearance of Comrade Stalin's well-known articles, and the decisive correction of mistakes of individual organizations in collectivization pulled the ground out from under the kulak and forced him to change tactics. The middle peasantry, which reacted positively to the party's aforementioned measures, refused to follow the kulak's overtly counterrevolutionary slogans, and melees declined from month to month. The kulak still attempted after March to cling to his positions, making use of the local organizations' sluggishness in straightening out their line and correcting mistakes, but with less and less success.

Taking advantage of the confusion in many places of the lower apparatus over the appearance of Stalin's articles, the kulaks attempted to use the policy of correcting excesses as a pretext to subvert collective farms by spreading rumors that the party and Soviet power had abandoned collectivization and were liquidating collective farms.

In May and June there was an intensification of the movement for the return of kulak property seized during dekulakization, and for the restoration of voting rights to antisoviet kulak elements.

Kulaks, without permission but with the connivance, and sometimes assistance, of village soviets, often occupy the houses seized from them, expelling poor peasants or cultural organizations from them (Central Black Earth Oblast, Ukrainian SSR).

The rejection by local authorities of measures to return kulaks who have fled from exile and settlements located in out-of-the-way fields [beyond the collective farms] was utilized by kulaks for agitation and to spread rumors of "the capitulation of Soviet power to the kulaks," and they attributed it to the supposedly forthcoming war with Poland and Romania. The remnants of the shattered *aktiv* of counterrevolutionary cadres went deep underground, reorganized themselves, and while curtailing their work "on the surface," attempted to reassemble their *aktiv*.

Groups and counterrevolutionary organizations conspired deep underground and, unlike in the spring, cautiously recruited supporters in preparation for a decisive, new outburst, which was timed for the launch of grain procurements, and then for spring 1931. The *aktiv* of these groups

and organizations, while doing all they could to disguise themselves and in most cases personally refraining from taking any actions, carried out their subversive work against all Soviet measures in the countryside through their cadres of kulak followers among poor peasants, middle-peasant relatives who had been subjected to the necessary pressure and were anti-soviet-minded, and dekulakized and exiled kulaks.

The kulaks' attempts to resume counterrevolutionary work during the period of grain procurements (increasing mass disturbances and terror) were not the main line of the struggle of the active cadres of the counter-revolution. The main leadership role here is played by the well-to-do peasantry.

The main cadres of the counterrevolution, as was shown by investigations of a number of liquidated organizations in the Northern Caucasus Krai, the Central Black Earth Oblast, the Middle Volga Krai, Siberia, and other areas, took account of their spring defeat, avoided local disturbances, and did preparatory work, under the guideline "don't repeat the mistakes of the spring," [calling] for a simultaneous outburst at the time of the expected [foreign] intervention or the exacerbation of the country's domestic situation.

It is worth taking note of the strong class cohesion and strict discipline in a number of liquidated groups and organizations.

A meeting of a kulak-SR group in the former Balashov Okrug of the Lower Volga Krai issued a resolution on "the physical destruction of traitors." A kulak-insurrectionary group that was liquidated in Maksatikha Raion, Moscow Oblast, systematically harassed kulaks who refused to participate in the group's work. A false denunciation was made against a disfranchised person who refused to work in the group. The person who refused was given to understand that if he was disfranchised, then he had to work together with all the kulaks against Soviet power.

The leaders of a liquidated counterrevolutionary organization in the former Orenburg Okrug of the Middle Volga Krai attempted to link up with the city and with the Red Army. "We realized," said one of the arrested ringleaders of the organization, "that by ourselves we were not an organized force, and only the urban population could organize us. We were relying mainly on the Red Army, we tried to set up ties with troops since we wouldn't be able to do anything without troop units." Similar attempts to link up with the Red Army were reported in the Ukraine, in Siberia, in the Northern Caucasus Krai, and other oblasts.

The Muslim clergy in the national oblasts of the Northern Caucasus Krai has been very active in organizing antisoviet groups.



In the Middle Volga Krai, counterrevolutionary groups and organizations were uncovered inside collective farms that had been contaminated by class-alien and counterrevolutionary elements. Under the cover of the collective farm these groups were organizing and consolidating their cadres both inside and outside collective farms.

In recent months all sorts of provocative rumors circulated widely, rumors to the effect that “forced collectivization” would be repeated, that “individual middle peasants would be dekulakized” [*rasseredniachivanie*], that “absolutely all Cossacks would be exiled” from Cossack areas, etc. The rumors were designed to exacerbate the discontent of the broad masses of the population—rumors of approaching war, [foreign] intervention, and a general uprising—in order to disorganize collective farmers, the soviet *aktiv*, and poor peasants.

One can judge how serious and dangerous this type of agitation is (especially given the absence of sufficiently timely and accurate information and mass explanatory work in the countryside) by the fact that in the Lower Volga Krai, for example, the influx of people into collective farms in a number of raions stopped and intimidated poor and middle peasants started to quit collective farms; in the Northern Caucasus Krai, not only well-to-do strata, but also a significant portion of middle and poor Cossack peasants began to flee on a mass scale from their settlements (more than 10,000 families fled in four months); everywhere, the destruction and squandering of livestock, including work animals, took on a mass scale, largely under the influence of provocative kulak agitation; in the national oblasts of the Northern Caucasus Krai, rumors of an uprising to come in the spring circulated widely and were acknowledged by a large portion of the mountain population; similar rumors (rumors of a *basmach* [Central Asian counterrevolutionary] movement) circulated widely in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.

OGPU Secret Political Department deputy director Zaporozhets  
Division 2 Operations plenipotentiary Ivanov

## Appendices to Document 78

## Appendix 2

The Nature of Mass Disturbances and the Composition of Participants in the USSR in 1930 (in the Countryside)

Month	Total Number of Mass Disturbances	Number of Disturbances in Which Women Were in the Majority	Causes (Ground) of Mass Disturbances						
			Collectivization	Removal and Suppression of Antisoviet Elements	Closing of Churches, Removal of Bells	Sowing and Harvesting Campaigns	Grain and Meat Procurements	Tax Campaign	
January	402	229	158	68	159	7	2	—	
February	1,048	379	723	178	103	19	2	1	
March	6,528	1,172	5,010	749	514	160	2	5	
April	1,992	550	789	457	391	147	—	2	
May	1,375	486	284	338	126	154	3	1	
June	886	301	175	214	69	37	4	1	
July	618	167	170	177	38	9	29	2	
August	256	105	50	61	25	7	73	1	
September	159	82	12	40	10	2	65	3	
October	270	141	6	33	23	1	173	11	
November	129	56	3	17	12	1	67	3	
December	91	44	2	7	17	—	36	11	
Total in 1930	13,754	3,712	7,382	2,339	1,487	544	456	41	

<i>Causes (Ground) of Mass Disturbances</i>						
<i>Food Shortages</i>	<i>Shortage of Industrial Goods</i>	<i>Other Economic and Political Campaigns</i>	<i>Re-Election of Soviets</i>	<i>Cotton Procurements</i>	<i>Miscellaneous</i>	
January	4	—	—	—	—	4
February	9	—	—	—	—	13
March	65	—	—	—	—	23
April	172	10	—	—	—	24
May	433	7	—	—	—	29
June	348	5	—	—	—	30
July	141	7	—	—	—	40
August	17	1	—	—	—	18
September	9	1	—	—	1	9
October	9	2	—	—	2	8
November	10	1	1	—	2	6
December	3	—	4	—	3	7
Total in 1930	1,220	34	5	—	8	211

## Appendix 3

The Dynamics of Mass and Group Disturbances in the Countryside by Regions of the USSR in 1930

	Central						Urals	
	Ukraine	Northern Caucasus	Black Earth	Middle Volga	Lower Volga	Western Siberia		Eastern Siberia*
January	45	36	57	38	27	8	—	2
February	200	56	130	54	37	18	—	12
March	2,945	335	737	263	203	127	—	111
April	169	159	181	135	208	128	—	114
May	208	133	99	70	254	169	—	79
June	186	99	54	71	157	63	—	29
July	83	137	40	52	70	30	—	10
August	55	42	18	31	9	4	—	6
September	46	22	13	14	4	—	1	2
October	129	21	13	21	13	5	2	1
November	23	17	11	14	15	3	2	1
December	9	4	20	14	6	4	1	—
Total in 1930	4,098	1,061	1,373	777	1,003	565	6	367
Num[ber] of m[ass] disturb[ances] with an iden[tified] num[ber] of par[ticipants]	3,208	926	998	661	732	340	—	288
Number of participants	956,587	227,000	315,035	140,383	119,175	49,995	—	34,777

	Moscow	Leningrad	Western	Ivanovo	Belorussia	Nougorod	Far East	Northern
January	10	4	53	12	4	17	—	1
February	114	12	60	13	77	24	2	—
March	284	56	95	83	208	83	10	2
April	136	38	139	30	150	86	14	7
May	30	6	32	19	16	50	9	6
June	18	4	30	11	22	26	8	1
July	35	—	13	6	22	15	7	5
August	14	2	3	1	3	5	—	—
September	8	—	5	2	2	4	—	—
October	14	1	4	6	1	5	1	—
November	7	1	3	3	1	7	—	—
December	6	1	1	4	2	4	—	—
Total in 1930	676	125	438	190	508	326	50[51]**	22
Num[ber] of m[ass]	516	87	381	137	230	181	39	16
disturb[ances]								
with an iden-								
[tified] num[ber]								
of part[icipants]								
Number of	117,502	10,655	64,047	21,797	35,985	44,373	3,474	3,230
participants								

(continued)

	<i>Bashkiria</i>	<i>Tataria</i>	<i>Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Crimea</i>	<i>Central Asia</i>	<i>Transcaucasia</i>	<i>National Regions</i>	<i>Total in the USSR</i>
January	13	28	3	7	1	19	15	402[400]
February	12	33	20	11	29	95	39	1,048
March	109	254	43	46	219	139	176	6,528
April	36	97	64	10	16	20	55	1,992
May	10	39	61	16	28	15	29	1,375[1,378]
June	3	31	26	10	13	5	19	886
July	5	44	16	3	—	5	20	618
August	3	11	20	4	4	1	20	256
September	—	2	7	—	8	4	15	159
October	1	3	6	—	10	4	10	270[271]
November	4	1	—	3	3	5	5	129
December	—	5	—	1	5	1	3	91
Total in 1930	196	548	266	111	336	313	406	13,754 [13,756]
Num[ber] of m[ass] disturb[ances] with an iden[tified] num[ber] of part[icipants]	72	224	162	101	290	163	319	10,071
Number of participants	17,225	55,290	19,455	12,420	115,950	48,620	55,650	2,468,625

\* Data on Eastern Siberia is included in the data on Western Siberia.

\*\*The numbers in brackets are the correct subtotals for the rows.

Appendix 4

Mass Disturbances in the USSR in 1930

Month	Number of Mass Disturbances	Number of Insurrectionary Disturbances*	Number of Armed Mob Disturbances, Besides Insurrectionary Disturbances	Acts of Physical Violence by Participants			Number of Disturbances Quelled by Armed Force (operational groups, Red Army soldiers, militia)		
				Number of Cases	Number of Disturbances	Number of Disturbances			
								Total Number of Soviet Officials Who Suffered	From These
January	402	4	35	80	147	5	142	5	
February	1,048	37	4	167	279	33	23	223	108
March	6,528	80	—	778	1,505	91	106	1,308	807
April	1,992	24	—	208	452	2	33	417	56
May	1,375	3	1	114	218	2	5	211	3
June	886	3	2	72	149	2	11	136	4
July	618	8	1	83	171	3	10	158	3
August	256	6	—	36	79	1	1	77	1
September	159	2	—	20	35	—	7	28	2
October	270	6	—	30	73	13	3	57	2
November	129	3	—	17	28	—	5	23	2
December	91	—	1	11	19	—	3	18	—
Total in 1930	13,754	176	44	1,616	3,155	147	212	2,796	—

\* Under insurrectionary disturbances are listed armed disturbances that took place under the slogan of overthrowing Soviet power and were directed by insurrectionary centers and accompanied by the disbanding of village soviets, by attempts to broaden the territory covered by a disturbance, and by armed resistance to the authorities. Manifestations typical of an insurrection, such as taking control of main strategic localities and institutions, posting pickets and covering forces, forming detachments or armed groups, etc., have been taken into account here as well (note from the original document).

