



Do the Productivity Slowdown and the Inequality Increase Have a Common Cause?

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Outline



- 1. The Question
- 2. Key Facts about Productivity and Inequality to Explain
- 3. Evidence for Reduced Dynamism
- 4. Evidence for Reduced Competition
- 5. Possible Explanations

Productivity slowdown has coincided with increased inequality



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; World Wealth and Income Database; author's calculations.

How might productivity and inequality be related?



<u>Traditional Explanation</u>: Skill-biased technological change leads to inequality (e.g., Goldin and Katz 2010). This is in some tension with *slowing* productivity growth and the race with education explains less recently.

<u>Inequality Harms Growth</u>: Some macro evidence (e.g., Ostry et al 2014) and micro channels (e.g., Bell et al 2016), but questions about the validity of the macro results and also the magnitudes.

<u>Our argument: Common Cause</u>: Reduced dynamism and reduced competition can cause lower productivity & inequality.



Recent research on these issues

Firm-level inequality is important (Barth et al 2014 and Song et al 2016)

Industries with more concentration invest less (Gutiérrez and Philippon 2016 and Goldman Sachs 2016)

At a macro level, the rise of concentration helps explain the decline of the labor share (Barkai 2016)

Industries with more concentration have seen larger declines in the labor share of income—but they explain this as sorting (Autor et al. 2017)

Facts a consistent story should explain



- Productivity growth has slowed
 - But some firms are doing considerably better than others.
 - Moreover, diffusion to lower performing firms is down.
- Inequality has increased
 - Largely an increase in inequality of labor income. Smaller contribution from increased inequality of capital income and labor-capital share.
 - Within labor income, largely between firms not within firms.

More firms are earning super-normal returns



Note: The annual return to common equity is displayed for the stated year (i.e. 1996 or 2014) for all members of the S&P 500 as of the last week of May the following year (i.e. 1993 or 2015). The distribution of returns covers all members of the S&P 500 in the year indicated and buckets firms by single percentage-point intervals, smoothed by averaging over 20 five percentage-point intervals. The modal return in a given year was subtracted from each firm's return such that both distributions are centered approximately at zero. The tail ends of the distribution (above or below a 60 percent or 20 percent return on equity, respectively) were trimmed for optical clarity. Source: Bloomberg Professional Service; CEA calculations.

Dramatic returns on invested capital potentially reflect economic rents





Note: The return on invested capital definition is based on Koller et al (2015), and the data presented here are updated and augmented versions of the figures presented in Chapter 6 of that volume. The McKinsey data includes McKinsey analysis of Standard & Poor's data and exclude financial firms from the analysis because of the practical complexities of computing returns on invested capital for such firms. For further discussion of that point, see Koller et al. (2015). Source: Koller et al. (2015); McKinsey & Company.

Distribution of Annual Returns on Equity Across S&P 500

The OECD has shown that frontier firms have pulled away from other firms

Percentage difference in labour productivity levels from their 2001 values (index, 2001=0)



Top 1% are accruing larger share of income



Share of Total, Labor, Capital Income Accruing to Top 1%

Source: World Wealth and Income Database; Saez and Zucman (2016); CEA calculations.





Increase in wage inequality is between firms, not within firms



Note: Only firms and individuals in firms with at least 20 employees are included. Only full-time individuals aged 20 to 60 are included in all statistics, where full-time is defined as earning the equivalent of minimum wage for 40 hours per week in 13 weeks. Individuals and firms in public administration or educational services are not included. Firm statistics are based on the average of mean log earnings at the firms for individuals in that percentile of earnings in each year. Data on individuals/their firms are based on individual log earnings minus firm mean log earnings for individuals in that percentile of earnings in each year. All values are adjusted for inflation using the PCE price index. Source: Song et al. (2016).

Reduced entry of firms



Source: Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics; CEA calculations.

Between Firms: Change in Wage Structure Since 1981



Younger firms are an increasingly small share





Declining labor market fluidity



Source: Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics; CEA calculations.