## Appendix 5

## Kulak Terror in 1930

Month	All Acts of Terror	Character of Terror					Other Kinds of Terror Against Property
		Murders	Wounding	Attempted Murder	Beatings	Arsons	
January	808	95	62	154	223	251	23
February	1,368	112	125	303	312	462	54
March	1,895	131	121	311	437	841	54
April	2,013	127	117	214	442	1,055	58
May	1,219	105	72	90	207	705	40
June	796	87	57	82	183	370	17
July	762	80	53	69	153	362	45
August	928	113	54	85	143	471	62
September	946	85	58	103	188	444	68
October	1,440	114	77	187	276	709	77
November	954	90	58	152	235	384	35
December	665	59	41	105	171	271	19
Total in 1930	13,794	1,198	895	1,855	1,970	6,324	552



## Causes (Ground) of Terror

Month	Grain and Meat Pro-curements	Tax and Self-Taxation	Land		Re-election Struggle	Dekuzation lakti-zation	Religious Campaign	Sowing Campaign	Food Shortages	Pro-curement Contracts*	Do-mestic terror** (East)	Social Work by Activists***
			Col-lecti-ve zation	Re-organi-zation								
January	86	18	384	1	2	51	13	11	—	—	10	232
February	25	14	768	1	3	222	5	49	—	—	9	272
March	5	6	1,234	4	1	154	12	52	—	—	7	420
April	6	4	1,243	18	1	168	4	28	—	3	7	531
May	3	—	667	8	—	107	1	10	—	—	2	420
June	3	8	442	9	1	99	1	6	—	—	1	225
July	15	8	362	4	—	63	2	1	—	—	13	291
August	124	6	420	7	—	52	—	—	—	7	3	309
September	248	15	341	6	—	61	—	—	—	—	1	272
October	422	22	450	4	1	60	—	—	—	—	—	480
November	301	13	296	1	12	48	—	—	—	—	—	283
December	164	10	175	3	86	19	—	—	—	—	—	208
Total in 1930	1,402	124	6,782	66	107	1,104	38	157	8	10	53	3,943

\* kontraktatsiia

\*\* bytovoi terror

\*\*\* aktiivnaia obshestvennaia rabota

## Biographical Notes

For further information, see the biographical sketches in *TSD*, vols. 1–2. Additional information can be found in *Kto rukovodil NKVD, 1934–1941. Spravochnik* (Moscow, 1999).

A. A. Andreev (1895–1971) was the first secretary of the North Caucasus regional party committee from 1927 to 1930. In 1930 and 1931, he was chairman of the Central Control Commission, commissar of the Workers-Peasants Inspectorate, and a deputy chairman of Sovnarkom. He also chaired a special Politburo commission on kulak resettlement in 1931. He was a member of the Politburo from 1932, commissar of the railroads from 1931 to 1935, and CC secretary from 1935 to 1946.

R. I. Austrin (1891–1937) was the OGPU plenipotentiary representative in the Northern Region from 1929 to 1937. Repressed.

K. Ya. Bauman (1892–1937) led the Communist Party's Department on Work in the Countryside from 1924 to 1928, as well as serving as second secretary of the Moscow regional party committee. From 1929 to 1930, he was the first secretary of the Moscow regional party committee. From 1931 to 1934, he was first secretary of the Central Asian bureau of the party. In 1930, Stalin singled him out for censure as a result of collectivization "excesses" in the Moscow Region. Repressed.

M. N. Belenkii (1890–1938) was deputy chairman of Kolkhozsentr, the chairman of Khlebotsentr, and a member of the administration of Sel'skосоiuz from 1922 to 1930. From 1931 to 1934, he was deputy commissar of supply; from 1934 to 1936, he was deputy commissar of the food industry. Repressed.

N. A. Beliaev (1882–?) was a plenipotentiary for the USSR Commissariat of Transportation on the Omsk railroads.

- S. A. Bergavinov (1899–1937), was first secretary of the Northern regional party committee from 1927 to 1930. In 1930, he chaired a special commission to review cases of peasants who had been wrongly dekulakized. In 1931, he worked in VSNKh as chairman of the Northern Timber Agency, followed by an appointment as first secretary of the Far East regional party committee, where he worked until 1933. In 1936, he headed the political department of the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route. Repressed.
- G. I. Blagonravov (1895–1938) worked for the security services in a variety of positions through the 1920s and 1930s, serving as a member of the OGPU collegium from 1929 to 1931. From 1932 to 1935, he was deputy commissar of transportation, followed by an appointment to lead the Main Administration of Highways. Repressed.
- G. I. Boky (1879–1937) led the Special Section of the OGPU from 1921 to 1937. Repressed.
- N. I. Bukharin (1888–1938) was a member of the Politburo in the 1920s and, by 1928, the leader of the Right Opposition. From 1929, he headed a department within VSNKh; from 1932, he was a member of the Collegium of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. He was the editor of *Izvestia* from 1934 to 1936. Repressed.
- G. V. Chukhrita (1895–1937) worked in the Commissariat of Trade from 1925 to 1930. From 1931 to 1935, he was assistant head of East Gold (*Vostokzoloto*) in Irkutsk, followed by a position as head of Main Gold (*Glavzoloto*) in Moscow. In 1935, he was appointed to Cheliabinsk to manage the gold industry there. Repressed.
- R. I. Eikhe (1890–1940) was chairman of the Siberian regional soviet committee from 1925 to 1929. From 1929 to 1937 he was first secretary of the Siberian (later Western Siberian) regional party committee. From 1937 to 1938, he was commissar of agriculture. Repressed.
- M. I. Frumkin (1878–1938) was deputy commissar of finance from 1926 to 1929. He was a member of the presidium of VSNKh in 1931 and then a member of the collegium of the Commissariat of Transport. From 1932 to 1935, he was deputy commissar of foreign trade. In the late 1920s, he was a vocal critic of forced grain requisitioning. Repressed.
- F. I. Goloshchekin (1876–1941) was the first secretary of the Kazakhstan regional party committee from 1925 to 1933. Repressed.
- I. D. Kabakov (1891–1937) was first secretary of the Urals regional party committee from 1929 to 1934. Repressed.
- L. M. Kaganovich (1893–1991) was a candidate member of the Politburo at this time, as well as a Central Committee secretary. From 1930 to 1935, he was the first secretary of the Moscow regional party committee. In 1934 and 1935, he

- was chairman of the Commission for Party Control. From 1935 to 1937 and from 1938 to 1942, he was commissar of railroads. From 1937 to 1939, he served as commissar of heavy industry. One of Stalin's right-hand men through the 1930s and a member of the Politburo from 1930.
- M. I. Kalinin (1875–1946) was a member of the Politburo and the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of the USSR from 1922 to 1938. From 1938 to 1946, he was chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
- L. B. Kamenev (1883–1936) was a member of the Politburo from 1919 to 1925. He was a member of the Left Opposition to Stalin in the mid-1920s. After his final reinstatement in the party in December 1933, he was the director of the Academy Publishing House until his arrest in December 1934. Repressed.
- G. N. Kaminsky (1895–1938) was the deputy chairman of Sel'skосоiuz, then the chairman of Kolkhoztsentr in the years from 1922 to 1929. He was secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party from 1930. From 1932, he led the Moscow Region soviet. From 1934 to 1936, he was commissar of health for the Russian Republic and, from 1936 to 1937, he was USSR commissar of health. Repressed.
- K. M. Karlson (1888–1938) was the deputy director of GPU Ukraine from 1924 to 1934. From 1934 to 1936, he headed the Kharkov regional GPU/NKVD division, and from 1936 to 1937, he was deputy commissar of the Ukrainian NKVD. In 1937–38, he was the chief of the Tomsk-Asinsky concentration camp. Repressed.
- M. M. Khataevich (1893–1937) was the first secretary of the Middle Volga regional party committee from 1928 to 1932. From 1932 to 1937, he was a member of the Politburo. From 1933, he was first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee of the party. From 1937, he was second secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Repressed.
- M. I. Khlopliankin (1892–1938) was chairman of the Lower Volga Krai soviet executive committee at this time. Repressed.
- R. Ya. Kisis (1896–1981) was the second secretary of the Siberian regional party committee from 1926 to 1930.
- V. S. Kornev (1889–1939) was a member of the presidium of the Siberian regional soviet executive committee and a member of the regional party committee. Repressed.
- S. V. Kosior (1889–1939) was the general secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party from 1928 to 1937 and a member of the Politburo from 1930. He was simultaneously deputy chairman of Sovnarkom and chairman of the Commission for Soviet Control in 1938. Repressed.
- M. V. Kozhevnikov (?–?) was chairman of the Siberian regional court.
- N. V. Krylenko (1885–1938) was assistant procurator then procurator of the USSR from 1922 to 1930, and then from 1931, commissar of justice. Repressed.
- G. M. Krzhizhanovsky (1872–1959) was the chairman of Gosplan from 1925 to 1930.
- N. A. Kubiak (1881–1937) was a Central Committee secretary in 1927–28. From

- 1928 to 1931, he was the RSFSR commissar of agriculture. From 1931 to 1933, he was chairman of the Ivanovo regional soviet. Repressed.
- I. F. Kuchmin (1891–1938) was the chairman of the Irkutsk county soviet executive committee. Repressed.
- V. V. Kuibyshev (1888–1935) was the chairman of VSNKh from 1926 to 1930, and then, from 1930 to 1934 chairman of Gosplan and STO. From 1934, he was chairman of the Commission for Soviet Control and first deputy chairman of Sovnarkom and STO.
- N. I. Kulikov (1890–?) was a member of the collegium of the Commissariat of Trade and the head of the Commissariat's Administration for the Regulation of the Raw Materials Market.
- D. Z. Lebed (1893–1937) was deputy commissar of Rabkrin and a member of the presidium of the RSFSR Sovnarkom from 1926 to 1930; from 1930, he was the deputy chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom. Repressed.
- I. E. Liubimov (1882–1937) was the chairman of Tsentrosoiuz from 1926 to 1930. Repressed.
- V. R. Menzhinsky (1874–1934) was chairman of the OGPU from 1926 to 1934.
- S. A. Messing (1890–1937) was the head of the Foreign Department of the OGPU and a deputy chairman of OGPU in 1929–1930. Repressed.
- A. I. Mikoian (1895–1978) was the commissar of trade from 1926 to 1930, and from 1930, commissar of supply. From 1934 to 1936, he was commissar of the food industry. He was a member of the Politburo from 1935 to 1966.
- V. M. Molotov (1890–1986), one of Stalin's closest associates, was Central Committee secretary (1921 to 1930) and secretary of the Moscow city party committee (from 1928 to 1930). From December 1930 until May 1941, he was chair of Sovnarkom. He was a member of the Politburo from 1926 to 1957.
- I. S. Nusinov (1901–1937) was the secretary of the Barnaulskii county party committee at this time. Repressed.
- Ya. K. Olskii (1898–1937) was head of the OGPU Special Department in 1930; later he worked in the food industry. Repressed.
- G. K. Ordzhonikidze (1886–1937) was chairman of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party and commissar of RKI from November 1926 through November 1930. He was a member of the Politburo from 1930. In 1930, he took over as head of VSNKh and in 1932 was appointed commissar of heavy industry. Committed suicide in 1937, very likely as a result of conflict with Stalin.
- V. V. Osinsky-Obolensky (1887–1938) headed the Central Statistical Administration from 1925 to 1930 as well as serving as a deputy chairman of VSNKh and Gosplan. Repressed.

- G. V. Podshivalin (?-?) was a plenipotentiary for the Commissariat of Transportation in Siberia at this time.
- P. I. Popov (1872-1950) was the head of the Central Statistical Administration until 1926.
- P. P. Postyshev (1887-1939) was a CC secretary from 1930 to 1934. From 1933 to 1937, he was second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Repressed.
- E. A. Preobrazhensky (1886-1937) was an important theorist for the Left Opposition. He was largely responsible for coining the phrase "primitive socialist accumulation," a phrase akin to Stalin's "tribute." From 1921 to 1927, he was a member of the collegium of the Commissariat of Finance. He was expelled from the Communist Party in 1927, reinstated in 1929, and soon expelled again. In 1933 he was arrested and accused of Trotskyist activities, receiving a sentence of three years' exile. Repressed.
- G. Ye. Prokofiev (1895-1937) was the head of the Economic Department of the OGPU at this time and worked in the security services through the 1930s. Repressed.
- Ia. E. Rudzutak (1887-1938) was commissar of communications from 1924 to 1930 and a member of the Politburo from 1926 to 1932. From 1926 to 1937, he was deputy chairman of Sovnarkom and STO. He was also chairman of the Central Control Commission and Workers and Peasants Inspectorate from 1931 to 1934. Repressed.
- M. L. Rukhimovich (1889-1938) was deputy chairman of VSNKh from 1926 to 1930. In 1930 and 1931, he was commissar of the railroads and then director of the Kuznets Basin Coal Trust. From 1936 to 1937, he was commissar of the defense industries. Repressed.
- I. Rykov (1881-1938), an important member of the Right Opposition, was the head of Sovnarkom until the end of 1930. From 1931 to 1936, he was commissar of communications. Repressed.
- T. R. Ryskulov (1894-1938) was the deputy chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom from 1926 to 1937. Repressed.
- B. P. Sheboldaev (1895-1937) was the first secretary of the Lower Volga regional party committee from 1928 to 1930. From 1931 to 1934, he was first secretary of the Northern Caucasus regional party committee, then, from 1934 to 1937, first secretary of the Azov-Black Sea regional party committee. Repressed.
- V. V. Schmidt (1886-1938) was a deputy Sovnarkom chair in 1930 and led the Sovnarkom commission on the resettlement of the kulaks. Repressed.
- N. M. Shvernik (1888-1970) was first secretary of the Urals regional party committee from 1927 to 1929. In 1929, he was appointed chairman of the metal workers' trade union. From 1930 to 1944, he was the chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions.
- G. Ya. Sokolnikov (1888-1939) was the deputy chairman of Gosplan at this time. From 1929 to 1932, he was a diplomatic representative in Great Britain, fol-

- lowed by a stint as deputy commissar for foreign affairs. From 1935 to 1936, he was first deputy commissar of light industry. Repressed.
- L. S. Strikovskiy (1898–1938) was chairman of the Siberian union of consumer societies at this time. Repressed.
- S. I. Syrtsov (1893–1937) was the secretary of the Siberian regional party committee from 1926 to 1929. He was chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom from 1929 to 1930. He was charged with party factional activities in 1930 along with V. V. Lominadze and transferred to economic work. Repressed.
- A. A. Tauklis (1891–1938) was chairman of the board of the Tomsk railroad network at this time. Repressed.
- V. N. Tolmachev (1886–1937) was the Russian Republic commissar of internal affairs from 1928 to 1930 and played an active role in the administration of kulak resettlement in 1930. In 1931, he worked as the head of the Main Roads and Transport Administration and was also a member of the Russian Republic Council of the Economy. He was accused of oppositional activity in late 1932 as part of the so-called Smirnov, Eismont, and Tolmachev antiparty group, publicly castigated at the January 1933 CC plenum, expelled from the party, and sentenced to three years in prison. He was rearrested in 1937. Repressed.
- M. P. Tomskiy (1886–1937) was the chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions in the 1920s and a leading member of the Right Opposition. From 1929, he was chairman of the All-Union Association of the Chemical Industry and deputy chairman of VSNKh. From 1932 to 1936, he was the director of the Association of State Publishers. Committed suicide.
- E. A. Tuchkov (1892–?) was the assistant chief of the Secret Department of the OGPU from 1925 to 1929. He maintained a leading role in the security services through the 1930s. Repressed.
- I. M. Vareikis (1894–1938) was the first secretary of the Central Black Earth regional party committee from 1928 to 1934. From 1935 to 1936, he was first secretary of the Stalingrad regional party committee. Repressed.
- Ene Varga (1878–1964), a Hungarian communist, was the director of the Institute of International Economics of the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences from 1927 to 1947.
- I. Ya. Veitser (1889–1938) was a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Trade at this time. Repressed.
- K. E. Voroshilov (1881–1969) was the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council from 1925 to 1934. From 1934, he was commissar of defense.
- G. G. Yagoda (1891–1938) was the deputy secret police chief from 1924 to 1934. Because V. R. Menzhinskii, the actual head of the OGPU from 1926 to 1934, was frequently ill, Yagoda was the de facto chief. From 1934 to 1936, he was the head of the NKVD. Repressed.
- Ya. A. Yakovlev (1896–1938) was the commissar of agriculture from 1929 to 1934. Repressed.

- N. M. Yanson (1882–1938) was the commissar of justice from 1928 to 1931. From 1930 to 1931, he was deputy chairman of the Russian Republic Sovnarkom. From 1931 to 1934, he was commissar of water transport. Repressed.
- I. G. Yeremin (1895–1937) worked in the Commissariat of Justice at this time. Repressed.
- Ye. G. Yevdokimov (1891–1940) was the head of the Secret Operations Department of the OGPU at this time. From 1931 to 1933, he was the OGPU plenipotentiary representative in Central Asia. Repressed.
- N. I. Yezhov (1895–1940) was deputy commissar of agriculture in 1929. In the 1930s, he filled a series of important party posts and from 1936 to 1938 served as the commissar of internal affairs, presiding over the worst of the terror of the 1930s. Repressed.
- S. I. Zagumenny (1897–?) was the chairman of the Siberian regional agricultural bank at this time.
- L. M. Zakovsky (1894–1938) was the OGPU plenipotentiary representative in Siberia from 1926 to 1931. Repressed.
- G. Ye. Zinoviev (1883–1936) was a member of the Politburo in the 1920s and led the Comintern from 1919 to 1926. He was a leading opponent of Stalin in the mid-1920s, joining the United Opposition with Trotsky in 1926. He was expelled from the party in 1927 and executed in 1936.
- A. N. Zlobin (1896–1950) worked in the food organs of the Commissariats of Trade and Supply from 1924 to 1935.



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- No. 49 (17). Telegram from V. M. Molotov to I. V. Stalin on the draft decree of the CC of the VKP(b) on the pace of collectivization, prepared by the commission
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- No. 51 (22). Telegram from I. V. Stalin to B. P. Sheboldaev, secretary of the Lower Volga Krai party committee, on the upcoming consideration of the CC draft decree
- No. 52 (24). Decree of the CC of the VKP(b) on the pace of collectivization and state assistance to collective-farm construction

#### CHAPTER 5. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KULAK

- No. 53 (32). Report by the OGPU Information Department on arbitrary administrative conduct in connection with wholesale collectivization in the Central Black Earth Oblast
- No. 54 (34). Memorandum by OGPU deputy chairman G. G. Yagoda to leading officials of the OGPU with a proposal for devising repressive administrative measures against the kulaks
- No. 55 (35). OGPU directive to all plenipotentiary representatives on the urgent provision of information on agents' activities relating to cases under investigation
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- No. 57 (41). From protocol No. 113 of the Politburo session on the establishment of the commission
- No. 58 (42). Proposals of the subcommittee chaired by I. D. Kabakov, secretary of the Urals Oblast party committee, on the resettlement and utilization of exiled kulaks
- No. 59 (43). Politburo draft decree on the liquidation of the kulak as a class, prepared by the subcommittee of I. D. Kabakov
- No. 60 (44). Proposals by the subcommittee of Ya. A. Yakovlev regarding the Politburo draft decree on measures for the Liquidation of the kulak as a class
- No. 61 (47). Politburo decree "On Measures to Liquidate Kulak Farms in Raions of Wholesale Collectivization"
- No. 62 (52). OGPU directive on the creation of operational groups at OGPU plenipotentiary representative offices and on the elaboration of specific plans for exiling kulaks
- No. 63 (54). OGPU directive on preparatory measures for the exile of "kulak and White Guard elements" from raions of wholesale collectivization
- No. 64 (55). Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda to leading OGPU officials on increasing the intervention of OGPU central organs in dekulakization
- No. 65 (69). OGPU Order on Measures for the Liquidation of the Kulak as a Class
- No. 66 (71). Decree of the CC Secretariat on implementation of the CC decree on measures regarding the kulaks
- No. 67 (87). Special summary report from the OGPU plenipotentiary representative for Middle Volga Krai on the progress of dekulakization in the krai as of 13 February 1930
- No. 68 (94). Report by I. M. Vareikis to the CC on the progress of collectivization and on the measures to liquidate the kulaks in the Central Black Earth Oblast
- No. 69 (106). Politburo decree on the collective-farm charter and on I. V. Stalin's article
- No. 70 (113). Data from the RSFSR Commissariat of Agriculture on the course of collectivization in the RSFSR on March 1, 1930

## CHAPTER 6. DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

- No. 71 I. V. Stalin, "Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement"

- No. 72 (116). Letter from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin with an appended OGPU report on excesses in the conduct of collectivization and dekulakization
- No. 73 (162). From a report by the OGPU operations group on the results of the work to exile category 2 kulaks
- No. 74 (187). Survey by the OGPU Information Department of letters from kulaks exiled to the Northern Krai

## CHAPTER 7. EPILOGUE

- No. 75 (186). Results of collectivization, compiled on the basis of data from the USSR Commissariat of Agriculture, Kolkhozsentr, and the Statistical Sector of the USSR Gosplan, for the sixteenth party congress
- No. 76 (268). Information from the OGPU Special Department on the number of exiled second-category kulaks and [specially designated] "individuals"
- No. 77 (279). Report from the OGPU about the number of individuals repressed by the OGPU organs in 1930
- No. 78 (278). Report from the OGPU Secret Political Department on the forms and dynamics of the class struggle in the countryside in 1930

# Notes

## INTRODUCTION

1. The project staff would eventually encompass historians and archivists from seven different countries (Russia, Canada, U.S., U.K., Australia, South Korea, and the Netherlands), although the main staff of the project consisted of our Russian colleagues, including some of Russia's most distinguished and experienced archivists and historians.

2. For a discussion of the selection of documents used in the Russian edition and other technical issues, see M. M. Kudiukina, "Arkheograficheskoe predislovie," in *Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927–1939* (Moscow: Rosspen, 1999–2003), vol. 1, pp. 68–70; and E. Khandurina, "Arkheograficheskoe predislovie," in *Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni*, vol. 2, pp. 30–32.

3. The titular head of the OGPU was V. R. Menzhinskii (1874–1934), but G. G. Yagoda (1891–1938), the first deputy chairman of the OGPU, was in fact in charge of the day-to-day operations of the OGPU because of Menzhinskii's long bouts of illness.

4. For a critical discussion of important types of OGPU sources, see Lynne Viola, "Popular Resistance in the Stalinist 1930s," in Viola, ed., *Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 26–31.

## CHAPTER I. THE CRISIS OF NEP

1. For further information, see Lars Lih, *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–1921* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), chap. 2.

2. See Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991*, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), chap. 3, for an excellent discussion of war communism.

3. For further information, see the extensive discussion in Moshe Lewin, "Who Was the Soviet Kulak?" in his *The Making of the Soviet System* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), pp. 121–41. Also see Lynne Viola, "'The Peasants' Kulak': Social Identities and Moral

Economy in the Soviet Countryside in the 1920s,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 42, no. 4 (December 2000): 431–60.

4. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958–66), vol. 38, p. 9.

5. E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country, 1924–1926*, 3 vols. (London: MacMillan, 1958), vol. 1, p. 99.

6. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 43, pp. 60–61.

7. See Moshe Lewin, *Lenin’s Last Struggle* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), for a discussion of Lenin’s last writings.

8. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 45, p. 372.

9. See Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), chap. 6.

10. I. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 13 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946–52), vol. 7, pp. 153–55. The term Bukharin used was *obogashchaites’* or “enrich yourselves.”

11. See R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 28–31, for a more thorough discussion of the scissors crisis and its consequences.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31. E. H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia*, vols. 4–14 (London: MacMillan, 1954–78) remains the most valuable discussion of the political and economic history of the New Economic Policy.

13. From 1921 to 1928, the Communist International promoted a United Front policy in which the world’s communists were urged to form alliances with other “progressive” forces.

14. V. P. Danilov, “Vvedenie,” in V. P. Danilov, R. T. Manning, and L. Viola, eds., *Tragediia Sovetskoï derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy, 1927–1939*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1999–2003), vol. 1, pp. 22–23. (This book will be further cited as *TSD*.)

15. Danilov, “Vvedenie,” *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 25.

16. See glossary.

17. Roberta T. Manning, “The Rise and Fall of the Extraordinary Measures, January–June 1928: Toward a Reexamination of the Onset of the Stalin Revolution,” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* 1504 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), pp. 2, 7.

18. Davies, *Socialist Offensive*, pp. 39–40.

19. See Danilov, “Vvedenie,” *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 17–18; and V. P. Danilov, O. V. Khlevniuk, N. V. Murav’eva, and N. A. Sidorov, eds., *Kak lomali NEP. Stenogrammy plenumov TsK VKP(b). 1928–1929*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Materik, 2000), vol. 1, pp. 6–7, 343–44.

20. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 99.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 114–16.

22. *XV s’ezd vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet*, (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1928), p. 60.

23. Also see *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 89–92.

24. *XV s’ezd vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b). Stenograficheskii otchet*, p. 56.

25. Danilov, “Vvedenie,” *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 20.

26. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 113.

27. Thanks to R. W. Davies for helping me to clarify this issue.

28. Danilov, “Vvedenie,” *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 18.

29. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 77–82.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 86–88.



31. See document 17 below.

32. Danilov, “Vvedenie,” *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 19–20.

33. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 114.

34. See the directives of 14 December and 24 December 1927, in *ibid.*, pp. 108–9, 113–14.

35. “Bad road season” (*rasputitsa*) refers to the period of the spring thaw or fall rains when country roads became impassable.

36. *Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev*, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), p. 241.