Migration rates of migration have also fallen



The return to productive capital has risen recently, despite a large decline bond





Note: The rate of return to all private capital was calculated by dividing private capital income in current dollars by the private capital stock in current dollars. Private capital income is defined as the sum of 1) corporate profits ex. federal government tax receipts on corporate income, 2) net interest and miscellaneous payments, 3) rental income of all persons, 4) business current transfer payments, 5) current surpluses of government enterprises, 6) property and severance taxes, and 7) the capital share of proprietors' income, where the capital share was assumed to match the capital share of aggregate income. The private capital stock is defined as the sum of 1) the net stock of produced private assets for all private enterprises, 2) the value of total private land inferred from the Financial Accounts of the United States, and 3) the value of U.S. capital deployed abroad less foreign capital deployed in the United States. The return to nonfinancial corporate capital is that reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the one-year real interest rate is that reported by Robert Shiller at Yale University.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Robert Shiller, Yale University; CEA calculations.

...While business investment has trended down



Note: Shading denotes recession.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Income and Product Accounts; CEA calculations.



Concentration has increased in most sectors

Industry	Percentage Point Change in Revenue Share Earned by 50 Largest Firms, 1997-2012
Transportation and Warehousing	11.4
Retail Trade	11.2
Finance and Insurance	9.9
Wholesale Trade	7.3
Real Estate Rental and Leasing	5.4
Utilities	4.6
Educational Services	3.1
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services	2.6
Administrative/ Support	1.6
Accommodation and Food Services	0.1
Other Services, Non-Public Admin	-1.9
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation	-2.2
Health Care and Assistance	-1.6

Change in Market Concentration by Sector, 1997-2012

Note: Concentration ratio data is displayed for all North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) sectors for which data is available from 1997 to 2012. Source: Economic Census, Census Bureau.

Industry case studies



Financial Services: Loan market share of the top ten banks increased from about 30 percent in 1980 to about 50 percent in 2010 (Corbae and D'Erasmo 2013).

Agriculture: Share of revenues held by the top four firms increased between 1972 and 2002 in eight of nine agricultural industries (Shields 2010).

Hospitals: Between the early 1990s and 2006, average Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) increased by about 50 percent to about 3,200, level associated with just three equal-sized competitors in a market (Gaynor, Ho, and Town 2015).

<u>Wireless</u>: Average HHI for wireless providers in a market increased from under 2,500 in 2004 to over 3,000 in 2014 (FCC 2015).

<u>Railroads</u>: Increase in market concentration between 1985 and 2007 (Prater et al. 2012).



Network externalities





Common ownership has grown

Delta Air Lines	[%]	
Berkshire Hathaway	8.25	
BlackRock	6.84	
Vanguard	6.31	
State Street Global Advisors	4.28	
J.P. Morgan Asset Mgt.	3.79	
Lansdowne Partners Limited	3.60	
PRIMECAP	2.85	
AllianceBernstein L.P.	1.67	
Fidelity	1.54	
PAR Capital Mgt.	1.52	

Southwest Airlines Co.	[%]	American Airlines	[%]
PRIMECAP	11.78	T. Rowe Price	13.99
Berkshire Hathaway	7.02	PRIMECAP	8.97
Vanguard	6.21	Berkshire Hathaway	7.75
BlackRock	5.96	Vanguard	6.02
Fidelity	5.53	BlackRock	5.82
State Street Global Advisors	3.76	State Street Global Advisors	3.71
J.P. Morgan Asset Mgt.	1.31	Fidelity	3.30
T. Rowe Price	1.26	Putnam	1.18
BNY Mellon Asset Mgt.	1.22	Morgan Stanley	1.17
Egerton Capital (UK) LLP	1.10	Northern Trust Global Inv	1.02



Land use restrictions and occupational licensing are potential sources of reduced dynamism



Source: Gyourko and Molloy (2015); The Council of State Governments (1952); Greene (1969); Kleiner (1990); Kleiner (2006); and Kleiner and Krueger (2013), Westat data; CEA calculations..