37. The Information Department (INFO) of the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission)—GPU (State Political Administration)—OGPU (Unified State Political Administration) was detached from the Secret Department as an autonomous unit in December 1921 during the reorganization of the Cheka. It became part of the Secret Operations Administration (SOU). The task of the INFO was to systematize and process material received in the form of summary reports (*svodki*) from the provinces on the political and economic situation in the regions. After the Cheka was dissolved in February 1922, two sections were established within INFO: one for domestic information and one for foreign information. The latter compiled surveys of foreign press coverage of the domestic and foreign policies of the RSFSR, and then of the USSR, coverage of émigré activities, above all White Guard activities, and surveys of the press in foreign—mostly European—countries.

In November 1925 two departments—INFO and the Political Control Department—were consolidated. This unit was named the Information and Political Control Department; its functions were to prepare informational summary reports and to preserve the country’s military, political, and economic secrets. Sometime thereafter INFO became an autonomous structure again.

On 5 March 1931, in order to improve the efficiency of the Secret and Information departments, they were merged into the Secret Political Department (SPO), which was part of the Secret Operations Administration, while retaining the functions of the consolidated departments. The Second (Peasants’) Section of this department did work in the countryside, while the Fourth (General) Section processed informational material for the compilation of summary reports on the economic and political situation in the country. On 4 May 1932 the SOU of the OGPU was eliminated, and its constituent departments became autonomous. When the USSR NKVD was established in 1934, the SPO became part of the Main State Security Administration (GUGB), joining other operational departments.

38. Glavlit was the Main Administration for Literature and Publishing Houses of the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Education. Established by a decree of the RSFSR Sovnarkom dated 6 July 1922, it exercised advanced [or prepublication] and current control (censorship) over publishing operations, as well as issuing authorizations to open publishing houses and periodicals, determining the nature of publishing operations and the volume of output produced, and approving executive personnel (editors and members of editorial boards). Glavlit drew up an annual general plan for publishing house output, including sheet quantities and the distribution of literature by field and audience categories. It also exercised control over the content of works and the import of literature from abroad. In addition, radio broadcasts, exhibitions, and public lectures were subject to Glavlit censorship. Publications by the Comintern, GIZ (State Publishing House), Glavpolitprosvet (Main Political Education Committee), the newspaper *Izvestia*, and works of the USSR Academy of Sciences were exempted from advance inspection. In 1937 Glavlit became a secret agency. It repeatedly changed names; the last one was the Main Administration for the Safeguarding of State Secrets in the Press under the USSR Council of Ministers. It was abolished in 1991.

39. K KOV was the Committee for Peasants' Mutual Social Assistance. The establishment of K KOV was initiated by a decree of the RSFSR Sovnarkom dated 14 May 1921, "On Improving the Organization of Social Insurance for Workers, Peasants, and the Families of Red Army Soldiers," which directed that, in addition to intensifying the assistance to the peasantry, workers, and Red Army soldiers' families by the state that was already under way, mutual assistance among peasants themselves be organized in every village and volost through K KOVs that were being set up under village and volost soviets (*SU [Sobranie uzakonenii] RSFSR*, 1921, no. 48, art. 236). A decree of the All-Russian VTsIK and the RSFSR Sovnarkom dated 25 September 1924 approved the statute on K KOV, under which village K KOVs were to be established by a decree of a general meeting (or assembly) or citizens of a village. Their purpose was to organize and provide social insurance in the countryside, render all types of assistance to the small-scale peasant population, promote the formation of cooperatives and the consolidation of peasant households into the simplest collective associations, and to establish monetary and in-kind mutual assistance funds. In addition to village and volost K KOVs, the statute provided for the establishment through elections of uезд, okrug, gubernia, oblast, krai, and central committees. The functions and procedure of the committees' activities were to be determined by the People's Commissariat of Social Insurance (*SU RSFSR*, 1924, no. 81, art. 813). The K KOVs were disbanded during collectivization.

40. The *khutor* was a form of peasant land tenure in which a peasant family lived in a consolidated farm separate from the village community.

41. This is a reference to the White army, the bolsheviks' main opponent in the Russian Civil War, largely made up of officers from the tsarist military.

42. This is a reference to the short-lived Constituent Assembly that met for one day in January 1918 and was dispersed by the bolsheviks. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held after the downfall of the tsarist government and represented Russia's first truly democratic elections.

43. The expression "St. Bartholomew's Day massacre" appeared frequently in the countryside during collectivization and appears to have represented the idea of a pogrom or massacre, with little real analogy to the 1572 massacre of the French Huguenots in Paris.

44. Information on the import plan, on loans, and on industrial crops was omitted from the Russian edition.

45. A slightly condescending term for peasants except when used among peasants in which case it assumed a familiar and friendly connotation.

46. The Central Control Commission (*Tsentral'naia kontrol'naia komissia*) of the All-Union Communist Party, the highest control organ of the party from 1920 to 1934, was elected at party congresses and subordinated only to the congress. From 1923, the Central Control Commission combined its work with the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate (RKI or Rabkrin). At the seventeenth party congress in 1934 the Central Control Commission was replaced by the Commission of Party Control, directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist party.

47. The State Grain Reserve was a stock of grain and forage carried over from year to year and intended to meet the population's needs in cases of poor harvest or other disasters, and to meet the state's demands for grain and forage. It was also intended to eliminate irregularities in grain and forage supplies to grain-consuming regions and to moderate excessive increases in grain prices by releasing parts of the reserve to the market. The USSR Sovnarkom adopted the "Statute on the Permanent State Grain Reserve" on 11 January 1927. (*SZ [Svod zakonov] SSSR*, 1927, no. 5, art. 49.) The STO determined the total size of the reserve yearly, based on data from the USSR Commissariat of Trade. The sanction of the Commissariat of Trade was necessary in order to make use of the reserve. The

USSR Sovnarkom revised the statute on 22 February 1928. From that time, the USSR Commissariat of Trade was to determine expenditures from the reserve as well as grain procurement prices, based on directions from the STO. Under exceptional circumstances, the Trade Commissariat was allowed to expend the reserve without an appropriate STO decree, in an amount not exceeding five million poods per year, with subsequent reporting to the STO on each case of grain expenditure (SZ SSSR, 1928, no. 14, art. 123).

48. The first page of the document stored in the archive contains the notation: “Strictly secret. To Comrade Ponomarev. 2 Nov.” The signature is illegible.

49. The 30 November (1927) Politburo decision based on the state of the market. At its 30 November 1927 meeting, the Politburo resolved “to approve Comrade Rykov’s committee’s suggestions on measures following from the state of the market for July–October 1927 and on balancing the budget for the 1927–28 (economic year),” with a number of revisions. In particular, it instructed “to approve the committee’s suggestion regarding the import plan, except for the issues of grain procurements and grain export which are to be considered separately after the congress” (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 662, ll. 2, 6–18).

50. A reference to the divergence between increasing prices for industrial goods and declining prices for agricultural produce.

51. *Komitety nezamozhnikh selian* (Committees of Poor Peasants) existed in Ukraine from 1920 to 1933. They were analogous to the Committees of Poor Peasants existing elsewhere during the Russian Civil War.

52. The appendix is missing from the file.

53. This notation [ . . . ] indicates a break in the text made by the editors of the English-language edition.

54. This is a reference to the USSR Central Executive Committee’s manifesto celebrating the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. Included in the manifesto were tax breaks for poor peasants and the introduction of a seven-hour work day for workers. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 775, for further information.

55. The unified agricultural tax was introduced on 10 May 1923, replacing earlier taxes-in-kind (introduced at the inception of NEP) with a money tax that covered both central and local taxes. For more information, see V. P. Danilov, “Sovetskaia nalogovaia politika v dokolkhoznoi derevne,” *Oktiabr’ i sovetskoe krest’ianstvo, 1917–1927* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 164–91.

56. A cossack village.

57. In connection with the creation of the OGPU, on 28 March 1924, the USSR Central Executive Committee adopted the “Statute of the Rights of the OGPU Regarding Administrative Banishment, Exile, and Imprisonment in Concentration Camps.” Adopting resolutions on these measures became a responsibility of the OGPU Special Conference which consisted of three members of the OGPU Board (*Kollegia*) under the obligatory supervision of the procurator’s office.

The OGPU Special Conference had the power to process cases of counterrevolutionary crimes, espionage, smuggling, counterfeit and hard currency manipulation, and banditry, as well as cases of parasitism, drug and liquor dealing, den-keeping, black stock exchange, speculation, and other especially dangerous criminal offences.

In the late 1920s, the OGPU Special Conference reviewed cases that were compiled by the “troikas,” created by OGPU instructions from 1929 and 1931. The troikas included chiefs of operational directorates—OGPU departments and the OGPU permanent representative mission in the Moscow Military District—and processed cases submitted by the central apparatus and occasionally by the local organs.

With the formation of the NKVD (*Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del*, or the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) on 10 July 1934, the OGPU was liquidated, and its operational units were incorporated in the Chief Directorate of State Security within the

new People's Commissariat. The Special Conference persisted within the USSR NKVD structure and operated under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Its powers were curtailed, and it now had only the right to pass sentences of concentration camp imprisonment, exile, and banishment of up to five years or deportation from the USSR with regard to individuals "recognized as socially dangerous." The Special Conference under the people's commissar of internal affairs consisted of his deputies, the USSR NKVD plenipotentiary for the RSFSR, the head of the Chief Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Militia, and the people's commissar of internal affairs of the union republic where a particular case originated. The participation of the USSR Procurator or his deputy at the sessions of the Special Conference was obligatory.

The "troikas" and "dvoikas" were eliminated in November 1938, but the Special Conference remained as an extrajudicial organ without any changes in its functions. It persisted within the USSR MGB (Ministry of State Security) and MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and was abolished by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 1 September 1953.

58. Cf. documents nos. 17 and 23 in the Russian-language edition, vol. 1, and the introduction to this chapter.

59. The law on self-taxation was enacted on 29 August 1924 and gave villages the right to raise funds through self-taxation for various economic and cultural projects.

60. The Economic Directorate (EKU) of the VChK-GPU-OGPU was created in May 1921 in order to fight against economic crimes that "contributed to the destruction of the economic life of the RSFSR." The EKU incorporated the staff of the Special Interagency Committee (of the VSNKh; the People's Commissariat of Food Procurement; the People's Commissariat of the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate; the VChK; and the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions) that had been formed by the Sovnarkom decree of 21 October 1919 "for the study of phenomena impeding the success of economic construction in the RSFSR."

According to the statute approved on 30 January 1923, the directorate was called "an organ for the struggle against economic counterrevolution, economic espionage, malfeasance, and economic crimes" and "an organ for assisting the economic People's Commissariats in finding and eliminating defects in their work." The EKU included departments of trade and industry, foreign trade and finance, and agriculture, which were transformed into divisions in October 1923. After several reorganizations, the Seventh Division (of agriculture and cooperation) became the Fourth (of agriculture and food industry). In early 1925, the Second and Seventh Divisions divided the functions of the Fourth Division between themselves.

61. The Sibkraisoiuz (Siberian Krai Union of Agricultural Cooperatives) was established in September 1922 as a general center for agricultural credit for cooperatives in Siberia. In December 1922, it began to play an active role in the marketing of agricultural produce.

62. The Sel'skosoiuz, or the All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, was created by the Constituent Congress of Plenipotentiaries of Agricultural Cooperative Unions that took place in Moscow on 20–24 August 1921. According to its regulations, the Sel'skosoiuz worked on the unification of agricultural cooperatives for joint work in the organization of cooperatives. It also led work on agricultural improvements; the production of essential agricultural tools and machinery; the processing and distribution of agricultural products; and arrangements for agricultural credit, as well as other measures for raising agricultural labor productivity.

Its regulations defined the composition of the Sel'skosoiuz in the following way: "The All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives may have as its members: (a) all-Russian associations of agricultural trade and industry cooperatives and similar central associa-

tions in republics within the RSFSR; (b) oblast, krai, and gubernia unions within the territory of the RSFSR that unite agricultural and credit cooperatives producing or distributing agricultural products, as well as performing other transactions contributing to agriculture; and (c) those uezd and raion unions of the nature specified in item 'b' that are either not in any part members of a gubernia or oblast union, or, by nature of their activities, cannot be served by such a union" (RGAE, f. 4106, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 244–45). During the first period of its activities, until the separation of the all-Russian branch cooperative centers and the final shaping of distribution systems in agricultural cooperation, the Sel'skosiuz was the central association that provided means of production as well as processing and sales of agricultural products for the domestic and foreign markets. After the Council of the Center for Agricultural Cooperatives had been formed in 1925, and following the creation of the All-Union Council of Collective Farms (Kolkhozsentr), the Sel'skosiuz actually became a specialized center for supplying the means of production for agricultural cooperatives. In 1927, the Sel'skosiuz was renamed the All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives for the Provision of the Means of Production for the Peasant Economy. However, the Sel'skosiuz activities in providing supplies faced resistance from state agencies. The creation of a state joint-stock supply agency, Traktorotsentr, curtailed the activities of the Sel'skosiuz, and it ceased to exist in August 1929. The assets of the Sel'skosiuz were taken over by Khlebotsentr.

63. When dispatched to the provinces, this was amended to "some."

64. Cf. document no. 32 of the original Russian edition, vol. 1.

## CHAPTER 2. EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES AND THE RIGHT OPPOSITION

1. For a thorough examination of the Right Opposition, see Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938*, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Robert V. Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), chap. 13; and M. Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization*, trans. Irene Nove (New York: Norton, 1968), chap. 12. The previously classified stenographic reports of the party plena of 1928 and 1929, which reflect the evolution of Stalin's battle with the Right Opposition, have now been published. See V. P. Danilov, O. V. Khlevniuk, N. V. Murav'eva, and N. A. Sidorov, eds., *Kak lomali NEP. Stenogrammy plenumov TsK VKP(b). 1928–1929*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Materik, 2000).

2. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 325. (Parts of this speech are translated below in document 19, but the editors chose to omit this section.) See also I. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 13 vols. (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1946–52), vol. 11, pp. 141–96.

3. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 146.

4. See Roberta T. Manning, "The Rise and Fall of the Extraordinary Measures, January–June 1928: Toward a Reexamination of the Onset of the Stalin Revolution," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* 1504 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 2–3.

5. See document 10, above.

6. *The Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. Text of 1926 (with Amendments up to December 1, 1932)* (London: Foreign Office, 1934), p. 45.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

8. *Ibid.*, and *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 779.

9. See *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 263–64, 286–90 for other examples of criticism from officials. For further discussion of Stalin's encounter with the Siberian party, see *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, nos. 5–7 (1991); and the important works of James Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia and the*

*Crisis of the New Economic Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and *Stalinism in a Russian Province: Collectivization and Dekulakization in Siberia* (London: MacMillan, 1996).

10. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 114.

11. Molotov, who came to the Urals later than Frumkin, argued that Frumkin's position was "harmful from the point of view of the success of our business" and urged an increase in the procurement plan by some 9 million poods. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 187.

12. Moscow party leader N. A. Uglanov presented a similarly critical point of view diverging from Stalin's on the basis of his trip to the Volga region. See Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 1, pp. 15–16.

13. See also *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 86–88.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

15. Manning, "Rise and Fall of the Extraordinary Measures," p. 13. Partial region by region data for the use of article 107 can be found in *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 233–36; and in *Sovetskaia derevnia glazami VChK-OGPU-NKVD. Dokumenty i materialy*, 4 vols. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998–), vol. 2, pp. 736–42. See *The Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. Text of 1926 (with Amendments up to December 1, 1932)*, pp. 22–26, for definitions of article 58; also see *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 784–85, n76.

16. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 215–17, 224–26.

17. See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 228–31.

18. Mikoian defined *peregiby* as "an incorrect application of our instructions." See *ibid.*, p. 256.

19. See the interesting discussion in Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 2, pp. 5–9.

20. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 236.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 237–60.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 261–62.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 237–60.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 270–72.

25. Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 3, p. 24, vol. 4, p. 6.

26. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 277–90.

27. See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 317–19.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 217–22.

29. Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 103, 136; and *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 277–85.

30. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 269–70.

31. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 11, pp. 116–26; see also Stalin's speech at the November 1928 plenum in *ibid.*, pp. 245–90.

32. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 297–301. Also see *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev*, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), p. 249, for Molotov's characterization of Frumkin: "Frumkin was a very straightforward man. I knew him well. A man of integrity who confronted the Central Committee openly and head-on." Molotov claimed that Bukharin and Rykov were behind Frumkin's letter (pp. 248–50).

33. See *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 227–28, on the importance of a grain reserve.

34. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 11, p. 171.

35. See Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, pp. 22–23.

36. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 355–56, 362–63, 392–93.

37. Cohen, *Bukharin*, p. 291.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 290–91; Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 4, pp. 8–9.

39. Cohen, *Bukharin*, pp. 296–98.
40. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 363–66. Also see R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 40–43.
41. *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 366.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 443–59; Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 3, p. 16.
43. Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 3, p. 11.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.
45. For Stalin's speech at the November 1928 plenum, see Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 11, pp. 245–90.
46. Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 3, p. 22.
47. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 464–66.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 473–79.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 491–95.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 511–14.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 518.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 398–401.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 518–20.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 480–89.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 529–37.
56. Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991*, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 155.
57. Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 4, pp. 5–6, 10–11, 15.
58. The directive on the obligatory supply of no less than 60 million poods of grain to the center had from the very beginning caused the Siberian Krai authorities to fear that this would negatively affect Siberia's internal grain requirements. During the discussion of plan targets in the autumn of 1927, the leadership of the Siberian Krai took the following circumstances into account. During the previous three years, state procurements in the Siberian grain market had almost doubled, from 48 to 80 million poods. Accordingly, the share of Siberian grain in all-union procurements had also grown, from 9 to 12 percent. When approving the procurement plan for the 1927–28 economic year, the provincial party committee proceeded from the need to maintain procurements at the previous year's level. However, it was clear that the harvest would be lower in Siberia in 1927. Zlobin, the head of Sibkraitorg, believed that not less than 24 million poods would be necessary for internal Siberian consumption and suggested setting a realistic target for grain procurements in the krai at 74 million poods (50 million for exportation and 24 million for consumption within the krai), while 6 million would be considered “an insurance amount” if the campaign went successfully. Subsequent developments showed that Zlobin's assessment had been correct. The enforced plan of grain procurements in Siberia (82 million poods, out of which 60 million were intended for the center) was fulfilled by 96 percent. However, in addition to other negative consequences, the fulfillment of the plan caused substantial grain supply shortages in Siberian cities and industrial settlements during the spring and summer of 1928—for the first time since the beginning of the NEP.
59. See *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 778–79, n51.
60. See introduction to this chapter.
61. Roughly 4,000 people were mobilized for work in grain requisitioning at this time. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 779, n54.
62. This is a reference to the “Extreme Grain Troika” created under the Siberian Krai party committee on 10 January 1928. The troika held full plenipotentiary power throughout Siberia for the course of the grain requisitioning campaign. Its members were S. I. Syrtsov, R. I. Eikhe, and A. N. Zlobin. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 780, n55.

63. The Siberian Krai organizations raised the issue of the problem of the difference in grain prices between Siberian border regions and Kazakhstan to Stalin and Mikoian. Grain prices in Kazakhstan tended to be higher than grain prices in Siberia, thus allowing for unfair competition among state grain procurement agencies and influencing Siberian peasants to hold on to their grain in hope of a price increase. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 780, n56.

64. See document 11.

65. During the 1920s, while administrative exile (that is, exile carried out extrajudicially by the OGPU) was gradually restored in full, the use of internal exile to remote areas, such as the notorious Narym Region, for speculation was carried out cautiously and with discretion. Thus, according to the directions, from 1924 on the OGPU had the right only to banish speculators of the “black stock exchange.” At the same time, the composition of certain categories subject to banishment or imprisonment in concentration camps could be revised over time, provided there was a sanction of the USSR Central Executive Committee. In October 1924 the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee granted the OGPU the right “to operate with regard to individuals engaging in buying up, concealing, and maliciously raising the prices of grain products for the purpose of speculation as well as to struggle against kulak elements concluding exploitative deals with poor peasants.” However, the OGPU received only temporary permission (for a period not more than six months) to carry out extrajudicial reprisals against these social categories—only for the time of grain procurements and only in areas with poor harvests (GANO [Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Novosibirskoi oblasti], f. R-20, op. 2, d. 3, l. 118). Repression indeed hit mainly urban speculators, including resellers and grain traders. According to data from the krai procurator’s office, the number of administrative exiles in Siberia had reached 7,000 by mid-1927. The Narym Region had the largest number of exiles, about 1,800. Statistics grouped trade offenders together with hard currency dealers and smugglers into the category of “other crimes” (different from exile for political crime and pure felony) that made up about two thirds of Siberian exiles (GANO, f. R-20, op. 2, d. 135, ll. 13–14).

66. S. I. Zagumennyi’s letter contains notations by I. V. Stalin: “We haven’t ruled out admin[istrative] measures,” “ha-ha,” “NB,” as well as underlinings and question marks. *Izvestiia TsK KPSS* 5 (1991): 201.

67. The law on self-taxation adopted by the USSR Central Executive Committee provided that decrees on the implementation of self-taxation were not binding for “those persons who did not participate at the meeting [of the village assembly], as well as for those who abstained during the vote or voted against the decision” (*SZ SSSR*, 1927, no. 51, art. 509). The Russian republican Central Executive Committee decree of 7 January 1928 stipulated that resolutions by the village assembly on self-taxation were binding for all inhabitants of the village. The apportionment of the total amount of self-taxation was to be proportionate to the amount of taxes paid by each farm (*SU RSFSR* [RSFSR Collection of Laws], 1928, no. 8, art. 73).

68. Article 60 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, adopted on 6 June 1927, reads: “Nonpayment on the due date of any tax or of any compulsory insurance contribution, by any person having the means to pay, in cases where measures of recovery are taken by the making of an inventory of property or sale by auction of property thus inventoried, entails—even if the offense has been committed only once during the preceding or the current year of assessment—for the first offense, a fine proportionate to the payments evaded; for the second offense, forced labor for a period not exceeding six months or a fine equal to twice the amount of the payments evaded. Any such act, where committed by a group of persons in virtue of a previous agreement entails imprisonment or forced labor for a term of up to one year, with or without partial confiscation of property, or a fine of three times the amount of the payments” (*UK RSFSR* [RSFSR Criminal Code]. Moscow, 1929, art. 46).



69. See chap. 1, n54.

70. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 781, nn62, 63.

71. The distribution of bonds to strengthen the peasant economy. The USSR Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom decree of 30 December 1927 defined the terms of issuing state internal premium bonds for the strengthening of the peasant economy. The bonds of 10 rubles each, payable to the bearer, were issued for 100 million rubles for the period from 1 February 1928 until 1 February 1931, with an annual interest rate of 6 percent. The decree provided for six lotteries, in January and October of each year, starting October 1928. The winner received the right to buy agricultural tools out of turn for the amount of the prize. Ten percent of the value of the bonds distributed in each raion or volost was to be transferred to the raion or volost budget, in order to satisfy local cultural and agricultural needs: the construction of schools, hospitals, and roads; the arrangement and repair of granaries, mills, and winnowing stations; the public purchase of cattle and equipment; and melioration (*SZ SSSR*, 1928, no. 3, art. 24). In February 1928, the USSR Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom ordered additional bonds, totaling 50 million rubles (*SZ SSSR*, 1928, no. 14, art. 118). Simultaneously, the first lottery was rescheduled for an earlier time: from October to June 1928 (*SZ SSSR*, 1928, no. 14, art. 117). In April 1928, the first lottery was rescheduled for mid-May (*SZ SSSR*, 1928, no. 22, art. 192).

72. See document 58 in the original Russian-language edition, vol. 1.

73. See *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 781–82, n65.

74. An allusion to the fifteenth congress of the VKP(b).

75. See document 39 in the original Russian-language edition, vol. 1.

76. See document no. 7.

77. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 788, n90. (*Aktiv* refers to the most politically active segment of an organization or social group.)

78. Cited from *XV s"ezd VKP(b). 2 dekabria–19 dekabria 1927 g.: Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1928), p. 1091.

79. Note from the original document: At the time the issue was decided—early January—it was hard to choose and decide which options would unconditionally guarantee that we would receive grain, without which we would have had even worse consequences. We had to take extraordinary measures. While recognizing that those measures were inevitable at that time, one should not turn away from analyzing the material results that were achieved. Procurements of the four essential crops—wheat, rye, barley, and oats—came in the following quantities in the past three [economic] years (in millions of poods):

	1st quarter	2nd quarter	3rd quarter
1925–26	137.9	120.2	117.7
1926–27	142.9	255.6	136
1927–28	153.2	117.6	227.6

Compared with 1926–27, procurements in the third quarter (January–March), according to official data, were 91 million poods [more] than the preceding year. In reality, the latter figure should be reduced by 15–20 million poods since the procurements recorded as received included some that had never gone through the principal procurement agents before, that came from procurement agents who in the past had fed themselves with their own procurements and this year had eaten up the procured grain, which was reflected in the actual reserves of the Commissariat of Trade. With pressure only in the form of quite lawful, economic measures, we would have procured 150–160 million poods, 50–60 poods [*sic*] less, but then we would not have had to support all the small towns and the local needs of the grain-producing areas, which ate up at least these 50–60 million poods.

80. For the full text of Kubiak's address, see: 3 *sessiia TsIK 4 sozyva: Biulleten' No. 17* (Moscow, 1928), pp. 14–21.

81. Note from the original document: The seventh volume of the *Leninskii sbornik* [Lenin Anthology] contains a work by Varga that was read by Vladimir Ilich. Here is a quotation from Varga's book: "After difficult experiences with the peasants during the first two years of the dictatorship, people in Russia also arrived at the idea of shifting the center of gravity in the question of supplying the cities with foodstuffs to newly formed large estates of state cooperatives and rural communes." Vlad. Ilich underscored this and wrote in the margin: "Rubbish" (see *Leninskii sbornik*, vol. 7, p. 369).

82. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 788, n91.

83. I. V. Stalin's speech at the July plenum of the CC on 9 July was published in his works in abridged and amended form (Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 11, pp. 157–87). This book therefore reproduces a large section of the text from the transcript. The deletions indicated by ellipses in the text were made where the texts in both above-mentioned sources matched, provided that the content of the text was not of substantive importance or where characteristic repetitions occurred. (Both speeches are now available in Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 2.)

84. Ellipses in original document.

85. Ellipses in original document.

86. Kombed refers to the committees of poor peasants organized in 1918 to assist in grain requisitioning. See the introduction to chap. 1.

87. Ellipses in original document.

88. See Lenin, "Kak nam reorganizovat' Rabkrin," *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 45, pp. 383–88.

89. See *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (Moscow, 1984), vol. 4, p. 77.

90. The reference is to N. I. Bukharin's report "Lessons from the Grain Procurements and from the Shakhty Case and the Party's Tasks. On the Results of the April plenum of the CC and the TsKK of the VKP(b)." See N. I. Bukharin, *Put' k sotsializmu* (Novosibirsk, 1990), pp. 261–94.

91. The "Trotskyist proclamation" was an underground pamphlet distributed by the Left Opposition, describing Bukharin's meeting with Kamenev. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 800, n153.

92. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 800, n154, for further discussion.

93. See Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 11, pp. 222–38.

94. *Ibid.*, pp. 245–90.

95. Bukharin refers to the collection of articles that Lenin wrote in his last years, calling for moderation and gradualism in the party's relations to the peasantry. For further discussion, see Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle* (New York: Random House, 1968).

96. The published versions of Stalin's speech at the 14th congress do not include Stalin's criticism of Preobrazhensky. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 800, n155.

97. See *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 800–801, n158.

98. This is a very awkward phrase to translate. Bukharin appears to have meant that party members could not express their opinions publicly and as a result believed in one thing but publicly expressed something quite different, following the official line. I have translated the phrase as I believe it was intended. (L. V.)

99. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 801, n159.

### CHAPTER 3. THE GREAT TURN

1. Moshe Lewin, "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization," in Lewin, ed., *The Making of the Soviet System* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), p. 110.

2. *Wholesale (sploshmaia)* collectivization meant the collectivization of entire villages or, at the least, no less than 75 percent of the village. See document 75 below.

3. The Politburo endorsed the use of the USM in Siberia, the Urals, and Kazakhstan in a decree of 20 March 1929. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 805, n186.

4. For further information, see Yuzuru Taniuchi, “A Note on the Ural-Siberian Method,” *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 4 (1981): 518–47; and Taniuchi, “Decision-Making on the Ural-Siberian Method,” in Julian Cooper, Maureen Perry, and E. A. Rees, eds., *Soviet History, 1917–1953: Essays in Honour of R. W. Davies* (London: St. Martin’s, 1995), pp. 78–103.

5. *The Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. Text of 1926 (with Amendments up to December 1, 1932)* (London: Foreign Office, 1934), pp. 31–32. See also *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 805, n185.

6. See also Krylenko’s letter of 23 May to Stalin objecting to the use of the *piatkratka* in *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 615–16.

7. See also Stalin’s 10 August 1929 letter to Molotov, in which he criticizes the 15 August Central Committee decree: “Despite all its merits, I think it is *completely inadequate*.” Stalin ordered the OGPU to take immediate measures against urban speculators and grain traders. See Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds., *Stalin’s Letters to Molotov* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 165.

8. For additional provincial complaints regarding grain procurements, see *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 650–51, 654, 693–94.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 739.

10. For information and discussion on the results of the grain collections, see R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 106–7.

11. For statistics and a discussion of the regime terminology of terror and peasant disturbances, see Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 100–101, 103, 134–36.

12. See also *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 618–20, 622–24, 644–50, 657–58, 664–74, 687–91, 714.

13. Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, pp. 79–81.

14. V. P. Danilov, O. V. Khlevniuk, N. V. Murav’eva, and N. A. Sidorov, eds., *Kak lomali NEP. Stenogrammy plenumov TsK VKP(b). 1928–1929*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Materik, 2000), vol. 5, pp. 7–8.

15. Davies, *Socialist Offensive*, pp. 112, 147; Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 5, p. 8.

16. Davies, *Socialist Offensive*, p. 442.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 104–5.

18. Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 26–27.

19. *TSD*, vol. 1, pp. 378–90. Also see *ibid.*, pp. 402–35.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 209–10, 212–13.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 295–97.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 636–43.

23. For further information, see Lynne Viola, “The Case of Krasnyi Meliorator or ‘How the Kulak Grows into Socialism,’” *Soviet Studies* 38, no. 4 (1986): 508–29. See also *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 653.

24. On the issue of whether collectivization was *necessary* to industrialization, see the classic debate between James R. Millar and Alec Nove, “A Debate on Collectivization: Was Stalin Really Necessary?” *Problems of Communism* 25 (1976): 49–62.

25. Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938*, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 332–35; and Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 5, pp. 5, 8–9.

26. Kolkhoztsentr was the primary agency in charge of the collective farm system. Nominally under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Agriculture, it played a central role in wholesale collectivization. For further information, see *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 783, n71.

27. For discussion, see Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, pp. 25–26.

28. We were unable to locate the document from 7 May 1929.

29. Union Grain, a joint stock company under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Trade. For further information, see *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 786, n82.

30. The All-Union Central Union of Consumers' Societies.

31. The All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives for the Production, Manufacture, and Marketing of Grain and Oil Seeds. For further information, see *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 786, n83.

32. The All-Union Trust of Grain-Producing State Farms. See also *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 805, n184.

33. The Economic Councils of the Sovnarkoms of the union republics. For further information, see *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 771, n17.

34. The All-Union Sugar Trust. For more information, see *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 787, n87.

35. Gosselsindikat was a trade and supply organization servicing mainly the state farm system.

36. Ukrseltsuker was a combined syndicate of industrial and agricultural enterprises engaged in the production of sugar beets in Ukraine.

37. Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR reads: "Any concealment or incorrect declaration, organized by mutual agreement, of any items subject to taxation or registration entails—in regard to leaders and organizers—deprivation of liberty for up to one year with or without partial confiscation of property; in regard to other participants, as well as in cases when the stated act is committed by an individual not in prior agreement with anyone—a fine not exceeding twice the amount of payments due" (*UK RSFSR* [Moscow, 1929], p. 47).

In June 1929 the text of the article was changed: "Any concealment or incorrect declaration, organized by mutual agreement, of any items subject to taxation or registration entails—in regard to leaders and organizers—deprivation of liberty for up to two years or forced labor for up to one year with or without partial confiscation of property; and in regard to other participants—a fine not exceeding five times the amount of payments due.

Repeated concealment, even without prior agreement with other taxpayers [entails]—the measures of social defense prescribed in regard to organizers and leaders of organized concealment.

Concealment committed for the first time entails—a fine not exceeding five times the amount of payments due. 17 June 1929." (*SU RSFSR*, 1929, no. 46, art. 480).

38. See document 23. The 22 May date given is an error.

39. See document 186 in the original Russian-language edition, vol. 1.

40. See document 21.

41. Approved at a session of the Politburo on 27 June 1929. For the published text of the decree, cf. *SU RSFSR*, 1929, no. 60, art. 589.

42. By "disenfranchised," the document's authors mean in this case a person who has been deprived of legal rights because of prerevolutionary social status.

43. The decree was approved at a Politburo session (protocol no. 93 dated 15 August 1929).

44. Dated on the basis of A. I. Mikoian's report to the Politburo on 29 August 1929,

where it says that “on 21 August a directive coordinated with me went out through the OGPU” (RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 11, l. 85).

45. See documents 232–34 in the original Russian-language edition, vol. 1.

46. The Union of Unions (Soiuz soiuzov) of Agricultural Cooperatives, the central agency at the head of the agricultural cooperative movement. For further information, see *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 815, n19.

47. The All-Ukrainian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives. For further information, see *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 782, n66.

48. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

49. See document 237 in the original Russian-language edition, vol. 1.

50. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 808, n201.

51. On 14 April 1921 the composition of the Secret Operational Administration (SOU of the Cheka) was announced. The Secret Operational Administration united the Secret Operational (Secret), Special, and Transportation departments of the Cheka. The SOU of the Cheka accumulated and processed information and operational data coming from the provinces, as well as directing the struggle of the Cheka against covert and overt resistance to Soviet power and espionage in the provinces. It also included the Operational Department, the registration and statistics section, and the Information Department. The latter processed data coming from the provinces and compiled information reports on that basis. In 1921 the Foreign Department of the Cheka was made subordinate to the SOU. The SOU retained its status of the main operational unit within the GPU after the Cheka was liquidated.

When the OGPU of the USSR was created in 1923, the SOU continued to unite the main operational units: the Secret Department (Ia. S. Agranov); the Counterintelligence Department (Ia. K. Ol'skii); the Foreign Department (M. S. Gorb); the Eastern Department (T. M. D'iakov); the Operational Department (K. V. Pauker); the Information and Political Control Department (N. N. Alekseev); and the Department of the Central Registry.

In order to coordinate work on fighting espionage and antisoviet manifestations in and outside the Red Army, the Counterintelligence and Eastern departments of the OGPU were disbanded and integrated with the Special Department of the OGPU on 10 November 1930.

On 5 March 1931, “in order to raise the efficiency of work in the Secret and Information departments,” they were merged into one Secret Political Department (SPO) within the SOU. On 5 April 1931 the Operational Department was separated from the SOU and became an autonomous unit. On 22 September 1931 the Special Department also became autonomous. On 10 February 1932 the Department of the Central Registry was renamed the Registration and Statistics Department (USO) of the OGPU. Its functions did not change. The radical transformations that took place within the structure of the SOU of the OGPU in the years 1929 to 1931 reduced the necessity for the existence of the SOU in such a diminished state. As a result, on 4 May 1932, the SOU was liquidated, and its constituent departments became autonomous.

52. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 808, n206.

53. A. I. Aikhenvald and Aleksander Slepkov were young associates of Bukharin, members of what Stephen Cohen calls the “Bukharin school.” See Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, pp. 220–23, for more information.

54. Ellipsis in the document.

55. Kaminsky's report is published with several deletions: diagrams, maps, and repetitions involving excessive detail in the presentation have been removed. For the full text of Kaminsky's speech, including diagrams and maps, see Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 5, pp. 277–306.

56. Reference is to the sixteenth party conference.

57. Ellipsis in the document.

58. Ellipsis in the document.

59. See *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh*, vol. 5, pp. 28–39.

60. Contracting (*kontraktatsiia*): a two-party contract or agreement between government procurers and producers that provided for orders of a set quantity and quality of agricultural produce and its organized delivery within agreed time limits and under conditions stipulated in the contract.

Contracting had been used in the USSR since 1922. Industrial enterprises or cooperatives agreed to supply peasant farms with high-grade seeds, tools, foodstuffs, and industrial goods, as well as to loan money, so that peasants would be able to fulfill their obligations in crop sowing, maintenance, and harvesting. Peasants agreed to sow a specific area and to deliver (sell) the yield within the time limits, under the conditions and at the prices agreed in advance. Contracting agreements were concluded both with collective and individual farms.

Contracting was introduced as the main form of (state grain) purchasing in 1928–29. It now had the task of enhancing the socialist reconstruction of the peasant economy. In the first place, contracting was to be used on collective farms, in village producers' associations, and other basic producers' organizations of individual peasant farms, as well as of entire land communes. The resolutions of land communes on contracting were to become obligatory, with all the members of a producers' association and a land commune bearing collective responsibility for the fulfillment of the conditions of the contract. This was intended to help in the struggle against the kulak (CC of the VKP[b] decree of 26 August 1929, "On the Principal Results and Immediate Tasks of Contracting in Grain Crops").

61. For the full text of Molotov's speech, see Danilov et al., eds., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 5, pp. 363–77.

62. See *TSD*, vol. 1, p. 309, n211.

63. For the full text of Syrtsov's speech, see Danilov et al., *Kak lomali NEP*, vol. 5, pp. 137–43.

#### CHAPTER 4. THE DECEMBER POLITBURO COMMISSION

1. For some early work on the December Politburo commission carried out during the Khrushchev-era historiographical thaw in the Soviet Union, see N. A. Ivnikskii, "Istoriia podgotovki postanovleniia TsK VKP(b) o tempakh kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva ot 5 ianvaria 1930 g.," *Istchnikovedenie istorii Sovetskogo obshchestva* (Moscow, 1964), vol. 2; Ivnikskii, "O kriticheskom analize istochnikov po istorii nachal'nogo etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 2 (1962); Ivnikskii, "O nachal'nom etape sploshnoi kollektivizatsii," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 4 (1962); and B. A. Abramov, ed., "O rabote komissii Politburo TsK VKP(b) po voposam sploshnoi kollektivizatsii," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 1 (1964).

2. The *artel* and *commune* were both forms of collective farms. The *artel* featured the socialization of most land, production, and the basic means of production, whereas the more radical *commune* was meant to lead to the complete socialization of all land, property, and production as well as aspects of everyday life (dining, child-rearing, etc.). The *TOZ* (*Tovarishchestvo po obshchestvennoi obrabotki zemli*) was the simplest form of collective, an association for the joint cultivation of land.

3. V. P. Danilov, O. V. Khlevniuk, N. V. Murav'eva, and N. A. Sidorov, eds., *Kak lomali NEP. Stenogrammy plenumov TsK VKP(b). 1928–1929*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Materik, 2000), vol. 5, p. 351. See also *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 8–9, 33–35 and document 46, below, for further discussion on the background of the commission.

4. Members of the commission included Kaminskii, Sheboldaev, M. N. Belenkii, M. M. Vol'f (member of the presidium of Gosplan and chairman of its agricultural section), S. V. Kosior, A. A. Andreev, I. M. Vareikis, K. G. Maksimov (deputy commissar of trade), S. K. Klimokhin (chairman of the Moscow Sovnarkhoz), N. N. Patrikeev (Commissariat of Trade representative), T. R. Ryskulov, Mal'tsev (member of the Central Control Commission), M. M. Khataevich, I. E. Klimenko (deputy commissar of agriculture), F. I. Goloshchekin, S. I. Syrtsov, and K. Ya. Bauman. The eight subcommittees were concerned with administration and organization, the kulak question, the distribution of material resources, cadres, mobilization of peasant means, forms of collective farms, tempos, and cultural questions. See *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 36–37. The work of the commission was, in part, based on reports on collectivization submitted by the provincial party secretaries of key grain-producing regions. See, e.g., *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 41–44 (Khataevich's report on the Middle Volga) and pp. 47–52 (Vareikis's report on the Central Black Earth Oblast).

5. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 61–66, 75.

6. See *ibid.*, pp. 79–83, for Ryskulov's report to the Politburo on corrections for the revised collectivization decree.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78, 84.

8. V. P. Danilov, *Sozdanie material'no-tekhnicheskikh predposylok kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva v SSSR* (Moscow, 1957). (The title is somewhat misleading.)

9. Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 27.

10. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 37–40.

11. *Trudy pervoi vsesoiuznoi konferentsii agrarnikov-marksistov*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1930), vol. 1, p. 445.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 446.

13. See Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, chap. 3.

14. Okrug data is available in the original Russian edition of *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 53–60.

15. Traktorotsentr was created in June 1929. Under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Agriculture, Traktorotsentr's mission was to lead the mechanization of Soviet agriculture. For more information, see *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 815, n22.

16. From the resolution of the November (10–17 November 1929) plenum of the CC of the VKP(b) "On the Results and Further Tasks of Collective-Farm Construction." See *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (Moscow, 1984), vol. 5, pp. 28–39.

17. See document 1 in the Russian-language edition of *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 33–35. Also see the introduction to this chapter.

18. See document 42, above.

19. See *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 815–16, n23.

20. A slightly derogatory term for peasant women.

21. See document 3 in the Russian-language edition of *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 36–37.

22. Here Stalin is referring to Sheboldaev and Ryskulov. See the introduction to this chapter for more information.

#### CHAPTER 5. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KULAK

1. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 10–11, 116. Members included Yakovlev, Yagoda, Ye. G. Yevdokimov, S. A. Bergavinov, F. I. Goloshchekin, R. I. Eikhe, Variakis, A. I. Muralov (deputy commissar of agriculture RSFSR), K. M. Karlson, N. N. Demchenko (Commissariat of State Farms), Sheboldaev, Andreev, I. D. Kabakov, M. I. Kalmanovich (State Bank and the

Commissariat of Agriculture), Khataevich, N. M. Yanson, F. G. Leonov, T. A. Yurkin, Kossior, and Syrtsov.

2. See the reference to this request in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, l. 27.
3. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 103–4.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 104–5.
5. Presumably, the Politburo was the “appropriate level.”
6. Later, on 30 January, the Politburo would revoke the Moscow regional party committee decision. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 775, ll. 15–16; and *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 386–87.
7. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 142. (A similar directive went out to OGPU plenipotentiary representatives in Leningrad, the Far East, and the Western Region on 26 January. See GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 88.)
8. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 131. Also see Stalin’s and Molotov’s warning to the Central Asia party organization, *ibid.*
9. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 776, l. 14.
10. *Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii raboche-krest’ianskogo pravitel’stva SSSR*, no. 9 (24 February 1930): 187–88; RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 38, ll. 4–2.
11. *Sobranie zakonov*, no. 6 (13 February 1930): 137–38.
12. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 161. (This ruling applied to all districts, not just districts of wholesale collectivization.)
13. See also *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 287.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 151–55.
15. The ruling on the troikas was sanctioned after the fact by a Central Executive Committee–Sovnarkom decree of 4 February. See *ibid.*, p. 174.
16. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 35, ll. 1–8.
17. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, ll. 27–28. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 152–55, 163–67.
18. Also see *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 170–75.
19. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 65–66.
20. *Ibid.*, l. 67. See *Neizvestnaia Rossiia. XX vek* (Moscow, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 324–36, for more information.
21. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 72–77.
22. *Ibid.*, l. 80. Both the December and January Politburo commissions left a series of questions unresolved. In consequence, the Politburo decided on 4 February to hold two Central Committee conferences, to be chaired by Molotov (with Stalin in attendance), on collectivization and dekulakization in national republics and regions (11 February) and in grain-deficit regions (21 February). At the first conference, Molotov stated that there was no definite decision yet on dekulakization in national areas, hence the conference. Molotov requested from the delegates concrete information on the numbers of kulaks, categories, schedules for application of measures, and so on. The representative from Armenia told the conference that they had already begun work on dekulakization and exile before the 30 January decree. A. Ikramov, the first secretary of the Uzbekistan republican Communist Party, on the other hand, indicated that they had convened a meeting of county secretaries as soon as they received the decree and forbade any county party committee to declare itself an area of wholesale collectivization without the Uzbek Central Committee’s permission, thus implicitly ruling out dekulakization. The conference resulted in a decree, “On Collectivization and the Struggle with Kulaks in National [and] Economically Backward Districts,” confirmed by the Politburo on 20 February. The decree was largely cautionary, with repeated injunctions against dekulakization without collectivization and the necessity of preparation. The official policy for most of these areas remained the “limitation” of kulaks, continuing with the financial vise and a series of exclusionary laws. The decree was more harsh in regard to kulaks who sent their herds across the border or who themselves attempted to emigrate, calling for full property confiscation and a strengthen-



ing of border guards. In those regions, which were actually undergoing wholesale collectivization, dekulakization was the order of the day. The OGPU was instructed to carry out the arrest of category 1 kulaks in these areas by 15 March (350 in Dagestan, 1,300 in Central Asia, 1,200 in Transcaucasia, 100 in Buriatia).

At the second conference, Molotov also requested information from each region on the numbers of kulaks, categories, and so on. It was clear at this conference that many of the regions, most notably Moscow and Leningrad, had in fact gone ahead with their own dekulakization campaigns. Leningrad's Kozlov requested permission to exile more kulaks, to which Stalin (in attendance with Yagoda) replied, "all you want immediately [*use srazu khotite!*]" RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 15, ll. 1–3, 32, 61, 65, 93; d. 16, ll. 53, 83; op. 162, d. 8, ll. 94–101.

23. This argument is developed in Lynne Viola, "The Campaign to Eliminate the Kulak as a Class: A Reevaluation of the Legislation," *Slavic Review* 45, no. 3 (1986): 503–24.

24. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 89.

25. *Ibid.*, ll. 88–89.

26. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 195–96; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 189.

27. Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 69–86; and I. E. Plotnikov, *Sploshnaia kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie v Zaural'e (Materialy po istorii Kur-ganskoi oblasti)* (Kurgan, 1995), p. 23.

28. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 15, ll. 1–3. He added that this warning had been violated with the publication of the North Caucasus decree in *Pravda* and the publication of the Lower Volga decree.

29. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, l. 80.

30. A. A. Bazarov, *Kulak i agrogulag* (Cheliabinsk, 1991), p. 193 (my thanks to James Harris for this source); Plotnikov, *Sploshnaia kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie v Zaural'e*, pp. 13–14; RGAE, f. 7446, op. 5, d. 87, ll. 16, 19, 31.

31. *Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Zapadnom raione RSFSR* (Smolensk, 1968), p. 359; *Put' trudovykh pobed* (Volgograd, 1967), p. 210.

32. Bazarov, *Kulak i agrogulag*, p. 210; *The Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic: Text of 1926 (with Amendments up to December 1, 1932)* (London, 1934), p. 50.

33. RGAE, f. 7446, op. 5, d. 87, ll. 16, 19.

34. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 65–66, 154–58; *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 130.

35. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 164–66.

36. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 167.

37. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 154.

38. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 167; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 109–10; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 82. The Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars had already passed a decree on 13 November 1929 on exiling "socially dangerous" elements from border areas. RGAE, f. 5675, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 42–1.

39. In addition to the use of OGPU internal security troops, the OGPU would mobilize its reserve and retired "chekists." *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 154, 182–84, 189–90. For information on the numbers and use of OGPU troops, see *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 405–9. On the participation of the militia, see GARF, f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1798, ll. 56–59; d. 1870, ll. 274–81.

40. For further information on the role of the army in collectivization, see Andrea Romano and Nonna Tarkhova, eds., *Krasnaia armia i kollektivizatsiia derevni v SSSR (1928–1933 gg.)* (Naples, 1996).

41. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 167. Voroshilov was involved in discussions about the effects of repression in the countryside on soldiers from at least 30 January. See RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, l. 84.

42. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 69. (Similar directives were issued on 5 March [l. 85] and on 20 March [l. 86].)
43. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 364–65. Compare these figures to those in R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 442–43.
44. *Ibid.* Davies's 1980 figures differ somewhat from the statistics in document 70.
45. Solovki was the popular name for the Solovetski Islands in Russia's far north, the site of a notorious concentration camp in the 1920s and 1930s. Before the revolution, the island was host to a centuries-old Russian Orthodox monastery.
46. Apparently it should be UGRO (the Criminal Investigation Division).
47. See documents 136 and 138 in the Russian-language edition of *TSD*, vol. 2.
48. See *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 822, n49.
49. See *ibid.*, p. 833, n50.
50. See document 51 in the original Russian-language edition, vol. 2.
51. See document 62.
52. The appendices are not published here. See GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 31–38, 51–64.
53. See document 61.
54. See *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 825, n63.
55. The printed figures in the text of the document are unclear; the number may be 4,000.
56. Note in original document: Contributions consist of draft animals, implements, buildings, enterprises, and so forth.
57. See document 71 and *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 832–33, n101.

#### CHAPTER 6. DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

1. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 364–65. Compare these figures with those in document 70 above and R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 442–43.
2. See *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 386–87, on the fate of Bauman.
3. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 479–81; and Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 99–100.
4. Viola, *Best Sons*, p. 125.
5. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 127.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
7. E.g., see *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 203–12, 241–50, 315–29, 355–63, 393–99 for a sampling of reports on excesses.
8. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 303–5.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 365–70.
10. See, e.g., *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 308–9, 310–11, 400–404.
11. Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 136, 140. Also see document 78, below.
12. Viola, *Best Sons*, pp. 123, 125.
13. See *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 461–65, for a sampling of peasant reactions to “Dizzy with Success.”
14. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
15. See, e.g., *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 430–32; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 154–58, 164–66.

16. *Istoriia kolkhoznogo prava: Sbornik zakonodatel'nykh materialov SSSR i RSFSR*, 1917–1958, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 172–75.
17. GARF, f. 393, op. 43a, d. 1796, ll. 184–90; TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 20, ll. 52, 95.
18. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 168–69, 171–73; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, ll. 7, 10.
19. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 270–71; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, l. 20.
20. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 270–71; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 126, 135, 139.
21. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 118.
22. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 270–71.
23. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 148.
24. *Ibid.*, l. 149.
25. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 126.
26. *Ibid.*, l. 121.
27. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, ll. 20–21.
28. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, l. 30.
29. *Ibid.*, ll. 34–36.
30. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 333.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 330–32.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 345–51. By the end of 1930, Austrin would report that 21,213 people had died in the Northern Region alone (*TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 784–85).
33. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 122, ll. 191–90.
34. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 115.
35. *Ibid.*, ll. 128–29.
36. *Ibid.*, l. 115.
37. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 330–32.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 381.
39. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, l. 163.
40. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 115; f. 393s, op. 43a, d. 1796, ll. 229, 231, 388, 408–9; f. 393s, op. 1a, d. 292, l. 48; f. 1235, op. 141, d. 786, ll. 4–2.
41. See Lynne Viola, “The Role of the OGPU in Dekulakization, Mass Deportations, and Special Resettlement in 1930,” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 1406 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), p. 30.
42. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 119.
43. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 345–51.
44. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 123–24.
45. TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 840, ll. 243–69; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, l. 173.
46. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 381–82. (“Incorrect exiles” included poor and middle peasants and the families of Red Army soldiers and longtime industrial workers.)
47. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 781, l. 1; f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 152–53.
48. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 140.
49. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 504, l. 111.
50. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 140.
51. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 26, ll. 1, 8–9; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 143–44.
52. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 26, l. 9.
53. *Ibid.*, ll. 2, 4–5.
54. Lynne Viola, “A Tale of Two Men: Bergavinov, Tolmachev and the Bergavinov Commission,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 8 (2000): 1455.
55. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 504, ll. 443–45, 454–60; GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 108–9. As kulaks came to be employed by the economic administrative agencies, the agencies were expected to supply rations at free worker norms to exiles, while providing a wage less 25 percent of the norm (25 percent for guard services). TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 504, l. 361; V. P. Danilov and S. A. Krasil'nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri* (Novosibirsk, 1992), vol. 1, p. 274, n12.

56. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 52, l. 59; GARF, f. 374, op. 28, d. 4055, l. 47; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 89, l. 205.

57. GARF, f. 3938, op. 43a, d. 1796, ll. 2–18.

58. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 760, l. 6; GARF, f. 3938, op. 43a, d. 1796, l. 232; *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 377–80.

59. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1944, ll. 100, 107.

60. GARF, f. 3938, op. 1a, d. 292, ll. 34, 82; Danilov and Krasil'nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 1, p. 274, nn6, 12, p. 279, n63.

61. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 760, ll. 20, 27; RGAE, f. 5675, op. 1, d. 23a, ll. 216–15, 148, 121, 53–2, 50–49; GARF, f. 3938, op. 1a, d. 292, ll. 34, 82.

62. The matter of the commission first came up in the Politburo on 20 February 1931, and it seems clear that Andreev had already taken control of matters from that time. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, ll. 138, 161. Iagoda and Postyshev were members of the commission, with Postyshev acting as chair in Andreev's absence. From October 1931 to the end of 1932, Rudzutak took over as the head of the commission. Danilov and Krasil'nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 2, pp. 5, 309, n11.

63. This decision was based on a Politburo resolution from March 1931. N. A. Ivnit-skii and V. G. Makurov, eds., *Iz istorii raskulachivaniia v Karelii, 1930–1931* (Petrozavodsk, 1991), pp. 142–43; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, ll. 51–54; f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, ll. 138, 161; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 10–16; f. 9479, op. 1, d. 949, l. 77.

64. Danilov and Krasil'nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 1, p. 279, n63; vol. 2, pp. 309–10, n2.

65. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 52, ll. 119–20; *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 784–85. Of the 39,743 people—mostly males—who had run away: 15,458 remained at large, 21,645 had been captured within the region, and 2,540 had been captured beyond the region by the end of 1930. (The statistics on escape in other regions are in GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 1943, l. 103.)

66. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 949, ll. 75–79.

67. The first mention of rehabilitation of deported kulaks is in a protocol of the Andreev Politburo Commission, meeting of 15 May 1931, announcing that kulaks would be restored all civil rights in the course of five years (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, ll. 51–54). The USSR Central Executive Committee published a decree to this effect on 3 July 1931, allowing rehabilitation in the course of five years for kulaks who worked honorably and “proved that they had ceased to struggle” (GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 2, l. 19). By August 1931, the Andreev Commission had appointed a new commission whose mandate was to keep the kulaks “permanently in their places of exile” (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, ll. 144–48). Suggestions to rehabilitate youth before the mandatory five-year period, made in August 1931 at the Andreev Commission, were overturned in September 1931 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, ll. 154–59; d. 11, l. 5). There were several other decrees about restoring civil rights before the five-year period in 1932, but these affected relatively few people and were mostly of a “parade” character. (See Danilov and Krasil'nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 2, p. 310, n3; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 3–4; d. 11, ll. 76–70.) In 1933, The Central Executive Committee published a decree ordering the issuance of civil rights to kulak children upon reaching majority (Danilov and Krasil'nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 3, p. 14). By January 1935 (if not earlier), it was clear that deported kulaks would not be allowed to return home. A 25 January 1935 the Central Executive Committee decree revised earlier rulings on rehabilitation to include the following statement: “Rehabilitation of civil rights of exiled kulaks does not give the kulak the right to leave the place of exile” (GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 25, l. 1). On 22 October 1938, a Sovnarkom decree granted youth the right to move temporarily from their places of settlement for work or study. They were to receive passports

with the notation that they could not live in “regime towns” (Danilov and Krasil’nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 4, p. 4). Sometime in 1938, Ezhov and Vyshinskii wrote to Stalin and Molotov urging them to leave in force the 25 January 1935 stipulation that rehabilitated kulaks remain in their place of exile (GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 54, ll. 1–2; see also GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 54, l. 26 for the relevant Sovnarkom–Central Executive Committee decree).

On 11 June 1940, Gulag requested that there be entered into the passports of rehabilitated kulaks a notation indicating that they were restricted to living in their places of exile. This request came as a result of the failure to include such restrictions on those rehabilitated before 1935 who received passports without any such limitations (GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 57, ll. 42–43). By 1942, deported kulaks could be drafted into the army and, as consequence, their families were given passports without any residence restrictions (GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 41, l. 48; Danilov and Krasil’nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 4, p. 115). On 8 January 1945, Sovnarkom issued a decree granting all deported kulaks all rights of Soviet citizens, with the following exceptions: they had to be occupied in “socially useful labor” and could not leave their place of exile without permission (Danilov and Krasil’nikov, eds., *Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri*, vol. 4, pp. 121–22). Special settler status would be removed in 1948, but only in 1954 were deported kulaks finally allowed to leave if they wished (GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 949, ll. 75–79; d. 976, l. 24; *Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo, mart 1953-fevral’ 1956: Dokumenty*, vol. 1 [Moscow, 2000], p. 170). A series of laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s would finally “clear” the deported kulaks of their “crimes” (see *Sbornik zakonodatel’nykh i normativnykh aktov o repressiakh i reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressii* [Moscow, 1993], part 5).

68. *Sbornik zakonodatel’nykh i normativnykh aktov o repressiakh*, pp. 187–89, 194–204.

69. Experts’ farms was another term for kulak farms in Ukraine.

70. KNS, or Komitet nezamozhnykh selian, or the Committee of Poor Peasants, active in Ukraine from 1920 to 1933. See *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 834, n105, for further information.

71. See document 65.

72. See document 51 in the Russian-language edition, vol. 2.

73. See document 124 in the Russian-language edition, vol. 2.

74. See document 146 in the Russian-language edition, vol. 2.

75. The appendix is not included here.

76. They agreed to take these men because they came (at least initially) without families, thus contributing a cheap labor supply without the additional costs of providing housing and provisions for non-able-bodied family members.

77. The section “The Housing of Resettled Kulaks” is omitted here.

78. The background paper is not included here.

79. The section “Places of Permanent Settlement” is omitted.

80. Most likely by filling their huts with carbon monoxide from their stoves.—Trans.

81. Turinsk Raion was in Urals Oblast.

## CHAPTER 7. EPILOGUE

1. The issue of peasant support for collectivization has not been seriously studied. Soviet historiography tended to politicized treatments of this subject, while cold war mentalities in the Western historiography made the subject taboo. It is clear that some small portion of the peasantry supported regime policies if only because peasant activists and officials were generally the prime targets of peasant violence in the early 1930s. See Lynne

Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), chap. 4. A serious approach to this subject, however, will require regional studies of collectivization and village social structures as well as individual studies of various categories of rural inhabitants like Red Army veterans, rural communists and komsomols, poor peasant activists, and so on.

2. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 367–68.
3. It is impossible to say what portion of the 2.5 million participants may have been active in more than one revolt. It is also impossible to determine at this point how this count was taken.
4. “Terrorist acts” continued in somewhat larger dimensions and accelerated in the fall in combination with the resumption of collectivization (see document 78, appendix 5).
5. See Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, p. 176.
6. *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 746.
7. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, ll. 117–18.
8. *Ibid.*, ll. 81–82.
9. *Ibid.*, ll. 135–48, 152.
10. *Ibid.*, l. 153.
11. See N. A. Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie (nachalo 30-kh godov)* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 183–85, 222–23.
12. Another table within this document includes the following totals based on statistics that included families about to be exiled as well as actual exiles: a total of 101,902 families (521,235 people) of which 68,856 families (354,545 people) had been shipped in from other regions and 33,057 families (166,690 people) had been resettled within the region.
13. GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, l. 54. (There is a mistake in the document. The actual total of men, women, and children comes to 505,025.)
14. Also see the statistics in GARF, f. 9414, op. 1, d. 1943, ll. 12–13.
15. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 8, d. 329, l. 202. According to this document (based on incomplete statistics), between January and 15 April, OGPU made 140,724 arrests (including 79,330 kulaks, 5,028 clergy, 4,405 landlords, with the rest classified as “miscellaneous”). In the second period of the operation, between 15 April and 1 October 1930, the OGPU arrested an additional 142,993 (45,559, or 31.9 percent, of which were said to be kulaks). The numbers are striking: first as an indication of the rapidity of the OGPU operation and second in the overfulfillment (over fourfold [283,717] if we add the total figures and over twofold [124,889] if we count only “real” kulaks) of the original Politburo plan of 60,000 first-category kulaks. There is little doubt that these figures include arrests made in connection with peasant uprisings and other rebellious behaviors.
16. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 809–10; V. P. Popov, “Gosudarstvennyi terror v sovetskoi Rossii. 1923–1953 gg.,” *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 2 (1992): 28–29.
17. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 570–75.
18. R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 394. See also document 75.
19. Davies, *Socialist Offensive*, p. 338; Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, p. 70.
20. Davies, *Socialist Offensive*, p. 337.
21. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 774–75; Davies, *Socialist Offensive*, pp. 359–60.
22. *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 646–47.
23. Davies, *Socialist Offensive*, pp. 380–81, 442–43; Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991*, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 173.
24. Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*, p. 209. On food difficulties in the countryside in summer 1930, see *TSD*, vol. 2, pp. 473–78, 530–36.
25. “Completely” is used in the original, evidently by mistake.

26. Notes from the original document indicate that the data on the number of machines and tractor stations and on crop area, spring 1930, thousands of hectares, are for 15 June, with the exception of Khlebotsentr's data which is from 1 June.

27. "Individuals" (*odinochki*) refer to individuals arrested in the border zones of Belorussia and right-bank Ukraine. These individuals included those arrested for banditry, espionage, counterrevolutionary work, and contraband, as well as kulaks, primarily of Polish nationality, designated for exile irrespective of the level of collectivization in their home districts. See chapter 5.

28. Corrective-labor camp.

29. Exile (*ssylka*) refers to administrative banishment to a defined locality, while banishment (*vysylka*) from a specific locality may or may not specify the location of administrative exile.

30. See note 29, above.

31. The total below does not match the sum and should be 172,937. However, the percentages indicated in the table have been calculated on the basis of the sum total of 179,620.

32. Otdel ucheta i raspredeleniia, or Department of Registration and Allocations.

33. Ellipsis in document.

34. The so-called Industrial Party consisted of economists and members of former opposition parties, who were placed on trial in one of the famous show trials of the First Five-Year Plan period. For further information, see Naum Jasny, *Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to Be Remembered* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); and R. W. Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 408–11.

35. This is a reference to the Union for a Free Ukraine (Soiuz osvobodhdeniia Ukrainy or Spilka vizvoleniia Ukraini), formed in early August 1914 in Lvov and dissolved in summer 1918. See *TSD*, vol. 2, p. 842, n164 for further information.

36. SR refers to the Socialist Revolutionary Party, a party representing the peasantry in 1917 and earlier.